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Only those occupying the positions of the dominators are self-identical, 
unmarked, disembodied, unmediated, transcendent, born again. It is 
unfortunately possible for the subjugated to lust for and even scramble into that 
subject position – and then disappear from view. Knowledge from the point of 
view of the unmarked is truly fantastic, distorted, and so irrational. The only 
position from which objectivity could not possibly be practised and honoured is 
the standpoint of the master, the Man, the One God, whose Eye produces, 
appropriates, and orders all difference. No one ever accused the God of 
monotheism of objectivity, only of indifference. The god-trick is self-identical, 
and we have mistaken that for creativity and knowledge, omniscience even. 
 
Donna Haraway 
From ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in 
Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective’ 
(1991 [1988]: 193) 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Following an introductory course on Religious Studies as a first year student in 
History, I was struck by the way Navaho Indians’ holistic ‘world view’ differs 
so markedly from that of Western culture, rooted in a dualistic outlook inherited 
from Christianity. The insight that other cultures and peoples have so very 
different views of and ‘ways of going about’ in the world subsequently moved 
me to complete my graduation in the Comparative Science of Culture. Ever 
since, ‘cultural differences’ have been my primary and most passionate 
preoccupation. However, my Ma. thesis on the comparative study of gender in 
Western and native American contexts brought me to another and equally 
exciting terrain. For all the talk of the ‘other’ in cultural anthropology and 
postcolonial critique, I found that for decades the concepts of the ‘other’ and 
‘difference’ have equally been fundamental in the continuous expanding fields 
of gender studies and feminist scholarship. This study then can, in many 
respects, be viewed as the temporary result of this search for links and 
convergences across these disciplines, ‘religion’ being its main subject matter. 
My main title expresses one of these convergences and captures the gist of my 
general findings. If comparative studies of culture and religion have shown us 
that Western thought and culture can largely be characterised by a ‘God’s eye 
view’, then feminist epistemology has similarly identified this view as not only 
culturally bound, but deeply determined by that of gender.         
My initial research question on the possibility of working towards a 
‘gender inclusive perspective in the comparative study of religion’ led me to the 
realisation that as a field, to date religious studies can be viewed as remaining 
predominantly inattentive to questions of gender. On the other hand, I found 
that the research being done in feminist circles on religion, can be termed as 
‘theology’, rather than ‘religious studies’, as a comparative and strictly 
‘scientific’ discipline. These insights formed the starting point for my analysis 
whilst my main question shifted to the deeper reasons why a paradigm shift in 
the study of religion towards gender inclusiveness appears such an – using 
Marilyn Strathern’s (1987) term – ‘awkward’ affair. Whereas the research 
questions will be explained in more detail towards the end of the first chapter, 
here I will be briefly outlining my perspective and starting points, in order to 
‘situate’ myself as in a ‘view from somewhere’, opposed to the objectivist gaze 
‘from above’, which can be seen as a mere replication of a ‘God’s eye view’.                   
           Not being classically trained in any of the disciplines from which this 
thesis draws, - gender studies, cultural anthropology, religious studies, and 
Jewish studies – my approach is comparative and innovative in the sense that I 
have sought ways to argue that these fields can borrow fruitfully from each 
other, but that there are also many irreconcilabilities. Feminist critiques of the 
kind of objectivist methodology that reigns in many ‘mainstream’ fields of 
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research have taught me that any project requires that the researcher can never 
be ‘invisible’, nor ‘neutral’, but is always ‘positioned’ and therefore must be 
held accountable for the knowledge s/he produces. This thesis can therefore be 
seen as a representation of over four years of the practice of what Donna 
Haraway (1991) calls a ‘situated knowledge’. In this process I have 
continuously had to reflect and deal with the particular ‘situated knowledges’ 
produced by positioned others, of which this thesis is only a momentary 
account. So my problem not only concerns the meeting of disciplines, and the 
making of theoretical and methodological choices, but also the making of 
political and moral choices, which have continuously been conflicting and 
shifting throughout. The question of political and moral accountability is 
particularly problematic in the case of doing feminist research on non-feminist 
women, seemingly a contradiction in terms, and one to which I will frequently 
return. In my view, scientific accountability minimally requires defining and 
contextualising of statements, the justification of sources, references and 
choices, and also accounting for the possible limits, fallacies and lacunae.     
My approach to the question of the relationship between religious 
studies and gender studies is therefore but one possible route of entry, where I 
have singled out a few possible hypotheses and broadened these on the basis of 
my background in cultural comparative and interdisciplinary work. Although 
my main perspective is that of feminist critique and scholarship towards the 
study of religion, I will also be working towards a critique of the first, and the 
benefits it might gain by broadening its perspective in order to incorporate the 
issue of cultural and religious differences. Whereas gender differences and the 
question of equality between women and men might be conceived almost 
irrelevant or bypassed from the contemporary Western point of view, I will 
argue and illustrate that, in the context of intercultural comparison, the 
importance of gender cannot be denied. And the same could be said of 
‘religion’, seeing the little impact religious ideology, institutions and practice 
seem to have in modern liberal and secular democratic societies, in a global 
perspective and especially in the context of discussions on multiculturalism, the 
issue of gender and religion could not be more acute. My proposal for a 
methodological de-colonisation or de-orientalisation of feminist research 
(chapter four), is in this respect inherently connected to questions of 
globalisation, multiculturalism and the urgency of feminist transnational 
critique, as suggested towards the end of chapter eight and in my concluding 
remarks.     
Whereas I will be returning to some of these questions in the final part 
of my account, the main objective of this thesis concerns the level of theory and 
methodology pertaining to the problems and possibilities in ‘the engendering of 
religious studies’. The case study that covers the second part of the thesis is 
therefore foremost explorative and illustrative of a number of hypotheses set 
out in the chapters before, rather than an applied study of a sociological 
problem towards ‘solving’, or ‘comparing’ the problematic status of women in 
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patriarchal-defined religious cultures. Nor does my empirical research that 
included a series of interviews held with women of a strictly Orthodox Jewish 
community, purport to be an ethnographical representation in the traditional 
sense. In function of my main hypotheses though, I do ultimately defend an 
anthropological approach as the best for the study of these women’s religious 
lives. By limiting my analysis to the study of a Mediterranean and monotheistic 
‘world religion’ of the book, however, and a religious community located 
within the Western part of the world, it is my contention to show that one does 
not have to look so far towards the ‘exotic’ in order challenge culturally bound 
assumptions. Having conducted research ‘at home’ concerning a religious 
tradition not so far ‘removed’ from Christianity, I show how the ‘difference’ of 
gender can even challenge anthropological assumptions about the kind and the 
extent of the differences between that of the ‘own’ versus the ‘other’ culture.       
Not being an expert on Jewish history, life or religious law, this 
ignorance provided an additional challenge, in ‘recovering’ religion as it is 
practised in every day life, and from the strictly Orthodox Jewish woman’s 
point of view. As I will show, this particular perspective is consistent with 
premises of feminist methodology, but is deeply problematic once juxtaposed 
with the insider/outsider debate in mainstream religious studies and discussions 
on the way to study religion in a non-essentialist way. In order to study women 
who are excluded from the texts, practice, and official positions in what is 
usually represented as the paradigmatic, official and public religious domain, 
the majority of my primary literary sources are therefore necessarily 
‘secondary’. As an ‘outsider’, I do not embark on any interpretations of 
religious scripture, or participate in discussions of doctrinal or legal accuracy, 
which is reserved as the ‘religious activity’ in itself for the subjects of my 
study. Any ‘mistakes’ from the point of view of a religious expert therefore, 
concern the interpretations of the scholars or informants under study, although 
the conflicts and inconsistencies between  these various interpretations will 
receive my close attention.1 
   In the first chapter I provide an introduction to the concept of gender 
from the perspective of cross-cultural analysis, applying what I term a feminist 
gender theory approach. Opposed to what is generally referred to as French 
feminist theory, I will draw on recent American/British oriented theorising, 
which I argue is more conducive to empirically based and comparative social 
scientific work. However, as recent developments in feminist scholarship show, 
there are cross-fertilisations to be gained by transgressing the boundaries of the 
traditional humanities/social sciences divide. As for the concept of ‘religion’, I 
do not enter into any of the countless discussions on definition, and use the term 
‘religious studies’ as a general heading for a field of scholarship that is 
sometimes also referred to as comparative religion  and the history of religions, 
although there are similarly debates abound on the question of content and 
delineation of these terms. Rather, the main objective is to examine how the 
study of religion can be approached from the perspective of feminist gender 
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theory and critique. Although my findings show that there may be far reaching 
implications for the question of definition, the formulation of a theory of 
religion in itself is not my primary concern. In general, ‘religion’ is understood 
here as in the context of religious traditions and living religious communities. 
Terms such as ‘religious discourse’ and ‘religious practice’ refer to the way 
‘religion’ is used as a vehicle for the reproduction, negotiation, and dynamic of 
both individual and collective identity.  
In a similar way, the first chapter looks to some instances in which the 
concept of gender is used - analytically and politically –, rather than providing 
any definitive or universally applicable answers to what it may be. For the sake 
of clarity, at this point I will include a remark on my usage of ‘feminism’, 
‘gender’ and titles such as gender studies, feminist studies, and women’s 
studies. I see no inherent differences in these different usages in order describe 
to a certain field or approach. Whereas one could argue that ‘gender’ includes 
‘the study of men’, or that ‘feminist’ would be more ‘political’ than for example 
a women’s studies approach, individual theoretical perspectives vary 
considerably, and are often independent of the specific title one applies to 
her/his research. The intricacies of some of these discussions and my own 
positioning and strategy will be elaborated further in the first chapter, and in 
particular, the way they are played out in the context of studying religion. 
 Chapter one thus briefly addresses some conceptual issues and debates 
in the contemporary study of gender. It furthermore provides an initial 
methodological framework to be applied in the following analysis of the 
problematic status of religion as subject matter in gender studies. My main 
research question on the problem of a paradigm shift of the mainstream study of 
religion towards that of gender inclusiveness, is reframed in terms of a deeper 
relationship of seeming incompatibility between religious studies and a feminist 
gender studies approach. Three main observations are put forward, suggesting 
that in the interconnections between these observations lies the relationship of 
in/compatibility. I ascertain that (1) the mainstream study of religion remains 
‘androcentric’ from the perspective of feminist critique, (2) feminist gender 
theory has barely been integrated in the feminist study of religion, and (3) the 
feminist study of religion is marginalized in gender studies as an 
interdisciplinary field. In the following three chapters, which comprise the 
theoretical and methodological part of my account, I set out to analyse the 
interconnections between these observations in order to find out why an 
engendering of religious studies appears so dubitable.           
Chapter two provides a historical overview of the relationship between 
feminism, religion and the Western academy. The purpose is to offer the 
contextual grounds of the way in which feminism enters religious studies 
scholarship at the height of the second wave feminist movement. Whereas 
feminist religious studies scholarship as such did not exist during what is 
generally called the ‘first wave’ of the feminist movement in the West, liberal 
feminist activism takes place in a society very much circumscribed by a 
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religious worldview. During the second wave however, liberal equality 
feminism is secular and even anti-religious. Within mainstream Christian and 
Jewish religious denominations themselves, feminist critique draws on an 
equality paradigm, yet only meets slow gains due to the deeply patriarchal 
character of these religious traditions. Radical feminism on the other hand, is 
overtly anti-religious or otherwise alternative forms of ‘feminist religion’ 
develop opposed to, and outside of the mainstream and orthodox norms. 
Religious feminism in the form of ‘thealogy’ enters the academy, yet this is a 
difficult process due to the specific position of the study of religion in many 
universities and its ties to ‘patriarchal’ dominations. 
This second chapter already offers some cues as to some of the main 
observations concerning the problematic relationship between religious studies 
and feminist scholarship. The critique of androcentrism in religious studies is at 
its most basic level impeded through the close relationship between the study 
and the practice of religion, the latter being patriarchal as guided by the 
ideology of essential and hierarchical sexual difference in Christian and Jewish 
traditions. This ideology simultaneously accounts for the problematic 
relationship between religion and feminism in Western society during the 
development of the second wave. Feminism is for the most part anti-religious, 
conceiving the religious domain as patriarchal at its core, a final bulwark 
against the emancipation of women to be overcome. ‘Feminist religion’ and the 
development of feminist thea logy on the other hand, that similarly draws on – 
albeit inverted - ideologies of sexual difference, is too heterodox vis-à-vis the 
practice of religious – patriarchal – theology in the academy. 
In chapter three, the question is posed to what extent general typologies 
of the development of feminist theory and methodology have been applied in 
the feminist study of religion. Although feminist religious studies’ scholars 
have formulated critiques of androcentrism in the mainstream, and subsequently 
started research ‘from women’s religious lives’, a final stage of an 
epistemological critique towards deconstruction and ‘transformation’ take on a 
particular form. Typologies of feminist research in religion simply appear to 
replicate an earlier divide on the reformability of religious tradition  (the 
reformists versus the revolutionaries or the reconstructionist position), rather 
than the reformability of the discipline itself. Therefore, feminist gender theory 
remains to be integrated in the feminist study of religion, which I argue, can be 
explained by its persisting essentialist tendencies. 
I draw on the hypotheses of anthropologist/religious studies scholar 
Rosalind Shaw (1995), who attributes this essentialism to the mainstream 
discipline of religious studies. The essentialist character of the mainstream 
fosters a de-contextualised approach towards its subject matter, thereby 
inhibiting the possibility of any disciplinary transformation from the 
perspective of gender. Borrowing Marilyn Strathern’s (1987) idea of the 
‘awkward relationship’ between anthropology and a feminist approach, 
Rosalind Shaw argues that the relationship between religious studies and a 
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feminist approach is even mutually ‘toxic’. The problem lies in that the 
mainstream study of religion is predicated on a ‘view from above’ perspective 
on religious phenomena, employing two main definitions of religion : ‘religion 
as scripture’ and ‘religion as sui generis’. Religion is conceived of as socially 
decontextualised, relegating questions of politics, power, inequality, and gender 
outside of the religious domain, and contradictory to premises of feminist 
scholarship and its insistence on a ‘view from below’. The essentialism of the 
mainstream is furthermore carried on in feminist studies in religion of the 
reconstructionist kind, that similarly employ an essentialist notion of ‘woman’ 
or a feminised ‘homo religiosus’. This kind of research fails to effect a shift 
towards a deconstructionist and intersectional phase of scholarship that 
acknowledges the differences between  women, as has been incorporated in the 
development ‘from critique to transformation’ in general typologies of feminist 
theory and methodology.  
Whilst concurring with Shaw’s main hypothesis on the character of the 
mainstream study of religion that impedes a feminist approach, I argue, 
however, that the issue of ‘diversity’ has not at all been neglected in the 
feminist study of religion. However, this shift towards theorising gender along 
multiple axes of gender, ‘race’, class, ethnicity, etc. has mostly taken place 
within the confines of one religious tradition only, that of Christianity or Post-
Christian theo/alogy. Despite the focus on class, ‘race’, or cultural differences, 
religious differences themselves have not greatly been theorised from the 
perspective of feminist theory and methodology. This situation is not only 
characteristic of feminist research in general, but especially of the feminist 
study of religion as a distinct field of scholarship. The answer to the question 
why religious diversity is marginalized, I argue, is related to some other 
observations which underlie and account for the incompatibility between 
mainstream religious studies and feminist perspectives, and the subsequent 
im/possibility of an engendering of the first. Critiques of essentialism and calls 
for ‘diversity’ thus fail to meet the challenge of bringing the feminist study of 
religion into phase with contemporary developments in feminist theory and 
consequently inhibit any possibility of a paradigm shift of the mainstream.                
In chapter four I take a closer look at some recent critiques attempting to 
account for the relationship of in/compatibility, arguing some particular features 
of both religious studies and a feminist approach have been overlooked. In 
particular, the insider/outsider problem or the debate on essentialism/ 
reductionism in mainstream religious studies is juxtaposed with feminist 
approaches. In the latter, boundaries between insider/outsider, theory/practice, 
but also the religious versus the non-religious point of view appear to be 
conflated. Typologies of the feminist study of religion discussed in chapter 
three are reassessed in view of the insight that there appears to be no 
epistemological distinction between the insider perspective – the practice of 
religion in terms of studies in  religion or ‘theology’ – on the one hand, and the 
strictly scholarly outsider perspective such as in the mainstream study of 
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religion’s methodology on the other. In the feminist study of religion in which 
boundaries are commonly drawn along the lines of reformist or revolutionary 
divides, I show how there is no distinction between the critique of androcentric 
methodology and patriarchal religion  as such. Moreover, from the perspective 
of contemporary feminist epistemological critiques on notions of objectivity 
and value-neutrality, the blurring of boundaries is celebrated rather than 
rejected.  
Those scholars repudiating the feminist study of religion as a religio-
ideological activity, can themselves be shown to be incapable of being immune 
to the instantiations of politics and ideology into their proposals for ‘objective’ 
scholarship. The problem is that in the mainstream study of religion, 
discussions on boundaries, and essentialism and reductionism are far from 
being resolved. Whereas the ‘essentialist’ approach with its ‘view from above’ 
and sui generis conception of gender inhibits questions of gender, the 
alternative reductionist approach that views the first as mere ‘crypto-theology’ 
is similarly problematic. For the reductionist approach rests on principles of 
objectivity and value-neutrality, equally suspect from the perspective of 
feminist epistemology. I argue towards some possibilities for a de-
theologisation and de-orientalisation  of religious studies through an alliance 
between debates on reflexivity and postmodern feminist critique. Concepts such 
as Donna Haraway’s (1991) ‘situated knowledges’ may allow for a critique and 
refutation of the ‘god trick’ or the ‘God’s eye view’, both in the sense of the 
omniscient ‘modernist’ objectivist perspective and in the sense of the religious 
point of view. Finally, once again I turn to feminist anthropology. Whereas here 
the ‘difference’ between researcher/researched stands central, a feminist 
anthropological approach to the study of religion and gender may in turn 
contribute to a further de-orientalisation  of feminist theory and research in 
general.  
In chapters five to eight I present the results of a case study, illustrative 
of the main hypotheses set out in the previous chapters concerning the 
relationship of in/compatibility between mainstream studies and a feminist 
gender studies approach. The problematic ‘view from above’ perspective is 
countered through an analysis of religious practice and identity among women 
in the strictly Orthodox Jewish community of Antwerp. My analysis of 
literature in chapter five first addresses the ‘insider’ perspective in feminist 
religious studies scholarship in Judaism, applying some of the axes of 
differentiation and typologies on gender and feminist research set out in 
chapters two and three. Then I turn to existing social scientific research – 
outsiders’ perspectives - on strictly Orthodox Jewish communities. These I 
show to be androcentric, regardless of their focus on religious practice rather 
than religion ‘as text’. Finally, I review some of the research on strictly 
Orthodox Jewish women, which I show to be lacking in the kind of feminist 
gender theory I alternatively propose. 
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In chapter six, an account follows of the historical, social and 
organisational information available for the strictly Orthodox Jewish 
community of Antwerp, focussing on the traditionalist congregation of the 
Machsike Hadass. In a reflexive mode, I describe the process of gaining entry 
to the field, finishing with an introduction of my main research questions and 
methods. My main objective is to find out how religious agency, or broader 
religious identity, can be characterised from the standpoint of the strictly 
Orthodox Jewish women I interviewed. This analysis takes place in view of 
these women’s exclusion at the level of research and representation in what is 
generally seen as the paradigmatic forms of religious practice in Orthodox 
Judaism. In terms of methods, a comparative discourse analysis is applied, 
‘discourse’ (both interviews, primary and secondary literature) being viewed as 
constitutive of particular subject positionings or situated knowledges with 
regards to gender and religion.  
In chapter seven my analysis proceeds of the discourse my interviewees 
applied in their construction of gender. I conclude that although they largely 
replicate a two-sexes/two-genders ontology, founded on an ideology of sexual 
difference, gender is not essentialised into any one kind of discursive formation. 
Rather, gender difference is located in the realm of religious practice. This 
insight provides the basis from which to continue my analysis, whether an 
alternative perspective on ‘religion’ is possible from a gendered perspective 
within  a particular religious tradition. The remainder of this chapter concerns an 
illustrative ‘testing’ of the first main hypothesis in accounting for the 
androcentrism of mainstream religious studies in its limited focus on religious 
‘scriptures and elites’. In their conception of religion, my strictly Orthodox 
Jewish interviewees emphasised the centrality of orthopraxis above doctrine 
and belief, embodied in religious law (halakhah), containing differential 
proscriptions for religious deeds and roles according to gender. Regardless of 
their exclusion from the ‘scholars’ society’, and their exclusion or exemption 
from paradigmatic religious commandments for men such as Torah study and 
prayer, I nevertheless argue that strictly Orthodox Jewish women do have 
‘religious agency’, primarily located in the domestic sphere and their mothering 
role.  
In the final chapter, I attempt to disclaim a sui generis notion of religion, 
by moving beyond the religious practice from which strictly Orthodox Jewish 
women in my case study were excluded, in order to focus on those realms 
usually absent in mainstream representation. This involves both their ‘official’ 
religious role, as well as the realms which are more difficult to identify as 
‘religious’. In general, this analysis shows how the boundaries between 
‘religion and politics’, the ‘public and the private’ and the religious from 
‘everyday life’ altogether, can be deconstructed. I concentrate on three different 
topics, including the notion of woman as ‘enabler’, as an ‘indirect’ form of 
religious ‘capital’ or agency, and secondly the mother as the ‘priestess of the 
miniature temple’, involving the sanctification of domestic activities and the 
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private sphere. Thirdly, one of the rare commandments exclusively incumbent 
on married women is discussed, the religious obligation of the maintaining the 
laws of family purity. Various kinds of personal and public discourse 
legitimising the laws are extensively reviewed, providing a contextualised 
analysis and attention to the workings of gender, power and control. Opposed to 
the public sphere of collective religious practice performed by men, the private, 
individual practice of the laws of niddah  and ritual immersion are ‘politicised’ 
and appropriated as a symbol for collective religious identity. Women’s 
religiosity in strictly Orthodox Jewish communities itself becomes defined in 
sexual terms. Women’s bodies are seen as their own Sanctum Sanctorum, 
thereby functioning as vehicles for the gendered construction of communal 
boundaries and identity. Finally, the related gendered religious principle of 
modesty (tzniut) is interpreted as the very definition of female piety.  
In order to be religiously observant and retain their identity as strictly 
Orthodox Jewish Jews, my interviewees necessarily insisted on gender role 
differentiation, prescribed by normative discourse in a traditionalist community 
that is patriarchal and ethnically defined. In order to remain the ‘same’, an 
increase in gender conservatism, stringency and isolationism takes place, 
opposed to the ‘outside world’ and its ‘permissive’ society. Thus in order to 
uphold tradition, this requires partaking in a resistance toward the sexual and 
gender politics of secular modernity. For most of my informants this involved 
reproducing the discourse and practice of women’s proper religious and moral 
behaviour, as a defining feature for women’s own religious identity, but also 
that of collective strictly Orthodox Jewish piety and identity. 
Finally, I briefly reflect on the problematic notion of ‘fundamentalism’. 
I question to what extent the traditionalist religious community under study can 
be dealt with in more comparative feminist analyses of the notion of ‘women as 
bearers of the collective’ in many traditionalist and fundamentalist religious 
identity politics throughout the world. As various studies have shown, gender 
conservatism and segregation, and the regulation of women’s behaviour 
through notions of modesty and chastity, appear to be cross-cultural and cross-
religious characteristics of these movements, whereby women are attributed the 
status of the ‘cultural reproducers’ of the group’s identity. 
 
                                              
1 The spelling and translations of Hebrew and Yiddish words are borrowed from the literature in 
English and their glossaries that was used for this study. Although the spelling varies 
tremendously among authors, the transcription is usually applied as used by the author in 
question. Terms that recur throughout my account are spelt in the way they most often are in 
English, even though in this way I may not adhere to a uniform system of transcription 
throughout. For example, I write halakhah instead of e.g. halacha, but Chabad, in place of 
Habad.      
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THE STUDY OF GENDER AND RELIGION: POINTS OF DEPARTURE 
 
 
 
1. A Millennial Fantasy: On the Verge of a Paradigm Shift towards 
 Gender Inclusiveness?  
 
Following a panel on ‘Religion and Gender’ organised by Ursula King (1995a) 
at the seventeenth congress of the prestigious International Association for the 
History of Religions (IAHR) held in 1990 in Rome, a book carrying the same 
title was edited by King and published in 1995 (King 1995a). The volume 
Religion and Gender includes write-ups of contributions to the panel, an 
introduction by King on the current ‘state of affairs’, and an up-to-date 
literature overview of this field of research (King 1995b, 1997: 652). In her 
introduction, King looks to a ‘paradigm shift’ that upon closer inspection 
appears to be twofold. In the first place a paradigmatic transformation within 
the study of gender and religion itself is envisioned, whilst secondly, King 
clearly points to a broader paradigm shift of the ‘mainstream’ under the impact 
of crucial developments in the study of gender and religion. In the same 
introduction, King (1995b: 21) refers to an earlier paper presented at the 
fourteenth IAHR congress in 1986.1 In this she had argued that a feminist 
perspective was still not part of the ‘common horizon of religious studies’, and 
the development of a truly inclusive framework for the study of religion would 
entail giving ‘full space to the voices and perspectives of women’.  
Whether any progressions at all would have been made during the 
course of almost a decade, when reading King’s assessment (1995b: 2-3), one 
gets the impression – at least as far as the paradigm shift in its second meaning 
is concerned – that changes may indeed be in sight. Perhaps towards the end of 
the twentieth century the impact of gender studies on the contemporary study of 
religion may at last be becoming noticeable. In her own individual contribution 
to the collection of articles in Religion and Gender for example, King (1995c: 
220) states that the study of religion by women and feminist scholars ‘has not 
yet sufficiently transformed’ the study of religion. In what way and exactly how 
the mainstream would have been already transformed is not specified in both 
articles, and shall be addressed later on in this chapter. If one could speak at all 
of transformation, then according to King this would in any case be a ‘slow 
process’, and the consequences of such a ‘profoundly transformative effect of a 
basic paradigm shift’ are hereto much less visible in religious studies than other 
areas of the humanities (King 1995b: 3).    
So despite the apparent optimism and signs of hope which are 
unfortunately not illustrated any further, King professes that mainstream 
religious studies to date has mostly remained ‘androcentric’. The steady 
increase of women scholars studying religion and the development of the 
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feminist study of religion in all of its diversity notwithstanding, the mainstream 
for the most part remains completely untouched. At the same time, publications, 
prominent journals, international conferences on gender and religion – 
including panels dedicated to gender issues at prestigious mainstream events 
such as those of the IAHR – and even the incorporation of topics on ‘women 
and religion’ within university curricula have nevertheless continuously 
expanded. Separate courses within educational programmes in religious studies 
or theology departments have been introduced since the eighties, next to a 
steady increase in tolerance for and sometimes even the ‘integration’ of gender-
critical perspectives or analyses within other fields within the humanities. 
However, all this has only had a limited or – depending on the viewpoint - 
belated impact on the mainstream study of religion.  
In order to gain some insight into the reasons why in 1995 King can 
claim religious studies to be only or already on the verge of a paradigm shift, 
first an important differentiation needs to be addressed. This concerns the 
differences between ‘acceptance’, ‘tolerance’ and even ‘integration’ of 
gendered perspectives at a more structural level within the institution of the 
academy, opposed to a much more profound theoretical turn, in which any 
theoretical or empirical research project could no longer be accused of 
androcentrism, as gender inclusiveness would be the norm. At the structural 
level one can indeed think of the incorporation of courses in religious studies 
departments, whether these are compulsory or optional individual courses on 
gender and religion or limited to a few hours of lecture within a particular 
subject area. One could also refer to the publication of articles in the field of 
gender and religion in major mainstream journals and workshops, or even 
plenary sessions at international conferences, chapters in introductory course 
syllabi or general handbooks in the theory and methodology of religious 
studies. So even though it can be shown that a kind of structural or institutional 
gender inclusiveness is definitely on the rise towards the end of the twentieth 
century, King justifiably warns for the dangers of incorporating religion and 
gender as a ‘ghetto subject’, a term she borrows from a situation that developed 
in cultural anthropology as early as the seventies. In the guise of the 
‘anthropology of women’, gendered critique was accepted as a sort of 
additional subject within the curriculum, thus ‘tolerated’, yet leaving 
mainstream anthropology largely intact.2 Regardless of the differences in 
approach or content, even when ‘gender’ instead of ‘women’ is given as a title 
to such a course – perhaps thereby hoping to attract both female and male 
students -, according to King (1995b: 25), such a course becomes to be seen as 
marginal within a disciplinary programme or ‘a merely contemporary 
concession to current intellectual fashions’. 
King (1995b: 28) clearly envisions transformation of content when she 
holds that the ultimate goal of research and education in gender issues should 
be an altogether different critical perspective in all courses and study 
programmes in religious studies. That such a transformation of content should 
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have far reaching implications or imply even a total re-conceptualisation of the 
discipline, may not be that surprising taking into account the critiques and 
sometimes the consequences feminist and/or gendered perspectives have shown 
to provoke for other disciplines of the humanities. However, the slow or 
delayed process, and therefore the ‘lagging behind’ of religious studies opposed 
to many other of these disciplines cannot be merely coincidental. The question 
is whether it is just a matter of taking that last step over the threshold, or that 
this delay in itself may be attributed to more serious incongruities between 
paradigms in religious studies and those of the study of gender. 
 
In the second place a paradigm shift within the study of religion and gender can 
be problematised, where similarly a situation of more inclusiveness is aspired. 
Again, in the case of this sense of a paradigm shift, King only makes more 
demands than she can offer concrete suggestions, and again much more is at 
stake than at first sight appears. Where King spoke of ‘feminism’ and 
predominantly ‘women’ in 1986, the concept of ‘gender’ features prominently 
in her introductory article published halfway through the nineties (King 1995b). 
The mainstream not only appears to have shown ample attention to women and 
religion, but the feminist study of religion itself is primarily occupied with this 
category of ‘women’. According to King (1995b: 25), it is not just that the 
study of women has been marginalised in the study of religion, but ‘…the 
comprehensive study of gender as a category with even larger connotations has 
hardly begun’. This development must be understood within the context of the 
shift from feminist scholarship or ‘women’s studies’ to ‘gender studies’ in 
general. Additionally, it concerns the ways in which gender as a category or 
dimension of analysis and gender-related themes have become accepted and 
often integrated in the mainstream, its curricula and the institutions of various 
disciplines in the social sciences and humanities. 
King (1995b: 1) sees gender studies as of yet as almost identical to 
women’s studies. In the tradition of gender studies nevertheless, she does make 
a plea for a constructionist approach that requires an analysis of both femininity 
and masculinity as interrelated concepts and realities.3 While King refutes 
forms of gender polarisation or radical separatism which she attributes to some 
earlier and contemporary women’s studies approaches4, in her vision of gender 
inclusiveness and the means by which it is to be achieved, the separatism which 
she dismisses is nonetheless reified by appropriating the phenomenon of ‘men’s 
studies’ as the missing link. In spite of the insistence on an incorporation of 
‘gender’, where the concept would enable a detachment of gendered symbolism 
and ideology from real life ‘biological’ women and men, King merely 
understands gender inclusiveness in the study of religion as the future 
incorporation of studying men and masculinity. The dangers of creating a new 
‘false universalism’ - versus androcentrism – on the basis of only women’s 
experiences could then be solved through applying a more gendered 
perspective, which according to King (1995b: 30) must be left up to men:                    
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Women scholars, for fairly obvious reasons, concentrate their research 
on women; it is not their main task to critically investigate gender issues 
as they arise for men. Men have to do this for themselves.  
 
It can not only seriously be questioned whether a re-conceptualisation of the 
study of women into that of gender through simply ‘adding’ men’s studies is 
likely to happen. It is also questionable to what extent it can be justified to just 
‘leave it up to men’ for the task, in the hope of an easy passage from a phase of 
‘integration’ towards simply bringing male and female’s gender issues ‘into 
fruitful relationship with each other’ as King predicts (30). The lagging behind 
of religious studies compared to other disciplines of the social sciences and 
humanities can also be illustrated here, with the fact that in the field of men’s 
studies the study of religion does indeed seem to be limited, if non-existent, at 
least at this point in time. King goes on from this assertion to justify the 
temporary equivalence between gender studies and women’s studies in religion. 
King thus suffices with a simple sum of ‘women’s studies + men’s studies = 
gender studies’, which indeed strikes as a rather easy solution to the problem. It 
is seriously debatable if a simple ‘add men’s studies and stir’ will offer any 
remedy in as much as the method of ‘add women and stir’ has been abandoned 
as a solution in the struggle against androcentrism in the mainstream of various 
disciplines for some time now. 
Another problem regarding King’s vision of change in focus from 
women to gender in gender studies of religion is again related to debates on this 
same shift within feminist theorising in general, but as will be shown later is 
played out in specific and complex ways as far as the study of religion is 
concerned. Here it suffices to emphasise the role of the feminist project within 
such a paradigm shift. This can perhaps furthermore be linked to King’s 
proposition of postponing true gender inclusiveness for the time being. If the 
impact of feminism in the field of the mainstream study of religion has 
altogether been minimal, then some temporary restraint may possibly even be 
wise. Firstly, there is no theoretical attempt whatsoever in King’s introductory 
articles to delineate women’s studies, or for example a focus on ‘women’s 
voices’ or ‘women’s experiences’ from a feminist perspective, feminist 
critiques of theory, etc. Within contemporary feminist theorising however, such 
conflations are far from evident. Relationships between ‘women’, ‘gender’ and 
‘feminism’ and their respective affixes ‘studies’ are matter of debate regarding 
both the place and the consequences for the political-critical dimension toward 
both scholarship and social reality. Perhaps androcentrism is institutionalised 
too deeply in religious studies fo r a switch to a – less radical? - gender 
perspective. Of course King has no intention of losing this radical element, it all 
still revolves around structures of inequality and the unequal balance of ‘power’ 
in general. In her request for a paradigm shift, the adjective ‘critical’ is present 
in the demand for a more inclusive gender studies approach. 
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As for a shift from women to gender in the context of a broader 
paradigmatic change in the mainstream study of religion, an interpretation in 
terms of a strategic move is similarly not unimportant. For only a gendered 
perspective can ever affect the mainstream and enable an escape from a ghetto 
of women’s - or men’s - studies (King 1995b: 23, 24). Here we see how the 
multiplicity of the notion ‘gender inclusiveness’ as applied by King carries with 
it a certain irony regarding the anticipated paradigm shifts. While gender 
inclusiveness would initially refer to the incorporation of the religious voices, 
experiences and perspectives of women, we see that the re-conceptualisation 
that follows involves an adding of the study of men, in which men and 
masculinity are problematised rather than appropriated as the invisible norm. 
The persistent marginalisation of feminist perspectives in the study of religion, 
as with other – or maybe even more so than in other –disciplines, can only be 
transcended when finally ‘men’ or ‘masculinity’ are incorporated. Both 
versions of the paradigm shift nonetheless carry the danger of de-legitimising 
the feminist political project, unless the emphasis on inequality, power and 
societal transformation remains upheld. The following quote does not leave any 
doubt as to King’s (1995a: 18) ‘utopian’ position on this matter: 
 
…the perspective of women’s studies, of feminism and of more 
inclusively conceived gender studies, includes as an integral part a 
strong commitment to contemporary personal and social transformation. 
It is perhaps this utopian goal, the strong wish to transcend all gender 
discrimination and polarization, to seek a holistic life-affirming 
spirituality and build a new society, which is the creative source of the 
often provocative and intellectually daring stance found among 
contemporary feminist scholars. Feminism is both a new academic 
method and also a new social vision. 
 
That a paradigmatic transformation of mainstream religious studies from a 
gendered perspective would automatically imply a social and thereby a 
religious transformation for the feminist study of religion is far from 
unequivocal however, and as will be argued later on, rather connotes one of the 
main obstacles for a paradigm shift. In the remains of this introductory chapter 
though, the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings, the contours, and the 
implications of Ursula King’s assessment of contemporary study of gender and 
religion, and in particular the question of a paradigm shift from the perspective 
of gender will first be critically addressed. Religion and Gender published in 
1995, including King’s introduction, is to date still often referred to as one of 
the authoritative and rare readers reflecting the current standing and theoretical 
development in the research area of women, feminism, gender and religion. 
However, toward the beginning of the new millennium new readers including 
discussions on methodology are increasingly being published, pointing to what 
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promises to be an exciting future for a field that currently appears to be in the 
midst of significant evolvement.5 
Additionally, some of the arguments outlined above supporting the 
evaluation of the mainstream as androcentric may no longer be entirely valid, 
especially those referred to in structural terms. Despite its definite ‘lagging 
behind’ compared to other disciplines in the social sciences and humanities, 
major international journals and publications in religious studies have recently 
shown to incorporate more and more contributions from and attention for 
gendered approaches. Most notable perhaps has been the publication of an 
entire special issue on ‘gender and the study of religion’ of the well-known 
mainstream journal Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, the journal of 
the North American Association for the Study of Religion, edited by Randi 
Warne and published in 2001 (vol. 13, nr. 2). This particular issue is in any case 
a novelty and beyond comparison to King’s state of the art bibliography dating 
from 1995. However, as pointed out earlier, something like a ‘special issue’ can 
refer to toleration and acceptance, yet also a ghetto status, and the ‘true gender 
inclusiveness’ which King aspires to may still be far off the mark.   
In an article in another ‘mainstream’ journal, Studies in 
Religion/Sciences Religieuses published in 1998, Randi Warne (2001 [1998]: 
149-150) states that the past twenty years have seen considerable changes and 
that next to the explosion of publications on women and religion, the topic itself 
has gained ‘sufficient respectability’ as a speciality in the field of religious 
studies. Towards the end of the nineties it can even be added that women 
scholars, including those engaged in gendered or feminist approaches serve on 
the committees of important organisations and editorial boards of top journals. 
However, echoing Ursula King’s comments that you cannot just ‘add women 
and stir’, Warne argues that androcentrism still has not been cured (150): 
 
These changes might be taken to suggest that Religious Studies was well 
on the road to being successfully ‘engendered,’ and that gender-critical 
perspectives had found their place within the traditional academy and 
were now secure. This however, is a misreading, both of the situation 
and of the nature of the problem itself.  
 
Although the mainstream may have occasionally been ‘disrupted’, 
according to Warne it has not been ‘dislodged’. Scholarship may have 
‘decentred male privilege at the margins’, but not at the centre, where 
androcentrism, the conflation of the male with the generic ‘human’ perspective 
and norm prevails. Warne’s even more recent publications (2000, 2001) attest 
to more of the same; despite structural gain and a toleration on the margins, a 
gender-critical turn, in which gender would be integrated as an ‘analytical 
category for how we think about religion, what we consider to be data, and 
what questions we bring to our studies’ (2000: 249) has yet to be fulfilled in the 
academic study of religion.  
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A paradigm shift then, has in any case not - or not yet – taken place in 
the mainstream in spite of the shift from ‘women’ to the concept of ‘gender’, 
which would promise to be more inclusive and offer a means of avoiding the 
ghetto -effect the ‘add women and stir’ phase caused. Regardless of the change 
in terminology, Warne’s assessment in fact does not radically differ from that 
of Rita M. Gross (1977) for example, formulated almost twenty-five years 
earlier during the very beginnings of feminist critique and scholarship in the 
academy. Here Gross accuses the mainstream of being androcentric instead of 
‘androgynous’, a term which meanwhile is rarely used by the majority of 
feminist theorists, but strikingly similar in its context of critiquing the 
mainstream. A paradigm shift would involve ‘the transition from an 
androcentric methodology to an androgynous methodology’ (Gross 1977: 7), in 
which the male norm and the human are no longer collapsed, and women are 
not discussed as ‘other’, as ‘an object exterior to mankind’ (10). In Gross’s 
words (1977: 13): 
 
I chose the word ‘androgyny’ for the alternative method and model of 
humanity because even the simplest meaning of the term – ‘both male 
and female’- involves the negation of all three components of 
androcentrism. … Simply put, there is a fundamental reorientation of 
consciousness to the deeply internalized realization that, however 
similar or different men and women may be in a religious situation, 
however dominant one sex or the other may be, they both represent 
modes of the human. Therefore, information about and understanding of 
both must be a part of the data that goes into creating a human 
perspective on a human world, a model of religion, or an analysis of any 
specific religious situation. 
 
In her later work, Gross (1993a, b, c, 1996) explicitly feminist perspective on 
religious studies is accompanied by the same emphasis on a paradigm shift in 
terms of ‘androgyny’, or a ‘two-sex or bi-sexual model of humanity’ (1993b: 
296): 
 
We need a basic paradigm shift from models of humanity and modes of 
research and thought that perceive males at the center and females on 
the edges to modes that perceive both females and males at the center 
and reflect the essential ‘femaleness-maleness’ of androgynous 
humanity.        
 
The failure in effecting a true paradigm shift through the introduction of gender 
as an analytical concept in itself can in some ways be inferred from the very 
fact that it indeed warrants a ‘special issue’, paralleling earlier treatments of 
‘women’ as a topic of special interest or expertise. This appears to be the case 
even if it concerns the special issue of an important mainstream journal, and is 
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expressed by the editor Warne (2001: 151) herself: ‘It is my fervent hope that 
the fact this is a “special” issue of this journal will one day be truly puzzling to 
future generations of critical, scientific, and academic scholars of religion’. The 
shift from ‘women’ to a plea for more ‘gender inclusiveness’ (or as some would 
perhaps still prefer, ‘androgyny’) as proposed by authors such as Ursula King 
and then most recently Randi Warne has thus enabled some toleration on the 
margins or furthered an entry into the mainstream of a more structural kind. 
However, even if a more fundamental shift in terms of epistemology or 
methodology in general has not been achieved, other voices have their doubts 
over what the benefits would be of such a ‘gender-critical turn’. Elisabeth 
Schüssler Fiorenza (1995: 5) for instance, is highly critic al of what she sees as 
the emergence of a distinct approach in religious studies, termed as ‘gender 
studies in religion’: 
 
This approach not only has emerged from within the academy but also 
does not position itself explicitly in a political women’s movement for 
change. Instead it orients its discourses towards a ‘scientific’ mostly 
male audience and seeks to win its respect and approval as a serious 
intellectual malestream discipline.                              
 
Fiorenza’s concern with the shift of women’s studies or feminist studies to 
gender studies would be its de-politicising tendencies in its accommodation ‘to 
the reigning scientist paradigm and abandoning [of] political concerns and 
practical connections with women’s movements in society and church…’ (6). 
In Fiorenza’s view, the replacement of ‘women’ with ‘gender’ would be paired 
with a limitation to descriptive and functionalist accounts, bereaved of the 
possibility of making value judgements and thus closer to the ideals of 
objectivity and neutrality held in mainstream scholarship. Fiorenza is definitely 
no exception in this type of critique of ‘gender theory’ or the shift from 
women’s studies to gender studies, which continues to be debated in feminist 
theory and scholarship across a variety of disciplines beyond that of the study 
of religion.  
A complete account or even a concise summary of the developments in 
feminist scholarship during the last three decades which underlay some of the 
divergences of opinion, the conceptual and theoretical varieties and shifts 
referred to, would be impossible to achieve in one introductory chapter here. At 
least some clarification will be offered and choices will be made in order to be 
able to both contextualise and work towards a reformulation and pinning down 
of the main research question regarding the im/possibility of a paradigm shift. 
Up to this point it has already become apparent that the very idea of a 
‘paradigm shift’ in the mainstream discipline of religious studies under the 
influence of feminist scholarship and critique can be understood in at least two 
different senses. This would furthermore be related to variable appropriations 
and understandings of and relations between concepts such as ‘women’, 
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‘feminism’, ‘gender’. The question similarly must be raised what the 
relationships and the differences are between ‘women’s studies’, ‘feminist 
studies, scholarship or theory’ and gender studies. 
It can already be stated that there are no clear-cut definitions of these 
terms, nor is there any intention of arriving at any such of a definition or 
closure. As argued in the introduction, I am of the opinion that conceptual and 
theoretical disagreement, debate and development are part and parcel of what 
‘feminist scholarship’ is all about. Rather, the purpose of this introductory 
chapter is to merely review some lines of discussion or strands of feminist 
thought, selected in function of building the main arguments throughout the 
chapters. This selection and the way I bring some of these discussions together 
is based on personal choice, the temporary result of an ongoing study and 
reflection. The account is therefore what I see as the representation of my own 
practice of ‘situated knowledge’ about the original research question, a 
paradigm shift of the mainstream and the status of ‘feminist scholarship in 
religion’ today.   
 
 
2. Constructing, Deconstructing and Reconstructing Gender   
 
This section will follow up on Fiorenza’s (1995) remark about the ‘de-
politicising tendencies’ implied by the introduction of gender as an analytical 
concept in the study of religion or the emergence of ‘gender studies in religion’, 
as opposed to an approach in the frame of women’s, womanist6 or feminist 
studies more specifically. In general, some positionings will be surveyed that 
provide a background to the assessment of Ursula King’s vision of a paradigm 
shift towards gender inclusiveness in the first sense, that is - formulated as a 
matter internal to the field of feminist scholarship. Some new positionings will 
then be sought in order to raise some new questions regarding the status and the 
feasibility of a broader paradigm shift in its second sense, that of transforming 
the mainstream field of religious studies altogether. Already implicated in the 
following brief discussion of conceptual development and debate are questions 
and discussions of politics, epistemology and methodology that are not only 
relevant, but will prove to be central in providing an answer to the main 
research questions and further argumentation. These will then be gradually 
unfolded throughout the chapters to come, the remains of this first chapter 
merely providing some initial theoretical grounding and the directions of 
analysis sought.   
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Political and Postmodern Appropriations 
 
In a lecture entitled ‘Gender: The Short History of a Critical Term’ held in 
19997, the eminent feminist theorist and historian Joan Wallach Scott 
introduced her talk with the ‘millennial fantasy’ of a nightmare scenario, in 
which biological determinism would once again rise to reclaim the concept of 
gender (‘Dossier: over “gender”’ 2000: 11). Even if it is as of yet too early days 
to state whether this millennial fantasy is likely to come true, it cannot be 
denied that the once so promising and liberating concept of gender is 
momentarily being re-appropriated in various contradictory and indeed, 
politically ‘dangerous’ ways. Once appropriated as a concept against biological 
explanations of women’s subordinate status in society by feminist scholars (see 
below), in daily usage and common language, gender is increasingly being used 
as a ‘politically correct’ term. It is frequently applied in the context of what 
used to be referred to as ‘women’s issues’ and additionally often just more of a 
polite way to refer to ‘sex’. In both cases however, gender simply comes to 
stand for the latter term denoting what are understood as the biological (genetic, 
chromosomal, physical, etc.) differences between women and men.8 
In accordance with Scott’s observations, the influence of a ‘new 
biological determinism’ has come to replace the earlier hold of sociobiological 
ideas on the roles and status of, and relationships between women and men as 
two distinct group of human beings. This biological determinism is  often 
present in the research practices of burgeoning disciplines in the current 
academy such as evolutionary and cognitive psychology, micro- and 
neurobiology, and the field of genetics, and has filtered into the mind of the 
public at large (e.g. Connell 1999). Both the ‘backlash’ against contemporary 
feminist critique where contemporary ‘equality’ is often taken for granted, and 
‘androgyny’ and gender b(l)ending even celebrated, is simultaneously being 
accompanied by a renewed interest in dualistic thinking on what ‘makes us 
different’ in stereotypical – even if not necessarily hierarchical – terms in 
contemporary popular culture and daily practice.9 The growing influence and 
vulgarisation of certain tenets of neo -Darwinian thought cannot be 
underestimated here, as new kinds of essentialism resurface and reclaim 
concepts. Ironically, one such a term is gender, which was originally introduced 
in defence of a social constructionist position on differences, roles, identities, 
and sexual preferences.10  
Scott’s recent concern whether gender would remain a useful as an 
analytical category in light of its recent usage in ways that threat to neutralise 
its political edge, has been shared by a number of feminist theorists and 
particularly feminist activists, critical of the way the concept has gradually 
become mainstreamed during the nineties in and outside of the academy. At the 
UN Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in September 1995 for 
example, grassroots development workers and women activists from the South 
launched a critique of the way gender has become institutionalised in gender 
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development policy and practice (GAD). They argued that gender analysis had 
become limited to a ‘technocratic discourse’, no longer addressing issues of 
power central to women’s problematic status and subordination. According to 
the convenor and panellist from a Pakistani organisation of one particular 
workshop, the focus on gender rather than women ‘had become 
counterproductive in that it had allowed the discussion to shift from a focus on 
women, to women and men and, finally, back to men.’ (Baden and Goetz 1997: 
5-6).  
In the same article discussing the heated debates, the confusion and 
contradictions surrounding the concept of gender at Beijing, Baden and Goetz 
(1997: 7) draw attention to the way the mainstreaming of gender in many fields 
of research has similarly resulted in a ‘static and reductionist definition of 
gender (as woman/man) – stripping away consideration of the relational aspects 
of gender, of power and ideology and of how patterns of subordination are 
reproduced’. The reduction of gender even to a mere statistical variable as is 
often the case in the ‘harder’ areas of research within the economic, political, 
psychological, and social sciences, fortunately may not have taken place in 
disciplines in and nearer to the humanities such as anthropology and religious 
studies. However, similar concerns for the effects of mainstreaming gender are 
abound that question the process in which gender as an analytical category has 
gained more respectability and toleration. According to Baden and Goetz 
(1997: 6-7) this process has however also accompanied a loss of its ‘allegiance’ 
to feminist research, with the ‘new players’ not even being ‘familiar with its 
basic texts, concepts and methodologies’.  
Preceding these developments is the shift from women to gender within 
the field of feminist research, testified in the change of title of many prior 
women’s studies departments or centres to that of gender studies. The renaming 
of journals, even outside of English-speaking countries, such as the Dutch-
language Tijdschrift voor Vrouwenstudies that became the Tijdschrift voor 
Genderstudies in 1998 also illustrate this trend. In the first issue of the latter, 
the reserves of several authors on this move are expressed, warning for the 
same risks and potential loss of an emphasis on power and inequality. These are 
crucial ingredients in any feminist analysis, yet potentially absent in gender 
research, the arguments goes. According to Joyce Outshoorn (1998: 5-6) (tr. 
from Dutch): 
 
Part of my worries is the fact that gender does not necessarily 
automatically refer to power; only in certain theoretical contexts is 
gender seen as the result of power processes. Due to the neutral 
character of the term it is easily accommodated in a liberal dis course on 
sex roles and sex differences, making gender interchangeable with sex. 
Here the concept loses its critical sharpness. The insight that power 
works in creating a hierarchical gender difference and the asymmetry 
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between men and women must not be lo st: in the future the new journal 
must be evaluated accordingly. 
 
The concept of ‘gender’ as distinct from ‘sex’ was first introduced in the 
emerging field of feminist research and critique by sociologist Ann Oakley 
(1996 [1972]). It was borrowed from psychologist Robert Stoller’s earlier 
delineation of sexual from gender identity (in Sex and Gender published in 
1968 in Oakley 1996: 159). Yet, the idea of femininity and masculinity being 
cultural or learned constructs, variable in space and time rather than determinate 
and inborn, reaches back to Simone de Beauvoir’s (1976 [1949]) famous 
dictum in Le deuxiéme sexe, ‘on ne naît pas femme, on le devient’. The ‘sex as 
biological/gender as cultural’ scheme evidently served feminist political 
critique. It opened opportunities, for it allowed feminists to envision political 
and societal change. Women’s and men’s roles and status in society could no 
longer be legitimised or universalised by appealing to what nowadays would be 
called ‘essentialist’ claims. Ann Oakley’s book, and somewhat later 
anthropologist Gayle Rubin’s (1997 [1975]: 32) idea of a ‘sex/gender system’, - 
‘a set of arrangements by which the biological raw material of human sex and 
procreation is shaped by human, social intervention’- can be merited for the 
introduction of the sex/gender distinction in feminist theorising and research 
throughout the late seventies and eighties. A further highly influential and to 
date most appropriated elaboration of ‘gender’ as a useful category of analysis 
however, was undertaken by no one other than Joan Wallach Scott in 1986, the 
same scholar entertaining nightmarish fantasies some thirteen years later on.  
Scott proposes an appropriation and definition of gender as an analytical 
concept involving two main propositio ns. First Scott (1996 [1986]: 167) sees 
gender as ‘a constitutive element of social relationships based on the perceived 
differences between the sexes’. Secondly – influenced by Michel Foucault – 
Scott (169) claims that gender, power and politics are related in the sense that 
‘gender is a primary field within which or by means of which power is 
articulated’. The first proposition involves four interrelated elements: that of 
symbols or symbolic representations; secondly normative concepts ‘that set 
forth interpretations of the meanings of the symbols, that attempt to limit and 
contain their metaphoric possibilities’; thirdly the level of social institutions and 
organisations, from kinship systems to the political arena, and finally that of 
subjective identity.11 Scott furthermore argues that this analytical model of 
gender construction can equally serve in discussions of class, ‘race’, ethnicity, 
etc.12 Scott’s model exemplifies and in practice has inspired the application of 
gender has something of a heuristic device or a lens through which to look and 
to critically address the general question of difference and power within society 
and ideology. As an analytical concept it questions how these come to be 
institutionalised as structural patterns and practices of inequality between 
women and men, themselves engendered through cultural ideologies of sexual 
difference.  
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As Halsema and Schreurs (1998: 11) remark however, - and is echoed 
by those scholars critical of the way gender is often appropriated - regardless of 
the utility of Scott’s first proposition and its multidimensional scheme, the 
second proposition involving the construction of gender as inherent in relations 
and understandings of power often remains undertheorised or is simply 
bypassed in many analyses. Related critiques of the way gender is often 
applied, point to how gender has become increasingly reified to the extent that 
it no longer functions as a strictly methodological tool of analysis. Stefan 
Dudink (1998: 8) for example, argues how ‘the presentation of gender as a 
solution instead of as a means of reviewing the feminist tensions regarding its 
constitutive category of “women”, results in a preliminary fixation of what 
rather should be a continuous reflection on these tensions’. Gender then 
becomes the ‘final stage’ of the ‘constructionist project’. In a critical review of 
a number of efforts to theorise gender, including Judith Butler’s Gender 
Trouble (1990), Mary Hawkesworth (1997: 680-681) argues how in these 
works, gender is transformed from an analytical category into a causal force, 
conflating gender as universal explanans:       
 
The heuristic tool is displaced as gender is accorded ontological status. 
It is described as the cause of certain beliefs about the world; the force 
that molds a plastic humanity, produces naturalized bodies, or imposes 
sexual dimorphism; the determinant of identity; the process that 
structures labor, power, and cathexis; or the mental category that 
structures a form of dichotomous perception. … Although gender as 
analytic category can be invaluable to feminist scholarship in 
illuminating certain facets of social existence, it is a grave error to 
attribute explanatory force to gender.  
 
Joan Scott’s recent questioning of the concept she once defended so adamantly, 
concerns the current appropriation of gender which can partly be attributed to 
the way the sex/gender divide itself replicates dualistic oppositions between 
nature and culture or between body and the mind. Feminist theorists have been 
critiquing these very dualisms for some time though, a point to which I shall 
return. Problematic in the social constructionist emphasis on gender is the way 
in which one pole of the divide, sex or biology, has been undertheorised in 
feminist analysis, only to be capitalised by the ‘hard’ sciences and in the worst 
nightmare scenario fully in the process of completely encapsulating ‘gender’.  
At Beijing, next to the ‘attack’ on gender for losing its political edge and 
its connection to the question of women’s inequality by certain feminist 
grassroots organisations from the South, a critique of the concept was launched 
from another corner and clearly motivated by wholly different concerns. Prior 
to the conference in September 1995, debates over the ‘Platform for Action’ 
arose concerning the very subject matter of the conference, when 
representatives from various Catholic countries in the North and South 
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proposed a bracketing of the word ‘gender’ throughout the platform text. 
According to Baden and Goetz (1997: 11) this move represented an 
‘unexpected politicization of the concept “gender”, which expressed, in part, 
aspects of backlash reactions to contemporary feminism’. The authors single 
out one among the many conservative and gender-critical papers circulated at 
Beijing (by a writer for a US conservative Catholic publication), refuting what 
is termed ‘gender feminism’, which was perceived as the threat of social 
constructionist reasoning for issues of sexuality and reproduction. The paper in 
question basically argues that in the implications of a definition of gender as 
social construction, roles and relationships between women and men are 
challenged, sexuality becomes ‘fluid’ and the value of the family and 
motherhood in particular are put into question. As Baden and Goetz note, the 
panic and – faulty – reasoning deriving from this conservative position 
concerns the perceived implications for the ‘two conservative bogeys’, 
homosexuality and abortion. By contrast, women’s participation in public 
economy or in public decision-making roles were not particularly emphasised 
nor seen as particularly problematic by conservatives at the conference in 
general.  
Central in this conservative reaction is the interpretation that social 
constructionism would simply imply a ‘deconstruction of the body’. The same 
problem has notably also been one of the central concerns in feminist theory 
during the last decade in which the sex/gender distinction has increasingly 
become problematised and has unleashed much confusion and critique from 
different ideological sides in and outside of the academy. Exemplary is the 
controversy following the publication of Anne Fausto-Sterling’s (1993) article 
‘The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not Enough’ in The Sciences, 
among Right-wing Christians in the US (Baden and Goetz 1997: 17; Fausto-
Sterling 2000a: 19). In this article, Fausto -Sterling (1993) argued that the two-
sex system dominant in Western society would be misplaced even at the level 
of biology. Instead, it should be expanded beyond the exclusive categories of 
male and female to include various forms of sexual difference, covering genital 
and genetic variation among ‘intersexes’, including ‘herms’ (hermaphrodites), 
‘merms’ (male pseudohermaphrodites), and ‘ferms’ (female hermaphrodites). 
Moreover, Fausto-Sterling remarks, ‘sex is a vast, infinitely malleable 
continuum that defies the constraints of even five categories’, an argument 
which would be further elaborated in later research (2000a, 2000b). On top of 
the critique of ‘gender’ then, Fausto-Sterling’s paper was appropriated by many 
conservatives who insisted the status of ‘sex’ in the Platform for Action for 
Beijing become clear, demanding the two-sex system and the existence of only 
two sexes be reassured (Baden and Goetz 1997: 17). 
The fact that the confusion and critique surrounding sex and gender at 
Beijing took place and was often related to differences concerning feminism 
and the status of women on cultural or religious grounds, is one important 
factor to which I shall return. These particular debates however, were clearly 
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provoked by and both reflective of problems and shifts in current feminist 
theorising regarding the sex/gender distinction. Problematic in its more recent 
reformulations, various strategies against essentialism appeared to have left the 
‘body’ or the biological undertheorised, a point which Joan Scott recently 
brings to attention. What the debates furthermore show is the variety in which 
theories and terminologies of sex and gender have been interpreted and re-
interpreted in order to serve diverse political ends in often contradictory and 
ironic ways. In a response to a recent lecture by Anne Fausto-Sterling13, 
feminist scholar Rosi Braidotti (2000a) Braidotti refers to another instance in 
which ‘The Five Sexes’ was appropriated in ways detrimental to feminist 
critique. Different from the condemnation of the conservative kind, here 
Braidotti shows how anti-essentialism can be used in defence of liberal 
individualism under cover of ‘a quantitative kind of pluralism’. Thus the 
Brazilian writer Mario Vargas Llosa in one of his novels appropriates Fausto-
Sterling’s work on intersexuality and model of multiple categories of sex in 
what Braidotti (2-3) calls a ‘conservative rejection of gender dualism for the 
purpose of phallic erotic pleasure’14:   
 
In what strikes me as flawed argument, Vargas Llosa wants his cake and 
eats it too: his defence of multiple genders barely conceals the sexual 
dualism that is intrinsic to the definition of the individual and of 
individual rights, which he defends. This indicates to me that there is 
nothing inherently subversive or even transformative is at stake in this 
otherwise noble and erotic praise of multiple sexual pleasures. Fausto-
Sterling’s work has taught us that the numerical multiplication of gender 
options does nothing to alter the balance of power and the political 
economy of sexual dialectics, which is one of the motors of the 
phallogocentric regime. Moreover, I think that both sexuality and sexual 
difference are so central to the constitution of the subject, that they 
cannot be gotten rid of by merely swapping or reversing socially-
enforced gender roles. It is instead the case that in-depth transformations 
or metamorphoses need to be enacted as a political and discursive 
practice.                         
   
Braidotti’s critique and own work can be situated in a particular strand of 
feminist theorising which will be dealt with below. The concern for the loss of 
elements of power and inequality in Braidotti’s critique has been a concern ever 
since the shift from ‘women’ to ‘gender’, as has been argued above. Initially 
introduced in a dualistic framework of (fixed) nature versus (constructed) hence 
malleable) culture, the sex/gender divide itself has undergone transformation 
under the influence of postmodern and/or poststructuralist critique in many 
strands of contemporary feminist theory. The publication of Judith Butler’s 
Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1990a) can without 
doubt be seen as authoritative in this phase of the social constructionist 
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theorisation of gender.15 The ‘Butler effect’ (Vasterling 1995) signals a 
paramount shift in feminist theory and has provoked further debate on the 
relation between feminist theory and feminist politics. The gender confusion 
caused by the postmodern deconstruction of ‘real’ notions of sex, gender and 
women has furthermore reached into various settings, contributing to some of 
the ‘counterproductive’ appropriations in both conservative and liberal modes.  
Butler’s (1990a) refutation of the sex/gender distinction is grounded in a 
poststructuralist critique of the subject and identity16 that questions whether ‘the 
natural facts of sex’ may themselves merely be the products of various 
hegemonic (scientific, juridical, political, etc.) discourses in the service of 
particular political interests. Butler’s (1990a) primary influence on consecutive 
feminist theorising has been the argument that if gender is culturally 
constructed and does not automatically follow from sex, then  ‘sex’ is proven to 
be as culturally constructed as ‘gender’. Gender then refers to a ‘regulatory 
fiction’ or the ‘discursive/cultural means by which “sexed nature” or “a natural 
sex” is produced and established as “prediscursive,” prior to culture, a 
politically neutral surface on which  culture acts’ (1990a: 7). Drawing on 
Monique Wittig and Adrienne Rich’s ideas on normative heterosexuality or the 
‘heterosexual matrix’, Butler states that ‘the “unity” of gender is the effect of a 
regulatory practice that seeks to render gender identity uniform through a 
compulsory sexuality’ (31).  
Again, clearly influenced by Foucault’s theory on the workings of 
power, the ‘body is not “sexed” in any significant sense prior to its 
determination within a discourse through which it becomes invested with an 
“idea” of natural or essential sex’ (92). In Butler’s interpretation, bodies ‘cannot 
be said to have a signifiable existence prior to the mark of gender’ (8). Another 
central concept in ‘Butlerian’ theory is that of ‘performance’ or ‘performativity’ 
(1993), referring to the discursive practices and acts of repetition through which 
bodies become engendered in order to present the illusion of fixed identity or an 
inner essence or core. Gender therefore is not something that someone is, but 
something someone does (Halsema 2000: 15), through the performance or 
continuous repetition of norms (the heterosexual matrix) on masculinity, 
femininity and sexual desire. Most controversial has been Butler’s usage of the 
phenomenon of drag, which she uses to illustrate the performativity of gender 
in Gender Trouble. Drag par excellence reveals the fictionality and imitative 
structure of gender identity, as it is ‘a parody of the very notion of an original’ 
(1990: 138). In effect drag shows that all appearances of gender, of femininity 
and masculinity are performances, or ‘stylized repetitions of acts’ (140) in 
themselves. Problematic in the subsequent reception of Gender Trouble was 
that the example of drag was emphasised to the extent that Butler was 
interpreted as if gender was always a performance in the sense of a playful act 
and drag the means by which gender identity could be playfully ‘subverted’. In 
Bodies that Matter (1993), Butler takes on this misinterpretation and charge, 
firstly in an attempt to rethink the link between gender performativity and the 
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materiality of the body and re-stress the perforceability of the heterosexual 
matrix (x): 
 
For if I were to argue that genders are performative, that could mean that 
I thought that one woke in the morning, perused  the closet or some more 
open space for the gender of choice, donned that gender for the day; and 
then restored the garment to its place at night. Such a wilful and 
instrumental subject, one who decides on  its gender, is clearly not its 
gender from the start and fails to realize that its existence is already 
decided by gender.   
 
The eradication of the sex/gender distinction through a radical constructionist 
stance has nevertheless continued to be interpreted by many as a disregard or 
even outright denial of the body and materiality. The deconstruction of sex, the 
‘fluidity’ of the body and the suggestion of a kind of voluntarism and 
playfulness regarding what were hereto considered certain and fixed essences 
and roles, have therefore been ideas that have been received and appropriated in 
various ways. Whilst for some an understanding of sex/gender that has been 
influenced by ‘postmodern deconstruction’ may delegitimise feminist politics 
(e.g., among feminists within the academy such as Elisabeth Schüssler 
Fiorenza, but also the grassroots activists at Beijing), for others it may refer to 
an equally dangerous celebration of liberal pluralism and individualism 
(Braidotti). For many conservatives then again, deconstruction at both the levels 
of discourse (Butler) and biology (Fausto-Sterling) is perceived as a serious 
threat to traditional certainties concerning roles, identities and ‘proper’ sexual 
behaviour.     
 
 
Gender Theory versus Sexual Difference Theory 
 
On the once so promising idea of gender as an analytical concept for feminist 
research has not only been cast doubt by various feminist researchers, including 
erstwhile proponents, wary of the way it is currently being claimed and de-
politicised inside and outside of the academy. Towards the end of the twentieth 
century this questioning can also be contextualised in what seems to be a 
polarisation between two schools of feminist thought, that of the ‘feminist 
gender theorists’ versus the ‘sexual difference theorists’ (Foster 1999). Rosi 
Braidotti (1994a, 1994b, 2000b) is one of the important sexual difference 
theorists to have explicitly critiqued the ‘hegemony’ of the concept of gender in 
feminist theory and women’s studies (2000b: 5), claiming that the notion has 
reached ‘a crisis -point in feminist theory and practice and that it is undergoing 
intense criticism, both for its theoretical inadequacy and for its politically 
amorphous and unfocussed nature’ (1994b: 49).  
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Important in what Braidotti perceives as a crisis point is the conversion 
of what can be id entified as previously relatively independent strands of 
feminist theorising, the first being the French or French-inspired strand and the 
second the gender theory of the Anglo-American tradition. As part of what can 
be viewed as a general shift in feminis t theory, from the critique of patriarchy to 
a focus on difference and a reclaiming of women’s perspective and 
experience17, French theories of sexual difference such as the ‘écriture 
féminine’ movement have flourished since the eighties. Theoretically, French 
feminist thought draws on various frameworks from linguistics, literary studies, 
semiotics, philosophy and psychoanalytic theories of the subject, focussing 
primarily on the links between language, representation, the symbolic and 
materiality in the differences between the sexes.18 
From the perspective of sexual difference theory which is clearly rooted 
in a disciplinary orientation towards the humanities, ‘gender’ disregards the 
semiotic and symbolic in favour of an emphasis on material and social factors. 
Socialisation theories of gender for example that focus on the way the 
individual acquires a social gender identity and relates to other gendered 
individuals, have been criticised for their neglect of individual variance. Gender 
approaches have similarly been critiqued for disregarding the role of the 
unconscious and their reductionism of power relations to the mere description 
of the social roles assigned to women and men (Brouns 1995: 55; Scott 1995 
[1985]: 156). As Braidotti (1994b: 50) notes however, the influence of broader 
cultural contexts and intellectual traditions runs deep. There is the mere fact 
that the term ‘gender’ belongs to the English language, the sex/gender 
distinction making ‘neither epistemological nor political sense in many non-
English, Western European contexts, where the notions of “sexuality” and 
“sexual difference” make much more sense’. 
From the perspective of gender theorists then again, or at least those 
Anglo -American situated feminist scholars more inclined to empirically 
grounded research in the social sciences and humanities, both the textual 
emphasis, the idealism and the (biological) essentialism lurking in sexual 
difference theory have been highly problematic. From the perspective of 
feminist anthropology for example, the influence of psychoanalytic thought 
upon many French feminist scholars is particularly problematic (e.g., Lacanian 
psychoanalysis), as it assumes the primacy and original nature of binary sexual 
difference, - through universalisations such as that of ‘phallo -logocentrism’ - 
often deemed ethnocentric from the anthropological or cross-cultural point of 
view (Moore 1994b: 21). Braidotti (1994b: 56) describes the polemic at its 
extreme as follows:    
 
…we came to two opposing claims: the argument that one needs to 
redefine the female feminist subject, which is reiterated by sexual 
difference theorists, is echoed by the contradictory claim of gender 
theorists, that the feminine is a morass of metaphysical nonsense and 
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that one is better off rejecting it altogether, in favour of a new 
androgyny.  
 
These two – albeit oversimplified – contradictory positions however, both circle 
around what can be seen as one of the central and persistent dilemmas of 
feminist research and politics, that of sameness or difference, or as Sandra 
Lipsitz Bem (1995) phrases it, the question is whether to ‘turn the volume down 
or up’ in order to dismantle gender polarisation and compulsory 
heterosexuality. According to Dudink (1998: 7) in the shift from ‘women’ to 
‘gender’ this tension repeatedly occurs: ‘the fact that feminism is organised on 
the denominator ‘women’, the denominator it is simultaneously – at least in its 
undesirable and constricting effects – trying to undo’.  
In the nineties however, the situation becomes more complex as cross-
fertilisations across the divides have occurred among both gender theorists and 
what Rita Felski (1997: 4) calls a ‘second generation’ of sexual difference 
theorists writing in Europe, Australia and the US. The latter includes Braidotti 
herself, but also figures such as Elizabeth Grosz (1994) and Drucilla Cornell. 
Gender theorists previously neglecting the issue of sexuality have thereby 
applied poststructuralist thought, of which Joan Scott’s (1986 [1985]) definition 
of gender is a prominent and early example. This has been done in an attempt to 
provide a more intersectional account of the symbolic/semiotic, the discursive, 
the social and the material dimensions. Judith Butler’s (1990) deconstruction of 
the sex/gender distinction can be seen in the same light, yet it is problematic in 
its interpretation for a ‘disregard of the body’ as referred to earlier. The second 
generation of sexual difference theorists then again, continue to remain 
committed to the primacy of sexual difference, yet ‘seek to legitimate sexual 
difference as a foundational category of feminist thought while simultaneously 
emptying it of any normative or essentialist content’ (Felski 1997: 4). For 
Braidotti (2000b: 7) however, at the dawn of the millennium, gender remains 
‘too polyvalent as concept to be really universally helpful’, as it does not 
sufficiently stress ‘the embodied female subject’, nor the question of feminist 
politics or agency  (6): 
 
I would like to try to reconnect the wilful agency required of politics 
with the respect that is due, both theoretically and ethically, to the 
affective, libidinal and therefore contradictory structures of the subject. 
Sexuality is also crucial to this way of thinking about the subject. Gende 
[sic] theory does not help me at all in this task.                                                                                       
 
Contra Braidotti, and in spite of the apparent crisis and (mis)appropriations of 
gender as a useful category of analysis narrated above, I would nevertheless 
argue that gender remains helpful precisely because of its great polyvalence 
which allows for rather than impedes ‘universal’ heuristic applicability. First 
however, I will return to the status of feminist research on religion regarding 
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some of these issues, in view of the argument put forward earlier that feminist 
religious studies in many respects appears to be ‘lagging behind’. 
     
 
Feminist Gender Studies In Religion? 
 
Although some of the more recent cross-fertilisations between sexual difference 
theory and gender theory summarised above have been introduced in feminist 
religious studies, such as in the feminist philosophy of religion (e.g., Anderson 
1998; Jantzen 1998; Klein 1995), feminist theology (e.g. Eriksson 1995; 
Gerhart 1995; Graff 1995), and feminist ‘thealogy’ or spirituality (e.g. Mantin 
2001), my contention is the following. Not only has gender theory failed to 
transform the mainstream study of religion (a paradigm shift in the first sense), 
but as of yet it has hardly been appropriated within the feminist study of 
religion (a shift in the second sense). Gender as a concept may be widely used, 
as it currently is in many areas of mainstream scholarship in the Anglo-
American world or contexts of scholarship and publication in English. Yet, the 
application of gender theory, involving an array of perspectives and debates on 
epistemology, methodology and feminist politics, to use Ursula King’s words, 
indeed, ‘has hardly begun’.    
Although some more specific arguments will be gradually put forward 
throughout the following chapters, my opting for and defence of a gender rather 
than a sexual difference approach in the first place revolves around the issue of 
tradition and disciplinary orientation as alluded to in the above account. From a 
social scientific perspective that places value on cross-cultural comparison and 
empirical research, I argue that a gender approach is better equipped for the 
study of religion. Firstly, it must be noted that women’s/gender/feminist studies 
can be viewed as an interdisciplinary field par excellence, in as much as the 
‘discipline’ of religious studies can be viewed to be poised between the 
humanities and social sciences, an important issue to which I shall frequently 
return. Feminist research challenges the rigidity – or what Chela Sandoval 
(2000 [1995]: 385) calls the ‘current apartheid of theoretical domains’ - of 
many mainstream disciplinary boundaries through cross-fertilisations and 
methodological borrowings that I consider highly productive and many of 
which I will be selectively drawing on.  
In the framework of an engendering of religious studies however, I shall 
argue that the appropriation of gender as an analytical concept vis-à-vis the 
mainstream study of religion offers particular challenges that do not arise in the 
case of an orientation more towards the humanities. My objective thus differs 
significantly from the perspectives and appropriations of  - predominantly - 
sexual difference theory as applied in more philosophical, theological or even 
literary (e.g., Clément and Kristeva 2001; Irigaray 1999) approaches as in the 
type of scholarship referred to under the heading of this paragraph. Moreover, it 
is my intention to eventually show how it is precisely the specificity of the 
 CHAPTER ONE  
 
 
31
subject matter we are dealing with – religion – which brings up these challenges 
facing any paradigm shift or the possibility of a gender-critical turn.                                          
Ursula King and Randi Warne’s assessments of the contemporary status 
of gender studies in religion aside, it can be stated that neither gender as an 
analytical concept, nor gender theory and methodology have been applied to 
any great extent in the practice of religious studies so far. As will be shown in 
the following two chapters, both ‘feminism’ and ‘women’ do continue to 
feature prominently in contemporary research, but little is there to be found on 
the dynamics of important theoretical debates on the notions of and relations 
between concepts of ‘women’, ‘gender’, ‘feminism’, ‘agency’, etc. of the likes 
only briefly touched upon above. If there is moreover, then there does not 
appear to exist much deep-going reflection on the possible implications of these 
debates for the study of religion .  
Take Darlene Juschka’s (1999) recent review article ‘The Category of 
Gender in the Study of Religion’ published in MTSR for example. After some 
fifteen pages of plain summaries on how feminist scholars have theorised 
gender, in works covering a vast time span and working in diverse areas as 
anthropology (Sherry Ortner 1974), philosophy of science (Evelyn Fox Keller), 
law (Catherine MacKinnon), film and literature studies (Teresa de Lauretis 
1987), French materialist feminist theory (Christine Delphy 2001 [1993]) and 
postmodern feminist philosophy (Linda Nicholson 1990), Juschka concludes 
that this literature shows that there are several problems with the concept of 
gender at hand. These concern familiar arguments that have been referred to 
earlier, such as the sex/gender dichotomy and the way it replicates a 
problematic nature/culture divide, or the way gender has replaced the categories 
of women and feminism to a large degree, including in religious studies. 
Juschka (1999: 92) claims the following: 
 
The intention of the category of women in the study of religion was/is to 
record women’s participation that had, hitherto, gone unmarked. 
Feminist studies then entered the study of religion challenging 
ideological presuppositions and structures that demonstrated not only 
androcentrism, but sexism. Gender as a heuristic  category seeks to 
analyze human behaviour, pretending to be neutral in a way that 
‘women’  and ‘feminism’ are not. But is it neutral since when we say 
‘gender’ we mean women and exclude the political. Why is it that if we 
pretend it is not about the polit ical we are being neutral? Is it neutral to 
obfuscate oppression?   
 
Juschka then goes on to make her case against gender analysis – for reasons that 
meanwhile ring familiar - in religious studies by critiquing the way gender is 
appropriated in two particular and recent texts. Juschka locates these 
publications in the area of religious studies, being John Hawley’s 
Fundamentalism and Gender published in 1994 and Ursula King’s Religion and 
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Gender (1995a) that was extensively treated in the beginning of this chapter. 
The choice for Hawley might seem somewhat peculiar, as the study of 
fundamentalism generally is more of a novel and separate area and not so much 
at the centre of religious studies research. Moreover, this work has been 
criticised on several grounds from the perspective of other gendered approaches 
on the phenomenon of fundamentalism by now, including the kind of criticism 
which Juschka appropriates in defence of her case against gender.  
Joan Mencher (1997: 5) in her general introduction to the volume Mixed 
Blessings: Gender and Fundamentalism Cross Culturally (Brink and Mencher 
1997) for example, critiques Hawley for taking a masculine rather than a 
feminist point of view, for failing to pay attention to the way women 
themselves in daily practices and contexts deal with fundamentalist movements. 
Juschka is similarly critical of the way gender ideologies are the main focus in 
Hawley and that they are often de-contextualised according to a ‘gender 
ideology continuum representative of Western epistemology’ (95). This 
ultimately leads Juschka to the inevitable conclusion that as a category gender 
must be discarded as it is simply reified and treated ontologically. For Brink 
and Mencher (1997) however, equally adamant on a feminist approach that 
does not lose the subjectivity of and contextualisation of women, such critique 
does not necessarily or automatically entail a rejection of the concept of gender, 
as is attested in the very title of their book.       
Ursula King’s (1995a, b) appropriation of the category of gender is 
critiqued for some of the same reasons and particularly the way the concept and 
its relation to ‘women’ and ‘feminism’ is under-theorised as set out in the 
beginning of this chapter. In the end however, for Juschka both Hawley and 
King prove inevitable points: in gender analysis both the feminist edge is lost 
and the body and sexuality remain out of sight (104): 
 
Gender as an ontological category of analysis separates off the historical 
and social aspects of sex and in this undercuts feminist arguments that 
seek justice for all women. Feminists do themselves a disservice by 
assuming this category that has historically been the means by which 
women have been oppressed. Our genders are not coats placed on the 
rack of the sexed body. We are sexed beings who have been caught up 
in the valuation of sex, whether as oppressors or the oppressed, and so 
sex as both historical and social construction requires theorization. Sex 
requires deconstruction and not reification as that which acts as the 
ground for gender.  
 
At this point I would not only remark that again this is a misinterpretation of the 
way gender is used in current feminist gender theory, but especially draw 
attention to the fact that Juschka’s discussion does not bear upon any of the 
implications of gender or feminist research altogether on the study of religion. 
The arguments advanced appear to cut across disciplines and concern feminist 
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critique and scholarship in general, but do not offer any concrete 
methodological suggestions for the feminist study of religion in particular. 
Juschka’s (2001) recent reader Feminism in the Study of Religion, which for 
perhaps the first time brings together important articles published in the field of 
feminist research in religion during the past decades, in its representative 
selection I think illustrates this point rather well.  
In the first of five groupings of articles in the book, out of the six essays 
in total under the header ‘intersections of feminist theoretical insights and 
feminist theory in the study of religion’, only one article – by Randi Warne 
(2001 [1998]) – actually concerns such an intersection. The other five articles 
are more general articles in feminist theory (e.g. Ortner 1974), not concerning 
the study of religion in particular. The same ratio occurs in part five on 
‘feminist responses to theoretical issues in the study of religion’. Only one 
essay (Christ 1991) consists of such a response. Other essays are reprints of – 
nevertheless practically classic – essays including one on feminist standpoint 
theory (by e.g., Nancy Hartsock 1997 [1983]), and engagements between 
feminism and postmodern and poststructuralist theory (Judith Butler 1992; Kate 
Nash 1994), again none of which are individually concerned with religion. In 
fact, these lacunae I would argue characterise the general tenet of the whole 
volume. Out of some thirty-one essays supposedly dedicated to the topic of 
feminism in the study of religion, only approximately a third of the 
contributions concerns religion as its subject matter. If anything, this recent 
reader shows how the intersection between gender theory and methodology and 
the study of religion is only in its infancy, and continues to lag behind in 
comparison to other areas of research in many respects. 
As always however, there are exceptions, of which Caroline Walker 
Bynum’s (1986) general introduction to the reader Gender and Religion: On the 
Complexity of Symbols (Bynum, Harrell  and Richman 1986) can be considered 
a fine example. Published too long ago to be held accountable for not taking 
certain gender theory discussions into account, Bynum’s (1986: 2) approach is 
nonetheless innovative in the way gender is applied as an analytical concept in 
the study of religion. For Bynum critically addresses the mutual implications of 
such a move, by asking: ‘what it means to take gender seriously in studying 
religion and what it means to take religion seriously when asking questions 
about gender’. It is clearly stated in this introduction that the goal of the book is 
not to remedy the earlier neglect of women’s religious lives (the ‘add women 
and stir’ technique) nor to critique or explain ‘male dominance’ in religious 
traditions as such (like in earlier work e.g., Sanday 1981). Rather, the focus is 
on both religion and gender as polysemic concepts, in a usage of the latter 
which bears much resemblance to Joan Scott’s (1996 [1986]) multi-dimensional 
and interdisciplinary concept of gender contrived in roughly the same period. 
While the main area of interest is the meaning of religious symbols, the analysis 
is not limited to how religion relates to gender at the level of symbolism or 
ideology alone (as in Juschka’s critique of Hawley above). Rather, the question 
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is how religious symbols relate to genderedness and to people’s experiences as 
gendered beings (2-3):       
      
Gender-related symbols, in their full complexity, may refer to gender in 
ways that affirm or reverse it, support or question it; or they may, in 
their basic meaning, have little at all to do with male and female roles. 
Thus our analysis admits that gender-related symbols are sometimes 
‘about’ values other than gender. But our analysis also assumes that all 
people are ‘gendered’. It therefore suggests, at another level, that not 
only gender-related symbols but all symbols arise out of the experience 
of ‘gendered’ users. It is not possible ever to ask How does a symbol – 
any symbol – mean? Without asking For whom does it mean?       
 
I think what Bynum is aiming at here, is a flexible, multi-dimensional 
understandin g of the relationship of gender and religion, which incorporates 
different levels and questions the relationship between them. It furthermore 
points to what I see as different ways of potentially addressing these 
relationships in a comparative, social scientific way: How is religion 
experienced or constructed through gender? And conversely: How do religions 
construct gender differently? How does religion function as a vehicle for the 
production and reproduction of gender constructions and relations? In a 
sociological approach towards gender the emphasis will most likely lie on level 
of institutions and experience. William H. Swatos’s (1994) volume of articles 
Gender and Religion for example, is divided into two parts, the first grouping 
contributions focussing on how gender relations affect women’s exercise of 
professional religious functions, the second part dealing with the ways gender 
structures religious experience. Catherine Wessinger’s (1996) volume is 
another example of research into the roles of women as leaders in mainstream 
Christian and Jewish religious institutions, from a historical and sociological-
descriptive perspective. However, in the latter two works, the relationship 
between experience and practice on the one hand and ideology and symbolism 
from a social constructionist or feminist gender theoretical perspective does not 
stand central. Tessa Bartholomeusz’s (1994) historical, anthropological and 
political study of the tradition of Buddhist female world renunciation in Sri 
Lanka on the other hand, is a fine example of a more interdisciplinary approach 
focussing upon both daily actual practice and the way this relates to political 
and religious ideology concerning women’s roles in religion, but it again, 
conversely does not employ any gender theory.                
Perhaps one of the rare exceptions to apply feminist gender theory in the 
social scientific and comparative study of religion is the work of Israeli 
anthropologist Susan Starr Sered (1992, 1994a, b, 1998, 1999a, b, 2001).19 
Whereas in some of her earlier work (e.g. Women as Ritual Experts: The 
Religious Lives of Elderly Jewish Women in Jerusalem 1992, Priestess, Mother, 
Sacred Sister: Religions Dominated by Women  1994a, and ‘Religious Rituals 
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and Secular Rituals: Interpenetrating Models of Childbirth in a Modern, Israeli 
Context’ 1994b), Sered’s focus has predominantly been on the religious lives of 
women, later the concept of gender features much more prominently in her 
vocabulary. However, this is not to be seen as a mere change in terminology or 
the simple inclusion of the issue of masculinity or men such as Ursula King 
(1995b) proposes, but as a serious attempt to apply important discussions in 
feminist gender theory to the study of religion (e.g. Sered 1998, 1999a), 
appropriating gender in such a polyvalent manner as to allow an avoidance of 
the setbacks more disciplinary bound approaches carry.  
In ‘”Woman” as Symbol and Women as Agents: Gendered Religious 
Discourses and Practices’ (1999b), Sered emphasises that in analysing gender 
in religious systems two ‘ontologically different sets of issues’ are at stake 
(194). First of all there is the issue of actual women, real people having various 
degrees of religious agency within specific situations. Secondly according to 
Sered there is Woman as a symbolic construct ‘conflating gender, sex, and 
sexuality, and comprised of allegory, ideology, metaphor, fantasy, and (at least 
in male-dominated religions) men’s psychological projections’. The problem is 
that in much religious studies scholarship, these two distinct categories are 
easily conflated, a point which will be taken up again in the following chapters. 
Although there are additional reasons for this conflation to which I shall also be 
returning, one reason as also Sered claims, lies in the disciplinary perspective as 
was also denoted above. Whereas ‘Woman’ has mostly been the subject matter 
of scholars of religion situated in the humanities (Sered mentions goddesses, 
demonesses, myths, etc.), social scientists have been much more inclined to 
study ‘women’, such as in their religious roles and religious participation (e.g. 
the examples cited above). Sered’s call is then for more cross-fertilisation 
between the humanities and the social sciences and moreover, where the 
intersection between cultural symbols and real people would become the focus 
of study (216): 
 
Social scientists have a great deal to learn from the careful textual 
analysis that allows a historical view of religious development, detailed 
understandings of myths and symbols, insight into the power of religion 
to engage and motivate believers, and engaged depictions of human 
religious beliefs. At the same time, historians of religion have a great 
deal to learn from the study of social structure that gives meaning to 
texts and rituals, and that facilitates examination of human agency in 
context. The next round could fruitfully take a more subtle look at the 
interplay of myths, symbols, rituals, life experiences, resources, social 
contexts, and social structure.                        
  
Whereas Sered’s focus is on ‘women’ here, it is definitely non-essentialist and 
akin to the constructionist and multidimensional gender approach such as that 
of Joan Scott. In her recent publications based on anthropological research on 
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gender and religion, particularly that on religious practices in Okinawa, the only 
contemporary society in which women lead the official mainstream religion, the 
integration of gender theory is even more pronounced (1998, 1999a, 2001). 
Sered’s theoretical borrowings and framework I believe, can be viewed as the 
result a sort of convergence between recent feminist anthropological theorising 
and feminist gender theory, including its appropriation of feminist 
poststructuralist thought and a deconstructive approach towards sex/gender. In 
chapter four I shall be taking a closer look at the methodological practicalities 
of such an approach when applied to the study of religion and gender. For the 
moment, I will briefly elaborate on the conceptual aspects, in order to argue 
further what appears to me to be a fruitful approach in the application of gender 
as a category of analysis in the study of religion, and one that crosses some of 
the disciplinary divides referred to above.  
   
 
The Polyvalence and Practice of Gender 
 
Since the introduction of the concept of gender in feminist research and theory, 
historical and cross-cultural research par excellence have proven the variability 
in the ways femininity and masculinity are constructed in relation to each other. 
In anthropological research, which takes a comparative approach however, the 
question had been how upon the fixed biological categories of sexual 
difference, gender is constructed in culturally different or variable ways. So if 
the feminist anthropologist can be said to be primarily interested in the ways 
‘culture’ (rituals, economy, kinship,…) is experienced and structured through 
gender, then an anthropologist in general would in the first place be focussed on 
the way gender is experienced through culture (Moore 1988: 9). For religious 
studies, the same ‘two-way’ question applies as was stated earlier.   
In anthropology, after the phase of the ‘anthropology of women’, Sherry 
Ortner and Harriet Whitehead’s Sexual Meanings (1981a) can be cited as 
illustrative of the growing constructionist trend. Both gender and sexuality are 
treated as symbols, as parts of different possible gender ideologies. 
Additionally, different social contexts are delineated in which these cultural 
notions of gender and sexuality are given form, such as the realm of kinship and 
marriage, and especially the domain of prestige structures. Their work is still 
structuralist in the sense that male dominance - albeit in diversified forms – is 
understood to derive from their position in the public sphere. In their  
introduction Ortner and Whitehead (1981b: 1) suggest that: ‘… the natural 
features of gender, and natural processes of sex and reproduction, furnish only a 
suggestive and ambiguous backdrop to the cultural organization of gender and 
sexuality’ (italics mine). However gender was culturally and culturally variably 
constructed, it still was understood to be connected to or arising from the 
evident and exclusive sexual difference between women and men. The problem 
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however, was how and to what extent it was possible to argue that gender was 
not determined by biology.            
  A number of anthropologists noticed how the sex/gender distinction 
becomes untenable through the confrontation with cultures in which such 
nature/cultures divides do not make sense. Thus Sylvia Yanagisako and Jane 
Collier (1987, 1990) argue towards the end of the eighties that the sex/gender 
distinction as much as many other binary categorisations (nature/culture, 
public/private, practical/symbolic, production/reproduction) was simply 
eurocentric and part of a Western folk-model. The authors therefore severely 
question its universality and analytic utility. Yanagisako and Collier (1987: 15) 
question whether ‘cross-cultural variations in gender categories and inequalities 
are merely diverse elaborations and extensions of the same natural fact’ or (48):   
 
… we suggested that feminism’s next contribution to the study of 
gender and kinship should be to question the difference between women 
and men. We do not doubt that men and women are different, just as 
individuals differ, generations differ, races differ, and so forth. Rather, 
we question whether the particular biological difference in reproductive 
function that our culture defines as the basis for difference between 
males and females, and so treats as the basis of their relationship, is used 
by other societies to constitute the cultural categories of male and 
female. 
 
Feminist anthropology since gender would develop at an analytical and 
theoretical level towards the study of gender instead of women, whereby the 
interrelations between women and men in the structuring of society, ideologies, 
economic systems and political structures could no longer be conceived of as a 
side-issue (Moore 1988: 6). That constructions of gender could take on variable 
forms was even expanded to an intra-cultural level, upon the insight that 
different or even opposing gender ideologies - depending on the context and the 
person - are possible within cultural wholes (Sanday and Goodenough 1990).  
However, for decades anthropologists have been searching for analytical 
tools and concepts in order to understand phenomena such as transvestism or 
homosexuality that would be more in congruence with the native point of view. 
The ‘berdache’ phenomenon among the North-American Indians, an 
institutionalised role for (biological) men or women fulfilling roles that lie 
outside of the two gender categories, is often taken as illustrative of the 
existence of third or fourth gender categories in other cultures (Longman 1999a, 
b, 2002).  Although they may not have explicitly questioned the sex/gender 
model, a number of anthropologists since the seventies has drawn attention to 
the way other cultures perceive the physical differences between people, that do 
not necessarily comply with the dichotomous classifications that dominate in 
the West (Kessler and McKenna 1978; Martin and Voorhies 1975). Thus 
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feminist anthropologist Henrietta Moore (1993: 198) more recently argues that 
much ethnographic material suggests that: 
 
…the differences between women and men which other cultures 
naturalize and locate in the human body, and in features of the physical 
and cosmological environment, are not necessarily those which 
correspond to the constellation of features on which Western discourse 
bases its categorizations.    
 
For example, Moore refers to the Khumbo in Nepal who allocate social 
differences between women and men in the body as ‘natural’, but the female 
and male, flesh and bone are also located in all bodies. Research on many 
Native American societies has also shown that gender categories are often 
determined in terms of roles rather than sexual assignment or sexual preference 
(e.g. Jacobs, Thomas and Lang 1997; Roscoe 1998). As Susan Sered (2001: 
153) argues on the basis of her own research among the people of Okinawa 
(1998, 1999a) and in referring to other societies, ‘few traits are recognised as 
gendered; only external genitalia or pregnancy are perceived and acknowledged 
as essential differences, while other attributes and roles, even if they tend to be 
associated with men or women, are understood to be temporal or local rather 
than essential.’ In many other cultures however, paradigms of sex/gender 
dualisms reign and are ‘naturalised’ beyond the individual body to aspects of 
cosmology and religious ideology, as is in most societies of the Mediterranean 
cultural type (e.g. Bourdieu 1990 [1980/1970], 2001; Delaney 1991).  
The dichotomous sex/gender dichotomy thus becomes superfluous from 
the viewpoint of cross-cultural comparison and comparative historical analysis, 
as also testified in the various contributions to Gilbert Herdt’s (1994a) Third 
Sex, Third Gender. As Herdt (1994b) argues in his lengthy introduction to the 
book, classifications of sex/gender show tremendous variety across space and 
time, from the medieval sodomite to the dominant ontology of a one-sex/two-
genders model in pre-modern Europe as hypothesised by Thomas Laqueur 
(1990). Herdt attributes the dominance of the two-sexes/two-genders model that 
has governed Western thought in modern times to what he terms Darwinian 
‘sexual dimorphism’, revealing an underlying reproductive paradigm of science 
and society, which to date is ‘represented as if it were a uniform law of nature 
like gravity’ (1994b: 26). This essentialist thinking continued under the 
development of sexology in the nineteenth century and is similarly replicated in 
its contemporary forms of essentialism/constructionism, biology/culture, sex as 
biological/gender as learned. Again, as Herdt (1994b: 31) argues, although 
critical learning theory and the emphasis on the social construction of gender 
have provided an ‘antidote’ to downright essentialism, ‘this appearance is, like 
all varieties of essentialist and constructionist ideas, in part illusory because it 
assumes that learning gender identities takes place only with respect to the 
dimorphic two-sex system of male and female.’ Moore’s (1994: 15) argument, 
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yet from an anthropological rather than a historical perspective is markedly 
similar: 
 
Sex, then, as far as we understand it within the terms of western 
discourse, is something which differentiates between bodies, while 
gender is a set of variable constructions placed upon those differentiated 
bodies. It is precisely this formula which obscures rather than 
illuminates when it comes to the cross-cultural analysis of sex, sexual 
difference and gender.    
                
Moore (1999: 153) has also noticed how some of this theorising on sex/gender 
– referring to Yanagisako and Collier, but Herdt can definitely be added here – 
is clearly marked by the entry of neo-Foucauldian thought into anthropology. 
Judith Butler’s (1990) inversion of the sex/gender scheme is then exemplary of 
such a congruency between feminist poststructuralist thought and this kind of 
anthropological work. Moore thereby quotes this oft-cited passage by Michel 
Foucault (1990 [1978]: 154): 
 
…the notion of ‘sex’ made it possible to group together, in an artificial 
unity, anatomical elements, biological functions, conducts, sensations, 
and pleasures, and it enabled one to make use of this fictitious unity as a 
causal principle, an omnipresent meaning, a secret to be discovered 
everywhere: sex was thus able to function as a unique signifier and as a 
universal signified.          
 
What Foucault did for sex, Butler did for gender, as in her reading of Foucault, 
not only is binary sex the effect of a specific discourse, but so is gender. The 
distinction between the two therefore falls away.20 The de-naturalisation and 
de-essentialisation, or deconstruction of sex/gender would then involve a 
questioning or unmasking of the radical contingency of the hegemonic 
discourses constitutive of these rigid constricting effects, or from the 
anthropological perspective the cultural embeddedness – and thus variability - 
of particular sex/gender systems or ontologies. Here, what Butler identifies as 
the ‘heterosexual matrix’ or ‘compulsory heterosexuality’ can be aligned with 
for example Gayle Rubin’s much older ‘sex/gender system’ (1997 [1975]) or 
what Herdt (1994b) terms the Darwinian legacy of the paradigm of ‘sexual 
dimorphism’.     
However, in the deconstruction and de-universalisation of sex/gender, 
both in terms of feminist politics and strategies of resistance, and also the - 
equally politically informed - de-colonisation of Western schemes of thought 
and classification in their application to other (often non-Western) cultures and 
societies, the dethroning of the very concept of gender as a primary organising 
principle is also potentially implied. Earlier, some feminist concerns regarding 
the loss of political element have been referred to above, as others have 
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signalled how at the level of theory and analysis ‘gender’ is reified in a 
problematic way, for instance as an explanans (Hawkesworth 1997), or the 
endpoint of analysis rather than a methodological tool (Dudink 1998). A recent 
‘postcolonial’ critique offered by anthropologist Oyeronke Oyewumi (1998), 
nevertheless presents some additional important and challenging concerns. In a 
critical review article of ‘Confounding Gender’ by the same Hawkesworth 
(1997) mentioned above, Oyewumi (1998: 1050) criticises the way the author 
fails to incorporate a notion of ‘culture’, as is common among many feminist 
theories of gender:  
 
Gender is first and foremost a cultural construct. As such, it is 
intelligible only in a cultural frame; any theory of gender, therefore, 
must be attentive to the fact that there are many cultures in the world 
and Western culture is only one of them. Thus any claims made on the 
basis of studies in one culture cannot necessarily hold true for other 
cultures and should not be universalized. Many Western theorists of 
gender seem to be impervious to the existence of other cultures; they 
make their case for gender from the narrow confines of the West.  
 
So far Oyewumi’s argument is consistent with my own comparative positioning 
on the necessity to theorise gender not only as culturally constructed, but indeed 
what is often overlooked from a eurocentric point of view, that gender is 
culturally variably constructed. This anthropological perspective on gender can 
to some extent be aligned with what has grown to be a more intersectional 
approach to gender. The construction of categories and identities often takes 
place through the intersection of multiple axes of oppression, apart from 
gender, being ‘race’, class, ethnicity, sexuality, etc. This insight can be 
attributed to developments in second-wave feminism. Women living in the 
Western world became highly critical of the way second wave feminism was 
often extremely limited in focus and exclusionary in its ignorance of the 
different experiences of women from ‘minority’ groups. Thus ‘women of 
colour’ in the U.S. claimed that their experience of subordination could not be 
attributed to ‘male dominance’ alone, but that sexism and racism were 
simultaneous experiences, unacknowledged by many ‘white middle class 
heterosexual’ feminists of the time.21      
Currently, the emphasis on the intersections between categories of 
identity has often become simply a form of tokenism among many Western 
feminist theorists. It is this type of work that Oyewumi fiercely repudiates. The 
‘usual caveat about how other social identities such as race and ethnicity are 
important’ (1051) is often included in such work. However, this does not 
prevent eurocentrism (or ‘Westocentrism’) in terms of universalist claims on 
the basis of empirical evidence limited to the Western world alone; Nor does it 
prevent generic notions of women and men, which in actual fact is limited to 
the experience of white women and men only, without qualifying these 
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limitations of scope explicitly. Oyewumi then takes her critique of feminist 
gender analysis a step further, by referring to her own research on Yoruba 
culture of Southwestern Nigeria.22 According to Oyewumi, no matter what 
social constructionist feminist theories of gender purport to be, they cannot 
escape biological foundationalism or determinism. From a cross-cultural 
perspective this arises from a very specific conception of seeing the word or a 
particular culturally based cognitive schema in which gender is an ontological 
category. Oyewumi’s main thesis is that in the conceptual framework of the 
Yoruba by contrast, gender is ‘absent’ in both language and kinship categories. 
Categories are based on seniority and dependent on the speaker in any social 
situation. Concepts of power and authority are not gendered, nor do exclusive 
male or female social roles or identities exist. According to Oyewumi, the 
conclusion would be that if in the cognitive schema gender did not exist, neither 
would the social categories of ‘man’ or ‘woman’.  
Western feminists are therefore felt to be highly ethnocentric in the way 
they ‘continue to seek gender and male dominance in other cultures without 
first establishing whether gender as a social category is transcultural’ (1054). 
Oyewumi obviously raises some challenging issues for feminist gender analysis 
that behoves a further de-colonisation of its own grounds. In contrast to those 
feminist anthropologists (see above) who have been making similar points on 
the basis of empirical evidence on the way that bodies and identities are 
differentially constructed cross-culturally. For Oyewumi this must involve the 
eradication of gender as an analytical category in itself. Many questions can be 
raised regarding Oyewumi’s radical stance, - and not only what this gender 
studies scholar would then be researching in the future. One wonders for 
instance also to what extent Oyewumi – focussing primarily on ‘traditional 
language classification’ - takes the impact of (post)colonial historical processes 
and globalisation on Yoruba society into account.  
Oyewumi however, regrettably refuses to allow for a further 
sophistication and adjustment of feminist gender analysis on the basis of cross-
cultural analysis. She thereby fails to precisely situate feminist gender theory in 
its own cultural, historical and theoretical context. In the light of Oyewumi’s 
and other feminist anthropologists’ insights into the way gender is variably 
constructed, I would at least argue that in any case, the alternative of sexual 
difference theory is too culturally bound. For it is even more problematic in 
cross-cultural or universal terms. Oyewumi however, appears to be arguing that 
gender theory can never ‘escape’ biological determinism, and moreover that it 
always necessarily involves the question of universal ‘male dominance’, a point 
with which I from a cross-cultural perspective tend to equally disagree. For 
instance, Oyewumi justly draws attention to the fact that Judith Butler’s ideas 
put forward in Gender Trouble (1990) are limited to the context of Western 
society, but then fails to see that this is what Butler’s theory precisely and 
blatantly  is (1058): 
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It is difficult to sustain Butler’s notion that gender emanates from an 
imposition of compulsory heterosexuality if one looks at the category of 
the hijra in Indian culture or the female husband of the Igbo. From the 
Igbo standpoint, Butler, in order to sustain her narrative of ‘compulsory 
heterosexuality,’ obviously and mistakenly takes for granted the notion 
that sexual desire can be expressed only within the marriage institution. 
Many African societies organize marriage for reproduction but not 
necessarily to promote or support sexual desire between conjugal 
partners. In other words, there are institutionalized conjugal partnerships 
like the woman marriage that do not involve sexual intercourse. Believe 
me, ‘gender trouble’ is not universal. 
 
Even if Butler had claimed that the heterosexual matrix were universal, this 
would not leave much room for ideas about the possibility of subversion and 
resistance that the same author favours so dearly. Oyewumi consequently fails 
to appropriate Butler’s notion of compulsory heterosexuality for what it is from 
the perspective of cultural and historical analysis: a particular and therefore 
contingent discourse constitutive of a particular sex/gender system or cognitive 
schema that is currently hegemonic in certain parts of the world. Before turning 
to some others ways in which contemporary gender theory in the study of 
religion may profit further from the convergence – rather than the divergence – 
of feminist poststructuralist and anthropological perspectives on gender as 
analytical concept, some further answers to the challenges to gender that have 
been hereto screened will be discussed.           
Joanna Foster (1999) offers such a defence or more of a ‘clarification’ of 
feminist gender theory in the face of some of the critiques by some ‘second 
generation’ sexual difference theorists23, which in the course of this chapter 
have been identified as one kind among criticism from many different angles. 
According to Foster, gender theory has been misinterpreted on three major 
grounds. First it has been accused of reifying a sex/gender distinction, (as also 
the case in Oyewumi’s postcolonial critique). Secondly, the by now more than 
familiar critique of gender theory for its erasure of the category ‘woman’ and 
the consequential de-politisation is also misplaced in Foster’s view. Finally, the 
accusation that gender theory would be more focussed on the material – it is 
assumed that Foster is referring to social, economical ‘material’ reality here, 
and not so much ‘physical’ materiality – to the detriment of the symbolic (as in 
sexual difference theory) in order to understand ‘women’s experience’ would 
be unfair.  
In the first kind of misinterpretation for example, gender theory is 
mistakenly conflated with gender role theory according to earlier paradigms of 
socialisation. Whilst the latter used to leave issues of sexual desire and 
embodiment untheorised, current gender theory according to Foster (1999: 437) 
‘in no way assumes that there is a fixed relationship between sexed bodies, 
desires, or identities’ (438): 
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There is a good deal of current gender scholarship that conceptualizes 
gender not as functional interdependent roles based on heterosexist 
notions of biological sex but as social processes or practices that are 
shifting, historical, and produced on multiple levels of social 
organization. Moreover, unlike sexual difference theory, such a 
perspective has generated empirical research on the ways in which 
social structures of gender are inseparable from other axes of 
domination and subordination.    
 
It has already become clear what the benefits are of such an intersectional 
approach towards identity categories. From the perspective of both 
anthropological evidence as well as the critiques by feminists of colour on the 
problematic character of the categories of ‘women’ and ‘sexism’, a shift 
towards an intersectional approach allows for an analysis of the way categories 
are ‘produced and reproduced within particular sociohistorical and political 
contexts as part of the production and reproduction of inequality’ (Foster 1999: 
441). I would argue that the idea that the element of feminist critique would be 
lost in a gender approach, very much lies in the way power (often overlooked in 
Joan Scott’s definition of gender), and inequality are linked to identity, 
theorised and included in analysis. This in turn would imply a questioning of 
the notion of feminism itself, which under the influence of cross-cultural 
differences and increasing globalisation has moved far beyond the simple 
critique of the ‘universal subordination of women by men’. Oyewumi’s analysis 
– as many other anthropological material - offers a case in point here, as from 
the perspective of cross-cultural comparison, - hypothetically - gender systems 
may exist that do not imply notions of hierarchy or inequality. The question 
then becomes ‘does difference necessarily imply hierarchy?’; a question that in 
the context of the history of Western feminism itself has been asked many a 
time. 
An intersectional approach at least leaves more room to focus on the 
way categories of difference and identity such as gender, ethnicity, ‘race’, 
sexuality, etc., are continuously intertwined in processes of power, whilst an 
approach that attributes primacy or an ontological status to sexual difference 
becomes problematic from the perspective of cross-cultural comparison and 
multicultural reality today. Feminist anthropologist Kamala Visweswaran 
(1994: 75) for example, argues that a displacement of gender from the centre of 
feminist theory ‘starting from a consideration [of] how race, class, or sexuality 
determines the positioning of a subject – not with being “women,” but how 
women are different’, does not necessarily de-legitimise the possibility of 
feminist anthropology or more comparative research.   
Again related to the problem of sexual difference theory in cross-
cultural contexts, but, in Foster’s focus view to that of a social scientific 
perspective in general, is the accusation of gender theory supposedly 
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disregarding the symbolic. Again I concur with Foster that the problem lies in 
the way sexual difference theorists often understand the ‘symbolic’, in limited 
terms such as that of semiotics, accusing gender theorists of undertheorising the 
role of language and meaning in the reproduction of domination. However, as 
Foster argues, in sociology a strand such as symbolic  interactionism for 
example, also focuses on ‘meaning’, but more as a product of daily interaction 
between individuals than situated in language alone. Rather the ‘symbolic’ is 
much more broadly understood from the gender approach, and the challenge is 
to analyse the way it relates to other dimensions of gender and identity that can 
be viewed as more ‘material’. Again and as Foster notes, the appropriation of 
psychoanalytic theory and the notion of the ‘unconscious’ as among sexual 
difference theorists is far less central in the social sciences. 
The dichotomy between sexual difference theory and gender theory that 
has served as a way of delineating how gender as an analytical concept is 
proposed, is obviously greatly oversimplified. In many respects a choice 
between the two positions may even be seen as a false dilemma, as authors 
from both sides often draw from each other’s work in many fruitful ways. The 
recent attempts by sexual difference theorists to become less essentialist and for 
gender theorists to focus more on sexuality and embodiment shows how 
currently cross-borrowings and convergences are on the rise. That some of the 
differences can be attributed to disciplinary divides (social sciences versus 
humanities) has been emphasised throughout. One last aspect of gender as an 
analytical category  will be discussed in terms of its convergence with 
anthropology. 
 
Both feminist anthropologists Henrietta Moore (1993, 1994a, b, 1999) and 
Susan Sered (1998, 1999a, b) have adopted Judith Butler’s (1990, 1993) notion 
of gender as ‘performative’ in their anthropological work. As noted above 
according to Butler, the body is understood as ‘performative’ in the sense that 
the performing itself creates the illusion of a gender core. Butler thus critiques 
the sex/gender distinction by no longer focussing on the categories of identity 
themselves, but the actual processes that have lead to the formation of these 
categories. While Butler sees this process in terms of a particular historical 
hegemonic discourse that is continuously repeated in the discursive practices of 
concrete women and men, this ‘doing’ or ‘making’ of gender is by no means 
entirely novel, and indeed as Moore (1994: 91) remarks, not even that 
‘revolutionary’ from the anthropological point of view.  
Suzanne Kessler and Wendy McKenna in their Gender: An 
Ethnomethodological Approach for example, (1978) see the ‘world of two 
sexes’ as the result of what people do, that is a social and interactive process in 
which individuals constantly make gender attributions. The authors even 
suggest that in cultures where third and fourth gender categories exist, the 
gender role one exercises (for instance showing an interest for certain 
occupational activities) may in fact form the basis for gender attribution. This is 
 CHAPTER ONE  
 
 
45
opposed to the possession of particular genitals which serve as the fundament 
for gender attribution and the ‘natural attitude’ towards sex/gender in the West 
(38). This perspective on the doing or making of gender, whereby gender (or 
sex) is no longer seen as the fundament - or in Butler’s terms the ‘origins’ -, but 
as the particular result, depending on the context, in any case offers a fruitful 
way of the study of gender cross-culturally. The contingency of a dominant 
normative two-sexes/two-genders model can be shown, whereas it allows for an 
understanding of the processes or practices of gender construction in other 
places and times that are not founded in this particular paradigm. 
Feminist anthropologists and feminist poststructuralist feminist theorists 
have not been the only ones to have been occupied with the ‘deconstruction’ of 
binary categories and the emphasis on practice/process. Feminist sociologists 
have also theorised the shift of gender from category to dynamic process, 
including Foster (1999), whose arguments concerning on gender theory have 
already been discussed. In a groundbreaking article entitled ‘Doing Gender’, 
Candace West and Don Zimmerman (1987) suggest that gender is not so much 
an individual attribute, variable or role  – what Foster terms earlier gender role 
theory – but the product of the social doing of gender, the result of interaction 
between human beings. Gender is no longer seen as the result of a socialisation, 
but concerns a social and lifelong process of ‘gendering’. When this 
praxeological vision of gender is then linked to the more layered models like 
Joan Scott’s (1996 [1986]), gender can be studied as the product of social 
practices in all domains of social life, from the level of the individual 
(subjective identity) to institutions, the state and globalisation processes 
(structures) and the level of representation (symbols, images, etc.). According 
to Evelyn Nakano Glenn (1999: 5): 
 
The concept of gender thus provides an overarching rubric for looking at 
historical, cultural, and situational variability in definitions of 
womanhood and manhood, in meanings of masculinity and femininity, 
in relationships between men and women, and in the extent of their 
relative power and political status. If one accepts gender as variable, 
then one must acknowledge that it is never fixed, but is rather 
continually constituted and reconstituted.   
 
For Foster (1999: 444), this emphasis on the doing rather than the having of 
gender is furthermore an important difference with sexual difference theory that 
holds that men – carrying the Phallus – do not have a gender. Thus to theorise 
men as somehow removed from gender, ‘is to ignore how masculinities are 
shaped in various social and historical contexts and to gloss over the ways in 
which different groups of men “carry the Phallus” in disparate ways and with 
what consequences’. Besides the construction or performance of men and 
masculinity, gender also offers a way of theorising the intersections with other 
identity categories or performances, such as ‘race’, ethnicity, sexuality, and 
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class. What holds for gender as a constructed category, holds for these other 
categories in the same way. Different processes often work together and 
simultaneously: gender is always ‘raced’ or ‘classed’ and ‘race’, ethnicity and 
class are in turn always ‘gendered’ (see also ‘Doing Difference’ by West and 
Fenstermaker 1995; Barot, Bradley and Fenton 1999; Phoenix 1999; Yuval-
Davis 1998). 
From a feminist perspective gender will usually not be seen as a form of 
difference or a ‘neutral’ category, but always as a form of ‘power’ or an axis of 
social inequality next to ‘race’, class, etc. Gender is never constructed in a 
vacuum but within a field of other constructions of inequality producing 
‘multiple systems of subordination’ (Dirks, Eley and Ortner 1994: 35, Collins 
1999: 263). These theorisations of power, subordination and inequality and also 
politics are very much inspired by Foucauldian and Gramscian 
reconceptualisations of power and dominance. Feminist critique ever since the 
beginning of the second wave then again has maintained that the ‘personal is 
political’, arguing that the political and the workings of power are not limited to 
the institutional and public sphere, but operate in everyday relationships and 
practices. People do not just take on a particular role, but are continuously 
negotiating questions of power, authority and control over the definition of 
reality (Dirks, Eley and Ortner 1994). At the level of theory this 
reconceptualisation of power reappropriated in contemporary gender theory and 
social theory in general, can be ascribed to the work of Michel Foucault.  
Central in neofoucauldian theory is Foucault’s postulation that power 
must not be understood as a transcendental or universal urge (drift), or 
something that only belongs to repressive apparatuses. It is something that 
moves in social spaces and is not the prerogative of the powerful alone (Dirks, 
Eley and Ortner 1994). From thinkers such as Gramsci then again the idea is 
borrowed that the ‘taken-for-granted’ practices and assumptions make 
dominance seem natural and inevitable for both those in power as well as the 
subordinated. In gender theory, it is precisely the assumptions and practices 
concerning gender that seem ‘natural’ and do not necessarily accompany direct 
(physical) coercion. Thus as phrased by Glenn (1999: 13): ‘…contestations of 
race and gender hierarchies may involve challenging everyday assumptions and 
practices, may take forms that do not involve direct confrontation, and may 
occur in locations not considered political’. If gender-practices are seen as 
power-practices, then this leaves a broader interpretative frame in which is no 
longer thought in terms of (male) dominance or (female) victims in totally 
oppressive systems, but in which forms and gradations of power-processes 
between  people can be conceptualised.         
Rosalind C. Morris (1995) claims that the entrance of the notion of 
performativity into the anthropology of gender would have been doubtful in the 
absence of practice theory, ascribed to the work of mainstream 
anthropologists/theorists such as Pierre Bourdieu, Michel de Certeau and 
Marshall Sahlins. As Morris (571) notes: ‘Perhaps what made practice theory 
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most attractive to constructionist anthropologies of gender was its promise to 
overcome the Manichean oppositions between the given (which is not here 
reducible to the natural) and the constructed, with a more dialectical sense of 
how what is socially constructed comes to have the force of the given in 
individual lives’.  
Noteworthy here is Bourdieu’s (e.g. 1990 [1980]) work, such as his 
notion of the habitus, a set of structuring dispositions, ‘producing and produced 
by specifically embodied subjects’. In his typical style of moving beyond the 
objectivist/subjectivist divide in social science Bourdieu applied his theoretical 
framework to the study of gender, very much echoing the type of gender theory 
put forward in this chapter that has been developing for over a decade now. 
Especially his rereading of the construction of gender in Kabyle (2001) based 
on fieldwork in Algeria during a more structuralist phase (1990 [1980/1970]) 
can be seen as a fine example of the way compulsory heterosexuality, sexual 
dimorphism, the ‘natural attitude’, or what have you, - presumably deeply 
rooted in many Mediterranean cultures - is ‘performed’ at the level of 
cognition, and ‘inscribed’ or ‘somatised’ in bodily praxis, structure and 
ideology in a dialectical fashion. For example, Bourdieu (1997: 195-196) 
claims concerning gender in Kabyle and beyond: 
 
…these objective gendered divisions inscribed in the social order of 
things become inscribed into bodies in the form of dispositions and 
become subjective principles of vision, cognitive categories through 
which individuals come to see and construct the world as meaningful, 
lived reality. Being issued out of the world, such schemata of perception 
are accorded with the objective order of things and incline us to take the 
world as given. This spontaneous agreement of the social structures and 
cognitive structures – when it occurs – is the basis of the doxic 
experience of masculine domination as inscribed in the nature of things, 
invisible, unquestioned.  
 
Innovative, but using Henrietta Moore’s words again ‘not that revolutionary’ 
from the perspective of contemporary feminist gender theory. If gender theory 
is answering any charges from (second generation) sexual difference theory 
then this would be the question of embodiment and how the earlier sex/gender 
divide ‘neglected’ the one side of this mistaken dichotomy. Henrietta Moore 
(1994, 1999) in particular sees much potential in Rosi Braidotti’s ‘return to the 
body’, defined as ‘one’s primary location in the world’, being ‘neither a 
biological nor a sociological category but rather as a point of overlapping 
between the physical, the symbolic, and the sociological’ (Braidotti 1994: 4). 
From the perspective of cross-cultural comparison, the issue of embodied 
subjectivity as theorised in sexual difference theory still remains problematic 
though, in the way the influence of psychoanalytic thought renders the body 
and sexual difference ontological and primary status. In view of these 
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developments and reshufflings of concepts and positionings, for Moore (1999: 
168) there is all the more reason not to give up the sex/gender debate, albeit in a 
radically reconfigured way: 
 
Bodies are the site where subjects are morphologically and socially 
constructed, they mark the intersection of the social and the symbolic; 
each subject’s relation with his or her body is both material and 
imaginary. Sexed bodies cannot be comprehended either by arguing that 
all of sex is socially constructed or by arguing that there is a part of sex 
that remains outside social construction. Sex, gender and sexuality are 
the product of a set of interactions with material and symbolic 
conditions mediated through language and representation. We need to 
bring into connection and manage as a complex relation a radical 
materialism and a radical social constructionism. This what the 
sex/gender debate allows us to do. 
 
Although it remains to be seen in what directions the type of gender theory 
Moore suggests will go, from the ‘other’ side some exciting new work is being 
done. In many respects it is offering a reclaiming of gender from the hands of 
the contemporary resurgence in biologism fearfully expressed by Joan Scott at 
the beginning of this subchapter. In Sexing the Body, historian and biologist 
Anne Fausto-Sterling (2000b) draws upon both sexual difference theory (e.g. 
the work of Elizabeth Grosz 1994) and gender theory in order to propose a 
nondualistic account and interdisciplinary perspective of the body. On the one 
hand Fausto -Sterling argues that ‘truths’ about human sexuality are created by 
scholars (including biologists) and are reflective of political, social and moral 
struggles about cultures and economies (i.e. the constructionist, ‘discourse’ 
stance). On the other hand components of these political, social, and moral 
struggles ‘become, quite literally, embodied into our very physiological being’ 
(5). Thus the material (biology, anatomy, hormonal…) is ‘real’ and active, but 
bodily matter does not form ‘a neutral, pre-existing ground from which to 
understand the origins of sexual difference’ (22). Appropriating the image of a 
Möbius strip, Fausto -Sterling’s own suggestion would then be to develop more 
interactive ways between the biological and the social of looking at the body.  
As for Bourdieu’s ideas on both embodiment and ‘bodily practice’, and 
especially since the recent English translation of Masculine Domination (2001), 
it also remains to be seen how feminist gender theorists will be further 
appropriating some of his insights, particularly in light of his unfortunate 
sometimes deriding and ignorant stance of contemporary feminist research.24 
Thus both Morris (1995: 572) and Sherry Ortner (1996: 3) comment on how 
regrettable it is that the issue of gender barely entered into the major works on 
practice during the late 1970s and early 1980s, regardless of the exciting work 
being done in feminist scholarship during the same time.  
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In Making Gender (1996) Sherry Ortner sets out to both appropriate and 
critique practice theory from a feminist anthropological perspective, in which 
the problem of power returns to centre stage. In this rapprochement Ortner sees 
ways of transcending some of the recurring problems and binaries expressed in 
the notion of ‘making gender’ understood to contain a double meaning. On the 
one hand ‘making’ is aligned with a constructionist perspective on cultural 
categories and subjectivity derived from mostly French theorists with a focus 
on textual analysis and discourse. In its second meaning, the making can be that 
from the actor’s point of view, referring to the way the actor enacts, resists or 
negotiates the world, reproducing it, or producing something new (2): 
 
The anthropological project in the fullest sense, as I see it, must always 
comprise both kinds of work. Studies of the ways in which some set of 
‘texts’ – media productions, literary creations, medical writings, 
religious discourses, and so on – ‘constructs’ categories, identities, or 
subject positions, are incomplete and misleading unless they ask to what 
degree those texts successfully impose themselves on real people (and 
which people) in real time. Similarly, studies of the ways in which 
people resist, negotiate, or appropriate some feature of their world are 
also inadequate and misleading without careful analysis of the cultural 
meanings and structural arrangements that construct and constrain their 
‘agency,’ and that limit the transformative potential of all such 
intentionalized activity.      
 
Regarding a feminist-practice approach, Ortner argues that practice theory can 
precisely offer some cues of ‘restoring’ agency without reproducing the 
bourgeois subject that has been deconstructed in influential feminist 
appropriations of poststructuralist and postmodern theory. The forms and 
distributions of ‘agency’ are always culturally and politically constructed as in 
the constructionist perspective, yet this does not necessarily imply that 
acknowledging agency (or the absence thereof) would imply total voluntarism. 
In a feminist or subaltern-practice approach, the focus then comes to lie on 
moments of ‘slippages’ and ‘resistance’ in the social reproduction, the latter 
being more in the foreground of theorists like Bourdieu. According to Ortner 
(18): ‘whatever the hegemonic order of gender relations may be – whether 
“egalitarian,” or “male dominant,” or something else – it never exhausts what is 
going on. There are always sites, and sometimes large sites, of alternative 
practices and perspectives available, and these may become the bases of 
resistance and transformation’.       
Ortner’s vision of an anthropological-practice approach both supports a 
notion of gender as practised or performed for gender theory as theorised by 
other social scientists and anthropologists introduced above, and already offers 
some methodological tools for the study of gender in both contexts of 
‘discourse’ and ‘practice’ or agency which I argue may be highly useful when 
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studying religion. As far as I am aware, Susan Sered has been one of the very 
few to attempt such an integrative framework, although her theoretical 
groundings differ substantially from the account I have built in this chapter so 
far. As Morris (1995: 573-574) notes, in the anthropology of gender two 
distinct tendencies can be discerned, one focussing on the anthropology of 
‘difference’, the ways in which ‘cultural orders construct gender and create 
subject’. Moore calls the second strand of thought the anthropology of 
‘decomposing difference’, focussing on instances of ambiguity ‘encompassing 
everything from institutionalized transgendering in non-Western societies to 
specifically framed gestures of parody and transgression in North American 
theater’.  
Sered’s (1998, 1999a) work on gender and religion in Okinawa may be 
categorised in the second strand. Sered appropriates Butler’s concept of gender 
performativity in order to argue that in the religious rituals in the egalitarian 
culture of Okinawa, gender performatives are few and gender is deconstructed 
rather constructed. Gender dichotomies are exaggerated in specific rituals and 
contexts in order to reveal gender to be an ‘artificial category’. They are not 
being naturalised mitigating ‘against the development of essentialist 
understandings of social categories’ (1999a: 235). Sered’s appropriation of 
feminist poststructuralist theory in this ethnographic study can be placed in 
what Morris refers to as the second major strand in anthropologies of gender, 
that focussing on ‘real life’ examples of gender subversion or transgression. 
Morris’s (1995: 574) remark is therefore an important one, at first sight bearing 
affinities with Oyewumi’s much stronger repudiation of the imposition of 
gender on non-Western societies. Yet I believe she foremost stresses the fact 
that feminist gender theory - as anthropological practice - must in any case be 
reflexive by continuously acknowledging itself as a particular ‘situated 
knowledge’:   
 
Often, the production and decomposition of difference in other contexts 
is a kind of proxy subversion of the binary gender system that defines 
the anthropologizing culture. In this manner, ethnographies are as much 
about performing gender as are the cultures about which they speak.                                     
 
Whilst Sered (1998) argues for the Okinawa that sociological localising and 
temporalising discourses rather than ideological discourses construct - or 
deconstruct – gender, she similarly stresses how in many societies the 
ideological link between sex and gender is precisely often a religious ideology. 
In many contemporary societies, religious discourse in fact remains one of the 
most forcible ideologies in sustaining patriarchy, with its ‘uniquely persuasive 
ability to present ideas as true’ (607). While this may not universally be the 
case, and as I in the course of this chapter have attempted to show, the 
challenge in the particular case study in this thesis will be to appropriate both 
contemporary gender theory and a feminist anthropology oriented towards 
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practice within a ‘Western’ patriarchal religious context. Here, both a focus on 
religious practice and religious discourse will prove to be necessary in the study 
of gender and religion of an strictly Orthodox Jewish community ‘at home’.                
 
 
3. Points of Departure and Awkward Relationships 
 
If the kind of gender theory offered in the preceding paragraphs has as of yet 
hardly been integrated in the contemporary feminist study of religion, then it 
might even be way too premature to discuss the issue of a broader paradigm 
shift in the mainstream, in the form of what Randi Warne (2000) calls a 
‘gender-critical turn’. What was identified as two kinds of a paradigm shift 
towards gender-inclusiveness – within gender studies and within the 
mainstream – in my reading of Ursula King’s status quaestionis in the first 
paragraph, have shown to be related in the sense that the issue of feminist 
politics at stake. Those feminist scholars critical of gender as an analytical 
concept are precisely concerned for the way the term is being co-opted in the 
mainstream, thereby losing its political edge and a theorisation of power which 
is often and ultimately bypassed in gender analysis.  
After more than three decades of expansion and the maturation of 
feminist scholarship, and the institutionalisation of women’s or gender studies 
as an autonomous field, it could even be questioned if the general question of a 
paradigm shift of mainstream disciplines under the influence feminist critique is 
all that central at all. This questioning refers to further heated debates on 
complex issues such as of the ‘mainstreaming’ of feminism and gender issues, 
the canonisation of the relationship between feminist practice and academic 
feminism, and the meaning of feminist theory.25 On the one hand the incentive 
for the development of feminist critique of the mainstream for being 
androcentric in not attending to issues of gender remains as acute as it was 
generations ago. The responses from the ‘mainstream’ are varied though, 
depending on the discipline in question, and often on the proximity of the 
paradigms in fashion with feminist work. The original justification for women’s 
studies as an autonomous discipline being grounded in it being necessary as 
long as mainstream disciplines remained ignorant of gender, can no longer be 
seen in quite the same light. The situation has become increasingly more 
complex as feminist critique has evermore focussed on the question of 
epistemology, questioning the grounds for the production of knowledge and the 
existence of traditional disciplinary divides altogether.              
Whereas this chapter has mostly dealt with gender as a concept of 
analysis, this focus has already immediately engaged with questions of 
epistemology, methodology and politics. They are inextricable from the 
conceptual discussions and will become the main focus of the chapters to come. 
In chapter two and three the trajectory will be that of ‘feminism’ in order to 
return to the concept of gender again in chapter four. Rather than providing any 
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definite answers to these complex issues, in the anti-essentialist approach 
towards gender such as the one I propose, its situatedness, its feminist 
genealogy, and its temporality must be underlined. It is in this context that I do 
not enter the debate on the desirability of paradigm shifts of traditional 
disciplines as such. Nor do I see the necessity of offering any clear-cut 
definitions of, and divisions between gender studies, women’s studies or 
feminist studies or what would be their proper subject matter. More important is 
the way these concepts are strategically applied and accounted for. This I have 
tried to do in my own vision of a particular, momentary - necessarily always 
incomplete - approach of feminist gender theory, embedded in a social 
scientific approach towards religion, which I will be gradually exploring and 
modifying further in the chapters to come. In my own opinion gender thus 
primarily provides a heuristic point of departure, carrying political and 
epistemological origins and implications, and precisely helpful because of this 
polyvalence - thus contra Rosi Braidotti’s point of view, but by quoting one of 
her many eloquent definitions nonetheless (Braidotti 1994: 52): 
 
…for the sake of precision I would define ‘gender’ as a notion that 
offers a set of frameworks within which feminist theory has explained 
the social and discursive construction and representation of differences 
between the sexes. As such, ‘gender’ in feminist theory fulfils primarily 
the function of challenging the universalistic tendency [of conflating the 
masculine viewpoint with the general] of critical language and the 
systems of knowledge and scientific discourse at large.                            
 
At the end of this introductory chapter, I return to the original problem of the 
im/possibility of a paradigm shift in the mainstream study of religion under the 
impact of gendered critique. Only recently has this problem been given some 
thought in an article by Randi Warne (2001), editor to an earlier mentioned 
special issue dedicated to ‘gender’ in MTSR.  Warne wonders how it is that 
despite the fact that religious studies ‘prides itself in being a scientific 
discipline’, committed to the removal of all sorts of bias through the ideal of 
comparative and non-confessional scholarship, analytical engagement with 
gender is lacking and androcentrism prevails. Warne (2001: 147) suggests that a 
‘deeper reason’ is involved which primarily points to the historical context in 
which Religionswissenschaft emerged: 
 
The projects and practices of Religionswissenschaft were framed from 
the very outset within a series of assumptions about humanity and the 
hierarchical evolutionary ranking of groups within it, all given credence 
by the overlay of ‘disinterested science’.       
 
Warne briefly refers to the post-Enlightenment era in which a doctrine of 
‘separate spheres’ relegated women to the private, domestic realm, a gender 
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ideology that was at its height when Religionswissenschaften was born. Her 
comments on religious studies being a ‘disinterested science’ then refer to the 
way that androcentrism was ‘inbuilt’ in the discipline, with the male being the 
‘normal subjects’ of study, and the study of females potentially distorting rather 
than contributing to more ‘objective’ results. The gender ideology in which the 
discipline arose, that of gender differences between women and men 
understood in complementary terms of public/private, reason/emotion, 
science/religion, thus framed and fed the context in which critique of 
androcentrism would be rejected under the guise of objectivity. According to 
Warne (148) therefore, ‘insights and arguments from a woman-centred 
perspective will be scientifically dismissible as personal, emotional, and 
unreliable’. The paradox for anyone currently attempting to effect a paradigm 
shift would therefore be the following (149): 
 
They can either accept traditional constructions of gender in religious 
studies as scientifically sound and unproblematic, thereby accepting 
self-definitions grounded in and deployed via the dual gender ideologies 
noted above, or they can challenge those constructions on the grounds of 
experience and self-definition, leaving themselves open to charges of 
self-interest and self-advocacy. It is a great irony that the high ground of 
scientific objectivity is claimed by those who are most invested a [sic] in 
a very specific Euro-North American masculine mode of its deployment.  
 
The historical context and its dominant gender ideology that Warne refers to 
however, was the same context in which many other disciplines rose and thus to 
my mind cannot fully account for the present situation in which religious 
studies is impeded from making any gender-critical turn. Whilst my own angle 
in accounting for androcentrism in religious studies will definitely allude to 
some of the ‘inbuilt’ mechanisms of the discipline of which Warne briefly 
speaks – especially that concerning the problem of scientific objectivity versus 
self-interest and advocacy – I will be locating the relationship of 
(in)compatibility at the intersection  of religious studies and a feminist 
approach. Thus the ‘deeper reasons’ for the ‘lagging’ behind or the seeming 
impossibility altogether of a paradigm shift of the mainstream are attributed to 
both internal features of feminist scholarship, of religious studies, but mostly in 
the juxtapositioning of these two fields of study.  
In my assessment of the contemporary status of the study of gender and 
religion, three main observations can be ascertained. Firstly it can be stated that 
the mainstream study of religion is and remains androcentric from the 
perspective of feminist critique. Although this insight has been repeated 
throughout this chapter, - starting with the status quaestionis by Ursula King - 
this accusation will be studied more fully in the course of the following two 
chapters. Secondly, it can be argued that gender studies in religion, if at all 
existent under such a name, does not integrate, or in any case does not 
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sufficiently take developments in contemporary feminist gender theory into 
account. This insight was argued in the current chapter, which already 
contained in it a particular positioning in feminist scholarship. This positioning 
simultaneously contained the seeds for an alternative methodology from the 
perspective of comparative social science, to be addressed more fully in chapter 
four and ‘tested’ by way of an empirical case study in chapters five, six, and 
seven. Thirdly, one important issue that so far has not been raised is the status 
of the study of religion within gender studies or feminist scholarship itself. If 
gender theory is little integrated in the feminist study of religion, then the latter 
has equally been neglected in gender studies as a purportedly interdisciplinary 
field. Thus, although the field of feminist theology and feminist spirituality is 
thriving and expanding as never before, this kind of research can be said to be 
‘ghettoised’ itself in the field of gender studies. Few general readers in feminist 
theory or gender analysis contain contributions or exemplary texts from this 
field, despite the fact that more often than not, articles from all spectres from 
the social sciences and humanities and of late even natural sciences are 
represented. That the few exceptions then concern the work of women scholars 
from ethnic minority groupings – the so-called ‘women of colour’ – to whom 
spirituality is an indissoluble dimension of their ethnic identity, or the work on 
religion in non-Western cultures by feminist anthropologists is not entirely 
coincidental I believe. In this case, the deeper reason for this awkward 
relationship refers to the awkward relationship between feminism and religion 
in the context of Western culture and history tout court.      
In a roundtable discussion in JFSR this problem has gained some 
attention – from the side of feminist religious studies scholars that is – where it 
is explicitly stated that there appears to exist ‘a lack of interest and/or outright 
suspicion’ among feminist scholars regarding religion and spirituality outside of 
this field (Townes 1998: 106). Michelle M. Lelwica (1998) argues this point 
through an analysis of antireligious currents in two best-selling exemplars of 
both popular feminist discourse (Naomi Wolf’s The Beauty Myth published in 
1991) and academic discourse in Linda Nicholson’s Feminism/Postmodernism 
(1990). In Naomi Wolf’s liberal rhetoric religion is simply seen as the enemy of 
female liberation, any feminist consciousness being necessarily secular against 
and over the ‘false consciousness’ that sexist and misogynist religion would 
indoctrinate. In Feminism/Postmodernism by contrast, religion is more absent 
than overtly under attack, yet according to Lelwica the rhetoric haunts ‘like a 
ghost’ among the contributors to the book united in their postmodern critique of 
the Enlightenment pursuit of liberty and truth.  
As noted above, Lelwica first emphasises how religion as a field of 
study is missing in the authors’ various lists of disciplines that have been 
affected by feminist and postmodern critique. Secondly, religion is absent in the 
catalogue of ‘variables’ that reflects the specificity of female gender identity, 
including the typical ‘class, “race”, ethnicity, age and sexual orientation’. In the 
decade that has followed the publication of Feminism/Postmodernism , I would 
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argue that the by now standardised intersectional approach that takes these axes 
of difference into account, religion continues to remain absent most of the time. 
Thirdly Lelwica (116) argues, religion is missing as a subject of inquiry, and 
becomes apparent in the long lists of dualisms ‘that feminists and 
postmodernists alike are eager to deconstruct – mind/body, subject/object, 
individual/society, culture/nature – indeed, just about every binary under the 
sun except the seemingly insurmountable distinction between secular and 
sacred’. This absence or neglect is not coincidental Lelwica argues, but points 
to the way religion is held as suspect in its relationship to modernity, having 
‘equipped the Enlightenment with its normalizing idioms and universalising 
claims’ (117). The feminist critique of mainstream scholarship attacking the 
latter on deep-rooted epistemological grounds, thus holds religion and science 
to be two sides of the same androcentric coin. Hence, the modern scientific 
ideal of objectivity which is the main focus of feminist postmodern critique is 
merely viewed in terms of continuity or a replication of the religiously oriented 
belief that true knowledge reflects a “God’s eye view”’ (117-118).              
Here, Lelwica hits a mark I think concerning the problematic 
relationship between feminism and religion in Western culture in general. This 
becomes even more awkward when both are the frames of reference or subject 
matter of academic scholarship. To Lelwica’s critique that the authors in the 
book – which can be expanded to the sceptic majority of feminist scholars – 
have a rather monolithic view of traditional religion can be added the remark 
that this view is also a rather culture-bound and Western oriented perspective of 
religion. If feminist research is to become less parochial, less colonial and 
finally embark on taking into account cultural differences in the construction of 
gender and in the agency of women, then religion may be one of the most 
undertheorised but important issues to address. Religion needs to be taken more 
seriously in contemporary feminist scholarship, especially in comparative work. 
An outright rejection or silencing over as if religion were necessarily 
antithetical to women’s agency or feminist identity proves to be severely 
limited. 
Without taking up these issues any further here, the following chapter 
will in any case shortly embark on the history of the relationship between 
feminism, religion and the academy in the west, if only as a way of setting 
some grounds. This chapter will necessarily only be briefly pointing to the 
particularity of this relationship, which obviously is in need of much more 
research than I can offer here. I conclude this chapter by putting forward my 
main thesis that in terms of the question of the im/possibility of a paradigm 
shift, the three observations I have hereto spoken of are all connected: it is 
precisely in the interconnection between these three observations that lies the 
seemingly incompatibility between religious studies and a feminist gender 
approach.                
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1 King, Ursula, ‘Female Identity and the History of Religions’, in: V.C. Hayes (ed.), Identity Issues and 
World Religions, Bedford Park: The Australian Association for the Study of Religions, 1986, pp. 82-
92.  
2 See chapter three for more on the relationship between feminist critique and the discipline of 
anthropology.  
3 See next paragraph for more on gender as an analytical concept. 
4 King hereby refers to the well-known controversial post-Christian feminist theologian Mary Daly, 
who will be referred to in more detail in chapter two.  
5 Examples are Darlene M. Juschka’s (ed.) Feminism in the Study of Religion: A Reader (2001) and the 
not yet published (at the time of this writing) Women, Gender, Religion: A Reader edited by Elizabeth 
A. Castelli and Rosamond C. Rodman, published by Palgrave and Arvind Sharma’s (ed.) Methodology 
in Religious Studies: The Interface with Women’s Studies to be published by the State University of 
New York Press in 2002.   
6 The term ‘womanism’ was coined by the novelist Alice Walker in the eighties and has since then 
been appropriated by many self-identified black feminists in the U.S.A., denoting a specific form of 
feminism that is highly critical of second wave ‘white feminism’ for failing to address questions of 
‘race’, class and ethnicity. For the background of the term and the debate, see chapter three.  
7 Joan Scott’s lecture was held at the invitation of Sophia, the Belgian Co-ordination Network for 
Women’s Studies, and took place in Brussels on December 8th 1999. 
8 In the Dutch language ‘gender’ opposed to biological or physical sex (‘sekse’ or ‘geslacht’) is 
similarly gradually being incorporated in its English form in newspapers and policies. The original 
emphasis on gender as culturally constructed opposed to biological sex however, again is hardly 
emphasised, it becoming more of an intellectual or elite term, sometimes simply denoting anything to 
do with men or – more often – women’s issues in general, but mostly simply in reference to biological 
sexual difference.  
9 Examples are the work by Desmond Morris, but also recent best-sellers such as John Gray’s Men are 
from Mars, Women are from Venus series. There are also countless publications containing a kind of 
‘revaluation of femininity’ type of popular discourse through concepts such as ‘emotional 
intelligence’.   
10 Although the focus will be on gender theory in this chapter and thesis, it must be emphasised that 
there are important links with the literature and developments in the field of sexual identity and 
sexuality. The essentialism/constructionism debate in fact owes much to the way this has been played 
out in the study of homo- and heterosexuality and the later development of fields such as gay and 
lesbian studies and queer theory in particular. The work of Mary McIntosh (1981 [1968]), Jeffery 
Weeks and Edward Stein (1990) are but a few prominent examples of this kind of work.  
11 Sandra Harding (1986) proposes a similar multidimensional model of gender that must study the 
interaction between three levels of gender: gender symbolism, division of labour or gender structure 
and finally individual gender. Another less known ‘layered’ model of gender has been proposed by the 
German social psychologist Carol Hagemann-White, who delineates four levels of gender analysis: 
gender as a social category, symbolic dichotomies of sexual meaning, gendered forms of behaviour 
and sexual gender identity (in Tonkens 1998).   
12 I will be referring to ‘race’ in brackets throughout the text. Whereas the term is rarely used in the 
European context, in the American and British literature I draw upon, it frequently features as a 
category of identity or axe of difference used to distinguish between bounded groups in terms of 
community and nation. I therefore understand the concept - like other categories – as a socially 
constructed category with no biological basis, despite the fact that it is used in for instance racist and 
biologist discourses.      
13 This lecture was held at the conference ‘The Body in Culture: Corporeality in Social Practice’ in 
Nijmegen (NL) December 13th 2000. 
14 According to Braidotti, the chapter in question is entitled ‘The rebellion of the clitorises’ in Mario 
Vargas Llosa’s erotic novel The notebooks of Don Rigoberto published by Penguin Books in 1997.   
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15 Judith Butler is obviously not the only feminist theorist in the appropriation of postmodern or 
poststructuralist theories, nor the first and only to critique the sex-gender distinction. (For example, 
Stevi Jackson (1998) refers to the materialist feminist perspective of Christine Delphy (2001 [1993]) 
and Denise Riley’s social constructionist position on the notion of ‘woman’). Butler’s work 
nevertheless can be said to have been most influential in ‘gender theory’ as practised in most English 
speaking countries, although Butler herself is clearly influenced by many French philosophers 
(Derrida, Althusser, Foucault), and French feminist philosophers such as de Beauvoir and Irigaray.     
16 See also chapter three. 
17 Chapter two deals with this shift in more detail. 
18 Notable adherents are Hélène Cixous, Luce Irigaray, Julia Kristeva.  
19 Obviously Sered is not the only scholar to have applied gender theory in the study of religion from 
an anthropological approach. Joanne C. Watkins’ Spirited Women: Gender, Religion, and Cultural 
Identity in the Nepal Himalaya (1996) is a fine example of how gender is applied as an analytical 
category in this kind of work. However, as far as I know, Sered is one of the few relatively widely 
known scholars to be actually working on the boundaries and intersections of gender studies, 
anthropology and religious studies, e.g. by publishing in journals in all of these fields.       
20 Foucault’s work has been critically analysed many times in its usefulness for contemporary feminist 
theory. One example is Lois McNay’s (1992) reading of Foucault’s oeuvre. McNay argues that on the 
one hand his work has offered much for feminist theory, particularly in his theory of power and its 
relation to the body. On the other hand, Foucauldian theory remains problematic for feminist theory in 
its over-determination of the subject, and thus contains shortcomings in terms of normative and 
political questions of agency and emancipation. In his later – and more neglected - work on the 
‘technologies of the self’, this view is somewhat counteracted, yet according to McNay in no way 
warrants a straightforward alliance with contemporary postmodern thought.      
21 For more on the background and literature relating to this movement of critique, see chapter three.  
22 Oyewumi, Oyeronke, The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender 
Discourses, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.  
23 The works that Foster reviews are Rosi Braidotti’s Nomadic Subjects (1994), Drucilla Cornell’s 
Transformations: Recollective Imagination and Sexual Difference, New York: Routledge, 1994 and 
Tania Modleski’s Feminism without Women: Culture and Criticism in a ‘Postfeminist Age’, New 
York: Routledge, 1991. 
24 Despite the obvious convergence between Bourdieu’s ideas on gender and masculine domination 
and contemporary gender theorising, in a lecture at Berkeley given in 1996, Bourdieu (1997: 201) 
simply equates ‘feminism’ in danger of being ‘rendered inoffensive by its contamination with what is 
called in the United States ‘postmodernism’. Notwithstanding the fact that in the many varieties of 
contemporary feminist thought and movements, groups of feminists withhold the very same critical 
position, Bourdieu rejects what he perceives as the domination of philosophy and ‘deconstruction’ in 
‘feminism’, thereby taking one particular form of deconstruction and discourse analysis for all of 
contemporary feminist ‘poststructuralist’ or ‘postmodern’ gender theory. In the English republication 
of Masculine Domination (2001 [1998]) the omission of generations of feminist scholarship, while 
approximating many of the same conclusions is striking. The situation is illustrative of the awkward 
relationship between feminist theory and its place and legitimacy as in an autonomous discipline such 
as women’s studies, and the relationship between feminist theory and ‘mainstream’ theory I believe. In 
the case of Bourdieu it cannot be denied that feminist theorists have looked more towards fruitful 
appropriations of his ‘mainstream’ theory (for optimistic and more sceptic readings of Bourdieu see 
e.g. Delhaye 1991; Lovell 2000; McNay 1999; Moi 2000; Vom Bruck 1997) than has been the case the 
other way round when the focus has been on gender issues. For instance, Judith Butler (1993, 1999) 
has critically engaged with the work of Bourdieu whilst the latter in Masculine Domination (2001: 103, 
n. 37) only refers to Butler in a few sentences concerning the familiar misinterpretation of the 
voluntarism of gender performance through drag, and a somewhat awkward footnote on Butler’s 
rectification of the matter in her later work. 
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25 For example, see the recent interchanges in the new journal Feminist Theory following the 
publication of Liz Stanley and Sue Wise’s (2000) article on the question how feminist theory should be 
defined and practised (Ahmed 2000; Ermath 2000; Humm 2001; Kapur 2001; Marchbank and 
Letherby 2001; Stacey 2001; Winter 2000).   
CHAPTER TWO 
SETTING THE GROUNDS OF AN AWKWARD RELATIONSHIP: 
PIONEERING WOMEN SCHOLARS AND FEMINIST ACTIVISM 
 
 
 
In this chapter, which takes a historical focus, the background is prepared for 
the analysis of the apparent incompatibility between religious studies and a 
gender approach, that will be the main subject of chapter three. In particular 
some initial insights will be gained, as to the intertwining of women’s studies 
and feminist scholarship with the development of feminism outside academy on 
the one hand, and a different yet similar multiple positioning of the study and 
the practice of religion. First, the history of women scholars in religious studies 
will be briefly evaluated. This is methodologically illustrative of a type of 
feminist critique of androcentrism, to be fully explored in contemporary times 
in chapter three. A general and brief overview of the history of the relationship 
between feminism and religion in Western society follows, covering the periods 
of first and second wave feminist movement.1 I will attempt to delineate the 
major dissimilarities in this relationship in these distinctive eras, but also those 
that can be attributed to the different socio-cultural contexts of the U.S. and 
Western Europe. The chapter concludes with an account of the way in which 
feminism enters religious studies scholarship in the academy at the height of the 
second wave.                
 
The earliest feminist critiques of science and academic scholarship, followed by 
the emergence of ‘women’s studies’ as a discipline or a distinct field cannot be 
understood, nor viewed outside of the socio-political context of second wave 
feminism or the women’s liberation movement in Western Europe and the U.S. 
of the sixties and seventies. Minimally, the feminist movement in  its main 
objective towards ending the subordination of women simply demanded 
concrete knowledge about women’s lives and their situation of inequality. 
There was the hope that the academy or science could ‘fill the gaps’ in 
knowledge about women, but also provide some more definitive answers to and 
theoretical explanations for what was perceived as women’s universal 
secondary status in society. The emerging practice of ‘feminist research’ was 
understood as the production of knowledge about women, carried out by 
women and for women (Stanley and Wise 1990). It was therefore explicitly 
political in that the kind of knowledge envisioned could be put to use in serving 
the goals of the feminist movement: to change women’s lives and the 
transformation of sexist society.  
The entrance of feminism into the academy as the ‘intellectual arm of 
the women’s movement’ (Crowley 1999) and the development of feminist 
scholarship directed at ‘filling the gaps’ and the production of new knowledge 
thus simultaneously accompanied  a suspicion towards the same academy. The 
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academy and its practice of the acquisition and production of knowledge or 
science in general was also to be held accountable for the invisibility or 
exclusion of women as both subjects and objects of knowledge. This was 
initially expressed in what is usually considered to be another main 
characteristic of the burgeoning feminist scholarship: the exposure and 
elimination of androcentrism2 and ‘sexist bias’ of the mainstream, which 
rendered women hidden, deviant, or conversely, conflated the male as the 
universal norm (Brouns 1995; Maynard 1998; Stacey and Thorne 1998 [1985]; 
Stanley and Wise 1990).   
Although questions of epistemology were not explicitly addressed 
during this early phase, this second critique of the mainstream as malestream 
already carried with it the seeds of what was to become much more prominent, 
and elaborately discussed in later feminist theories, namely the question of 
objectivity and value-neutrality of scientific methodology and knowledge. The 
exposure of the links between science and politics had been underway in the 
form of an apparent crisis over the application of the positivistic paradigm in 
the social and behavioural sciences since the early seventies (Reinharz 1992: 
423). Joyce McCarl Nielsen (1990) includes two traditions of thought that are 
illustrative of what she calls ‘the postempirical crisis in knowledge’ in the 
social sciences, that developed following the growing scepticism towards what 
was perceived to be the ideal scientific method of attaining objective 
knowledge.3 The first of these, the interpretive or hermeneutic tradition 
questions the possibility of the positivistic paradigm in the study of social life 
by incorporating the subjectivity of the object under study into the research 
process. Although the hermeneutical method has been especially important in 
disciplines leaning towards the humanities such as cultural anthropology and 
religious studies, as Nielsen (1990: 9) argues, this form of research 
methodology to date provides a ‘legitimate alternative’ in the social sciences, 
despite the continuous dominance of objectivism.  
The second tradition that characterises the postempirical crisis in 
knowledge was more directly aligned with the development of feminist 
scholarship as rooted in a general crisis of society and the rise of various critical 
social movements. Whilst alternative, more interpretative research paradigms 
were designed in response to the insistence of the immediate social relevance of 
social science, including grounded theory, participatory research and 
phenomenology (Reinharz 1992; Poldervaart 1990), critical theory (or the 
Frankfurter Schule) was the most explicit in the political accountability of 
scientific knowledge. Critical theorists not only included positivist science in 
their rejection of dominant ideologies such as capitalism that maintained social 
inequality, but considered scientific knowledge itself to be the very product of 
these social contexts and determined by the values endorsed by its practitioners. 
These challenges against the elitist character of both the institution of the 
university and the practice of science itself were often located in many a protest 
or liberation movements among students, blacks, the anti-war movement in the 
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U.S., etc. The feminist movement was one movement among them, focussing 
on the question of inequality in terms of sexual rather than class or economical 
differences.  
The feminist critique of androcentrism, sexism or ‘patriarchy’ in 
relationship to the academy was thus from its inception multi-facetted. On the 
one hand the institution of the academy and its production of scientific 
knowledge was held to be suspect in that it contributed and sustained the 
oppression of women and other unprivileged groups in society. On the other 
hand, it could also promise to serve the feminist movement once rid of all forms 
of both institutional and epistemological and methodological biases within 
academic disciplines. The demand for more knowledge for and about women in 
order to further women’s liberation thus went hand in hand with an 
epistemological critique. This initially involved the process of discovering and 
then exposing the ways in which knowledge that was produced rendered 
women invisible (androcentrism), or at worst was full of patriarchal bias that 
contributed to the reproduction of gender-based oppression in society. An 
obvious starting place for feminist academics to reflect was on their own 
position of women as scholars or scientists taking part in the particular 
historical institution in which objective knowledge was produced. This early 
form of feminist critique that explicated and problematised the under-
representation of women at various levels within academic institutions indeed 
still forms a prominent place on the contemporary feminist agenda. However, 
the link between women as producers of knowledge and the methods and 
contents of this knowledge may not have been questioned in this stage of 
exposing and accounting for women’s inequality in patriarchal society and 
scientific representation as it is today.  
 
 
1. A Feminist Historiography of Religious Studies?  
 
The growing feminist critique in various academic disciplines had special 
repercussions when it reached the field of religious studies, seeing the specific 
position of the latter in its close relationship with the practice of theology and 
religion in its institutionalised forms. Carol P. Christ (1992: 83) notes that for 
the U.S., where religious studies were not established as an academic discipline 
until the sixties, there was certainly no deliberate ‘conspiracy to exclude women 
and others from the founding of Religious Studies’. A substantial part of 
scholars in religious studies were, and still often are themselves affiliated with 
or working for religious institutions or seminaries. Consequently, not only are 
these scholars/practitioners limited in being representative of or studying 
mostly mainstream religious traditions present in the West such as 
Protestantism, Catholicism and Judaism. This has also implied an exclusive 
male perspective on these traditions, as at an institutional level these religions 
have always been male-oriented. Here it already becomes clear how the 
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interweaving of the academic study of religion with – hegemonic – religious 
practices has led to the exclusion of women in institutional terms. Access to the 
scholarly study of religion was a priori barred on the grounds of an explicit 
religious ideology of sexual difference. This basic premise figures as one of the 
factors preventing or delaying feminist critiques of the mainstream, especially 
compared to other disciplines where the dominant doctrines of objectivity 
officially held gender not to be of any relevance for the scientific enterprise. 
Ursula King (1995c) rectifies Christ’s characterisation of religious 
studies as an academic discipline in the sixties for the European context. For the 
‘independent’ study of religion, apart from denominational affiliations, better 
known under the title ‘history of religion’ in its broad application had been 
practised in Western Europe for more than a century. As for the participation of 
women in the development of the discipline until the second wave of feminist 
movement, a glimpse of Mircea Eliade’s (1987) prominent sixteen volume 
Encyclopaedia of Religion forces us to conclude this would have been minimal. 
Besides the general ‘invisibility’ of feminist and women’s studies in religion in 
the whole of this series4, King (1995c: 223) notes that of the privileged 142 
scholars to whom a biography has been accorded, only four women have been 
added. Two of these in fact come from the discipline of anthropology (Ruth 
Benedict (1887-1948) and Barbara G. Myerhoff (1935-1985). Only two British 
women Jane E. Harrison (1850-1928), specialist in Greek religion, and Evelyn 
Underhill (1875-1941), the writer on mysticism, are among the chosen.  
King’s own study of ‘forgotten’ and invisible women from the history of 
religious studies, can itself be regarded as an exemplar of a way revealing 
androcentrism in the mainstream. Although this deals with a deconstruction of 
the male norm for the historiography in the study of religion, the apparent 
invisibility and/or absence of women researchers in past and present scholarship 
in any case testifies to the possible androcentrism in the ‘canonisation’ of a 
discipline. According to Stanley and Wise (1993: 217) histories are therefore 
always better seen as historiographies, their facts ‘are highly partial and 
constitute elements of a framework stitched together by the preoccupations and 
intellectual concerns of the historian, not of “the past” itself’.   
 
 
‘Woman Worthies’ 
 
In Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women’s Lives (1991), 
and following up on The Science Question in Feminism  (1986), feminist 
philosopher Sandra Harding proposes a framework in which the diverse ways in 
which science, technology and theories about knowledge in general can be 
analysed from a feminist perspective.5 One possible avenue that can show the 
androcentrism or what Harding calls the sexism of mainstream science, is 
attending to the role women have played in the production of scientific 
knowledge. For Harding this level of critique is more in the line of reformation 
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and correction rather than a more radical critique in view of the kind of real 
paradigm shifting she ultimately supports. However, the search for ‘women 
worthies’ in the history of men-dominated sciences in any case may lead to 
other steps in unmasking the ‘false universalism’ and the socially situated 
character of scientific scholarship. 
With respect to religious studies,  - apart from Ursula King’s (1999c) ‘A 
Question of Identity: Women Scholars and the Study of Religion’ in Religion 
and Gender (1999a) discussed in the previous chapter - hardly any historical 
research into the extent of the contribution of women scholars or writers to the 
development of religious studies has been carried out.6 King’s own research not 
only shows how androcentric mechanisms and norms were applied such as with 
Eliade’s ER in the selections of what is considered  a valuable contribution. It 
also demonstrates how concrete structural barriers have been put in front of 
women in the past and more recent times. King notes that the ER does not 
mention two particular women scholars in the field of Buddhist studies, 
although they delivered considerable accomplishments and fundamental 
‘qualitative’ work even according to the dominant norms of the time. Caroline 
Augusta Foley (best known as Mrs. C.A.F. Rhys-Davids) was a publisher, 
translator and contributor to more than twenty-four different editions of Pali-
texts. Foley then succeeded her husband, the orientalist Thomas William Rhys 
Davids (1843-1922), founder and president of the Pali text Society in 1881 after 
his death in 1922, for some twenty years. Mr. Rhys Davids is nevertheless 
mentioned up to four times in the ER, despite only having nine publications to 
his name. King argues that the same negligence and omission holds for works 
such as Eric Sharpe’s (1998 [1986]) overview of the comparative study of 
religions. Mrs. C.A.F. Rhys Davids is only mentioned once, (a reference to her 
presence at a particular conference), opposed to her husband who is brought up 
frequently as professor of the comparative study of religion in Manchester. In 
the Seventy-Fifth Anniversary Papers from 1979 from the department at 
Manchester then again, according to King, Sharpe (1980: 33 in King 1995c: 
230-1) does refer to C.A.F. Rhys Davids, suggesting that perhaps her 
contribution to the study of Buddhism was greater than that of her husband. 
C.A.F. Rhys Davids nonetheless only became a specialist due to her marriage to 
the professor in oriental studies, a phenomenon that Harding (1991: 22) refers 
to as typical for the few ‘woman worthies’ in most scientific domains of the 
past: 
 
When scientific collecting and experimentation were primarily 
gentlemen’s activities, daughters as well as sons could gain a scientific 
education in the laboratory out behind the kitchen. It is striking how 
many early women scientists were related to male scientists; they 
learned science from or were related to male scientists; they learned 
science from or were supported in their work by fathers or husbands 
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who were also scientists. Indeed, it is difficult in many areas to find 
women scientists who were not mentored by male relatives. 
 
The successor of C.A.F. Rhys Davids as president of the Pali Text Society, 
Isaline Blew Horner (1896-1981), may have been more of a completely ‘self-
made woman scholar’. Although a complete biography is lacking, King (1995c: 
231-232) claims Horner directed the editing and translation of at least seventeen 
volumes of Pali texts by herself, next to the publication of many books and an 
international recognition for her expertise in Pali as a revisor of the 
Copenhagen Pali Dictionary. So even though Horner enjoyed considerable 
recognition in the field of Buddhist Studies for her merits regarding the Pali 
Text Society, there is similarly no reference to her in the ER . The few women 
who did gain access to a scientific or scholarly career, not depending on the 
ample opportunities through their husbands or other family ties then again, were 
women who came from the higher classes of society, possessing the necessary 
financial means and the time to commit themselves to such work. In Horner’s 
obituary from 1982 she is not only acclaimed for the ‘energy and time’ she 
invested in the Pali Text Society, but also for her financial support.7  
Harding (1991: 22-23) points to the fact that the social processes that 
determined and prevented access to the scientific field were not only gendered, 
but also circumscribed by class and ‘race’ differences. Even though the 
opportunities for men with less financial means and ‘men of colour’ who 
additionally faced racism were also slight, according to Harding they at least 
did more often succeed in gaining access to scientific higher education, than 
poor women or women of colour, even if their career prospects may have been 
limited. The individual achievements by ‘women worthies’ who did or did not 
work by the side of their husbands, or owed their positions to male family 
members, were obviously not necessarily inspired by what Harding calls a 
‘feminist consciousness’. They had to organise their lives in such a way that 
resembled that of the male scientist, where the impact of marriage and children 
would be less compulsive and not necessarily force them into choices for their 
families ‘or’ their careers.  
The fact that these exceptional women were often forced to combat male 
prejudice in an environment that did not always take them seriously in itself can 
be reason enough to attribute them a ‘feminist consciousness’. However, this is 
no guarantee their feminist consciousness may have been transferred to the 
actual content of their work, expressed in any kind of implicit or explic it 
critique of androcentrism. Publications such as I.B. Horner’s Women under 
Primitive Buddhism published in 1930 were probably exceptions to the norm in 
terms of their subject matter. At best, the presence of  ‘women worthies’ shows 
whether a particular discipline or field or study as an institution may have been 
sexist.  
Whereas King (1995c) only pays attention to the structural patterns of 
androcentrism in her historiography of women pioneers in the study of religion, 
 CHAPTER TWO 
 65
- many of which appear to be specialised in the field of Buddhist Studies – 
perhaps some contemporary feminist buddhologists can reveal some more on 
the content of the work of these pioneers. Rita M. Gross (1993) and Tessa 
Bartholomeusz (1994) both refer to I.B. Horner’s work on women in Early 
Buddhism from 1930. Regardless of its status of being a ‘classic’, ‘exceptional’ 
(Bartholomeusz 1994: 12) or an ‘important’ (Gross 1994: 34) work on women 
in Early Buddhism, the book was recently only reprinted for the first time after 
more than seventy years. In Bartholomeusz’s references to Horner, we gain the 
impression that however exceptional her work might have been, in retrospect, it 
must have somehow been motivated by what Sandra Harding has calls a 
feminist consciousness.  
Apart from an analysis of the specific rules that guided the old order of 
Buddhist nuns, Horner would have studied the life histories of many members 
on the basis of their own religious poems, the Therigatha. Bartholomeusz 
(1994: 12) on Horner’s work: ‘… the religious experience of women does not 
provide supplementary information about the experience of men; rather it is 
seen as truly representative of Buddhism and the Buddhist monastic 
community.’ We furthermore read that the way was paved for Horner by other 
studies that ‘were sympathetic to the woman’s point of view’ (ibid.). 
Barthomoleusz refers to C.A.F. Rhys Davids, and a certain Mabel Bode, who 
enquired into the lives of women leaders in early Buddhism as early as 1890.8 
C.A.F. Rhys Davids would have been the first to make a translation of the 
famous poems of the Therigatha-nuns, that was then published in 1909.9 It is 
therefore difficult to straightforwardly attribute a feminist consciousness to 
these pioneers without further serious investigation into these publications and 
if possible into the lives of these pioneers. Additionally the Therigatha are not 
some obscure or unofficial source but are part of what is considered the official 
Pali Canon or the Tipithaka, the oldest collections of holy scriptures in 
Buddhism we know of (Cornille 1994: 119).  
The women worthies in the history of religious studies indeed appear to 
be the individual exceptional women that Harding speaks of, who mostly 
through structural advantages, often via their husbands, were given the 
opportunity to deliver contributions to their field of study. Although in 
retrospect these pioneers can be attributed a great ‘feminist value’, and the 
negligence in mentioning their work in the canonisation of the discipline of 
religious studies cannot be overlooked, it is much more difficult to ascribe any 
form of ‘feminist consciousness’. That these pioneers are primarily located in 
the field of Buddhist studies or Orientalism, can perhaps be explained through 
the relative absence of structural obstacles that were definitely present for the 
study of Christianity and Judaism, which Christ (1992) referred to regarding the 
institutional relationship between religious studies and theology.  
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Smaller ‘Her-stories’ and Structural Barriers  
 
Next to the woman worthies, Harding refers to the importance of not merely 
taking into account the exceptional achievements of a few special individuals in 
the history of scientific scholarship. The demand to abandon the so-called meta-
narratives or grand histories, which only figure big names and events as the 
representation of ‘history’, is anyhow an important part of feminist critique, as 
it is for any kind of historical study. In Harding’s proposal for a first possible 
critique of the androcentrism of science though, ‘women in science’ are seen in 
much broader terms than merely reinstating the ‘women worthies’. The search 
for the ‘lost’ and ‘forgotten’ women of the past, one of the first directions of 
research typical for feminist history, entails a broadening of the historiography 
of science, including the contributions not only determined by androcentric 
norms. Research should not limit itself to the exceptional cases, but also include 
‘less public, less official, less visible, and less dramatic aspects of science in 
order to gain a better understanding of women’s participation in these 
enterprises’ (Harding 1991: 26). 
Next to her attention for the women worthies excluded in the ER, King 
applies another historiographical method in order to retrieve the roles women 
played in the history of religious studies. Through the available documents 
(programs, proceedings) of the International Congress for the History of 
Religions held since 1908, King attempts to find out how many women were 
registered for the congresses and in which way they participated (simply 
accompanying their husbands or as individual participants). At the third 
congress of the IAHR held in Oxford in 1908, some 253 of the 599 members 
appeared to be women, the majority, 183 being registered independently and 
therefore not mere travel companions to their husbands. Of the 132 papers that 
were presented, only eight of the speakers were women and some twelve 
women performed as discussants of papers. So although 40% of those present 
were women, it can be assumed that most of them ‘remained silent; they were 
present without being active participants’ (King 1995c: 225). Despite the lack 
of active participation, this ratio of women participants has not been reached 
until the congress of 1985. At the sixth congress held in Amsterdam in 1950, 
only thirty individual participants were present of a total of 193, and only two 
papers were presented by women. Without drawing any definite conclusions or 
attempting to account for the differences in the women’s relative presence and 
participation, when we compare these different historical epochs, the limited 
‘active’ contribution nevertheless remains noticeable. 
We can also wonder how ‘passive’ the women present actually were at 
the IAHR meetings. The contributions of women in science in terms of what 
Harding refers to as ‘more preparatory work; next to the collection of data, and 
teaching assignments, cannot be underestimated and it was likely the case in the 
study of religion. A feminist query into the way ‘contribution’ is defined, again 
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leads to the question of the structure of science and the academy itself, as it is 
the elites in both science and in society who have determined these definitions. 
The fact that within religious studies, as in many other disciplines of the 
sciences and humanities, only exceptional or ‘invisible’ women have been 
active can for a great part be ascribed to the social structures that have made 
women’s access to the academy difficult. First it was shown how ‘objective’ 
structural barriers were prominently present in religious studies, because of the 
close relationship between the disciplines of theology and the academic study 
of religion, the first of which women were excluded from because of their sex. 
Besides actual numbers, recent research shows how even today mechanisms of 
informal discrimination systematically prevent women from building an 
academic career comparable to men. Harding (1991: 29) mentions factors such 
as the devaluation of work by women, the exclusion of women from informal 
networks of men, etcetera. 
As for the period during the first decade of the twentieth century, - and 
concerning the field of ‘comparative religion’ - a number of contributions by 
women are noted in the overview Comparative Religion: Its Genesis and 
Growth from 1905 by Louis Henry Jordan (special lecturer in comparative 
religion at the University of Chicago) (in: King 1995c: 224-5). Jordan includes 
the contributions of three women scholars, Agnes Smith, Margaret Dunlop 
Gibson and Jane Ellen Harrison, and pursues with the following remarks 
concerning the position of women in the discipline (Jordan 1905: 149-50 in: 
King 1995c: 224): 
 
It is sincerely to be hoped that the example which these industrious 
ladies have set, whether Mrs. Adams or her more fully equipped 
successors, will now frequently be imitated, indeed, it may confidently 
be predicted that, under the vastly improved conditions which at present 
prevail, the example in question will before long be deliberately and 
strenuously emulated, why should not ladies of scholarly tastes, and 
possessed of the leisure and skill which this quest so rightly demands, 
apply themselves with patience and diligence to a solution of one or 
more of the problems which Comparative Religion unfolds?  
 
King’s (1995c) analysis of the literature shows that historiographies are never 
made neutrally, but that there are always mechanisms of selection based on 
underlying ‘agreed’ norms and criteria. These determine for example what is 
and what is not counted as ‘science’. The few exceptional women worthies may 
or may not be mentioned and attributed recognition or honour. Retracing the 
role that women played in the history of a discipline is only one form of 
critiquing the androcentric character of a mainstream discipline. But with these 
criticisms Harding (1991) already takes a step towards an epistemological 
critique of what counts as science. Religious studies appear to share a number 
of features with other disciplines. One is that of the dominant gender ideology 
 SETTING THE GROUNDS OF AN AWKWARD RELATIONSHIP:  
 PIONEERING WOMEN SCHOLARS AND FEMINIST ACTIVISM  
 
 
68
that justified a society in which gender is a fundamental ‘structuring principle’, 
sustaining the idea that ‘science’ was not for those of the female sex. Apart 
from the general structural obstacles for women and the lower classes and 
ethnic groups in general, religious studies do show a fluctuating success and 
access for women.  
Simple generalisations on the processes of both inclusion and exclusion 
must be avoided, yet more important, a distinction must be made between the 
sex of the scholar and the content of her/his work, rather than simply projectin g 
a notion of ‘feminist consciousness’. On the other hand, and especially as far as 
the study of Buddhism is concerned, the limitation of interest for women by 
women cannot be entirely coincidental. Although showing an interest for 
‘women’ and their place in a certain religious tradition could have been 
motivated by both personal, critical or even religious-critical reasons, these 
isolated examples, next to altogether ‘gender-neutral’ studies that these women 
conducted, do not show any form of challenge towards the discipline or the 
place of women as subjects or objects of research therein. Labelling these 
women ‘feminist pioneers’ or making these women ‘visible’ in order to show 
that women indeed participated in research in the past, perhaps shows that 
religious studies in the past were androcentric, but does not say anything 
whether or to what extent these women may have openly resisted this. It 
furthermore does not show whether they felt the discipline to be androcentric in 
terms of its content or whether they simply reproduced the ‘mainstream’ in their 
own work. Historiographical research from a contemporary feminist 
perspective in whatever discipline implies much more than simply ‘rewriting’ a 
canon. It must be understood as but one aspect of locating androcentrism, the 
relevance of which lies in contemporary feminist critique (King 1995c: 223): 
 
It is important to research these data on earlier women’s scholarly work, 
as the example of their struggles an achievements can enlarge our own 
consciousness, strengthen our identity as women scholars of religion, 
and provide additional role models and inspiration for younger women 
entering the discipline today.  
 
Whilst in the former paragraph the focus was on the role of women in the 
academic study of religion, Christ (1987: 61) argues that for the U.S., - where 
the loosening of the relationship from the denominational context only started 
to develop a few decades ago - the institutional dominance by men of a 
religious tradition has directly influenced the access for women to this 
academic discipline. For the European context however, the study of religion 
has been understood to be a ‘scientific’ endeavour proper from a historical and 
comparative perspective and independent of theology, and has been practised 
for more than a century. King’s (1995c) research shows that as far as the 
congresses of the prestigious IAHR are concerned, the presence of women 
visitors/participants has never been as numerous as in 1908. There where 
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women worthies have paid attention to women as objects of study in their work, 
this appears to be in the field of orientalist studies and not in any of the 
Mediterranean religious traditions of Judaism, Christianity or Islam. 
 
 
2. Religion and Women’s Liberation until the Second Wave 
 
In the following paragraph the period up to the second wave of the feminist 
movement will be viewed from a different angle, to show how the above 
suggested relationship between respectively the study of religion and the 
religious tradition itself concerning women can be tentatively understood. 
Whilst the impact of feminism as a social-political movement has been limited 
or just slow in the academic study of religion, compared to other disciplines in 
both the sciences and the humanities, a wholly different story can be told with 
regards to the development of religious traditions themselves in the West since 
the nineteenth century.  
 
 
The First Wave: Anglo-American and British Religious Feminism10   
 
Resistance to tyranny is obedience to God 
Susan B. Anthony (1820-1906) 
(in: Donovan 2000: 36) 
 
There is a Word sweeter than Mother, Home, or Heaven. That Word is 
Liberty. 
     Matilda Joslyn Gage (1826-1898)11 
 
       
Women were gradually pushed out of the official clerical structures and 
hierarchy after the first centuries of the development and institutionalisation of 
the Christian tradition. Although there were possibilities for leading a religious 
life or even playing a religious role, - outside of the heretic movements or 
monastic and mystical life - as was the case for the majority of ‘common’ men, 
women mostly remained subjected to the authority of the church. The contra-
reformation and the revaluation of marriage brought some renewed recognition 
for protestant women, but this simultaneously meant a circumscription of their  
religious role to that within the private domestic sphere. In the nineteenth 
century, the religious participation of women in West-European and North-
American Christianity had never been greater (Gross 1996: 33-34; Morgan 
1999: 44). On the one hand an ideological-religious discourse developed that 
considered women as morally or spiritually superior, as the very embodiment of 
religious values. Yet the same discourse relegated them outside of the secular 
sphere of politics and economic life which remained an exclusive male domain. 
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This emphasis on women’s religiosity however, paradoxically did give many 
women the opportunity to move outside of their homes, enabling them to 
participate in charity events or even to travel to missionary posts abroad.12 
Whereas religious issues did not take centre stage in the women’s 
movement of the nineteenth century, the first feminist wave did include women 
who critiqued religious institutions. In turn, the position of women in broader 
society was linked to the patriarchal Christian cultural inheritance. The 
increased participation by women in the religious sphere and the opportunities 
this gave to women to develop themselves may have caused a more explicit 
‘political consciousness’ (Banks, Olive, The Faces of Feminism, Oxford: 
Blackwell 1986, pp. 13-27, in: Morgan 1999: 45).  
In the U.S., religion did initially play an important role in the 
development of American feminism. The nineteenth-century women’s 
movement for equal rights had grown out of their participation in abolitionism 
or the anti-slavery movement. Many women committed to this protest 
movement had criticised other abolitionists who had reacted in a hostile way to 
the public role that they as women had taken on within the campaigns. 
Therefore, in the North-American context an analogy was drawn between the 
lack of equal rights for both slaves and women during the first wave of 
feminism. Speaking in public had never been allowed for women in both 
religious and political settings. It was a norm that prevailed in the liberal 
conceptions of citizenship that postulated a gendered division between the 
private and public sphere. This norm together with the general construction of 
femininity that was hegemonic in all spheres of life was crossed by the 
abolitionist sisters Angelina and Sarah Grimké who from 1836 onwards 
regularly held public speeches against the institution of slavery (Gross 1996: 
36). From what Morgan (1999) calls a ‘liberal feminist attitude’ – against the 
religious establishment – the sisters spoke against the harsh reactions to their 
behaviour as ‘unfeminine’ or ‘unchristian’ (Gross 1996: 36), thereby rejecting 
the ‘biblical ideals of the subordinate domesticated female’ (Morgan 1999: 46). 
Sarah Grimké wrote that God did not differentiate between men and women in 
terms of morality (Grimké 1999 [1837], Letter II ‘Woman Subject Only to 
God’):  
 
Even admitting that Eve was the great sinner, it seems to me man might 
be satisfied with the dominion he has claimed and exercised for nearly 
six thousand years, and that more true nobility would be manifested by 
endeavouring to raise the fallen and invigorate the weak, than by 
keeping women in subjection. But I ask no favours for my sex; I 
surrender not our claim to equality. All I ask of my brethren, is that they 
will take their feet from off our necks, and permit us to stand upright on 
that ground which God has designed us to occupy. 
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Grimké was one of the first to apply the natural rights discourse of the time and 
the appeals to religious equality in arguing against the subordination of women. 
In her textual analysis of biblical passages used to justify women’s oppression, 
according to Donovan (2000: 29) she can perhaps be seen as one of the first in 
bringing critical thinking to Biblical exegesis which dominated nineteenth-
century biblical scholarship. Coming from a radical Protestant tradition, Grimké 
rejected the necessity of (male) clerics as intermediaries and interpreters of the 
scripture, and also urged women to preach (Letter XIV ‘Ministry of Women’).       
After the American delegates Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton 
at the 1840 World Anti-Slavery Convention in London had been forbidden to 
speak opposed to their male colleagues, they organised the famous Seneca Falls 
Convention eight years later. This convention is usually held to be the launch of 
the American women’s movement. The Declaration of Sentiments and 
Resolutions that was written for the occasion and subsequently ratified by the 
convention, similarly appropriates religious rhetoric of equality in creation and 
rights by God, in legitimising the political and social equality to which the 
movement aspired. The explicit link between religion and politics in this respect 
can be read in the final resolution by Lucretia Mott (Stanton 2001 [1887/1848]):                
  
Resolved: That the speedy success of our cause depends upon the 
zealous and untiring efforts of both men and women, for the overthrow 
of the monopoly of the pulpit, and for the securing to women an equal 
participation with men in various trades, professions and commerce.  
 
In the liberal feminist movement of the nineteenth century, religion thus played 
a role in the ideological battle for equality, and sometimes was even seen in 
terms of a counterforce in the liberation of women. Decades after the 
declaration, Elizabeth Cady Stanton in fact would take a much more radical 
position against the church, and in retrospect her way of argumentation is often 
viewed as a basis for the formation of twentieth century feminist theology. For 
in 1895 Stanton together with Matilda Joslyn Gage and a committee of thirty 
others would publish The Woman’s Bible, a collection of critical commentaries 
on biblical passages concerning women. The writers did not aim to completely 
reject the Bible, but merely show that it was a creation of a certain cultural 
epoch harbouring both godly truths and culturally limited – androcentric – 
perspectives (Gross 1996: 37-38). In the Woman’s Bible Stanton suggests that 
God is composed of both feminine and masculine elements, and in this she can 
be considered one of the first feminists to introduce the idea of an androgynous 
godhead. Furthermore, through advocating a prayer to a ‘Heavenly Mother’ and 
proposing a theory of the matriarchate (Donovon 2000: 52-54), Stanton’s calls 
for a reinstatement and re-valuing of femininity echoes ideas which would 
again be taken up by feminist theologians almost a century later. During this 
time however, Stanton’s propositions were not only rejected by most official 
church authorities but eventually by organisations within the women’s 
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movement itself, underlining its exceptional radical and perhaps anachronistic 
character at this time. 
Matilda Joslyn Gage’s Women, Church and State published in 1893, 
takes Stanton’s critique of Christianity even further in radically opposing the 
Church as a system of ‘organised robbery’ that bereaves women of their rights, 
developmental abilities, judgement, consciousness and willpower (Morgan 
1999: 46). According to Donovon (2000: 55) even though the type of discourse 
eventually employed by these authors would in temporary terms be referred to 
as more ‘cultural feminist’ than liberal feminist, it is nonetheless rooted in the 
natural rights theory and the ‘Protestant emphasis on individual conscience’ so 
typical of the time. The identification of the Church, the Bible, of Christianity 
itself with patriarchy in Gage’s radical perspective, did not necessarily imply 
that Gage – and Stanton - were anti-religious. Their call for an androgynous or 
a feminine deity and their emphasis on women’s special capacities and 
spirituality underlies their vision of an alternative religiosity rather than 
atheism.   
 
The feminist movement within the religious domain itself in the nineteenth 
century concentrated on the issue of ordination and the struggle for access to 
positions of more responsibility and decision for women in particular Protestant 
circles. Since the seventeenth century there had been individuals and groups 
within Protestant Christianity that had defended both spiritual equality and 
ministerial equality for women. The Fifth Monarchists, and especially the 
Quakers, founded by George Scott, appropriated the unity of Christ in man and 
woman as the main argument in defence of ministerial equality, proclaiming 
women’s right to ‘speak’ with arguments from the Bible (Bauman 1983: 36). 
Apart from these groups, movements in the margins of the official traditions 
developed such as the Seventh Day Adventists or Mormons and the Salvation 
Army (Cornille 1994: 61). Especially among the Evangelic al groups there were 
openings for the acceptance of women as preachers, similarly appropriating 
religious rhetoric of equality between men and women and gender irrelevance 
as a means of justification. In 1853 Antoinette Brown was the first American 
woman to be ordained in the Congregationalist church under the passage from 
Gal. 3.28 ‘In Christ there is neither male nor female’ (Morgan 1999: 44). Other 
groups such as the Methodists, the Unitarians, and the Universalists would 
gradually make ordination available to women, but this was not achieved 
without struggle and ultimately there were only a few instances where theory 
was put into practice (Gross 1996: 35). By the end of the nineteenth century at 
least the office of deaconess became available to Protestant women (Cornille 
1994: 62).  
Finally, women would play a prominent role in a number of North 
American sectarian movements, such as the Shakers and the Oneida 
community. Ann Lee (1736-1784), who originally was a member of the Quaker 
community, founded the Shakers in 1774 after a revelation following a period 
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of strict asceticism. Lee was considered to be the female manifestation of Jesus 
Christ and God was seen and referred to in both masculine and feminine terms 
(Cornille 1994: 60). Nevertheless, one of her successors, Joseph Meachem, 
during the time of the further institutionalisation and expansion of the 
movements, would remain rather reticent about Ann Lee’s role or the issue of 
women’s leadership in general. According to Brewer (1986: 25): ‘It seems 
likely that these omissions were made for the sake of the public Meachem 
hoped to reached, who perhaps would have nothing to do with a sect that 
professed belief in a female Messiah.’ Among the Shakers gender equality was 
propagated through a compulsory celib ate lifestyle, that simultaneously laid 
down limitations on the daily interaction between women and men. The Oneida 
community was founded by a man, John Humphrey Noyes (1811-1886) and 
even though this group also deviated from the dominant gender norms in the 
surrounding society, by acknowledging the masculine and feminine dimensions 
of God, in this community by contrast complete sexual freedom was permitted.  
Less separatist and radical groups also deviated from these dominant 
configurations of gender. The Christian Science Movement and the Theosophy 
movement were both founded by women (resp. Mary Baker Eddy in 1821 and 
Madame Blavatsky) and allowed for participation and positions of leadership 
for women. All of these groups outside of the mainstream emphasised the 
masculinity and femininity of God (Gross 1996: 35), according to Morgan 
(1999: 45) a direct reflection of their strife for full spiritual and social equality 
for women. In the sectarian group of the Mormons then again, in spite of the 
image of God with his wife, the ‘eternal mother’, a patriarchal structure was 
kept in place and polygamy was permitted for married men (Cornille 1994: 61). 
According to Heinerman and Sharpe (1985: 9-10) though, polygamy was more 
important in the imagination and condemnation of the movement by 
surrounding society, whilst in practice no more than one in five men were 
polygamous and the practice was officially abandoned in 1890. 
 
In Great Britain where the first feminist wave was primarily known as the 
‘suffragette movement’, similar debates took place regarding positions of 
leadership for women within most denominations of Roman Catholicism and 
Anglicanism. Among the Methodists for example, women were granted 
permission to preach and educate, but the prohibition on ordination was kept in 
place. Like in the U.S., alternative routes were chosen and new religious 
movements were erected. In Britain at the turn of the century a similar 
interweaving between secular and ecclesiastical suffrage developed, which 
according to Morgan (1999: 45) was the context for the growth of an ‘assertive 
Anglican feminism.’ Prominent Anglican women who were barred from the 
institute and authorities of the church joined the parliamentary suffragettes in 
the hope that this would further a transformation of their religious 
establishment. 
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From this brief summary of the changes and the diversity surrounding the 
position of women within and on the margins of the Christian tradition in the 
U.S. and G.B., a number of preliminary statements can be made concerning the 
relationship between the first feminist wave and religion. From the moment one 
could speak of a form of organised women’s movement, it appears that the first 
feminist critiques by women formulated against patriarchal society, were 
directed at all segments of society, including institutes such as the church. 
Secondly, it becomes clear how influential the construction of gender and 
femininity within religious discourse was in determining the position of women 
in society. It is quite apparent how the Christian prohibition on or at least the 
great resistance to women ‘speaking’ in public was clearly applicable in all 
public and therefore political contexts and formed the very starting point for the 
emergence of the women’s movement in the U.S. The strife for or resistance 
against institutional equality for men and women went hand in hand with an 
appropriation of gender ideology, that for the greater part was determined by 
religious discourse or symbolism, such as the relevance of the gender of Christ 
or God. The post-Enlightenment world-view and organisation of society based 
on the idea of natural rights and laws did not alter women’s exclusion from 
positions of subjecthood, citizenship or authority. If anything, the identification 
of the public male sphere with rationalism furthered the development of an 
association of women with the private, the non-rational and the moral. All 
liberal feminists appropriated the Enlightenment discourse on ‘reason’, 
‘individualism’ and ‘freedom’. For some ‘reason’ and God were understood to 
be the same, whereas for others, women’s liberation could not take place under 
the patriarchal Christian church, nor its ideology.         
As for the internal dynamics of these Christian religious traditions and 
the emerging marginal movements considered sectarian groups by the dominant 
Christian denominations, there appears to be a significant correlation between 
gender equality and complementarity on the level of ideology and symbolism. 
In practice however, it is sincerely doubtful whether the ideal that many of 
these movements preached were always put into practice. Bauman (1983: 36-
37) for instance, notes that concerning the Quakers, despite the admission of 
women to the ministry, ‘deep rooted patterns of sexual subordination could not 
be overturned’. Regardless of the introduction of deaconesses in the majority of 
the Protestant churches towards the end of the nineteenth century, the function 
was mostly limited to caring activities and the relational abilities of women 
were prioritised and valued above positions of leadership (Cornille 1994: 62).  
It was not until the second feminist movement of the twentieth century 
that the struggle for institutional gender equality within Catholicism and the 
Anglican and Episcopal variants of Protestantism commenced and for some 
continues today. In the debate on ordination for women theological arguments 
are invoked that can account for this discrepancy. In the Protestant tradition, the 
ministerial function is understood to be the practical representation of a 
prophetic function, whilst in the Catholic tradition the emphasis lies on the 
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sacrificial and sacramental role of the priest as the true representative of Christ 
(Cornille 1994: 62-63). The construction of gender in the symbolic dimension is 
invoked here in order to justify the institutional organisation of gender.  
 
 
Liberal Feminism: For and against Religion  
 
For many liberal feminists adopting Enlightenment ideals of reason, freedom 
and equality for all, rationality implied at least a sceptical, critical, anti-
foundational approach to religion. For these feminist thinkers, religion or 
religious institutions were rejected as important tools for women’s 
emancipation, and rather seen as major self-evident obstacles to be overcome. 
As Rosemary Radford Ruether (1999: 217) notes, ‘liberalism challenged the 
traditional Christian doctrine of the “orders of creation,” that interpreted class 
and gender hierarchy as “natural” and “divinely ordained”’. In referring to 
Olympe de Gouges, Ruether (1999: 218) also notes the very different 
relationship between feminism and religion in the U.S. compared to France: 
‘French feminism, influenced by revolutionary liberalism in the late eighteenth 
century and then by socialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, has 
been predominantly secular. Religion has been seen, not simply as irrelevant, 
but as the enemy of women’s rights, and indeed the enemy of progress toward 
social justice generally’. According to Ruether, this is furthermore also one of 
the main reasons Christian feminism and feminist theology has primarily 
flourished in the U.S. from the second wave onwards, where secularity and the 
influence of Marxism on the public at large has been much smaller than in 
France (218-219).  
Olympe de Gouges (1748-1793) was quick to protest against the 
exclusion of women from the new rights for men and the citizen when she 
published Déclaration des droits de la femme et de la citoyenne13 in 1791 in the 
midst of the French revolution. In the declaration, which was to be presented to 
the National Assembly in order to demand women’s admission, de Gouges 
argued for women’s equality to men on the basis of the ‘laws of nature and 
reason’. She defended women’s absolute sameness in terms of intellectual 
capabilities and freedom by birthright. The transposition of the notion of 
‘sovereignty’ from God to the state, making all ‘men’ equal on earth than 
merely before God, was embodied and finally realised in Rousseau’s social 
contract theory in the French constitutional draft of 1791. This formed the very 
same basis/rhetoric to which de Gouges would recur in her plea for the 
incorporation of women.14 
De Gouges’s even more famous contemporary in Britain, Mary 
Wollenstonecraft (1759-1797) was inspired by the French revolution, and also 
applied the idea of natural rights in arguing for women’s equality. For 
Wollstonecraft, reason, the grounds for moral judgement, accompanied spiritual 
growth which was as much the property of women as of men (Donovan 2000: 
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25). Women should have the right to decent education in order to be allowed to 
grow into ‘reasonable’ beings. They should not be kept in ignorance, as 
explained in her Vindication of the Rights of Women published in 1792 
(Wollstonescraft 2000 [1792]):  
 
Contending for the rights of women, my main argument is built on this 
simple principle, that if she be not prepared by education to become the 
companion of man, she will stop the progress of knowledge and virtue; 
for truth must be common to all, or it will be inefficacious with respect 
to its influence on general practice. And how can women be expected to 
co-operate unless she know why she ought to be virtuous? Unless 
freedom strengthen her reason till she comprehend her duty, and see in 
what manner it is connected with her real good? If children are to be 
educated to understand the true principle of patriotism, their mother 
must be a patriot; and the love of mankind, from which an orderly train 
of virtues spring, can only be produced by considering the moral and 
civil interest of mankind, but the education and situation of woman, at 
present, shuts her out from such investigations.  
 
For these European thinkers, and following them the liberal feminists of the 
nineteenth century such as John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and Harriet Taylor 
(1807-1858) (who co-wrote The Subjection of Women published in 1869), the 
grounds on which they argued for equality, was ontological sameness between 
women and men. They favoured ideas of equal nature or intellect, or moral 
worth, although the prime goal was to attain  freedom and equality within the 
public sphere, in public institutions in representative bodies or education. 
Religious rhetoric may have been used to buttress these arguments, but did not 
appear to play as central a role as was the case in American liberal first wave 
feminism or the Anglican feminism in turn of the century Britain.  
In her account of the relationship between women and the state, Mary 
Evans (1997: 28) argues that the greater part of nineteenth and twentieth 
century feminism in fact has been characterised by struggles by women to 
negotiate the relationship between the gendered spaces of the public and the 
private. By the end of the nineteenth century, the industrialised Western world 
had witnessed campaigns for women’s education, entry into professions, legal 
emancipation and the right to vote. All of these debates centred on women’s 
access to the public sphere and its institutions. Apart from the sectarian 
movements within the U.S. and Britain, women’s equality within the Church 
does not seem to have been one of the primary issues on the liberal agendas of 
feminist pioneers before the end of the nineteenth century. On the contrary, a 
religious rhetoric of sameness and the problem of institutionalised religion as 
such, were more important than the question of access. Morgan (1999) argues 
that in Britain, issues of women’s ordination were aligned with the movement 
of the suffragettes, although in practice none of these battles would be won for 
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many decades to come, unlike other struggles for measures of equality in most 
other spheres. 
Thus women’s admission to the ministry in the Anglican Church of 
Britain was not granted until almost a century later in 1992, and to this date the 
Roman Catholic Church hierarchy still refuses women’s admission to the 
priesthood. It is therefore not very surprising that from a contemporary feminist 
point of view these facts alone would give religion the aura of one of the last 
‘patriarchal bastions’ to be overcome. Yet at this point Evan’s (1997: 28) 
reservation on women’s plight for full citizenship can be repeated. Inclusion did 
not follow from the alteration of gendered assumptions:  
 
…often institutional barriers fell before attitudes changed: for example, 
women were admitted to the medical profession long before (very long 
before) medicine’s view of the female body was reinterpreted in 
anything like a female understanding. The case of the relationship of 
women to the law is analogous: women were allowed to practise as 
lawyers very long before the assumptions of the law about women were 
subject to any kind of feminist criticism.  
 
In focussing on the first wave between 1850 and 1920 in the Netherlands in 
particular, Saskia Poldervaart (1991: 27-32) notes the differentiated impact of 
the industrial revolution and the accompanying social and economic 
transformations in the situation of women in the Western world. Different 
forms of feminism arose from the different contexts in which women from 
different classes of society were situated. Life was very different for the women 
of the bourgeoisie class of modern capitalist society, than for women in the 
workers class, who were increasingly forced into participation in the industrial 
production process and its appalling living circumstances. Accordingly, for the 
Netherlands, Poldervaart divides the women’s movement in these times into a 
bourgeoisie and a socialist form. With liberal feminism being the dominant 
version of first wave feminism, Marxist and in general early socialist feminist 
critiques of society before their ‘revival’ in the sixties are often overlooked. 
More often than not throughout socialist history, Engels’s argument in 
The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (orig. 1884) that the 
emancipation of women would automatically follow from a socialist revolution 
(Weedon 1999: 16-17), has been popular in diverting and dismissing any 
attention to gender issues. Beyond the broad activism of women within labour 
movements since the beginning of the twentieth century, a few important voices 
stand out such as the socialists, communists and anarchists, including the 
Russian-American anarchist Emma Goldman (1869-1940), the Russian 
revolutionary Aleksandra Kollontai (1872-1952), the German socialist Rosa 
Luxemburg (1871-1919) and the French anarchist Louise Michel (1830-1905) 
(Brouns 1995: 17). The vast majority of those inspired by Marxism saw first-
wave feminism as ‘a bourgeois deviation from the class struggle for a socialist 
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revolution’ (Weedon 1999: 17), although very often the same bourgeois model 
of the nuclear family and the women in basically domestic, supportive roles 
was replicated.   
It need not be said that for early Marxist, socialist or anarchist varieties 
of feminism, religion was one major issue in which the mainstream and 
feminism agreed completely. Relevant in this chronology however, is to note 
that feminists like Goldman, not only politically strode for causes such as the 
improvement of the labour circumstances of working class women who were 
forced into the workforce outside of the home. Anti-liberal feminists like 
Goldman, in fact directly challenged forms of inequality, subordination and 
exploitation that take place within the private realm of marriage, the family and 
sexual relationships. Placing these issues on the political agenda was a radical 
divergence from their liberal contemporaries, thereby laying the groundwork 
for some of the central political and paradigmatic shifts during the second 
wave.     
However brief this overview, it shows a very important point concerning 
what is often overlooked from a contemporary vantagepoint, namely that 
contrary to the second wave, first wave feminism was by no means exclusively 
secular. Especially in the U.S., although religion may not always have been the 
explicit focus of the demands of these pioneering activists, the movement itself 
took place at a time in which a religious worldview greatly guided people’s 
lives and religious rhetoric was applied in justifying their subordinate status. 
Thus Bourdieu claims (2001: 85-86) that next to the family, the educational 
system, and later the state, the main agency of the church perpetuated the 
reproduction  - objectively and subjectively - of the patriarchal order through 
the matrix of ‘masculine domination’: 
 
…pervaded by the deep -seated anti-feminism of a clergy that was quick 
to condemn all female offences against decency, especially in matters of 
attire, and was the authorized reproducer of a pessimistic vision of 
women and womanhood, it explicitly inculcates (or used to inculcate) a 
familialist morality, entirely dominated by patriarchal values, with, in 
particular, the dogma of the radical inferiority of women. In addition, it 
acts, more indirectly, on the historical structures of the unconscious, 
notably through the symbolism of the sacred texts, the liturgy and even 
space and time (the latter marked by the correspondence between the 
structure of the liturgical year and the farming year). In some periods, it 
has been able to draw on a series of ethical oppositions corresponding to 
a cosmological model in order to justify the hierarchy within the family, 
a monarchy by divine right based on the authority of the father, and to 
impose a vision of the social world of women’s place within through 
what has been called ‘iconographic propaganda’.    
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Many feminist activists too used both the doctrine of natural rights together 
with the same religion and scripture to argue for women’s equality, whereas a 
few others rejected Christianity as hopelessly patriarchal in favour for 
alternative forms of gender inclusive or even feminine spirituality. In 
movements of religious feminism itself, women’s access was argued as it 
concerned other patriarchal institutions in life. This included a rejection of the 
way the division between the public and the private sphere relegated women to 
the latter. So although they were often seen to embody moral and religious 
values, they were excluded from the very institutions that produced and 
reproduced these very ideologies.    
 
 
3. The Second Wave: A Fissure? 
 
When one of the main objectives of the first feminist wave – giving a voice to 
women in the public sphere through the right to vote – was accomplished in the 
U.S. and in most European countries during the first half of the twentieth 
century, ‘women’s resistance’ decreased gradually, at least in the organised 
form of a socio -political movement.15 The shortage of labourers in the 
reconstruction of the European countries after the wars did not prevent the 
resurgence of the ideal of the mother who stays at home (Poldervaart 1991: 35). 
Traditional gender patterns and socio -economic differences were reconfirmed, 
the structural relations of dependency between women and men were 
prolonged.  
The ‘domestication’ of women in the fifties furthermore implied a very 
low participation of women in positions of leadership, including in the 
institutionalised religious domain which retained its patriarchal organisation. 
The consequences of the second feminist movement throughout the Western 
world in the sixties would ultimately be felt in the religious sphere. The 
relationship between feminism, politics and religion evidently changed due to 
the position of religion in society which itself had altered. It would therefore be 
unthinkable to speak of an ‘intrinsic alliance between religious and political 
equality’ as was characteristic for American feminism of the preceding 
centuries. The demand for having a voice, for the right to speak, would be 
broadened to encompass a general or even universal problem in which women 
were seen as subordinated as a historical group or whole category of persons. 
The issues given priority in the political struggle for equality between women 
and men were those of sustained inequality in the political-economic sphere in 
general, such as equal pay for the same work, or even the right or the ability to 
work at all. The increase in divorce rates and the higher level of education that 
girls began to achieve in the fifties and sixties would contribute to economical 
independence that had become both a necessity and an aspiration for many 
women. On the one hand the second wave movement continued the struggle for 
access to positions and possibilities that were previously were restricted to men, 
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in the spirit of the older dominant liberal feminist demand for individual 
freedom, choice and equality. Other forms of feminism opted to concentrate on 
other issues, employing different forms of rhetoric concerning the structural 
causes and possible solutions for ‘the problem that has no name’ (Betty Friedan 
in The Feminine Mystique first published in 1963).    
Friedan and her liberal companions pursued their struggle against the 
social inequality of women by linking it to the image of women and the 
dominant constructions and representations of femininity in the post-war West. 
The image of the woman as the ‘child -woman’ (Poldervaart 1991: 36), as 
dependent and inferior, linking domesticity and passivity to being a woman and 
the general extrapolation of the problem to level of psychological mechanisms, 
showed that in order to rid social inequality, deeper roots would have to be 
exposed. The rediscovery of La deuxième sexe by Simone de Beauvoir (1976 
[1949]) in the sixties for example, with its precise analysis of the woman as the 
eternal ‘Other’ in history and as a contemporary discernible ‘fact’, but also at 
the level of the psyche, in mythology and narratives, inspired the second wave 
as a movement of resistance on many fronts. The movement thus broadened 
and deepened its critique against so much more than the imbalances that were 
propagated in equality discourse and thought.  
Contrary to the first women’s movement, the second feminist wave, - 
next to many other protest, civil rights and anti-colonial movements - took 
place during and was fed by a climate in which all traditional authorities were 
thrown into question, including the institution of the church. In feminist 
equality discourse religion did not feature prominently, but at an ideological 
level it was seen as but one patriarchal element that contributed to the 
subordination of women, in whatever way this subordination had to be 
explained and combated. In this era of increasing secularisation and the 
decreasing influence of religion on every day life in general, both Christian 
ideology and the church as an institution were perceived as a Western 
inheritance characterised by male dominance. Next to many other institutions 
and ideological systems of thought, Christianity was merely seen as a ‘cultural 
product’ invented by men (de Beauvoir (1976 [1949]: 18, transl. from Dutch): 
 
Legislators, priests, philosophers, writers and scholars have all zealously 
and stubbornly set out to prove that the subordinate position of women 
was the will of heaven and brought along advantages on earth. In the 
religions, thought up by men, this will to conquer is reflected; men have 
crafted their weapons against women drawing from the legends about 
Eve and Pandora. They have used philosophy and theology to their own 
ends as is attested in quotes from Aristotle and Thomas of Aquinas.    
 
This rhetoric shows a stark contrast with that of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and 
Lucretia Mott of the first American civil women’s movement. There, religion 
had played a fundamental part of the protest and had been used in defence and 
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legitimisation of the equality between women and men. The second feminist 
wave on the contrary, can be characterised as a wholly secular and an anti-
traditionalist movement, directed at the eradication of every single form 
institution and ideology dominated by men. 
The struggle for equality by women also took place in an era of a 
movement towards increasing ‘sexual freedom’. Sex and sexuality were an 
explicit part of the changes in terms of morality during the sixties: ‘…by the 
end of the decade sexual codes had changed, “permissiveness” had arrived and 
the explicit discussion of sexuality had become the lingua franca  of the West’ 
(Evans 1997: 5). The ‘sexual revolution’ in the sixties, accompanied by the 
invention of the contraceptive pill, propagated an increase of freedom of 
sexuality for women and men, pulling it out of the sphere of reproduction but 
also morality. This freedom was contrasted to a past of sexual ‘repression’ and 
a puritan morality that for the greater part was ascribed to the hold of Christian 
ideology and institutional control. The issue of sexuality would become central 
in the anti-liberal versions of feminism in the early seventies. 
In an analysis of the bankruptcy of the dominant liberal version of 
Western feminism up to 1968, Chris Weedon (1999: 13-16) accuses the failure 
of the liberal model to take ‘the body and its meanings’ into account. Well-
known feminist writers from the second feminist wave like Betty Friedan and 
Germaine Greer (The Female Eunuch  published in 1970) would reach a broad 
public, yet according to Evans (1997: 15-16) can be situated in a long tradition 
of liberal Western feminism reaching back to Mary Wollstonecraft. The 
emphasis lies on the inclusion of women as full citizens in the tradition of 
Enlightenment thought, focusing on equal opportunities within existing social 
relations within the public sphere. Thus in the liberal-feminist vision the 
separation between the private and the public sphere that is typical of modern 
liberal societies is not questioned, and the private sphere is seen as an 
ungendered space of individual freedom and choice.16 Additionally, both 
Friedan and Greer wrote for a predominantly white, heterosexual highly 
educated middle class audience. From the seventies onwards alternatives to the 
liberal feminism of the second wave developed. These anti-liberal strands 
shared the same main objectives in the struggle against the subordination of 
women on the basis of sexual difference, yet were more diversified in their 
strategies, including in their localisation of the causes for and the diverse 
contexts in which ‘sexual inequality’ originates and persists.  
 
 
Discovering Patriarchy 
 
In the early seventies a number of books were published differing significantly 
from the likes of Friedan and Greer’s liberal feminism, and also introducing a 
number of concepts and even slogans which would become central analytical 
tools in the further development of second wave feminism. Kate Millet in 
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Sexual Politics published in 1971, considered by some to be one of the 
founding texts of the second wave feminist movement (Andermahr, Lovell & 
Wolkowitz 1997: 199), was among the first to make use of the notion of 
‘patriarchy’. The concept of patriarchy allowed for a broadening and 
universalising of the scope of ‘male dominance’ to all possible locations of 
existence, including literature, myth, theory and ideology in general.17 ‘Sexual 
politics’ take place in every kind of human interaction or area of life, whereby 
‘patriarchy’ is seen as the overall organising principle that results in oppression 
on the basis of sexual difference.18 The discovery and acknowledgement of this 
‘root’ of women’s subordination and its pervasiveness was accompanied by 
slogans such as ‘the personal is the political’ and ‘sisterhood is powerful’19 
which would come to symbolise diverse forms of non-liberal feminist thought 
and activism.                
The slogan of the personal being political in fact both made visible and 
deconstructed the division between the public and the private, the unquestioned 
axiom of the structure of contemporary society according to the liberal 
viewpoint. Whereas liberal feminist concerns had been issues such as the vote, 
and later equal pay, equal political representation etcetera., feminist action 
groups in the seventies increasingly came to emphasise inequality within the 
family, demanding that child care, abortion and rape were in fact highly 
political affairs (Brouns 1995: 13). The former disregard for ‘the body’ and all 
kinds of issues pertaining to patriarchal power dynamics within the realm of 
sexuality and procreation became central in the later development of radical 
feminism. The public/private divide as expressed in the sexual division of 
labour (domesticity and production versus reproduction) was a primary issue 
for various kinds of socialist feminism that evolved even further from their first 
wave predecessors. 
 Another classic feminist publication of the early seventies The Dialectic 
of Sex (published in 1970) by Shulamith Firestone (U.S.) for example, theorised 
patriarchal oppression by identifying women as a class. Firestone saw the 
sexual division of labour being the ultimate and primary cause for the rise and 
development of the class-system in capitalist society (Weedon 1999: 18). Most 
socialist feminist theories would not go so far to as to privilege patriarchal over 
other types of oppression, but fundamental was their attention to and re-
conceptions of ‘women’s work’. For example, the insight was strained that 
domestic labour or the labour of reproduction, besides production, was a 
necessary requisite to the survival of capitalism.  
Those who did privilege oppression on the basis of universal sexual 
difference over all other possible forms of oppression could be included in what 
was to be termed radical feminism, a strand of feminist theory and activism that 
insisted on the primacy of patriarchy in society. In the radical feminist 
perspective, women’s oppression by men through mechanisms such as 
violence, heterosexuality and reproduction is centralised, whereby men as a 
group are held to be the oppressors of women (Maynard 2001a [1995]). The 
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greater part of second wave feminist activism such as the shelters for women, 
rape crisis centres, women’s groups and organisations and protests against the 
representation of women in the media were also inspired by radical feminist 
critiques. As put forward above, a novelty for second wave feminism opposed 
to earlier and contemporary liberal perspectives, and playing a crucial part in 
radical feminism, was the emphasis on the body as first and foremost central to 
sexual politics. The radical feminist approach to women’s oppression was a  
politicisation of the body. It was regarded as the very site of difference, 
patriarchal violence and exploitation at every kind of level. Yet radical feminist 
politics also sought to reclaim ‘control’ over the female body, often formulated 
in issues pertaining to women’s sexuality en reproduction.  
Next to the campaigns against male power over the female body such as 
in sexual violence, pornography, and other forms of representation such as 
beauty contests, the sexual revolution of the sixties had furthermore made it 
possible for the reclaiming to take place in a very positive sense. The 
celebration of the female body as a source of empowerment and strength 
became the prerogative of a number of feminist authors, and it is usually in this 
context that religion re-enters genealogies of second wave feminist thought. 
The focus on women’s difference rather than equality is central in the radical 
feminist perspective. In what is often referred to as cultural femin ism, the focus 
lies in the stressing and exploring of women’s cultural creativity as radically 
different and separate from that of men. The psychoanalytically inspired work 
by French writers of the écriture feminine (such as Luce Irigaray and Hélène 
Cixous) that articulates the distinctiveness of female or feminine language or 
imaginary is then usually located in this strand of thought, whereas the work of 
Adrienne Rich is taken as an example of radical lesbian feminism. Mary Daly 
(especially in her work from the seventies onwards) is then exemplary of 
American radical feminist or even separatist feminist critique, but also one of 
the pioneering second-wave feminist scholars on religion and spirituality, and 
will therefore be discussed later on.               
In the broad public opinion in the West, to date ‘feminism’ has often 
been identified or even altogether conflated with radical feminism. The focus is 
sometimes even exclusively on radical lesbian feminism, which aligned and 
broadened the radical feminist critique of patriarchal sexual politics with an 
attack on the institution of heterosexuality itself.20 This identification can also 
be attributed to the differing degrees of gender separatism which characterise 
much radical feminist thought and were typic al of many forms of political 
protest and action during the second wave. Even within the diverging variants 
of radical feminism though, attitudes differed towards the actual meaning of the 
central tenet of sexual difference. Many took a more social constructionist 
position, drawing back on de Beauvoir’s idea of the differences between men 
and women as the product of society, whilst for others the centrality of the 
female body gained an absolutely foundational status, ‘rooting patriarchy in 
biology’.          
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All kinds of second wave non-liberal feminist theory shared some main 
characteristics that in any case made them differ significantly from previous 
critiques of male dominance in Western society. This not only included a 
transformation of the conception of the ‘political’ tied to the centrality of the 
female body and its presumed control by men. The introduction of the notion of 
patriarchy in an attempt to locate and describe the nature and extent of the 
control over women and their oppression however was applied in very 
universalistic terms, to become one of the main subjects of critique in the 
eighties. The idea of the universal oppression of women by men accompanied 
the premise that all women shared in this oppression, and were therefore 
potentially united in feminist resistance through popular concepts such as 
‘global sisterhood’. In general, second wave feminism is therefore often 
understood as the period in which for the first time difference, and particularly 
sexual difference became theorised, opposing the paradigm of ‘sameness’ 
which underlies early and contemporary forms of liberal feminism.21 Stated 
even more broadly, according to Evans (1997: 16) it was identified for the first 
time that: 
 
…sexual difference has far more profound effects on human thought 
than has so far been imagined: it was not, therefore, a question about 
what men thought, but how men thought. The second issue identified at 
this time was the assertion that differences of gender manifested 
themselves in all aspects of behaviour. 
 
 
Second Wave Religious Feminisms 
 
Post-Christian Feminisms  
 
As for the role of ‘religion’ and feminist critiques thereof during second wave 
feminism in the late sixties and early seventies, initially the subject appears 
almost absent as an issue and in the rhetoric in comparison with the earlier 
liberal struggles for gender equality. For the radical feminist, ‘religion’ in the 
Western context was often simply identified as one of the major ideological 
institutions supporting patriarchy. However, times had changed, and due to the 
process of secularisation and the place of feminism within other anti-
authoritarian and anti-traditional movements of that period, religion itself was 
losing importance in day-to-day society. Feminism and the development of 
feminist theory within the academy have been for the major part a wholly 
secular enterprise. Although the problem has not received much attention, to 
this date it is accurate to state that religion has by and large been ‘neglected’ by 
Western secular feminism and feminist theory in and outside of the academy 
(Andermahr, Lovell & Wolkowitz 1997: 189; Lelwica 1998; Ruether 1999: 
219-20).  
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As was referred to earlier, a further important distinction to be made 
according to Ruether (1999) concerns the differential impact of second wave 
feminism on the relationship between feminism and religion in the United 
States versus Western Europe. This distinction would reach back to first wave 
feminism, where particularly in France, both liberal and socialist feminism have 
been exclusively secular. For Ruether this would also be one of the main 
reasons Christian feminism and feminist theology has primarily flourished in 
the U.S. from the second wave onwards, where secularity and the influence of 
Marxism on the public at large has been much smaller than in France (218-
219).  
In the U.S. however, at the height of second wave feminism, the first 
feminist attack on institutionalised Christianity ever since Stanton was launched 
by the Catholic Mary Daly (1968) who had been inspired by the work of 
Simone de Beauvoir (1976 [1949]). In many respects this critique raised many 
of the questions some of the first wave pioneers had done, as at this point the 
work of figures such as Stanton was virtually unknown (Ruether 1998: 209). In 
1968 Mary Daly published The Church and the Second Sex in which she 
vigilantly set out to expose the misogyny of Christianity. The book was to be 
followed by a succession of publications that have been highly controversial 
outside and in the feminist movement and scholarship,. In her reading of de 
Beauvoir, Daly draws attention to the way the author de Beauvoir fiercely 
argues how Christianity has served as an instrument in the oppression of 
women, on the one hand creating a ‘delusion of equality’, yet on the other,  
‘exalting and sanctifying’ her in an unrealistic way.  
In de Beauvoir’s view the church also entertained a double morality, 
holding that women were by nature inferior, tainted by sinfulness and sexuality 
to be controlled within the patriarchal family in the service and in adoration of 
men. Through excluding women from the Church hierarchy, the church would 
have contributed significantly to ‘the process of inculcating inferiority feelings 
and cause [ing] psychological confusion’ among them (Daly 1968: 23). The 
tendency to equate the male sex with the divine, would explain the way many 
religious women in the past (e.g. many mystics) often appear neurotic or even 
sado-masochistic in their behaviour and religious practices. Daly concurs with 
many of de Beauvoir’s critiques yet also argues that there are many promising 
elements in Christian thought and an adequate cure must be sought for the 
‘nature of the disease’. Besides the ‘expulsion of the demonic myth of the 
eternal feminine in theology’ (151), Daly plead s for an eradication of the 
discrimination of women at all levels, including the question of women clergy. 
Central in Daly’s critique is that the (Catholic) Church cannot be seen as 
separate from the broader society and change must follow upon the total 
problem of the emancipation of women and the cultural climate of the time. 
Concerning the ordination of women as priests for example (166): 
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It is essential that those who are concerned with relations between the 
sexes in the Church give serious attention to this modern development in 
the direction of democratization and specialization. When the emphasis 
is shifted away from symbolic roles which are identified with fixed 
statuses of life and toward functional roles freely assumed on the basis 
of personal qualifications and skills, away from caste systems and 
towards specialization based on ability, there will be hope for realization 
of that higher level of dialogue and cooperation between men and 
women which we seek.  
    
Thus in The Church and the Second Sex Daly claims there are signs of 
optimism and there may be alternatives which do not involve the ‘self-
mutilation’ in de Beauvoir’s account. A commitment to a ‘radical 
transformation of the negative, life-destroying elements of the Church as it 
exists today’ (179) requires both hope and change. Daly’s call for more equality 
would soon radically alter however, and evolve towards a radical feminist 
paradigm of difference in her following work. If anything, particularly Daly’s 
work testifies to the apparent incompatibility between feminism and religion, 
because for decades now, this radical feminist has been viewed as utmost 
controversial by non-feminists and feminists alike, especially for her often 
radical separatist stance.22  
In 1971 Daly moved beyond critique and finally broke with the Catholic 
Church. After preaching the first sermon ever to be held by a woman at 
Harvard’s Memorial Church, entitled ‘The Woman’s Movement: An Exodus 
Community’, Daly simply walked out and invited others to follow (Clark and 
Richardson 1977: 264-5; Gross 1996: 40). This move not only signalled Daly’s 
break with the institutionalised Catholicism, but would also represent the 
beginning of what would become a total distancing form Christianity 
altogether. After Beyond God the Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women’s 
Liberation  published in 1973, Daly’s publications in the seventies and eighties, 
culminated in both radical feminist universalistic (Gyn/Ecology 1979)23 and 
radical feminist separatist publications (see Ursula King’s (1995b: 7) critique of 
Daly’s dismissal of gender studies as ‘blender studies’ in her autobiography 
Outercourse published in 1992).  
Daly’s move away from institutionalised Christianity would also mark 
the beginnings of a particular strand of what could be called  ‘feminist religion’ 
or conversely ‘religious feminism’, best known under the title of the feminist 
spirituality or the Wicca movements. According to Gross (1996: 40), the 
movement was ‘officially’ launched with foundation of the ‘Susan B. Anthony 
Coven No. 1’ on the winter solstice by Zsuzsanna Budapest, ‘convinced that the 
feminist movement needed a spiritual dimension’. Feminist spirituality as an 
outgrowth of second wave radical feminism, can indeed in itself be regarded 
one of the most radical forms of feminism. Its goals are highly anti-patriarchal, 
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and it is ontologically founded on the principle of sexual difference, often 
reclaiming and celebrating the female body and/or female imagery. 
In Post-Christian forms of feminist religion, women’s experience and 
feminism itself becomes the ‘primary theological norm’ (Christ and Plaskow 
1979a: 195). Sources for spirituality and thea logy are sought in contemporary 
literature (e.g. Christ 1979), dreams (e.g. Goldenberg 1979) or female-centred 
religions of the past, such as in ancient traditions of witchcraft and Goddess 
worship. In the ‘womanspirit movement’, with writers and activists such as 
Zsuzsanna Budapest (1979), Starhawk (1979) and Carol P. Christ (1979a, b), 
the Goddess is ‘reclaimed’ as a central symbol. Women’s sexuality or ‘birthing 
power that connects women to nature and the life and death forces of the 
universe, and the sense of wholeness that emerges from recognizing women’s 
connection with all waxing and waning processes are celebrated as fundamental 
to the religious life’ (Christ and Plaskow 1979a: 197).      
 
   
Ordination Debates: Struggles for Religious Equality 
 
On the whole, the gains of second wave feminism in the religious sphere are 
best known in terms of women gaining access to ‘mainstream’ existing 
religious institutions through a paradigm of equality and usually measured by 
the degree to which ordination for women has been achieved. For non-
Orthodox strands of Judaism and the many Protestant and heterodox Christian 
denominations that had  not already accepted women’s ordination in the 
nineteenth century, the issue of women’s equality in leadership roles was first 
often placed on the agenda in the post-war period, and then accelerated with the 
onset of the second feminist movement. During the Assemblée of the World 
Council of Churches in Evanston in 1954 a ‘Department for the Co-operation 
between men and women in the Church’ was founded. According to Catherine 
Cornille (1994: 62) however, the issue of the ordination of women was mostly 
left in the hands of local churches, as was the case for the Protestant churches in 
Europe.  
Since the beginning of the twentieth century in many Protestant 
churches the possibilities and religious occupations for women had increased, 
while functions such as theologian and pastoral worker had been added to the 
profession of deaconess and religious teacher that had been introduced in the 
previous century. Whereas the Second World War dramatically put a halt to any 
similar developments in the increase in women’s religious institutional 
professions in the Jewish tradition, Freund (1997: 92) notes that for Protestant 
denominations in Germany at least, the absence of men had allowed for an 
increase in women pastors who had taken on all of the free tasks. In the 
Calvinist churches the discussion on women’s ordination was directly linked to 
discussions on women’s right to vote. Towards the end of the sixties the 
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admission for women to become fully ordained was granted (Cornille 1994: 62-
63).  
It was in the fused Lutheran Church in America that a woman first was 
ordained to become minister in 1970 (Elizabeth A. Platz), followed by the 
Episcopal Church in 1976. None of these changes occurred easily without 
struggle or serious debate. The Episcopal church had voted not to ordain 
women three years earlier, whilst in the following year eleven women were 
ordained priests in Philadelphia by sympathetic bishops, only to be officially 
recognised by the Church hierarchy in 1976. Individual priests however are still 
allowed to refuse to ordain women (Gross 1996: 41). Similarly, the Lutheran 
Church in the U.S., has had to put much effort into the prevention of women’s 
discrimination at all theoretical and practical levels within the Church. Much 
controversy surrounded the first electio ns of Lutheran women bishops in 
Europe and the U.S. during the nineties (Freund 1997: 92).     
The declaration at an ecumenical level in 1974 acclaiming the positive 
gains of those churches that had already accepted women priests and 
stimulating others to follow (Freund 1997: 93), was therefore not immediately 
followed by all denominations. Whilst mainstream protestant denominations 
now do ordain women – the most recent addition being the Church of England 
in 1992 – (besides some conservative strands and individual churches), 
theoretical changes have not always been followed by immediate practical 
acceptance of women as leaders within the Church hierarchies.  
Finally, on 22 May 1994, Pope John Paul II published the controversial 
Ordinatio sacerdotalis, in which the declaration prohibiting the admission of 
women to the sacramental profession of Roman Catholic priest from 1976 
(Inter insigniores) was confirmed by placing the issue outside of the church’s 
authority. This resistance towards changing gender ideologies and structures in 
all other domains of modern society throughout the West have been 
differentially debated and explained as the expression of the deeper 
fundamental character of Roman Catholicism, or of much more fundamental 
problems regarding gender and Roman Catholic theological anthropology 
(Freund 1997: 70-71). Others, like Mark Chaves (1997), see this resistance 
more in the context of a symbolic battle, or what could be termed the ‘identity 
politics’ of many religious movements in modern society. There the 
advancement of women is looked upon as a threat to the survival of ‘tradition’ 
and communitarian identity. In any case, and as already illustrated in the 
previous chapter and to which I shall also be returning, reactionary trends are 
evident everywhere. Ruether (1987: 233) refers to the Protestant fundamentalist 
groupings in the U.S., who have ‘dusted off the historic arguments of male 
headship as the order of creation and women’s subordination as an expression 
both of nature and of divine punishment for the sin of Eve’. By refusing to 
‘adapt’ to change, especially the type fuelled by the women’s movement since 
the seventies, the Roman Catholic Church had explicitly opposed the feminist 
movement. Besides denying women positions of leadership in the public 
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religious sphere, this opposition has also been most vehement on the issue of 
women’s reproductive rights. Nevertheless, Catholic feminists have not given 
up on the objective to reform Catholicism from within, the Woman-Church 
movement (founded in 1983 in Chicago) being a prominent example of 
organised resistance (Gross 1996: 44).     
 
 
Jewish Feminisms 
 
Whereas the scholarship on both Western first and second wave feminism and 
religion has mostly concentrated on that of the Christian tradition or conversely 
its absolute adversaries, during the early seventies the development of a 
separate Jewish women’s feminist movement in the U.S. has also been 
accounted. The Jewish Feminist Organization (JFO) only survived for two 
years (1974-1976) and according to Ellen Umansky (1999: 179), since then no 
comparable ‘unified, international or national Jewish feminist movement’ has 
existed, with the possible exception of the Israel Women’s Network. At this 
point the inter-religious differences between the Christian and the Jewish 
traditions as to their relationship to feminism come to the fore. Whereas both 
‘Christian feminism’ or feminist versions of Christianity  - no matter how 
diverse the content of these generalising terms – are always characterised by 
both feminism and religion, in the case of for example ‘Jewish feminism’, both 
a secular and a religious type of movement can be envisioned. Jewish feminism 
could also refer to a feminist secular critique of Judaism as a patriarchal 
religious tradition, whilst the same move in the other case – a secular Christian 
critique of Christianity – would be impossible and in se secular. We can 
furthermore assume that what it means to be a Jewish feminist in Israel or to be 
a Jewish feminist in the U.S. may entail two different things. Here not only the 
geographical context is determining, but also what it is to be a Jew does not 
take on the same levels of meaning as its Christian counterpart.24  
In ‘religious’ Jewish feminist critiques of Judaism as a religious 
tradition however, similar developments and divergences can be detected when 
compared to the impact of second wave feminism on Christian denominations. 
The different impacts and gains of feminism for denominations within the 
Christian tradition, i.e. the Protestant versus the Roman-Catholic traditions or 
the competing strands within Protestantism can be viewed as parallel to the 
differences between various strands of Judaism. These had precisely developed 
in the context of the confrontation with those other traditions and the survival of 
Judaism as a living religious tradition within a broader non-Jewish modern 
society in Europe since the Enlightenment. From the contemporary 
traditionalist perspective on Judaism, it could be argued that the schisms 
amongst Jews resulted in the very development of strands of Judaism which 
themselves actually became ‘religions’, yet adapted to the very model of current 
Christianity. 25 The fact that ‘Judaism’ or the Jewish tradition has been and 
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particularly in the twentieth century has become much more than a ‘religion’ in 
the sense that Christianity can be perceived as such, also needs to be taken into 
account when viewing the wholly different impact of the second wave feminist 
movement on Jewish communities throughout the west. 
The first known feminist critiques of Judaism do focus on the same 
fundamental patriarchal legacy that had historically pervaded religious 
‘doctrine’ and institutional structures. Rachel Adler’s ‘classical’ text from 1973 
‘The Jew who wasn’t there’ in fact shows many similarities to Mary Daly’s 
(1968) earliest critique of the sexism of Christianity. Writings such as these 
were not only among the first in their ‘discovering of patriarchy’ of their 
religious traditions, but also in that they functioned as precursors to the 
following divergent strands of feminist critique that developed in dealing with 
religious patriarchy. Thus Susannah Heschel (1995 [1985]: 4) a posteriori 
describes the reactions to Adler’s (1995 [1985/1973]) first feminist critique of 
Judaism: ‘Yet Adler’s moderate position has been denounced as too radical by 
Orthodox opponents, and too modest by feminists’.  
Adler discovers patriarchy in Jewish law and practice (halakhah), where 
women are viewed as mere ‘peripheral Jews’. Besides their exemption or 
exclusion from all-important male religious commandments, women’s major 
mitzvot and their religious role appear to be only in the service of their 
husband, family and the broader community. In Adler’s view they therefore 
function as a mere ‘tool’ for men in order to enable them to fulfil their own 
mitzvot or religious obligations. The religious commandments women are 
expected to fulfil, are then always connected to ‘some physical goal or object’ 
(15). In Adler’s critique however, the fundamental problem in  the case of the 
‘woman problem’ in Judaism is only presented, precursoring later answers and 
suggestions: ‘The problem is how to attain some justice and some growing 
room for the Jewish woman if one is committed to remaining within halakhah’ 
(16). Although in her later work, Adler does not go so far as Daly as to 
denounce Judaism as ‘hopelessly patriarchal’, Umansky (1999) does place her 
on par with the likes of radical Jewish feminists such as Judith Plaskow (1991). 
In short, the insight that ‘the “otherness” of women, evident in Jewish liturgies 
and texts, cannot be remedied through piecemeal halakhic change, for the 
halakhic system in and of itself is one that presupposes the otherness of women’ 
(Umansky 1999: 187).   
The ‘woman question’ in Judaism cannot entirely be located in the 
context of second wave feminism, as issues formulated in terms of women’s 
inferior status in Judaism in fact date back to the first half of the nineteenth 
century.26 That genealogies of the relationship between feminism and religion 
by feminist religious studies scholars such as Rita Gross (1996) do not elaborate 
extensively on Judaism in the context of first wave feminist critiques of religion 
can perhaps not entirely be attributed to the privileging of the Christian 
tradition.27 As for many other non-Christian and non-Western cultures and 
ideologies in general, even for second wave feminism, Heschel (Heschel 1995 
 CHAPTER TWO 
 91
[1983: 5]) notes that feminism in general has for the most part been experienced 
as ‘antithetical’ to the ‘interests of contemporary Judaism’. The above noted 
changes in the definition and strategies in the preservation of Jewish identity 
and the Jewish community also took place in the sixties and seventies, where 
‘feminism was perceived as a threat to Jewish survival’.28 In contrast, in the 
nineteenth century, those strands of Judaism that attempted to adapt to 
principles of the Enlightenment and social and economic changes that were 
taking place within modern society, did in fact take on the issue of women’s 
equality within their religious institutional frameworks.      
Liberal or Reform Judaism for instance, first put the issue of women’s 
equality on the agenda as early 1846, declaring ‘the holy duty of emphasising 
pertinently the full equality of the female sex’ (Cornille 1994: 37). Only a 
handful of individual women were able to distinguish themselves however 
Denise Carmody (1987: 201) notes, and the ‘bulk of women continued to be 
limited to the domestic sphere. Actual changes followed gradually with the 
admittance of women to the choir, and particularly the eradication of the 
Morning Prayer in which God is thanked for not making man a woman. In 1851 
the mehitza was abolished and in 1875 girls were admitted to the Reform 
theological seminary, the Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati. Birth rites and a 
parallel ritual to the bar mitzvah ceremony were introduced. The marriage 
ceremony was adapted as to give women a more active part in the ceremony. 
Finally liberal Judaism also abolished the menstruation laws for women. 
Although none of the female students at the Hebrew Union College would have 
sought ordination, according to Carmody (Ibid.) the issue of women as rabbis 
was discussed in 1921.29   
In Conservative Judaism, which had developed in a reaction of 
resistance to the rates of adaptation of the liberal variant to modern society, this 
pace was mirrored in the extent to which the status of women would be 
adjusted. Rather than abolishing the Morning Prayer, it was altered by 
eradicating the word of thank to God for not being created a woman. Women 
were similarly permitted to be included in the minyan, to be called to receive 
aliyot (recite blessings before and after the Torah reading in the pulpit), and to 
enjoy the bat mitzvah ritual for girls. Reconstructionist Judaism, which was 
founded in the 1930s, worked towards women’s equality and women were 
accepted by the Reconstructionist Rabbinical College (RCC) in Philadelphia 
when it first opened in 1968 (Umansky 1999: 184). The degree and rate at 
which women’s access and full participation in male dominated religious rituals 
and the institutional framework developed, did so from the paradigm of 
sameness and gender equality in a liberal feminist sense. The actual role of the 
feminist movement in these changes is nonetheless debatable. The strands most 
susceptible to changes in modern society or ‘assimilationist’ such as liberal 
Judaism were also those that went the furthest in achieving this kind of gender 
equality. Nevertheless, for most branches of non-Orthodox Judaism, full 
equality defined as women’s access to the highest positions in the religious 
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institutional hierarchy would not be achieved until the beginnings of second-
wave feminism during the seventies.             
 From the perspective of the liberal paradigm for equality, as Gross 
(1996: 41) notes, the gains of the twentieth century feminist movement for 
religious institutions are often measured by both the rapidity and the extent to 
which women would gain the right to be ordained within their particular 
denomination. As described in an earlier paragraph, during the nineteenth 
century this was only accomplished in these denominations and especially those 
religious sects which as such countered doctrines and structures of mainstream 
churches, including their gender ideolo gies.  
The historical developments pertaining to women’s equality within the 
liberal strand of Jewish religious institutional frameworks by and large seem to 
have taken place independently of the impact of secular liberal feminism on the 
religious sphere. Umansky (1999: 183) for example, notes that the decision to 
admit women into the American Reform rabbinate ‘predates the second wave of 
U.S. feminism by approximately ten years’. However, the first woman rabbi 
(Sally Priesand) was not to be formally ordain ed until the height of second-
wave feminist critiques of Judaism in 1972 (Cornille 1994: 37).30 
Reconstructionst Judaism followed by ordaining Sandy Eisenberg in 1974 
(Gross 1996: 42). Feminist critique and activism therefore has certainly 
functioned as a catalyst in gaining women’s access to formerly male dominated 
institutional positions since the seventies. Even in the case of Liberal Judaism 
however, official equal access has to this date not guaranteed actual equality in 
leadership positions, with the Hebrew Union College only having two full-time 
members of the rabbinic school faculty (Umansky 1999: 183).      
In Conservative Judaism, direct feminist criticism of the exclusion of 
women from religious leadership did take place. A women’s movement called 
Ezrat Nashim demanded full equality for women in religious observance at the 
annual convention of the Rabbinical Assembly in March 1972, including their 
admission to the Jewish Theological Seminary’s rabbinical and cantorial 
programs (Cornille 1994: 38; Umansky 1999: 184). These demands were met 
after years of difficult debate, and in 1979 women were officially accepted to 
the rabbinate. The first Conservative woman rabbi (Amy Eilberg) was only 
ordained in 1985. Ezrat Nashim were also active and present at a national 
conference entitled ‘The Role of Women in Jewish Life’ held in 1973, followed 
by a second conference a year later where the international umbrella 
organisation JFO (see above) was formed. Although JFO only existed for two 
years, a number of more local groups directed at the gaining of equal access for 
women in religious participation and leadership roles have flourished in the 
U.S. ever since. 
Outside of the U.S. and Israel, there is only one other context in which 
the feminist movement can probably be held countable, if only in an indirect 
manner in terms of the debates generated on gender roles and gender equality in 
the broader modern society: the admission of the first woman (Jacqueline 
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Tabick) to the rabbinical programme of the Leo Baeck College in London, U.K. 
in 1971 (joint British Reform and Liberal). As Umansky (1999: 185) notes on 
the impact of the feminist movement in these issues of women’s ordination, in 
any case: ‘open discussion about women’s role in society and within the Jewish 
community […] have been fuelled at least to some extent by an awareness of 
issues that feminism has raised in England, North America, Israel, and 
elsewhere in the world’.              
 
 
4. The Birth of the Feminist Study of Religion 
 
However slight or fragmented our knowledge on the participation of women in 
the academic study of religion during the earlier part of the last century, at the 
beginning of this chapter it became clear that it is difficult, and probably 
anachronistic to speak of any ‘feminist’ scholarship within this field. 
Additionally, this scholarship can be considered apart from or non-related to the 
development of the relationship between feminism and religion in the general 
social, religious or even political field during what is considered the long-
stretched phase of first wave feminist movement. The second-wave feminist 
movement accelerated some of the demands that liberal feminists had been 
putting forward for centuries. The struggle for ordination can in this sense be 
seen as a continuation of the struggle for the right ‘to speak’, that is by 
appealing to the right for equal access to various mainstream religious 
institutions which had been reserved only for men for centuries. On the other 
hand, the entrance of feminism into the academy and later the 
institutionalisation of feminist critique and women’s studies would also reach 
the field of the study of religion, both theology departments and the general 
field of religious studies scholarship. The close relation between religious 
institutional practice within denominations and theological seminaries, together 
with the advancement of women’s position vis -à-vis the religious domain and 
their demand for access to formal positions of institutionalised power, led to the 
development of various kinds of feminist theology within and outside of the 
academy.  
Opposed to first wave feminist religious activism therefore, the 
relationship between feminism and religion takes a turn from the sixties 
onwards. In line with the general pattern of the influx of feminism into the 
academy, disciplines and departments of theology and religious studies are 
could not remain unaffected. Feminist religious activism itself comes to be 
expressed through the medium of scholarship, primarily in the form of feminist 
theology, but as will be argued in the following chapter, also in the form of 
feminist religious studies. To bring an account of the relationship between 
religion and feminism from the second half of the twentieth century onwards, is 
therefore not only to deal with religious feminism in the form of struggles for 
equality or difference in the religious institutions, in alternative movements or 
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the work of individual writers. It also involves the work by women theologians 
and religious studies scholars within - or often working in the margins of - the 
academy.        
In most contemporary genealogies of the feminist study of religion for 
the U.S. context (e.g. Gross 1996; Morgan 1999), Mary Daly’s The Church and 
the Second Sex (1968) and particularly the early work of Rosemary Radford 
Ruether, including Religion and Sexism: Images of Women in the Jewish and 
Christian Traditions (1974) are often considered to be exemplary or even the 
launch of feminist theology and religious studies’ scholarship. Valerie Saiving’s 
(1979 [1960]) essay ‘The Human Situation: A Feminine View’, first published 
in 1960 is considered to be a classical example of early second wave feminist 
critique of androcentrism in both theology and religious studies scholarship. 
The reach and therefore the impact of all this work was not to be felt until 
during the latter part of the seventies. Hence Saiving’s essay is reprinted in 
well-known editions such as Carol P. Christ and Judith Plaskow’s (1979) 
Womanspirit Rising: A Feminist Reader in Religion. This volume was another 
important and to date widely used reference work in feminist religious studies 
courses that took stock of much of the work that had not reached broad 
audiences until the latter part of the seventies.  
As women located within various disciplines in the academy began to 
critique and reflect upon women’s inferior or unequal status in society and 
personal life, bringing these questions into their fields of research, so women in 
theology and religious studies courses began to discover the ‘patriarchal’ 
nature, sexism or androcentrism inherent in their religious traditions, religious 
studies scholarship and curricula. Thus Rita M. Gross (1996: 45-46) reflects 
upon her struggles during the late sixties, being one among but a handful of 
young women enrolled in the religious studies programme at the University of 
Chicago Divinity School. Gross also claims to have been mostly unsupported 
by mentors concerning questions of feminism, women and religion, and very 
uninformed, remaining ignorant of some of the early work published by Mary 
Daly and Rosemary Radford Ruether, presently considered as ‘pioneers’ in 
current feminist religious studies’ scholarship. When several women began to 
ask feminist questions in their theological or religious studies departments 
during this period, they often worked in isolation of each other. They had not 
heard of some of the work that had been done before them. They did not know 
their ‘foremothers’, that is those women Ruether (1998: 209) and King (1995c) 
call both first wave Christian activists in the U.S. or religious studies women 
scholars in the U.K. 
Carol Christ (1992: 84) points to similar experiences as Gross’s, being 
only one of two women enrolled in the Yale University graduate programme in 
religious studies in 1967. Christ was also one of the few with a Bachelor of 
Divinity, which until that time had been an ordinary route to a doctorate in 
religious studies, yet obviously quite pointless for women to pursue. As was 
argued at the beginning of this chapter, there were structural obstacles for 
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women to the field of religious studies, which in the U.S. especially had 
persisted into the second half of the twentieth century. Even when formal 
structural obstacles were removed, discriminatory practices continued. Ruether 
(1998: 210) notes that in the case of the first women to graduate as Masters of 
Divinity at Harvard Divinity School, ‘school officials were reluctant to give the 
only two women in the graduating class the top honors that they had earned, on 
the grounds that this would put the men in a bad light’. After continuously 
being ‘rebuffed’ upon wishes to enter doctoral programmes at Catholic 
universities in the U.S., in the early sixties Mary Daly had to go all the way to 
Europe to obtain a doctorate in theology (Ruether 1998: 216). According to 
Daly, the University of Freiburg in Switzerland was the only university in the 
world that allowed women to obtain the highest canonical (acknowledged by 
the Catholic Church) degrees at the time (Korte 1997: 110). 
Whereas the impact of feminism during the seventies had been felt in 
many major Christian and Jewish denominations, and was often most explicit in 
the struggle for women’s ordination, feminist theologians and religious studies’ 
scholars similarly began to meet and jointly structure their concerns. A first 
official meeting of women theologians and religious studies scholars took place 
in 1971 at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion (AAR) 
and Society of Biblical Literature (SBL) in Atlanta, Georgia where the 
Women’s Caucus – Religious Studies, chaired by Carol P. Christ and Elizabeth 
Schüssler Fiorenza was founded (Christ 1992: 84; Gross 1996: 46). Later a 
Women and Religion Working Group was formed, chaired by Mary Daly, 
which became a regular section of the annual AAR programme from 1972 
onwards. According to Gross (1996: 47) the consequences of these events for 
the further development of feminist religious studies were paramount: 
 
Before the meeting [the AAR meeting of 1971], isolated, relatively 
young and unestablished scholars struggled to define what it meant to 
study women and religion and to demonstrate why it was so important to 
do so. After the meeting, a strong network of like-minded individuals 
had been established, and we had begun to make our presence and our 
agenda known to AAR and the SBL.    
 
As for the newly founded Women and Religion Section (ibid.): 
 
Many feminist scholars, including myself, presented their first academic 
papers for the Women and Religion Section at these meetings. 
Especially in the early years, these papers were eagerly collected and 
published, becoming the nucleus of the courses on women and religion 
that we were beginning to teach. Readings for such courses were then 
very scarce, a problem we certainly no longer face.  
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Much less is to be found on the structural situation and beginnings of women 
theologians and religious studies scholars in the European context. Despite the 
much older tradition of religious studies as an autonomous discipline (or history 
of religion), King’s (1995c) historiographical research showed how women’s 
‘official’ participation in the development of the modern study was low. Her 
analysis of the attendance figures, programmes and proceedings of the 
International Congresses for the History of Religions held since the beginning 
of the twentieth century, shows that proportionally, participation and 
contributions by women at the Congress held in Amsterdam in 1950 (the year 
the IAHR was actually founded) was less than that in Oxford in 1908. The 
numbers for the 1975 XIIIth Congress held in Lancaster show an improvement, 
but still there were only ten women paper-givers of a total of 184. Considering 
the mid -seventies appeared to be the formative period for feminist religious 
studies scholarship in the U.S., one may have expected this U.K. conference to 
have shown some parallels. But according to King (1995c: 226), even in its 
content the proceedings do not reflect any progress:  
 
The Lancaster Congress theme was ‘The nature and destiny of man’, but 
little initial reflection on this theme is found. The papers remained 
locked in an entirely androcentric perspective in treating the theme, and 
no attention was given to gender differences in either the arrangement of 
the sections, the content of the papers (with one single exception on 
‘Women in Greek rituals’ by I. Chirassi-Colombo) or the 
methodological reflections. 
     
Concerning feminist theology in Western Europe, Rosemary Radford Ruether 
(1998: 179) claims that due to the differential context, this did develo p 
relatively late compared to the U.S., not fully until the eighties, and even then 
was also influenced greatly by existing North American work. In Germany for 
example, Ruether argues how both liberal and neo -Orthodox Protestant 
theologies were largely gender-conservative in post-war Germany. Since the 
sixties the well-known theologian Dorothee Sölle had critiqued both these 
forms of theology, developing a much more political form, dedicated to justice 
and social change. Sölle did not make the explicit link between this liberationist 
theology and feminism until the eighties though, although Ruether (182) argues 
‘the questions she had been asking as a political theologian were along the same 
lines as the critique and reconstruction of theology being formulated by 
feminists’. 
Turning to Catholic feminist theology in Western Europe, Ruether (190) 
claims that the largest developments have been limited to those countries which 
are predominantly and historically Protestant. In Catholic areas by contrast, 
such as France, Italy and Spain, even into the late nineties, there would be ‘no 
real conversation between feminism and theology’. This situation in fact is held 
in place in many a theological faculty in these countries. In the Protestant 
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countries of northern Europe, Catholic feminist theology has developed since 
the early years of women’s liberation, with prominent figures such as Kari 
Elisabeth Børresen in Norway and Catherina Halkes in the Netherlands, who 
was appointed to the first chair in feminist theology in Europe (1983). Linda 
Hogan (2001) speaking as a contemporary feminist theologian in the European 
context includes figures such as Elisabeth Gössmann and Kari Børresen along 
the likes of Daly and Ruether active in the very early years of the feminist 
critique of both the exclusion of women from the church and the sexism and 
misogyny inherent in Christian theology. Børresen’s Subordination and 
Equivalence, first published in 1968, was pioneering in that it attempted an 
analysis of the image of women according to the theologies of Augustine and 
Thomas Aquinas.  
 
In this chapter I have presented a historical perspective on the relationship 
between feminism, religion and the academy, by using the chronology of what 
is often referred to as the ‘waves’ of feminist movement in Western society. 
This overview has been necessarily concise and selective, depending on the 
availability and existence of the relatively little research that has been 
conducted on this subject. Whereas the greater part of contemporary feminist 
movement and scholarship since the beginnings of the second wave feminism 
has generally been regarded and identified as wholly secular, first wave 
feminist critique – especially in the U.S. – was inherently linked to the religious 
ideology which circumscribed the ‘world view’ in the culture and society of the 
time. As for the scholarship on religion conducted by women, in Europe a 
number of women may have been active in the field of religious studies in 
particular fields (orientalism), but the work of these ‘woman worthies’ (Harding 
1991) cannot necessarily be regarded as feminist scholarship. So although there 
may have been women scholars in religion and there were a number of religious 
feminists active during this phase, there was no feminist religious studies 
scholarship as such.  
Apart from a few notable exceptions, first wave feminist writing can be 
characterised as liberal in orientation, striving for and based on a paradigm of 
both ontological sameness and equality in the public sphere. Religious rhetoric 
often forms the background of or is actively used in the struggle and 
argumentation of this pioneering work. However, both the ‘radical’ exceptions 
that were rejected by the feminist movement at large and the liberal critiques 
remained unknown for many early second wave feminists compelled to 
‘reinvent’ the feminist critique of patriarchal religion during the sixties.  
In the second wave by contrast, the relationship between feminism and 
religion becomes more diversified and complex. Liberal equality feminism is 
for the most part entirely secular or even anti-religious. In mainstream Christian 
and Jewish denominations themselves feminist activism is influenced by the 
liberal paradigm of equality in the broader society, yet meeting tough resistance 
compared to the gains in the political and social sphere. In the development of 
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radical feminism religion is perceived as patriarchal at its core. On the other 
hand, radical feminist ideologies and movement is celebrating the ontological 
difference of women develop that propose alternative forms of feminist 
religiosity outside and opposed to mainstream and orthodox norms. For this 
kind of ‘feminist religion’, feminism and ‘women’s experience’ is the primary 
source for the construction of new kinds of spirituality. 
Religious feminism slowly but surely enters the academy in the form of 
feminist theology. A generation of religious studies women scholars is thereby 
‘doubly handicapped’ in integrating feminist critique into their work due to the 
gendered structural difficulties that characterise the study of religion in many 
universities. Radical feminist thealogians (e.g. Daly) who question and even 
reject normative patriarchal traditions by virtue of their radicalism only just 
‘hang on a thread’ to the academy.                                     
 
 
 
                                              
1 In the discussion of the first feminist wave, the focus is exclusively on Christian and Christian-based 
religious movements and feminist religious activism in the West. This choice depends on the available 
literature but is also motivated by the objective of delineating the general historical context in which 
feminist religious studies scholarship ultimately developed and is discussed towards the end of the 
chapter. Jewish religious feminism is therefore only discussed in the context of the second wave 
feminist movement as it is only at this point general literature on the history of feminist religious 
studies begins to pick up on religious traditions other than Christian feminism. This is not to say that 
there was no Jewish feminist ‘religious’ activism as such before the 1960s. For an account of the 
relationship between gender, religion and Jewish identity in the context of the history of assimilation in 
Western and Eastern Europe and the U.S. in the modern Era, see Hyman 1995.        
2 For a more elaborate discussion of the critique of androcentric scholarship, see chapter three.  
3 As Nielsen (1990: 4) herself notes, the social sciences in their formative years borrowed a particular 
model of the ‘scientific method’ (appeal to empirical evidence, experimentation, use of inductive and 
deductive logic) from the discipline of physics, that in itself was not representative of all the divergent 
methodologies found in other disciplines called ‘scientific’. Sylvia Walby (2001) for example argues 
how the rejection of science by many feminist theorists is often based on caricatured or out of date 
conceptions, and proposes to retain the ‘scientific method’ based on a concept of the social based on 
‘networks’ in support of a feminist knowledge project. In a reply to Walby, Sandra Harding (2001) 
then again claims that Walby’s article is exemplary of a typical misreading of her feminist standpoint 
epistemology that by contrast does not reject science, but rather seeks to maximise its methods and 
rationality through the integration of pro-democratic ethics and politics as aspects or elements of 
evaluative criteria.    
4 The omission of contemporary feminist study of religion in the ER is discussed in chapter three. 
5 Although in Harding’s work ‘science’ usually refers to both the physical and social sciences, her 
epistemologies have also been widely applied in other areas of scholarship in the humanities, not 
usually understood to be ‘science’ in the strict sense of the term. Here however, ‘science’ is understood 
in its broad meaning, referring to all forms of academic research.  
6 This in contrast to many other disciplines, where the history of women scholars has been registered 
earlier and more extensive. In history for example, but also in anthropology many women have played 
an important role, with well-known figures such as Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead (see e.g., Behar 
and Gordon 1995).  
7 In anthropology, Elsie Clew Parsons can be referred to as one of the exceptional women to have an 
academic career, even becoming president of the American Ethnological Society in 1923. Parsons did 
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come from a wealthy family though, and was thus able to finance her own research and that of many 
other anthropologists, including Ruth Benedict (Lamphere 1995).  
8 Mabel Bode, ‘The Women Leaders of the Buddhist Reformation’, in: Transactions of the 9th 
International Congress of Orientalists, London, 1892, pp. 341-343. This is based on the commentaries 
by Buddhagosa on the Anguttara Nikaya from the fifth century and Caroline F. Foley, ‘The Women 
Leaders of the Buddhist Reformation’, in: Ibid., pp. 344-361, for Dhammapala’s translation of 
Buddhagosa’s commentaries on the Udana, the Vimana Vatthu, the Peta Vatthu, the Theragatha and 
the Therigatha (in: Bartholomeusz 1994: 205, n.35). 
9 Mrs. Rhys Davids, tr. Psalms of the Early Buddhists: I. Psalms of the Sisters, London: Pali Text 
Society, 1909 in: Gross 1993: 322, n. 59. Together with the translations by K.R. Norman, tr. The 
Elders’ Verses: II Therigatha, London: Pali Text Society, 1971, these two translations were brought 
together by the Pali Text Society as Poems of Early Buddist Nuns (Therigatha), Oxford 1989.  
10 As the dominant focus in the available international English literature is limited to the situation in 
the U.S. and the U.K., this chapter will also be limited to portraying these two contexts.      
11 Sally Roesch Wagner, Executive Director of the Matilda Joslyn Gage Foundation 
(http:/www.pinn.net/~sunshine/gage/mjg.html) claims this motto by Gage might have been used in 
reaction to the truism of the day, Frances Willard’s motto ‘The sweetest words are mother, home and 
heaven.’ (Personal communication with Sally Roesch Wagner). 
12 This kind of activity, as with all other beginnings of organised feminist movement in general 
concerned women from the higher classes who could afford to participate in these activities and whose 
productive role in housework had diminished since the Industrial Revolution (Poldervaart 1983: 25-
26).     
13 The declaration was politically and academically ignored during subsequent centuries (Schröder in: 
de Gouges 1989: 57) 
14 In practice however, this period that is usually conceived of as a fundamental break with the feudal 
absolutist system of the past and a delegation of power to the people, can also be characterised as a 
form of continuity when viewed from the standpoint of women. Whilst ‘man’ became equal on earth 
rather than merely before God, this fundamental move nonetheless retained its highly patriarchal 
framework. The feudal Salian law of the royal family, in which women were excluded of the 
succession to the throne, thus functioned as the same ideology guiding the declaration of men’s- and 
citizens rights, presented to the king by the three estates of the National Assembly in 1789 (Schröder 
1989:58). Every freeborn man became a citizen of the state, a participant of ‘sovereignty’ that would 
concede from man to man, from the monarch to the men’s assembly, from father to son, and so on. It 
could also be argued that rather than abolished, this patriarchy was transformed into fraternity, 
replacing a system where the king (as the personification of the Father) had ruled over other men and 
women to a situation of equality amongst men within the public or political sphere.  
15 For an overview of the data that shows when women’s right to vote was achieved over the whole 
world, see ‘Women’s Suffrage: A Chronology of the Recognition of Women’s Rights to Vote and 
Stand for Election’, http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/suffrage.htm, pp. 1-3. This overview shows that even 
the developments within different Western countries were not parallel. New Zealand for example was 
the first country where women were permitted to vote (1893), with other countries following like the 
Scandinavian countries, the U.S.A. and the Netherlands in the first two decades of the twentieth 
century. Women did not acquire active voting rights in Belgium until 1948, and other European 
countries that did not give women complete active voting rights until the second half of the twentieth 
century were Hungary (1953), Switzerland (1971) and Portugal (1976).  
16 See also the contemporary feminist scholarship on citizenship and its problematic historical 
foundations in the gendered private/public divide, e.g., Lister 1997; Prokhovnik 1998; Yuval-Davis 
and Werbner 1999. 
17 Millet argues her case by an analysis of how male writers such as Freud, D.H. Lawrence, Henry 
Miller sustain patriarchy their writings. In this respect Millet does only focus on a Western 
understanding of ‘high culture’ which does put Millet on par with Germaine Greer’s work, both writers 
being linked to the academy (Evans 1997: 9-10)   
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18 The concept of patriarchy has been used in a myriad of ways by feminist thinkers (see Fox 2001 
[1998]), some using it in very general terms as the a-historical and universal system of male 
dominance (e.g., Kate Millet). Others have conceptualised it more as a particular system, a 
characteristic of society, parallel to a mode of production such as capitalism (e.g., Christine Delphy). 
For other feminist writers, the focus has been on patriarchy as primarily connected to relations of 
sexuality and reproduction, whereas those focussing on patriarchy as a ‘sex/gender system’, have 
drawn attention to the connection between ideology, psyche and social structure in more historically 
variable terms (e.g., Nancy Chodorow 1997 [1979]).           
19 This was also the title of a collection of essays by Robin Morgan published in 1970 (in: Evans 1997: 
11). 
20 The critique of the institution of heterosexuality was to be elaborately theorised in the eighties and 
later even integrated into the poststructuralist feminist theory of Judith Butler (1990, 1993), see 
previous chapter.   
21 Besides socialist and radical feminism, the issue of difference would also prominently figure in 
feminist appropriations of psychoanalysis, starting with Juliet Mitchell’s Psychoanalysis and Feminism  
published in 1975, and Nancy Chodorow’s The Reproduction of Mothering published in 1978. 
Feminist interpretations of Lacan and ‘French feminism’ in general is founded on the idea of sexual 
difference (Irigaray, Cixous), as is the second generation of contemporary feminist theorists influenced 
by these authors (Braidotti; Grosz), and previously discussed in chapter one. 
22 According to Madsen (2000), Daly has ‘hung on a thread to the academy’ for thirty-odd years now 
for consistently ‘blowing exuberant raspberries at the Vatican, Boston College, and the keepers of the 
patriarchal flame generally’. Only recently has Daly been suspended altogether from Boston College 
for her policy of teaching only female students in the classroom and male students in independent 
study.  
23 For a critique of Daly’s universalistic assumptions, see Uma Narayan’s (1997) feminist postcolonial 
critique in chapter three.  
24 The complexities of this debate and the multiplicity of the term of Jewish identity will be fully 
treated in chapter five. 
25 For more on the history of the development of different ‘denominations’ in Jewish religious practice, 
see chapter five. 
26As for other religious traditions, in Judaism religious women have also historically often played 
important roles in the reform of the tradition and women’s role. For example, Hannah Solomon who 
founded the ‘National Council of Jewish Women’ in 1893 united women from different schools of 
Judaism in order to ameliorate humanitarian goals. Lily Montagu was the first chair of the ‘World 
Union for Progressive Judaism’, founded in 1926, in order to revitalise Judaism through a full 
participation of women in religious life (Cornille 1994: 39).    
27 The problem of the way feminist theology and religious studies scholarship has primarily focussed 
on Christian and post-Christian religiosity and for the greater part has failed to include the analysis of 
other cultural and religious traditions will be discussed extensively in chapter three.   
28 The critique of Western feminism by postcolonial thinkers is discussed in chapter four, whilst the 
perception of feminism by traditionalist Jewish women and the broader context of identity politics 
involved will be elaborated on more fully in the case study in chapters seven and eight. 
29 More information on the gender roles in traditionalist Jewish law will follow in chapter five, seven 
and eight.  
30 Cornille (1994: 42) notes that in fact the first woman to graduate from the Berlin Academy for the 
Science of Judaism received ordination in 1935. However, she died in a concentration camp in 1940, 
never to attain leadership over a liberal Jewish community. It could therefore perhaps be argued that 
the great wars of the twentieth century and particularly the holocaust obviously arrested any 
developments pertaining to women’s status, as these were not perceived as the most crucial factors in 
the rebuilding and mere survival of religious Judaism during the post-war period.      
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A ‘VIEW FROM BELOW’? AGAINST AND BEYOND 
ANDROCENTRISM IN THE STUDY OF RELIGION 
 
 
 
In this chapter, the focus shifts from the feminist movement to contemporary 
feminist scholarship on religion, turning to questions of methodology rather 
than history. The first objective is to show how feminist theory and 
methodology has been applied in the feminist study of religion, and in what 
way this research has evolved further from the initial critiques of androcentrism 
that characterised an earlier phase of feminist scholarship. After an introduction 
on some commonly employed general typologies of feminist research and 
theory, the question is posed whether these are reflected in the development of 
the feminist study of religion, and secondly, whether a same basic 
methodological turn from ‘critique to transformation’ has taken place. Although 
feminist scholars in religion have eloquently analysed androcentric 
presuppositions and have subsequently set out to reform androcentric 
methodology through research that ‘starts from women’s religious lives’, 
overall, this scholarship has left the mainstream study of religion unaffected and 
inattentive to questions of gender.  
Moreover, a large part of this contemporary scholarship can be 
characterised as essentialist in being analogous to other areas of feminist 
scholarship in their earlier ‘additive’ phase. According to Rosalind Shaw 
(1995), this essentialism can substantially be attributed to the mainstream study 
of religion which she feels, is similarly essentialist in its ‘view from above’ 
perspective on religious phenomena. On the one hand, Shaw’s hypothesis on 
the incompatibility between religious studies and a feminist approach is 
concurred with. However, in the final part of the chapter it is shown that Shaw’s 
call to integrate ‘diversity’ to bring the feminist study of religion into phase 
with more recent developments in feminist research and theory has to a certain 
extent been heeded, but only in particular and limited ways. That a theorisation 
of religious differences or diversity is marginalised and absent in the feminist 
study of religion, in turn points to even deeper factors underlying the 
incompatibility that can account for the im/possibility of a paradigm shift of the 
mainstream.               
 
 
1. Feminist Theory: The Shift towards Questions of Epistemology 
 
In the previous chapter it became clear that although there may be some general 
agreement among contemporary authors on the division into varieties of 
feminism and different strands of feminist thought, there are no clear-cut niches 
into which this diversity can be categorised. Such typologies are constructed in 
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hindsight, and are never ‘neutral’. They are designed in a certain epoch 
reflecting a particular position which itself needs to be taken into consideration. 
Often typologies take the appearance of ‘evolving schemes’, or follow 
dialectical principles, implying that one strand is a reaction, therefore ‘better’ or 
in a developmental stage further than the last. One can ask for example whether 
Donovan’s (2000) usage of the term ‘cultural feminism’ for what is identified 
as a certain branch of feminism during the nineteenth century (belonging to the 
first wave), is anachronistic. Is it accurate and fair to project the framework of a 
much later movement into the past as some sort of predecessor? It was also 
shown that situating the relationship between feminism and religion into such 
schemes is by no means straightforward. Figures such as Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton can be placed into multiple and seemingly conflicting frameworks, 
depending on developing or altering positions within an individual’s lifetime.1  
As for typologies of second wave feminism, although the labels may 
have increased, Andermahr, Lovell and Wolkowitz (1997: 38) for example 
claim that for early radical, socialist, marxist, and liberal feminisms much more 
was shared, cutting across the strict distinctions these labels suggest. The 
overlaps in the categorisations of authors tend to increase as additional labels 
such as existential feminism, materialist feminism, psychoanalytic feminism, 
lesbian feminism, black feminism, spiritual feminism, ecofeminism, etc. are 
created, precisely in the attempt to account for the vast diversity and nuances in 
both earlier and more recent lines of thought. Mary Maynard (2000 [1995]: 
295) brings attention to and expresses her concern for many of the confusions 
arising from these kinds of labelling, making explicit that ‘there is no real 
consensus as to which categories are the most meaningful, how many there are 
and which writers are to be located within each.’ 
What Maynard (1998; 2000 [1995]) calls the ‘Big Three’, denoting 
liberal feminism, marxist or socialist feminism and radical feminism, is indeed 
often employed as the standard classification of both feminist political 
movement(s) and their concurrent theoretical frameworks. The tripartite scheme 
is standard currency in women’s studies textbooks and literature on feminist 
theory. As noted in the previous chapter, the entrance of feminism into the 
academy meant early feminist scholarship and the work within the developing 
field of women’s studies was explicitly focussed on analytically mapping and 
attempting to account for what was perceived to be the universal oppression or 
subordination of women in society, history, and knowledge. The underlying key 
question for this move was in what way it could directly serve the ideals of the 
feminist movement. Initially - though immediately problematically - 
classifiable as ‘liberal’, ‘radical’, or ‘socialist’ explanations and possible 
solutions for the problem of women’s status were central in women’s studies 
scholarship. However, in the following development, feminist theories came to 
draw on various broader existing theoretical frameworks into the meanings and 
significance of sexual difference underlying the problem of inequality between 
women and men. As argued in the first chapter, these frameworks were often 
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disciplinary bound. They included socialisation theories such as Sandra Bem’s 
gender-schema-theory, psychoanalytical theories such as Nancy Chodorow’s 
(1997 [1979]) usage of object-relations theory, or so-called ‘French feminism’ 
influenced by Derrida and Lacan. Finally, many feminist variants of 
poststructuralist, postmodern and postcolonial theories have flourished during 
the last two decades, and will be elaborately discussed later on.     
A way of summarising the meanings of the earlier categorisations is by 
their organisation along a main axis of ‘sameness or difference’ in the 
theorisation of sexual difference. Referred to as perhaps one of the central 
debates in second-wave feminism, Brouns (1995b: 44) suggests the difference-
equality debate touches one of the central dilemmas of feminism in general 
(also brought up in chapter one). Sometimes typified to as the 
‘minimalist/maximalist’ debate (e.g. Lehman 1994; Maynard 2001a [1995]), 
the positions taken are always both and simultaneously theoretically and 
politically invested. In the classification of the ‘Big Three’ for example, liberal 
and socialist feminism can be understood as organised on the premise of 
equality. The basic argument is that women and men are fundamentally the 
same. The differences between them are seen as the mere result of unequal 
treatment to be solved by equal rights in primarily the political or economical 
sphere.  
Radical feminists – and consequently cultural, spiritual and many 
psychoanalytic feminist theories - on the other hand prioritise the differences 
between women and men as ontological or essential. Women’s ‘difference’ 
cannot and must not be adapted to the dominant masculine norm but should be 
re-valued in its own right. As alluded to in chapter one, in feminist research and 
theories the problem recurs in terms of a fundamental dilemma in a variety of 
discussions such as the sexual difference/gender theory debate, essentialism 
versus social constructivism, and theories and politics of identity. The tension 
touches the very justification of women’s studies as an autonomous discipline, 
and more recently knows structural parallels in fields that have developed from 
women’s studies such as lesbian theory and queer theory. 
In an introductory overview applying the familiar classificatory 
approach, Rosemarie Buikema (1995) distinguishes between three ‘strategies 
and theoretical positions’ in the development of feminist theory: theories of 
equality, difference, and deconstruction. Buikema thus appropriates what I 
called above the major axis and tension underlying other categorisations, yet 
adds a third ‘stage’ to her scheme. This more recent perspective is described as 
having been influenced by poststructuralist and deconstructive theories that 
challenge the binary oppositions in an attempt to ‘transcend the 
equality/difference position’ of the previous lines of thought.2  
More in line with Maynard’s criticisms of rigid and imaginative 
categorisations noted above however, Buikema (1995: 4) also adds that there 
are overlaps and simultaneity. The theoretical approaches developed ‘do not 
follow each other chronologically in the sense that the birth of one theoretical 
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framework marks the death of the other.’ The impossibility of situating 
approaches from a position that is itself outside of one framework or another, is 
attested by for example the way Buikema - in contrast to Broun’s categorisation 
above - identifies ‘de-Beauvoir-related radical feminist social analysis’ as a 
major form of equality feminism. ‘Emancipatory theorists’, yet also ‘radical 
feminists’ such as Kate Millet then are located in a paradigm of equality.3 
Additionally, Buikema’s own perspective is that of feminist cultural studies 
which concerns issues of representation in the nineties in particular. Buikema 
therefore in retrospect categorises equality feminist approaches in their 
presuppositions of the ‘universal human subject’, and ascribes to their analyses 
a vision of texts as ‘more or less faithful reflections of reality’. This kind of 
evaluation typically arises from a postmodern, poststructuralist framework 
appropriated in current cultural studies scholarship. Under ‘difference’, the 
‘metaphor of the female voice’ as expressed in the so-called écriture féminine 
by French feminists such as Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray is included. As 
Buikema (1995: 11) notes however, this strand can also be understood as 
heavily influenced by poststructuralism ‘representing a link between theories of 
sexual difference and theories of deconstruction’.    
In an introductory article to women’s studies, Mary Maynard (1998: 
250) shortly presents another series of three ‘broad and interconnected phases, 
each influenced by the current stage reached in theorising about feminist 
knowledge’. Maynard calls the first the recuperative phase, the stage of 
‘adding’ women into existing knowledge that took place in the humanities and 
social sciences,  the women who had been silenced, stereotyped, marginalised 
or anyhow misrepresented in mainstream scholarship. According to Maynard 
this type of research was often directly influenced by feminist politics and was 
aimed at introducing women’s lives, experiences and perspectives into 
academic scholarship. In contrast, the second reconstructive phase went beyond 
‘adding women’ into existing knowledge. It generated new areas of research, 
concepts and theories. The new topics according to Maynard centre on the 
body, sexuality, the private sphere, next to theoretical discussions on 
‘patriarchy’ and the relationship between different forms of power and 
inequality. Finally, the reflexive phase refers to the way feminist theory has 
been confronted and had to deal with a number of critiques. These concern 
feminist theory’s universal pretensions and own biases resulting from the 
unquestioned position of speaking as women who are privileged as white, 
Western, and heterosexual. This critique regarding the ‘diversity’ of women’s 
experiences was initiated by black women from the U.S. and U.K. signalling 
the exclusion and often racism implicit in women’s studies, yet also from other 
excluded ‘others’ on grounds of sexual orientation, disability, age, etc.   
 
The development, increasing sophistication, yet also the institutionalisation of 
feminist theory and the development of women’s studies as a discipline for 
more than three decades now have become ever more reflexive in the sense that 
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debates on the meanings, the function and the boundaries of feminist theory 
itself have become paramount.4 Women’s studies and of feminist research was 
originally held to be a product for the women’s movement, in that the demand 
for knowledge about the lives of women was in view of transforming society, 
so as to end the subordination of women. Meanwhile it is seriously questionable 
whether contemporary ‘feminist theory’ – or better feminist theories – meets 
this demand in any straightforward manner. The meaning of feminist theory has 
most definitely shifted away from ‘explaining women’s oppression’ or even 
knowledge that could instantly serve the political goals of feminism. This shift 
has been towards a focus on ways of methodologically grounding feminist 
research and finally epistemological questio ns surrounding the production of 
knowledge and its complex and deep relationship with politics and power as 
such. Besides the well-known critique of grand theory, meta-narratives, and 
monocausal or universalistic explanations of women’s status, postmodern 
feminist theory in particular seems to repudiate many of the basic 
presuppositions and ontologies that formed the very impetus for women’s 
studies scholarship. The linguistic turn has implied the ‘deconstruction’ of the 
very categories such as ‘patriarchy’ and ‘women’ that grounded earlier feminist 
critique. 
In the course of these developments and processes of further 
institutionalisation, the original understanding of feminist or women’s studies 
scholarship as ‘research on, with and for women’ (Kelly, Burton and Regan 
1994: 29) or ‘on, by and for women’ (Stanley and Wise 1990: 21) has gradually 
made way for another kind of feminist scholarship. Current feminist scholarship 
concerns much more meta-theoretical reflection and competing understandings 
of what constitutes feminist research and feminist knowledge, or what is 
subsumed under titles such as ‘women’s studies’, gender studies’, and ‘gay 
studies’. This ‘race for theory’ is simultaneously being criticised for being 
detached from feminist practice and politics. Worse, it is ‘high theory’, with 
complex jargon that is not even useful for the women’s movement, the 
argument goes. In this context, the question of politics and debates on the 
relationship between feminist theory inside and outside of the academy, the 
academy and activism, or the ‘theory/practice’ issue have returned and continue 
to take centre stage (important works discussing these issues  are Butler and 
Scott 1992; Nicholson 1990).           
Many recent classificatory schemes of feminist research perspectives 
and theoretical frameworks indeed seem to replicate this recent shift towards 
the question of feminist epistemology. Perhaps the most influential typology of 
feminist research perspectives, which is also often adapted as a means to 
characterise subsequent phases in the development in all areas of women’s 
studies scholarship, is Sandra Harding’s (inter alia 1986; 1991) delineation of 
three main feminist epistemologies.5 Harding calls these three paradigms 
respectively feminist empiricism , feminist standpoint epistemology and feminist 
postmodernism . These epistemologies or theories of knowledge ground 
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methodologies of feminist research. In Harding’s definition - and in 
appropriation by others like Andermahr, Lovell and Wolkowitz (1997: 134) or 
Stanley and Wise (1990: 26-27) -, ‘methodology’ comprises both 
‘epistemology’ and ‘methods’. Methods are referred to in its narrow meaning of 
research ‘techniques’. ‘Methodology’ is therefore understood to be much 
broader, denoting a general ‘perspective’ on the theory and analysis of how 
research should be carried out.  
Harding’s threefold scheme in a way also provides a mapping of the 
answers that developed in reaction to the insight that mainstream sciences could 
not easily be transformed under influence of feminist critique and that ‘perhaps 
the fundamental problem was epistemological’ (Harding 1991: 19). In both The 
Science Question in Feminism  (1986) and Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? 
Thinking From Women’s Lives (1991), Harding provides a broad sequential 
account of feminist critiques of the sciences. The account presents distinctive 
lines of feminist research that are structured according to an underlying and 
shifting axis, framed in the form of a question that gradually changes from ‘the 
woman question in science’ to the ‘science question in feminism’. The ‘woman 
question in science’ asked what women wanted from the sciences and their 
technologies. The ‘science question in feminism’ signifies a more radical move 
in that in Harding’s view the answers provided by various feminist research 
programmes to the first question did not succeed in solving the problem of 
androcentric bias and sexism in science. Thus the ‘science question in 
feminism’ follows from the doubt that bias and sexism can be easily correc ted 
and ‘science-as-usual’ can be reformed at all: can a science and its underlying 
epistemology that is apparently so deeply involved in distinctively masculine 
projects possibly be used for emancipating ends?  
In the suggested shift from ‘reform to transformation’, Harding 
distinguishes between five areas of feminist science criticism or five research 
programmes ‘each with its own audience, subject matter, ideas of what science 
is and what gender is, and set of remedies for androcentrism’ (Harding 1986: 
19). The first three can be located under the ‘woman question’ or the reform 
perspective. These consist of (1) analyses of women’s situation in science; (2) 
the sexist misuse and abuse of the sciences and their technologies; and (3) 
sexist and androcentric bias in the results of biological and science research. In 
Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking From Women’s Lives (1991) the 
first line of research centres around the issue of equity and women in science 
and covers distinctive focuses, such as the rec overy of women’s – undervalued 
– contributions to science, structural obstacles to achievement and mechanisms 
of discrimination and issues of access and education.  
As with the first line of research, for the second, Harding looks at how 
feminist critique has fruitfully revealed the way sciences have often only 
benefited few, and have in fact been used in the service of sexism, racism, 
homophobia and class exploitation (e.g. in oppressive reproductive technology, 
management of domestic labour, gender discrimination in the workplace, 
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medicalisation of homosexuality, ecological destruction). She nonetheless finds 
it inherently problematic. Neither an analysis of women’s situation in science, 
nor uncovering the way science has been used and abused, challenges the idea 
of the value neutrality of science as such. The issue of responsibility is 
deflected once the results of ‘pure scientific inquiry’ are ‘released’ into society. 
The third line of critique however, does take on this challenge. Androcentrism 
and sexis m are revealed present within the practice of science and in the 
research process itself, from the level of the selection and definition of a 
research problem, but also the concepts, hypotheses, research design, and the 
collection and interpretation of data (1991: 40). Examples of feminist research 
that challenge these kinds of ‘bad science’ that have only taken men’s activity 
and belief as paradigmatic, are for example alternative studies of evolution such 
as the ‘woman-the-gatherer’- challenge to the man-the-hunter model6 or Carol 
Gilligan’s critique of the androcentrism in Kohlberg’s theory of moral 
development (1982, 1997 [1977]). Inherent in this third line of feminist 
research however, is what Harding already alludes to as the problem of 
objectivity. If so-called objective and value-neutral sciences are in fact shown 
to be masculine-biased, the question arises how these forms of ‘bad science’ 
can be distinguished from ‘science-as-usual’ (1986: 22-23):  
 
But if problems are necessarily value-laden, if theories are constructed 
to explain problems, if methodologies are always theory-laden, and if 
observations are methodology-laden, can there be value-neutral design 
and interpretation of research? This line of reasoning leads us to ask 
whether it is possible that some kinds of value-laden research are 
nevertheless maximally objective. For example, are overtly antisexist 
research designs inherently more objective than overtly sexist or, more 
important, ‘sex-blind’ (i.e. gender-blind) ones? And are antisexist 
inquiries that are also self-consciously antiracist more objective than 
those that are not?            
 
The questions Harding asks of the types of feminist research according to her 
own categorisation already signal the epistemological shift towards the ‘science 
question in feminism’, which is reserved for the final two feminist research 
programmes in Harding’s sequence. The fourth line of research interrogates the 
‘sexual meanings of nature and inquiry’, appropriating techniques of literary 
criticism, histo rical interpretation, and psychoanalysis in order to be able to 
‘read science as a text’. Metaphors used in early modern and contemporary 
science are central to the way so-called value neutral methods of inquiry and 
models of nature are conceptualised. These metaphors nonetheless reflect 
deeper social meanings, and particularly gender politics, such as the typical 
dichotomies of objectivity versus subjectivity, reason versus emotions, mind 
versus body, attached to constructions of masculinity and femininity in a 
hierarchical fashion.  
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Finally, the fifth research area covers the three distinct feminist 
epistemologies introduced above. These are representative of different 
responses to the problem of androcentrism in mainstream science and ways of 
approaching the paradoxes for feminism in having to deal with the relationship 
between clear political agendas on the one hand, and the notion of scientific 
objectivity on the other. The first, feminist empiricism holds that sexism and 
androcentrism in mainstream science are simply social biases that lead to ‘bad 
science’. For the feminist empiricist, bad science can be corrected by ‘stricter 
adherence to the existing methodological norms of scientific inquiry’ (1986: 
24). Harding immediately criticises this kind of feminist ‘reform’, as it contains 
the epistemological paradoxes that were noted for some of the feminist critiques 
of science categorised under ‘the woman question in science.’ The problem 
according to Harding, is that while at first sight feminist empiricism may seem 
appealing, for it does not question ‘science-as-usual’ and therefore stands to be 
accepted more easily by the mainstream, it in fact ‘deeply subverts empiricism’ 
(1986: 25). Whilst for the empiricist the social identity of the researcher should 
be irrelevant to the research process and its results, feminist empiricists are in 
actual fact arguing that women as a group are more likely to produce unbiased 
and objective results than men. Harding furthermore notes that while 
androcentric bias is usually to be found in the choice and definition of a 
research problem, empiricism holds that methodological norms only apply to 
the ‘context of justification’ (testing of hypotheses and interpretation of 
evidence), not to the ‘context of discovery’.  
Feminist standpoint epistemology is clearly influenced by marxist 
philosophy and as an approach was first developed by figures like Dorothy 
Smith (The Everyday World as Problematic: a Feminist Sociology published in 
1987), Nancy Hartsock (1997 [1983]) and Hilary Rose. The central idea is that 
women from the position of and by virtue of being subjugated, can offer more 
complete and therefore more adequate understandings of the world than the 
partial and therefore distorted or false perspective of men in the position of 
domination. Standpointism takes the implications of the critiques on ‘bad 
science’ in feminist empiricism a step further and offers its solution to the 
epistemological paradox by arguing research must not just include, but must 
actually ‘start from women’s lives’. However, this starting point is not to be 
conflated with the meaning of feminist standpoint (1986: 26): 
 
Feminism and the women’s movement provide the theory and 
motivation for inquiry and political struggle that can transform the 
perspective of women into a ‘standpoint’ – a morally and scientifically 
preferable grounding for our interpretations and explanations of nature 
and social life. The feminist critiques of social and natural sciences, 
whether expressed by women or by men, are grounded in the universal 
features of women’s experiences as understood from the perspective of 
feminism.          
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As with feminist empiricism, Harding already alludes to the inherent tensions 
within standpoint epistemology from the perspective of the subsequent type of 
feminist epistemology. Feminist postmodernism holds that both feminist 
empiricism and feminist standpoint theory are not radical enough. Both ‘still 
adhere too closely to damaging Enlightenment beliefs about the possibility of 
producing one true story about a reality that is out there and ready to be 
reflected in the mirror of our minds’ (Harding 1991: 48). In The Science 
Question in Feminism (1986) Harding describes feminist postmodernism as an 
‘agenda for a solution’ to the feminist paradox of epistemology, compared to 
the ‘two-relatively well-developed solutions’ of feminist empiricism and 
feminist standpoint theory. In Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking 
From Women’s Lives (1991) Harding attempts to build upon this suggested 
agenda, by inquiring further into the tensions and possibilities postmodernism 
holds for feminism, thereby drawing on the proliferation of feminist 
postmodern theories that developed from the late eighties onwards, and to be 
discussed in a following chapter. As was the case for the other typologies of 
feminist research discussed earlier, Harding’s different epistemologies are also 
presented here as ideal types. In later work, and spurred by many an 
appropriation, yet also critiques or ‘misreadings’ of these perspectives, Harding 
attempts to rework her scheme, seeking alliances and more syntheses between 
different positions (e.g. 1991, 1993, 1998).                  
 
 
2. Situated Typologies of Feminist Research in Religion 
 
Harding, Maynard, and Buikema’s typologies are but a few examples of the 
many ways in which contemporary introductions to women’s or gender studies 
have provided overviews of the development of feminist theory or ways to 
categorise different types of feminist research. All typologies are grounded in 
and depart from the feminist insight that mainstream academic practice and 
theory marginalises or otherwise misrepresents women, and that the 
consecutive stages are representative of the evolvement in the various answers 
provided to the challenge of ridding this androcentrism. The first phase in all 
three schemes – equality, recuperation, feminist empiricism minimally share an 
underlying idea of the possibility of rectifying mainstream discipline towards a 
‘successor science’, through what is commonly referred to as ‘adding women’. 
Men and women are perceived as the ‘same’, and women’s exclusion can be 
remedied by bringing them back into the picture in order to attain a more 
complete or ‘objective’ picture of reality.  
In Harding’s view of standpoint epistemology, women’s lives must 
function as a starting point for research. The following stage – difference, 
reconstruction, feminist standpoint – then builds on the insight that the 
corrective ‘adding’ stage does not suffice to counter male bias and 
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androcentrism. Putting women, ‘women’s experience’ and their ‘difference’ at 
the centre entails a broadening of the field in terms of research questions, 
concepts, theories, methodologies, etc. Finally, the third and very recent stage – 
deconstruction, reflection, postmodernism – have the most in common between 
Harding, Maynard, and Buikema’s schemes. Clearly all three authors are 
referring to the same ‘postmodern turn’ that has greatly determined the 
development of feminist theory and research since the early nineties. The 
epistemological shift is taken to its fullest in that both notions of sameness and 
difference are deconstructed together with the idea of objectivity. As Stanley 
and Wise (1993: 190) comment upon typologies like Harding’s, one must be 
careful in acknowledging that these only constitute models, and are not literal-
representational accounts of a limited number of epistemological possibilities: 
‘Typically feminists who are allocated to one of these positions actually 
encompass in their work elements of all three…’          
Considering the commonalties and overlaps between the general 
typologies of feminist theory and research presented above, the main question I 
will ask is to what extent these are reflected in or applicable to the development 
of the feminist study of religion. Secondly, if so, it can be asked whether in the 
feminist study of religion a same basic shift from ‘critique to transformation’ 
towards an eventual epistemological shift can be detected. A brief review of the 
literature will furthermore show that in the search for an answer to these 
questions, new insights shall be gained pertaining to the question of the 
paradigm shift and the factors underlying the apparent incompatibility between 
feminism and mainstream religious studies.      
 
 
General Classificatory Schemes 
 
In the introduction to a status quaestionis of research in the field of women and 
religion published since the beginning of the eighties, June O’Connor (1989: 
101) claims that feminist research in religion has grown and that besides the 
question of women as subject matter in religious traditions, a second area is 
concentrated on the issue of approaches and methodology: 
 
These questions arise out of an interest in what we know and how we 
know it. They come from a sensitivity to and criticism of the 
andocentric manner in which the traditions generally have been studied 
and, more fundamentally, the andocentric manner in which many 
traditions have been shaped and formulated. 
 
This claim appears to be consistent with the general development within 
feminist research as outlined in the typologies above. For implied in this claim 
is the question not only what sort of knowledge or experience concerning 
women’s lives or women’s inequality must be included or ‘added’ in 
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mainstream disciplines, but how to acquire this knowledge and furthermore 
what the implications are for the discipline, to what extent it must be 
transformed or whether transformation is at all possible. More recently, the 
argument that the development of the feminist study of religion has shown to 
have far-reaching epistemological and broader methodological significance is 
echoed in Ursula King’s (1995b: 21-22) introduction to the collection Religion 
and Gender7:      
 
The feminist paradigm in religious studies is one of transformation. Its 
critique of the traditional sources and content of an established field 
involves an alternative vision which transforms both the subject matter 
and the scholar at the same time.  
 
At first sight, these statements seem to suggest that the general scheme ‘from 
critique to transformation’ as present in the typologies that chart the general 
development of feminist theory may be equally applicable to feminist research 
in religion. In an article on this very question of epistemology in the same 
volume (1995), June O’Connor even makes use of Sandra Harding’s (1991) 
standpoint theory in making the argument that epistemological shifts in the 
feminist study of religion have taken place. From a phase of including women 
through the ‘retrieval and recovery of ignored or suppressed voices’, O’Connor 
claims the field has moved beyond integrative to more transformative work. 
Women’s lives only function as ‘a starting point’, yet additional questions, new 
models and concepts, ways of collecting data and interpreting findings, and in 
the end, complete new ‘paradigms for thinking’ necessarily follow.           
King (1995b: 22) presents the methodological process of critique to 
transformation beginning with ‘a hermeneutics of suspicion vis-à-vis traditional 
sources and methods’, followed by a ‘critical deconstruction and reconstruction 
of the key elements of the discipline, eventually resulting in its transformation’. 
Other recent authors have provided typologies of feminist research in religion 
that attest to a similar basic pattern of shifting epistemological grounds. In her 
typology of feminist theology for example, Linda Hogan (2001) distinguishes 
between a first phase of critique of the discipline for its gender blindness, and 
secondly a historical and textual ‘excavation’ that seeks to retrieve women’s 
ignored or forgotten religious roles. Finally Hogan points to a stage of 
‘reconceptualising the discipline’, including its theological concepts and 
doctrines. In Transforming Grace: Christian Tradition and Women’s 
Experience published in 1990, Anne E. Carr (in King 1995b: 13) then again 
envisions a third stage of transformation in terms of gender inclusiveness. In 
King’s summary of Carr’s scheme that borrows from both feminist history and 
feminist philosophy, the first stage in the feminist study of religion involves 
‘the deconstruction of error’, and the second ‘the reconstruction of reality from 
a feminist perspective’. The third stage must work towards the ‘construction of 
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general theories’, ‘a unifying framework which may be developed around a 
more inclusive gender system’.     
Another typology that often functions as a broad frame of reference is 
that by Constance H. Buchanan (1987), who wrote a section on ‘women’s 
studies’ in the well-known and authoritative Macmillan Encyclopedia of 
Religion  edited by Mircea Eliade. For Buchanan, women’s studies or feminist 
scholarship in religion takes gender as its primary category of analysis in the 
study of religion. Opposed to the typologies by Carr and King, gender therefore 
does not function as a means to distinguish consecutive phases of research. 
Rather, Buchanan offers distinctions between related research directions along 
the lines of the familiar notions of critique and reconstruction. One of the main 
purposes of feminist scholarship involves the recovery of women’s historical 
and contemporary experience. On the basis of this the recovered experience and 
perspectives of women, women’s studies can then ‘offer critiques of religious 
and cultural traditions, while at the same time making the experience and 
perspectives of women the starting point for the feminist reinterpretation and 
reconstruction of both religion and culture’ (Buchanan 1987: 433) [italics 
mine]. In Buchanan’s view, women’s studies is not simply concerned with 
‘adding knowledge’, but must build a methodological basis for developing a 
‘more adequate understanding of the whole of human experience’. However, 
consistent with the above typologies, the reinterpretation of women’s religious 
experience in the past and in the present serves as a ‘resource for contemporary 
theology’ (436): 
 
What distinguishes feminist theologians from women’s studies scholars 
in disciplines outside religion is their view that the key to women’s 
becoming creative forces in their own lives, in society, and in culture 
lies in the act of making and articulating their own religious meaning, of 
formulating their own theological problems and religious vision. 
      
Finally, another popular typology by June O’Connor (1989: 102) is markedly 
similar. O’Connor distinguishes clearly between three areas of questioning and 
research on women and religion under what she calls ‘the three Rs of rereading, 
reconceiving, and reconstructing traditions’. Rereading can be summarised as 
the quest of gathering information on women’s religious agency. The traditions 
and their sources must be reread, not only by focussing on women’s voices, but 
also on their absence or silence, and by finding the reasons for this exclusion or 
marginalisation in the material under study. Under reconceiving women in 
religious traditions, the focus remains on the recovery of women’s religious 
agency; yet, ‘the retrieval and the recovery of lost sources and suppressed 
visions’ (103) requires expanding traditional methodological tools. O’Connor 
refers to two examples, Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza’s New Testament exegesis 
that applies methods of social history and historical-critical biblical 
hermeneutics and secondly Carol Christ’s interest in reconceiving religion 
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through marginal or ‘heretical’ sources.8 The third area of questioning concerns 
reconstruction, which in O’Connor’s scheme involves two tasks. One option 
involves the reconstruction of the past ‘on the basis of new information and the 
use of historical imagination’ and secondly ‘employing new paradigms for 
thinking, seeing, understanding, and valuing’ (104). Reconstruction hereby 
refers to actual theological reconstruction, whether the ‘rethinking of a whole 
tradition from a feminist perspective’ such as the work of Rosemary Radford 
Ruether, or the ‘thea-logy’ as practised by ‘scholars of the goddess’.       
 
Although these typologies share a general sequence of initial critique of 
androcentrism followed by a general phase of retrieving, centring or departing 
from women (in terms of experience, voice, roles, etc.), the authors have 
different conceptions of a following and final stage, apart from the insight that 
it involves far-reaching epistemological transformation. It does not always 
become clear if the process of reconstruction or transformation is envisioned 
vis-à-vis the mainstream field of religious studies – the long awaited paradigm 
shift of the androcentric mainstream – and moreover, whether the 
transformation of the discipline of the study of religion or the transformation 
and reconstruction of the religious tradition  – theological reconstruction - itself 
is envisioned. I furthermore argue that the basic structure of these typologies, 
whether they claim to represent the development of the broad field of the 
feminist study of religion, research in gender and religion, or more explicitly 
focus on feminist theology (Hogan 2001), to a great extent merely replicates a 
much earlier and somewhat controversial typology. This typology was 
originally introduced in what is to date considered one of the main reference 
works in the feminist study of religion.     
 
 
The Great Divide: Reformists and Revolutionaries          
 
One of the first and until date perhaps best known overall means of 
classification in the feminist study of religion has been the so-called reformist 
versus the radical or reconstructionist/revolutionary divide. According to Rita 
Gross (1996: 52) this dichotomy of positions already began to emerge since the 
very first second-wave feminist critiques of patriarchal religion, but was not 
fully explicated in terms of a classificatory scheme until the publication of 
Carol Christ and Judith Plaskow’s (1979a) Womanspirit Rising: A Feminist 
Reader in Religion in the late seventies. The distinction the authors make in 
their introduction to the collection of articles that follows forms the very basis 
for the organisation of various contributions to the book.  
In the introduction (1979b) to the reader, the editors frame the tension 
that underlies what they see as a development into two distinct directions of 
feminist theology during a decade of scholarship. This tension follows from the 
answers different authors have given to the question whether and which sort of 
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feminist theology can truly contribute to the liberation of women. Follo wing an 
initial period of the discovery of sexism within and the critique of the 
patriarchal religions Judaism and Christianity, some feminists have opted to 
remain within their religious tradition, yet dedicate themselves to what they see 
as a possibility of reform. The general argument of the reformist position goes 
that, despite the historical development of sexist interpretation by dominant 
religious institutions such as the church and the synagogue, religious tradition 
holds some kind of essential core or truth that is non-oppressive or expressive 
of ‘freedom’ in relation to gender. Christ and Plaskow (1979b: 10) call this 
strand reformist feminist theology, analogous to the Reformation of Christianity 
of the sixteenth century. The articles included in the book grouped under the 
heading of reform, have in common that they remain within the boundaries of 
the normative religious tradition. 
By contrast, the editors call those thinkers revolutionaries, who refute 
biblical traditions as hopelessly patriarchal, sexist and ‘beyond repair’, calling 
for women to discover and participate in new forms of feminist religiosity, 
theology and spirituality. Included under the heading of revolutionaries are 
feminists who may call themselves post-Christian, post-Jewish, pagan, witch, 
Goddess worshipper, or members of the Womanspirit movement. Christ and 
Plaskow furthermore claim that the term ‘revolutionary’ has its problems and 
should not be understood as more ‘radical’ than the reformist option. 
Subsequent authors have nevertheless often appropriated this term in describing 
the distinction (e.g. Morgan 1999: 48). According to Gross (1996: 109), Christ 
and Plaskow’s categorisation did provoke some negative criticism among many 
‘reformist’ scholars. It was perceived that the ‘revolutionary’ position appeared 
to be accorded more value, or was suggested as a step further in the feminist 
critique and transformation of religion than those feminist scholars in the 
process of attempting to reform the biblical religious tradition with which they 
wish to remain affiliated.9  
One underlying developmental axis familiar to general typologies of 
feminist theory explained earlier, does tend to underlie the categorisation, and is 
explicated in the same introduction by Christ and Plaskow. The reformist 
position is aligned with the ‘call for equality in religious rituals and 
symbolisms’ (1979b: 13), whilst ‘those whose theological or spiritual reflection 
is primarily rooted in the women’s movement, especially in consciousness-
raising groups, more often call for an at least temporary ascendency of women 
and the female principle’. Although the equality-difference axis by no means 
coincides with the reformist-revolutionary dichotomy, the first tend to be in 
favour of a model of equality, of equal participation of women and men in 
religious communities (e.g. Ruether, Fiorenza, Gross and Plaskow). Followers 
of the Goddess propagate difference through female religious symbolism (e.g. 
Starhawk, Budapest) yet vary on the issue of gender separatism and/or 
exclusivity for women concerning religious rituals and community.  
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Christ and Plaskow insist that lines cannot easily be drawn between the 
different categorisations they propose, nor do they claim that any one option is 
better or further evolved than another. However, both the title and the 
organisation of the book, including the articles contributed by the authors 
themselves (Christ 1979a, b; Plaskow 1979) suggest that the authors position 
themselves within a more post-Christian and post-Jewish framework. Divided 
into four parts, the first consists of some of the early critiques of the sexism of 
Christian theology (Daly 1979 [1971]; Ruether 1979 [1972]; Saiving 1979 
[1960]). The second section (The Past: Does it Hold Future for Women?) is 
organised as if the feminist authors in this collection of articles logically take 
the next step in moving beyond a stage of critique. The main objectives consist 
of the rediscovering of the hidden history, the herstory of women’s religious 
experience through the reinterpretation of both canonical scripture (Fiorenza 
1979), yet also ‘heretical’ materials considered outside of the authoritative 
canon (Stone 1979). The third section then respectively covers articles with a 
reformist approach towards theology and ritual, although in their introduction to 
this section, the authors note that there are both continuities and overlaps with 
the first two parts in so far they all express a commitment to change rather than 
altogether jettison normative tradition. The final section by contrast, brings 
together a number of essays – including one by Plaskow and two by Christ – 
that repudiate biblical religions and are all committed to the construction of new 
feminist religious traditions, thus belonging to what the authors have termed 
revolutionary feminist theology. 
 
In the beginning of this chapter, it was pointed out that many typologies of 
feminist theory coincide with stages of development in feminist research or 
women’s studies as a discipline and these are often presented in a 
developmental sequence according to dialectical or even hierarchical principles. 
I furthermore argued that at another level these typologies must always be 
viewed as ‘situated’ and that at closer inspection, many overlaps, continuities 
and contradictions might exist. In the case of the feminist study of religion as a 
distinct area of research, it was shown that these arguments similarly apply, yet 
that there are additional particularities in the various schemes when they are 
mapped according to the more generic developmental schemes of feminist 
theory discussed earlier. Although they appear to follow the pattern towards an 
epistemological shift, the relatively recent typologies do not seem to borrow 
any of the contemporary feminist theoretical developments regard ing 
deconstruction, reflexivity and debates over postmodernity. Regarding the 
transformative or reconstructive phase that many of these typologies speak of or 
anticipate, it is not entirely clear whether a transformation of a disciplinary 
nature or a religious nature is at stake. I finally argued that many of these 
typologies therefore do not significantly differ from Christ and Plaskow’s early 
categorisation of ‘the great divide’ in feminist research in religion, and 
consequently, that their classification of critique-reform-reconstruction in fact 
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to date functions as a paradigmatic organisational axis in the field. Before the 
implications of this insight are analysed further, the minimal ‘steps’ shared by 
this and the more recent typologies shall be ‘retraced’, yet in line with the 
argument that these steps are not so much sequential in a chronological frame. 
By way of example, a number of approaches within the field of the feminist 
study of religion will be discussed in more detail, as new questions will be 
raised.  
 
 
3. Against Androcentrism: Critiquing Male Bias 
 
Whereas the early work by feminist scholars in religion such as Mary Daly and 
Rosemary Radford Ruether is considered classic for being critical of 
androcentrism and sexism in religious tradition, that of Valerie Saiving, Rita 
Gross and Carol Christ can be appropriated as exemplary for the unmasking of 
androcentric methodology in religious studies scholarship. Valerie Saiving’s 
essay ‘The Human Situation: A Feminine View’ ([1960] 1979) originally dates 
from a period before the onset of second-wave feminism. Its republication in 
Christ and Plaskow’s monumental Womanspirit Rising (1979) gave this article 
the status of one of the first feminist charges of androcentrism in the 
mainstream study of religion, in this case the overwhelming prevalence of male 
bias in Christian theology. The way Saiving (1979: 25) positions herself in the 
very first paragraph of this article and argues that such a positioning has far 
reaching consequences for the practice of a discipline, can be perceived as a 
feminist strategy of situated knowledge avant-la-lettre: 
 
I am a student of theology; I am also a woman. Perhaps it strikes you as 
curious that I put these two assertions beside each other, as if to imply 
that one’s sexual identity has some bearing on his theological views. I 
myself would have rejected such an idea when I first began my 
theological studies. But now, thirteen years later, I am no longer as 
certain as I once was that, when theologians speak of ‘man,’ they are 
using the word in its generic sense. It is, after all, a well-known fact that 
theology has been written almost exclusively by men. This alone should 
put us on guard, especially since contemporary theologians constantly 
remind us that one of man’s strongest temptations is to identify his own 
limited perspective with universal truth.     
 
From the perspective of women, Saiving goes on to criticise the theologies of 
Anders Nygren and Reinhold Niebuhr for the way the male is taken as the 
normative model for humanity and religious experience. By focussing on the 
concept of the original sin, Saiving argues that these scholars unjustly 
universalise a male conception of sin as ‘pride’ or ‘will-to-power’, opposed to 
the perspective of women in which sin is experienced as self-abnegation rather 
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than pride. Saiving’s essay has been both exemplary and inspiring for 
subsequent feminist scholarship in the study of religion, pertaining to what was 
later called the ‘question of androcentrism’. Only later did Saiving (1976) and 
Rita Gross (1977a) explicitly identify the exposure and critique of 
androcentrism as one of the primary tasks of feminist scholarship. Here, both 
Saiving in her later article (published in The Journal of Religion  in 1976) and 
Gross explore the fundamental ‘question of androcentrism’ in general terms. 
Saiving focuses on religious studies, and Gross on the history of religions rather 
than theology, albeit both departing from the presupposition that all disciplines 
are affected by the problem of male bias and false universalisation.  
In Gross’ (1977a) vision of a paradigm shift of the mainstream history 
of religions from an androcentric methodology to an androgynous 
methodology10 the history of religions is considered highly androcentric, due to 
the fact that one standard, the male norm, is taken for the human norm. While 
this human norm is taken to be generic, covering both male and female, in 
actuality women are not considered as requiring any study, as it is implicitly 
presumed that ‘to study males is to study humanity’ (9). Thus homo religiosus 
in fact turns out to be an ‘abstract concept’, masking the reality that only vir 
religiosus is the subject matter for religious studies research. However, for 
Gross the most problematic characteristic of the androcentric paradigm is that 
for those instances when women are discussed – which cannot entirely be 
avoided due to the obvious sex differentiation and gendered symbolism which 
exists in most religious and cultural traditions – they are studied and 
represented as specific cases that divert from the normative, i.e. the generic 
masculine. Women are then curiously ‘discussed as an object exterior to 
mankind, needing to be explained and fitted into one’s worldview, having the 
same ontological status as trees, unicorns, deities or any other object that must 
be discussed to make experience intelligible’ (10). Borrowing Simone de 
Beauvoir’s notion of women as ‘other’, Gross argues that in the mainstream 
history of religions, when women or ‘feminine imagery’ does function as 
subject matter, they are only dealt with in so far that they relate to vir 
religiosus. Women or femininity are only perceived at the level of the symbolic, 
the exterior, as objects only from the perspective of the males under study, not 
as religious subjects in their own right.   
Both Saiving (1976) and more recently Carol P. Christ (1991) have 
taken on the task of drawing on the work of the master himself of the 
contemporary history of religion, the late Mircea Eliade, in order to show how 
the discipline can be characterised as androcentric. Although these feminist 
critiques analyse two wholly different works in different periods of Eliade’s 
oeuvre, focusing on different aspects of his accounts, both literally claim that 
his androcentric assumptions are structured at a ‘deep level’, and therefore only 
detectable in a critical feminist reading.11 Saiving draws attention to the 
contradictions in Eliade’s Rites and Symbols of Initiation published in 1965. In 
this work which women’s initiation rites and their specific ‘sacrality’ are not 
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entirely ignored, but nonetheless considered deviant from the male structure of 
initiation which is then considered the generic human meaning of initiation. 
Eliade’s interpretations are both inconsistent and thoroughly androcentric in 
that on the one hand he sees female initiations as referring to a specific sacrality 
of women, associated mysteries of conception, birth, fertility, etc. In the context 
of men’s initiation rites then again  – covered much more extensively – women 
are simply portrayed as ‘profane’. One major problem in these interpretations 
according to Saiving is the probability that the ethnographic data upon which 
Eliade makes his generalisations itself is full of androcentric bias regarding 
women’s sacrality and profanity. However, regardless of this problem, Eliade’s 
own interpretations remain androcentric in that the cross-cultural 
generalisations he makes regarding male initiation,  - undergoing physical 
ordeals, conquering death and spiritual power, and other elements which 
Saiving sees as primarily associated with aggression, conquest and domination - 
are then universalised as the human paradigmatic form of initiation. This 
generalisation then deeply contradicts what Eliade himself had concluded to be 
typically feminine sacrality (associated with life, fecundity, etc.) (190):  
 
If, in short, to become really human involves deliberate destruction of 
one’s ties to the mother, the body, the earth and its creatures, life itself – 
if this is what is required of me, a woman, in order to participate in the 
sacred (which is to say, to become a genuine human being), then I, along 
with all other woman, am excluded from full participation in the sacred 
and in real humanness – unless of course, I am willing (and somehow 
able) to cease being a woman. It may be true, as Eliade asserts, that 
women have their own form of sacrality. From the viewpoint of women, 
this conclusion is scarcely trivial; nor should it appear so to scholars in 
religious studies. 
 
Saiving goes on to argue that in unmasking such androcentric presuppositions, 
further questions can be raised, such as the general evolutionary paradigm 
underlying Eliade’s universalistic, transhistorical interpretation of male 
sacrality. Saiving suggests that this understanding may also be distorted and 
initiates the hypothesis that perhaps the sense of the sacred in precivilisation 
may have been closer to the kind that Eliade attributes to female sacrality, such 
as the affirmation of life and nature for both women and men.  
An analysis of Eliade’s three-volume series A History of Religious Ideas 
published in 1975-85 by Carol Christ (1991) provides another example of the 
deconstruction of androcentrism in the mainstream study of religion. Christ’s 
article is not only interesting because it concerns work of the same authoritative 
scholar in the field of the history of religions, but also because Christ – 
inadvertently – follows up on Saiving’s hypothesis on religion in prehistoric 
times. As with Saiving, Christ notices the way that at first sight Eliade does 
include women and feminine sacrality in his account of the origins and history 
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of Western religion during Palaeolithic and Neolithic times, in this case even 
corroborating some of the insights in the feminist scholarship on this period 
which has grown considerably since the publication of Saiving’s article. A 
feminist critical reading however, leads Christ to conclude that androcentric 
assumptions reign, as in the interpretation of the data ‘man the hunter’s’ 
religious contributions and male symbolisms are not only emphasised and 
valued far above those of women-gatherers. Additionally, in uncovering 
androcentric assumptions, Christ also shows how culturally specific 
assumptions are falsely universalised (85): 
 
Eliade leaves the reader with the impression that aside from a few 
indecipherable ‘figurines,’ Paleolithic religion was a male affair, an 
interaction between (male) hunters and a (male) Lord of the Wild 
Beasts. Could this be because Eliade finds the alleged symbols of 
hunting religion, including the projectile weapon, sacrificial death, 
blood communion, and worship of the male supreme being repeated in 
later patriarchal religions, most especially in Christianity? And because 
images associated with the female symbolize the dangerous flux of 
things which he finds antithetical to the sacred?  
 
For the Neolithic period, Christ is even more critical of Eliade’s lack of 
enthusiasm for and neglect of archaeological material and other research that 
suggests women had socioreligious roles and Goddesses were central religious 
symbols. Christ finds Eliade’s rhetoric on the subsequent Indo-European 
religions and societies suspect in which the ‘violence of the warrior and 
conqueror’ is valorised. Finally, Eliade’s interpretation of classical Greek 
religion is taken to task, where again the choice of sources is highly selective 
(androcentric texts), women are absent and patriarchy is valorised.    
 
 
4. Starting from Women’s Religious Lives 
 
The insight that women were absent or otherwise misrepresented or conflated 
with ‘man’ as the generic human in research provided the grounds on which to 
start asking new questions that ‘started from women’s lives’. These questions 
had methodological implications in the sense that a shift took place beyond the 
phase of critique and recuperation from ‘what we know’ to ‘how we know’. 
The development of standpoint epistemology (Harding 1986, 1991) based on 
the work of Nancy Hartsock  (1997 [1983]) and Dorothy Smith (The Everyday 
World as Problematic: a Feminist Sociology published in 1987) showed how in 
order to start from women’s lives, often one had too look in places and subjects 
that had not been considered relevant or ignored in mainstream scholarship. 
Women’s work and activities in the domestic private sphere was one such a 
topic and space that had been greatly neglected and let alone problematised in 
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the mainstream. For the study of religion, parallel repercussions on issues of 
methodology – how we know - similarly took place.  
Beyond the level of critique, feminist religious studies scholars have 
been ‘starting from women’s lives’, researching women’s ‘difference’, their 
‘agency’, ‘experience’ and their own ‘voices’ in the realm of both religious 
texts and lived traditions. King (1997: 653-654) mentions two major and related 
clusters of inquiries. The first looks at women’s role and status as it is 
prescribed by religious traditions, their scriptures and teachings. The second 
concerns the image rather than the role of women, which focuses on their 
representation in religious language and thought. However, as King remarks, 
this level of research still deals with mainly androcentric material. As far as 
patriarchal religious traditions are concerned, for the feminist religious studies 
scholar this approach is methodologically problematic – and in many ways 
analogous to feminist historical research – as the data is often limited to what 
men have believed, taught and propagated about women and femininity rather 
than what women themselves may have experienced or said. Starting from 
women’s lives, moving from the study of women as ‘objects’ to ‘subjects’ of 
religion therefore has methodological consequences.    
For historical and theological research, the retrieval of women’s 
religious experience and lives requires alternative methodologies of interpreting 
women’s absence and retrieving women’s voices. As pointed out earlier, for 
feminist theologians this process then precisely involves a reconstruction of 
religious tradition itself. Positions diverge on the limits to which the creative 
reinterpretation must go (the ‘great divide’), as locating women’s experience 
may involve looking outside of the normative tradition. Taking ‘women’s 
experience’ as a basis for a ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ confronts feminist 
biblical scholars with a paradox, for they must ‘defeat the Bible as patriarchal 
authority by using the Bible as liberator’ (Morgan 1999: 54). Retrieving 
women’s religious voices in non-canonical sources for example, may lead to a 
questioning of normative religious tradition. Those who repudiate normative 
tradition altogether for being ‘hopelessly patriarchal’ and partake in the 
construction of alternative feminist religions often cannot find a place at all in 
mainstream theological and religious studies departments (e.g. Mary Daly and 
Carol Christ).     
In religious studies scholarship that takes a more comparative approach 
and is not limited to the study of Christianity or Judaism, the textual focus 
remains methodologically problematic. Serenity Young’s (1993) well-known 
anthology of sacred texts by and about women at least is up front in making 
explicitly clear that the focus is on scripture rather than women’s actual status 
in religious life. The book includes excerpts from selected scripture itself, and 
by way of introduction these are repeatedly situated in their historical context. 
As the title makes clear and despite Young’s (1993: xvii) acknowledgement 
that the vast majority of the religious texts that have been written by men and 
for men ‘convey an astonishing variety of religious expressions’, at least an 
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attempt has been made by the compiler to locate the much rarer texts written by 
women. These include a variety of texts such as the well-known Christian 
medieval mystical writings by women, but also biographies of Sufi women 
under the chapter ‘Islam’, poems and biographies of Buddhist nuns, the work of 
a Confucian woman scholar, stories of Taoist female sages and more memoirs, 
folktales, life stories, songs, poems and the like, by women in different religious 
traditions. Young does not limit herself to normative sources, but includes folk 
and fairy tales, in order to reveal the ‘little tradition’ or the level of popular 
religion – existing in primarily oral cultures -, in which the participation and 
sometimes even positions of authority are in the hands of women. Such an 
expansion of what counts as legitimate sources for religious expression or 
agency is even carried forward to include what Young terms the ‘texts of tribal 
peoples’, for which she turns to excerpts from the publications of 
anthropologists. These include recordings of stories by women and 
conversations by both women and men from a number of Native American 
tribes on any themes relating to the role of gender in creation stories, medicine 
women, and girls puberty rites. 
As Rosalind Shaw (1995: 68) remarks in her article however - to which 
I shall shortly return - the strand of feminist scholarship that simply ‘presents 
accounts of “women who wrote texts too”’, does not fundamentally challenge 
the domin ant approach in religious studies which focuses on religious scripture. 
In her article on androcentrism in the history of religions, Rita Gross (1977) had 
claimed that from the methodological point of view it is irrelevant whether the 
religious ideas and practices studied – the data - were androcentric and that the 
real issue involved combating the androcentric presuppositions of the 
researcher. However, the fact that the data often misrepresent or simply exclude 
women’s religious subjectivity has profound methodological consequences for 
the feminist religious studies scholar who is set upon starting research ‘from 
women’s lives’. In her introduction to Women in World Religions, Katherine K. 
Young (1987: 2-3) claims that from the perspective and methodology of the 
phenomenology of religion, ‘we cannot avoid the androcentric text which 
muffles our stethoscope and prevents us from hearing the heartbeats of real 
women’: 
 
We now know better than to think that women have always been of 
marginal importance, but as historians who must labor against the 
constraint of textual evidence we have less opportunity than 
anthropologists and other interpreters of contemporary societies, who 
document women’s actual lives, to recover the feminine perspective.  
 
Young’s perspective on the study of religion – even that of a phenomenological 
or history of religions approach – as limiting its data to that of religious texts 
and its method to that of textual analysis may be seen as an example of feminist 
empiricism in that it does not in any way challenge the methodological 
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presuppositions of the mainstream discipline. Pat Holden (1983) by contrast 
suggests widening the scope in order to bring into focus the everyday religious 
experiences of ordinary women. Although many religions are male dominated, 
they repress and restrict women, and reinforce female stereotypes, the 
discussion can be widened by ‘considering how women perceive themselves 
and their roles within varying religious systems’ (Holden 1983:4). In order to 
achieve such a broadening of scope, historical, textual and anthropological 
methods of analysis are often required.                                    
Besides the more descriptive overview women-in-religions type of 
publication to be discussed later on, a limited number of cross-cultural 
approaches on ‘women and religion’ do not limit themselves to the method of 
textual interpretation that dominates religious studies methodologies and 
otherwise inhibits the study of women’s religiosity in many a tradition. The 
volumes Women in Ritual and Symbolic Roles edited by Judith Hoch-Smith and 
Anita Spring (1978a) and Women’s Religious Experience edited by Pat Holden 
(1983) for example, between them include articles on both women in the 
Abrahamic religious traditions (Christianity, Judaism and Islam12), other world 
religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism13, but also papers on female 
religiosity in African societies. As the latter concern religions with little written 
tradition, women’s ‘lived’ participation in myth and ritual, or spiritual 
possession for example is discussed.14 In Hoch-Smith and Spring’s (1978b: 1) 
introduction to their volume, it becomes clear that the choice of the 
contributions is motivated by a focus on both ‘representations of women in 
sacred scriptures and ritual roles for women within those religions…’. The 
articles themselves are not divided along lines of analyses of female metaphors 
or female role prescription within sacred scriptures in the ‘world religions’ on 
the one hand, opposed to accounts based on actual ethnographic research into 
religious roles and rituals for women  - such as midwife, healer, doctor, 
medium, etc. – in religious contexts without scripture on the other hand. The 
editors claim the contributions centre on ‘theoretical or ethnographic 
relationship between feminine metaphor in religious and symbolic systems, 
female ritual and social roles, and beliefs about female sexuality’ (12). The 
focus therefore is not so much on feminine metaphors or imagery itself, but the 
way women (and sometimes also men) react or utilise these metaphors, or how 
certain symbols are contested, within or sometimes on the boundaries of 
institutionalised religion.  
Other contributions share the emphasis on religious practice and 
participation by women rather than the ‘scripture or religious elites’ focus of 
mainstream religious studies methodology.  Women are viewed and studied as 
religious specialists in their own right, often in ritual roles such as healers, 
midwives, spirit mediums, etc. Hoch-Smith and Spring’s (1978a) collection in 
general shows how in order to move beyond androcentrism and to focus on 
women’s religious agency, the study of religion must look towards alternative 
sources and methodologies. However, as an anthropological work, the editors 
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do not explicitly state this kind of critique on the mainstream study of religion. 
The method of combining symbolic analysis with ethnography within the 
anthropological context then is not novel. In this case, merely the subject matter 
is new, as the editors (1978a: v) claim their collection to be  ‘unique to 
anthropological literature, which has for the most part considered only images 
and roles of men in religious expression’.  
A final and equally exceptional example of an edition of cross-cultural 
research into women’s religious lives, is Nancy Auer Falk and Rita M. Gross’ 
(2001) third edition of Unspoken Worlds: Women’s Religious Lives. Whereas 
the first edition published in 1980 limited its contributions to what the editors 
now call an ‘artificial distinction between “non-Western” and “Western” 
religions’, the new edition included a number of articles treating Christian and 
Jewish women’s religious.15 However, in contrast to the literature mentioned 
above, the editors clearly situate themselves and their book in the discipline of 
religious studies, motivated by the androcentric character of the mainstream 
that leaves a ‘skewed and incomplete picture of women’s religious lives and 
roles’ (xv). In order to avoid the methodological androcentrism that often 
follows from the ‘hasty rationalization’ that the neglect of women’s practice 
and experience is based on what is perceived as their lesser prominence in – 
especially as official leaders, recorders and shapers of  - religions, the editors 
refuse to offer a book ‘about how religions view women’ (xv-xvi): 
 
To offer a new vision, our volume had to take up women’s lives; it had 
to place women in center stage – as men had been placed so often in the 
past – and to meet them as subjects, not objects, with their own 
experiences and aspirations. We had to create an understanding of 
women’s own enterprises, whether the world around them defined these 
as ‘in’ or ‘out’, respectable or shocking. We had to show that women 
have their own perspectives and claims on religion, even in systems in 
which men have traditionally done most of the acting and talking. If our 
authors discuss men’s ideas about women, they needed to show how 
such ideas actually affected women’s efforts and religious options. 
 
The search for contributors soon showed that ‘our fellow historians of religion 
could not command materials on women’s religious lives in enough different 
areas of specialization to give us a volume with the range that we had hoped to 
achieve.’ The editors were compelled to turn to area specialists and particularly 
cultural anthropologists. The result is that Unspoken Worlds contains an array 
of essays, both on contemporary and historical women’s religious lives, 
contrasting sections on women practising religion through ‘extraordinary 
callings’, such as Hindu gurus (White 2001), Korean shamans (Harvey 2001), 
an East African diviner (Binford 2001), but also integrative patterns whereby 
women’s religious life supports and validates women’s everyday and domestic 
concerns. 
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An important consequence of broadening the scope of religious 
traditions as well as the methodology beyond textual analysis to the study of 
daily practice through anthropological research, is that women‘s religious 
agency can be brought to the fore and differentiated according to cultural and 
historical contexts where gender relations and relations of power may be 
structured in multiple ways. Whereas a textual emphasis in the study of 
women’s voices in certain patriarchal religious traditions – save theological 
reconstruction - may render women altogether invisible, an anthropological 
focus at least enables a focus on the way women perhaps enact their prescribed 
role as members of their religious community. Questions can be posed such as 
whether women ‘accommodate’ patriarchal norms and control, and find a space 
in which to lead religious lives, or whether they overtly or covertly find room to 
resist or escape these norms. Moving beyond the so-called male dominated 
world religions allows for a comparative perspective on religious traditions 
where gender roles may be more balanced, where religiosity is different yet on 
equal terms for men and women, or where gender may even be irrelevant at the 
level both religious practice and soteriology. Another exceptional example for 
feminist scholarship on the boundaries of religious studies/anthropology is that 
of Susan Sered, mentioned in chapter one. Sered’s Priestess, Mother, Sacred 
Sister: Religions Dominated by Women  (1994a) for example, is a comparative 
study of research into religions throughout the world where women are both the 
majority of the leaders and the majority of the participants in religious 
traditions. These include both normative major religious traditions, strands co-
existing or intertwining with mainstream male-dominated religions, or 
independent and sectarian movements throughout the world. This kind of 
feminist religious studies scholarship is rare but in any case exemplary for the 
kind of work that moves the attention to women’s religious agency and even 
power through an anthropological methodology.  
 
 
5. The Problem of Essentialism and the ‘View from Above’ 
 
 
‘Essentialism’ indicates a belief in the existence of fixed and 
essentialist properties which often invokes ‘biology’ or more 
loosely ‘human nature’ as the supposed basis of these. The 
subject is seen as located within, indeed defined by, a fixed 
set of attributes treated as innately physical, intellectual or 
emotional, and thus derived from the essential properties of 
body, mind or emotions. […] Our view is that ‘essentialism’ 
is precisely an invention, the construction of a site of 
‘différance’ […] and thus of competing forces jockeying for 
control, and not the discovery of something innately ‘there’.  
Liz Stanley and Sue Wise (1993: 208-209) 
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Since the eighties, the feminist study of religion has considerably grown and 
become ever more diverse. Many cross-fertilisations have taken place, 
influenced by the general insight in feminist scholarship that interdisciplinarity 
is often required in the study of gender issues. They cannot be addressed 
through the methodologies traditionally employed in many disciplines. Many 
feminist studies in religion also look to and borrow insights from developments 
and theories beyond the central issues in religious studies and theology, from 
feminist literary theory, feminist anthropology and feminist philosophy (Knott 
2001). I will shortly be addressing some of these more recent developments that 
show many optimistic signs. However, in the framework of the typologies of 
feminist research and theory presented in this chapter, it was argued that for 
many feminist scholars in religion, a methodological and epistemological shift 
involves the process of reconstructing religion itself, simply replicating an 
earlier pattern from the seventies. Additionally and as postulated in chapter one, 
whereas postmodern critique and deconstructionism, so central in this 
epistemological shift for many areas of feminist research, have also entered the 
feminist study of religion in both theological and literary forms, gender theory 
for the most part remains to be integrated.  
One of the main reasons for this particular lacuna I suggest lies in the 
particular relationship between feminism and the study of religion that can be 
characterised by the notion of essentialism . Due to its persistent essentialist 
tendencies, the feminist study of religion appears to be ‘lagging behind’ 
compared to other areas of feminist research. For the most part it fails to make 
many of the methodological and epistemological shifts signalled in general 
typologies of feminist research and theory. Before turning to some examples of 
the way this essentialism has been addressed and attempted to be solved in the 
feminist study of religion, I will go back to the main research question 
concerning the paradigm shift of the mainstream from the perspective of this 
feminist scholarship and critique. It is precisely due to the inherent essentialism 
of the latter, a number of feminist religious studies scholars argue, that gender 
inclusiveness is unattainable and androcentrism prevails.  
Echoing Ursula King’s assessment (1995) in Religion and Gender 
discussed in chapter one, Randi Warne (2000, 2001 [1998], 2001) repeatedly 
claims that towards the new millennium the mainstream study of religion has 
still failed to make that gender-critical turn. There remains a ghettoisation of 
religious studies which takes women or gender as its primary focus, and as 
Warne (2001: 148) claims an ‘exoticisation’ of the same. Women and religion 
are seen as ‘additive’ or topics of special interest aside to supposedly neutral 
mainstream studies. This furthermore results in a kind of ‘non-reciprocal 
academic bilingualism’ whereby gender-critical scholars are expected to be 
proficient in both their own field and that of the mainstream, whereas 
mainstream scholars are not penalised for remaining gender-blind.  
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Although their comments are brief, both religious studies scholars 
Rosalind Hackett (2000) and Kim Knott (2001) allude to the character of the 
religious studies in explaining the im/possibility its engendering. Thus Knott 
(2001: 4) claims that although there is more awareness for gender issues, ‘many 
scholars have not yet seen how singularly transforming the lenses of gender are 
in understanding religious phenomena’. According to Knott, there ‘remains the 
need to recognise that religion is contextual and squarely rooted in power 
relationships’. Hackett (2000: 238) similarly points to the importance of context 
as it appears to be the missing link in the prospect of any kind of gender 
inclusiveness: ‘The heritage of phenomenological comparativism and a 
predilection for the irreducibility of “religion” in the history of religions has not 
served the study of gender well, in that it has fostered a generalized, 
essentialized, and decontextualised view of religion’. That both Knott and 
Hackett are religious studies scholars working on non-Western religious 
traditions (Knott on Hinduism and Hackett on African religions) and both 
employ anthropological methodologies in order to empirically research 
religious phenomena is an important factor which may have contributed greatly 
to their assessments, I suspect. However, I turn to another religious studies 
scholar/anthropologist who has to my knowledge most elaborately reflected on 
this issue, and whose hypothesis I shall build upon further in accounting for the 
problematic relationship between religious studies and a feminist approach.     
In a short but insightful article ‘Feminist Anthropology and the 
Gendering of Religious Studies’, Rosalind Shaw (1995: 65) suggests that the 
problem of eradicating ‘male bias’ in religious studies in view of a disciplinary 
transformation may entail ‘nothing less than the dissolution and reconstruction 
of the discipline itself’. In my reading of Shaw, the root for the incompatibility 
would lie in the fundamental and inherent epistemological and methodological 
properties of religious studies as an autonomous discipline that – analogous to 
the comments by Knott and Hackett - fosters a de-contextualised  and 
essentialist approach to its own subject matter. In making her case on the 
problem of disciplinary transformation from the perspective of gender, Shaw 
looks to the relationship between the discipline of anthropology and a feminist 
approach. As I have already suggested, it is precisely towards this particular 
discipline that the study of religion and gender must ultimately turn.  Shaw’s 
borrowings will first be dealt with in more detail.  
In an attempt to account for the problems of a disciplinary 
transformation of religious studies from the perspective of feminism, Shaw 
(1995) borrows the popular notion of an ‘awkward relationship’ coined by 
anthropologist Marilyn Strathern (1987). Strathern introduces the phrase in 
order to designate the mutual relation of ‘mockery’ existing between feminism 
and the discipline of anthropology. Strathern’s characterisation of the 
dissonance between these ‘neighbours in tension’ does not so much function 
within a broader critique as if both perspectives would constituted distinct 
paradigms in the Kuhnian sense. Rather, the dissonance is located in their 
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research practices, most poignantly expressed in a differing conception of the 
researcher’s relationship to his/her subject matter. Considering the extent to 
which this notion of ‘awkwardness’ has been borrowed as a designation of the 
conflicts between feminist approaches and the mainstream, within (e.g. Harvey 
1998; Walter 1995) and even beyond the discipline of anthropology, it is not an 
exaggeration to emphasise the fact that Strathern had two very specific 
branches of feminism and anthropology in mind. This involves a radical variant 
of feminism and what she terms a more recent, ‘innovative approach’ in 
anthropological theorising. In the following brief characterisation of the 
similarities and the tensions between both forms of scholarship however, 
especially regarding ‘feminism’, the focus is on the general, in order to 
contextualise Rosalind Shaw’s borrowing of these dilemma’s for the case of the 
study of religion.        
Whilst on the one hand it could be argued that anthropology has been 
relatively open or ‘tolerant’ towards feminist scholarship, Strathern and others 
(e.g. Moore 1988) have pointed out how this has precisely contributed to a 
‘ghetto’ effect. In this process, the anthropological study of women or gender 
becomes a mere specialisation and leaves the mainstream ‘untouched’ by 
feminist critique. Anthropology and feminist scholarship seem to share many 
methodological features such as an interpretative framework, or the privileging 
of qualitative research that has been prominent in most forms of feminist 
research and in both traditional and modern anthropology in general. On the 
other hand, it can also be argued the greater part of anthropological practice is 
at least implicitly informed or even founded upon a critical perspective or 
awareness of power inequalities, in the sense that anthropologists since the mid-
twentieth century have endorsed what Micaela di Leonardo (1991) calls a 
‘liberal ideology of cultural relativism.’ Anthropology always ‘necessarily 
involves a critical engagement with western science and social theory’ (Harvey 
1998: 73). Included in this stance has been a relativisation and thus implicit 
critique of Western standards, morals and knowledge and therefore of the 
presumed superiority of Western culture, as but one possibility among other 
peoples of the world. The similarities and tensions between feminist scholarship 
and anthropology are multifaceted. Reflexive or self-critical epistemological 
premises that reign in more recent ‘innovative’ or postmodern anthropology for 
example, again appear to be aligned with recent feminist critique, although in 
practice this form of ‘awkwardness’ has even turned into an almost hostile 
affair (see next chapter). As Strathern notes, these close neighbours are on the 
one hand both comparable in the sense that they are interested in promoting and 
sustaining ‘difference.’ Yet their diverging conceptions of ‘difference’ (along 
gender or cultural lines) yet again contain the seeds for mutual tensions and 
mockery. 
Strathern explains this mutual mockery in terms of the feminist scholar’s 
and the anthropologist’s relation to their subject matter, in their differential 
conception of the ‘other’. Set upon the endeavour to challenge the unjust 
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misrepresentation and appropriation of ‘women’s experience’, in Strathern’s 
interpretation of the radical feminist perspective, the ‘construction of the 
feminist self’ requires a non-feminist other. This non-feminist other is 
conceived of as ‘patriarchy’, often simply concretised as ‘men.’ The main focus 
of any kind of feminist inquiry, including that of the feminist anthropologist, is 
therefore gender – or for the radical feminist ‘women’ -, or more concretely, 
forms of oppression and inequality that are minimally structured by gender 
differences. For the anthropologist on the other hand, the other is the cultural 
other, with whom ‘difference’ is similarly established and held in place. 
However, this other is ‘not under attack’ as in the case of the feminist 
patriarchal other. On the contrary, if anything is ‘under attack’, especially in 
innovative anthropology and certainly anthropology informed by postcolonial 
critique, it is the traditional anthropological ‘self’. The self is under attack that 
has traditionally laid claim to be able to translate and interpret experience, 
representing the ‘other’ to the extent that the unequal power relations from 
colonial times are reiterated in the process of knowledge construction. 
The innovative anthropologist in particular attempts to radically rectify 
these forms of orientalism, hoping to achieve a full collaboration with the 
informant. This is aspired through numerous experimental techniques of 
dialogue or multiple authorship. The goal is to make explicit and include the 
ethnographer’s own participation, experience and voice in this ideal form of 
mutual dialogue between cultural others. Regardless of these more recent shifts 
under the influence of postcolonial critique and also poststructuralist theory, the 
liberal ideology of cultural relativism of which di Leonardo (1991) speaks 
reaches back further than both these epistemological turns in many disciplines 
within the humanities and social sciences. Any form of feminist critique is most 
likely suspect and incompatible with anthropology’s tradition of scrutinising 
Western assumptions and the imposition of Western political ideals, or the 
passing of moral judgement on other cultural traditions or communities. The 
ethics in anthropology rather lie in collaboration by giving the other subjectivity 
or presenting the ‘native’s point of view’. As Strathern (1987: 290-291) phrases 
the tension: 
 
…if such feminism mocks the anthropological pretension of creating a 
product in some ways jointly authored, then anthropology mocks the 
pretension that feminists can ever really achieve that separation from an 
antithetical Other which they desire. From a vantage point outside their 
own culture, anthropologists see that the very basis for the separation 
(from the antithetical other) rests on common cultural assumptions about 
the nature of personhood and of relationships. If women construct 
subjectivity for themselves, they do so strictly within the sociocultural 
constraints of their own society. The establishment of self must endorse 
a worldview shared equally by the Other.   
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In Rosalind Shaw’s (1995) reading of Strathern’s awkward relationship 
between feminism and anthropology, the emphasis lies on the question of 
viewpoint in the differential relationship of the researcher to its subject matter 
in both disciplinary approaches. Anthropology is currently struggling to effect 
an epistemological shift from a ‘view from above’, the context which enabled 
the production of anthropological knowledge in unequal power relationships 
between the (Western) anthropologist and (often colonised or ‘Third World’) 
informant. However, for the feminist scholar, ‘a view from below’ or a 
subordinate standpoint from which to proceed is simply taken for granted. In 
Shaw’s (1995: 66) words:   
 
While anthropology ‘mocks’ feminism from its advantaged position for 
cultural critiques of Western social forms, then, feminism – from its 
own assumed standpoint of the subordinate’s perspective – mocks 
anthropology. Anthropology can never really achieve its desired 
perspective of the ‘view from below’ until Western anthropologists have 
a stronger voice in its reinvention […].  
 
The awkwardness between anthropology and premises of feminist scholarship 
are replicated in feminist anthropology, which can be conceived of as ‘a hybrid 
beast’. For the feminist anthropologist simultaneously has to deal with and 
focus on problems of inequality of gender, yet also ethnocentrism, racism and 
(post)colonialism. The feminist anthropologist is therefore caught between 
differential viewpoints on and the primacy of issues of gender difference and 
cultural difference. In assessing the relationship between feminism and the 
history of religions however, for Shaw the situation is somewhat different, and 
the perspective of any kind of paradigm shift of the mainstream therefore even 
grimmer. At first sight, and in line with anthropology, the history of religions16 
is similarly renown for features in common with feminist research practice, 
such as the methodologies of hermeneutics and phenomenology, and an 
emphasis on the importance of empathy and interpretavism. In practice 
however, the mainstream history of religions mocks feminist scholarship by 
merely being empathetic in the sense that ‘lived religious experience’ is located 
in a seemingly collective, undifferentiated and thus ungendered religious 
subject, represented as the generic homo religiosus. In Shaw’s argument the 
mockery only goes one way though. As opposed to developmental shifts and 
efforts in (innovative) anthropology, the history of religion is predicated upon 
an exclusive ‘view from above’ perspective on religious phenomena. Feminist 
scholarship that is predicated on a ‘view from below’ does not so much deride, 
but according to Shaw can only ‘collide’ with, and is therefore practically 
antithetical to the mainstream history of religions. 
More so than in the case of anthropology, and besides the question of 
viewpoint and cultural or political critique, the ‘view from above’ perspective 
in the mainstream history of religion is identified by Shaw through two main 
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definitions of religion. These appear to be so paradigmatic and foundational of 
the discipline as to be completely irreconcilable with feminist scholarship. The 
first, the understanding of ‘religion as text’, is arguably not necessarily an issue 
of definition but more of a methodological approach whereby in practice 
religion is studied primarily through religious scriptures. At this level of Shaw’s 
argument, the incompatibility with feminism appears to be framed and seen as a 
consequence of this particular feature of religious studies scholarship (68):  
 
Understandings of ‘religion as scripture’ tend, for example, to privilege 
(a) religions with texts, and (b) scholarly elites within scriptural 
religious traditions who claim the authority to interpret texts (and from 
whom women are usually debarred.) The religious understandings of 
those excluded from authorizing discourses of textual interpretation are 
implicitly discounted and relegated to a ‘lower’ level.                      
 
Feminist religious studies endorsing such an approach are thus made impossible 
through the absence or denial of women as religious subjects. As argued earlier 
however, this appears not to be so much ‘deliberate’, but a consequence of the 
fact that the religious traditio ns mostly under study are themselves patriarchal, 
their scholarly elites usually being men. The understanding and the study of 
‘religion as/through text’ can  - and has been – critiqued from other corners than 
that of feminism, for its effect of resulting in parallel forms of a priori 
methodological exclusion. A view from above approach that privileges 
religions with texts automatically excludes or under-privileges the study of 
religions that lack religious texts, or at least where religious texts may function 
differently. A well-known defining feature in the history of the discipline itself 
has been the emphasis on the so-called ‘world religions’, starting with the 
Mediterranean religious traditions. Additionally, the study of world religious 
traditions other than, yet modelled after the text-focussed methodologies 
applied to Western traditions such as Judaism and Christianity can be critiqued 
as instances of orientalism (Balagangadhara 1993; Pinxten 2000; Smart 1996).  
Besides the text-focus, the elite-focus can similarly be held accountable 
on other, albeit related grounds than feminism. By defining or looking to the 
centre of the religious tradition as only those with the authority to construct, 
interpret, ‘handle’ and even broader, implement textual religious discourse, not 
only women are ‘relegated to the periphery’. Broader than Shaw claims, 
regardless of gender, the vast majority of self-identified adherents to a religious 
tradition or members of a religious community, both women and men are 
excluded or peripherilised as subjects of religious studies inquiry. This would 
exclude what is often referred to as ‘popular religion’, the religion practised by 
‘common’ people and often as part of their ordinary everyday lives.  
The second main feature of the ‘view from above’ perspective in 
mainstream religious studies scholarship according to Shaw (1995: 68), is the 
employment of a sui generis concept of religion, ‘in which religion is treated as 
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a discrete and irreducible phenomenon which exists “in and of itself.”’ The sui 
generis claim of the ‘uniquely religious’ which can only be understood and 
studied ‘on its own terms’, in Shaw’s view runs counter to feminist scholarship 
and its ‘view from below.’ Arguably, more than the ‘religion as text’ approach 
nonetheless, the sui generis claim which reigns in the mainstream, in effect 
excludes any possibility of an integration of the study of gender and power in 
the study of religion. For in the sui generis understanding, the ‘distinctively 
religious’ itself is conceived of as socially decontextualised. Any questions of 
politics, power, inequality or gender are at best seen as secondary or as side-
issues to the study of religion, but in themselves are not part of, nor do they 
constitute religion. Religious studies remains essentialist and therefore 
decontextualised in its ‘view from above’ perspective, thereby ‘effectively 
insulated’ from questions about standpoint, privilege, and power, which by 
contrast are part and parcel of what feminist scholarship is about.  
With power being irrelevant, according to Shaw (70) one is left with 
‘either meaningless accounts of  “religious gender roles” (“men do this; the 
women do that”) or with disconnected descriptions of female deities (“add 
goddesses and stir”)’. What Shaw appears to be critical of in current gender 
studies in religion is the kind of ‘additive’ feminist or women’s studies 
scholarship that focuses on women or femininity,  - be it at the level of social 
reality or religious imagery and ideology – that can then again be characterised 
as essentialist in terms of gender. This dominant strand of feminist religious 
studies according to Shaw can be seen as in a position analogous to that in 
which the ‘ghetto’ feminist anthropology found itself in the 1970s. However, in 
contrast to feminist anthropology, feminist religious studies have failed to leave 
their essentialist ghetto and to have any substantial impact on the mainstream. 
The capacity of feminist religious studies for disciplinary transformation is 
thereby currently ‘cramped by hangovers from mainstream religious studies 
which some forms of feminist religious studies have carried with them’ (73). In 
feminist religious studies scholarship, as in many forms of feminist spirituality 
and thealogy (Shaw refers to the reconstructionist work in Christ and Plaskow 
1979a), a ‘universalised female spiritual essence’ and an essentialist female 
collective subject or ‘feminized homo religiosus’ lives on.  
Viewed of in terms of the typologies of feminist research and theory 
presented earlier, feminist studies scholarship in religion in Shaw’s perspective 
would still be caught in a phase of centring yet essentialising women’s 
experience and difference. This strand of scholarship fails to make a shift 
towards a deconstruction  of the notion of ‘women’ in terms of acknowledging 
the diversity amongst them, towards a more constructionist type of gender 
theory that employs a more intersectional approach towards power and 
inequality as introduced in chapter one. Stanley and Wise (1993: 208-210) for 
example, locate features of essentialism in three types of discourses within 
feminism. One such a discourse presumes that there are ‘womanist qualities 
untainted by the patriarchal order, which lie beneath or behind the levels of 
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falsity and deformation’. This position is often associated with both strands of 
sexual difference theory and French feminism (chapter one) but also forms of 
radical and cultural feminism (chapter two). The second type of essentialism 
uses a notion of ‘woman’s oppression’ which assumes that all women are 
‘subjugated for the same reason/s by the same means to the same extent across 
all cultures and history within patriarchy’ (chapter two).  Finally, essentialist 
feminist discourse perceives unity in its object of enquiry, women: ‘Seeing 
‘Women’/women as united by certain characteristics is treated as essentialist 
because supposedly deriving from perceiving a fixed coherent set of properties 
as constituting women’ (210).  
The essentialist phase in which much feminist religious studies 
scholarship is caught and therefore incapable of achieving any impact on the 
mainstream however, according to Shaw can itself be greatly ascribed to the 
very character of the mainstream discipline and its ‘view from above’. 
Although Shaw in the space of her article does not reflect any further on this, or 
suggest there would be any concrete solutions or likelihood of the possibility of 
any paradigm shift of the latter, she does make a general plea for a 
deconstruction of essentialism in feminist study of religion. This plea would be 
in accordance with what has been understood as a more recent stage in the 
typologies of feminist research methodology, among which the need to theorise 
women’s diversity instead of the presumed essentialist commonalities between 
them.    
 
 
6. Deconstructing Women through ‘Diversity’ 
   
The Differences between Women 
 
Rosalind Shaw (1995) argues that many strands of contemporary feminist 
religious studies employ an essentialist notion of the category ‘woman’, which 
is out of phase with developments towards de-universalisation and growing 
critique from diversity which has become commonplace in the vast majority of 
feminist scholarship within and across other disciplines. For Shaw, feminist 
religious studies find themselves in a ‘ghetto’ comparable to the much earlier 
essentialist phase of the anthropology of women, isolated from and ignored by 
the mainstream discipline of anthropology. However, as noted, they are also 
incapable of developing further or having any impact on the mainstream due to 
sharing some of its fundamental features, such as the already referred to sui 
generis claim (Shaw 1995: 73):     
 
Currently, few feminist scholars in any discipline assume a universal 
‘female reality’. That many scholars in feminist religious studies are an 
exception to this derives, I believe, from the universalizing and 
essentializing tendencies of the discipline’s mainstream.       
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The critique of the unitary category ‘woman’ or the possibility to speak of 
universal ‘women’s experience’ which Shaw accuses the contemporary feminist 
study of religion of failing to incorporate into its theoretical frameworks, is 
nowadays commonplace in most fields of feminist research. This critique can 
be located within the unmasking of the distinct white, middle class and 
heterosexual character of feminist movement and scholarship that was initiated 
during the first decades of the second wave. Many lesbian feminists, feeling 
marginalised or betwixt and between both gay liberation and the women’s 
movement were highly critical of the norm of heterosexuality embedded in 
second-wave feminist thought. Theories were developed on notions of lesbian 
experience and identity, such as Adrienne Rich’s concept of ‘compulsory 
heterosexuality’, understood as a system or institution central to women’s 
oppression above that of  ‘patriarchy’.17 
Another major direction from which the question of the differences 
between women in second wave feminist movement and feminist theory 
evolved, can be understood as the heterogeneous rubric of ‘non-white’ or ‘non 
white/Anglo’ (Lugones and Spelman 1983) feminist critique identified under 
various headings such as ‘black feminism’, ‘women of color’, ‘third-world 
feminism’, ‘Chicana feminism’, etc. The term ‘black feminism’ or better the 
plural ‘black feminisms’ can be used as a general term for those feminisms in 
the U.S., U.K., and sometimes even in referral to any ‘non-Western’ or ‘non-
white’ type of feminist movement and theory that unmasks and strongly 
challenges racism and ethnocentrism, including that present in ‘white’ 
feminism. The term ‘black’ is problematic in defining these forms of feminist 
resistance and identity politics in that in the U.S. it is generally used in referring 
to African-Americans only, with Asian-Americans, Latinas and Native 
Americans often being referred to as ‘people of color’ or sometimes ‘Third 
World people’.  
In the British context however, ‘black’ has traditionally been applied as 
a political rather than a ‘racial’ category by Asians, Africans, Afro -Caribbeans 
and in general ‘non-white people’ (Andermahr, Lovell and Wolkowitz 1997: 
18-19; Kanneh 1998: 86; Maynard 2001b [1994]: 436; Nain 2001 [1991]: 348). 
‘Women of colour’ as a generic, inclusive and explicitly political term became 
widespread upon the publication of This Bridge Called My Back: Writings By 
Radical Women of Colour in 1979, an anthology presenting a diversity of 
contributions and definitions of non-white feminist resistance and identity in the 
U.S., edited by Gloria Anzaldúa and Cherríe Moraga (Kanneh 1998). It is 
nonetheless sometimes used for all non-white women other than those from 
African descent who are then called blacks, yet at other times as an all-inclusive 
category referring to both. Other U.S. scholars apply the term ‘third world 
women’ (Sandoval 2000 [1995]) interchangeably with women of colour, and 
have expanded the category during the nineties (Mohanty 1991: 7): 
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It is a sociopolitical designation for people of African, Caribbean, Asian, 
and Latin American descent, and native peoples of the U.S. It also refers 
to ‘new immigrants’ to the U.S. in the last decade – Arab, Korean, Thai, 
Laotian, etc. What seems to constitute ‘woman of color’ or ‘third world 
women’ as a viable oppositional alliance is a common context of 
struggle rather than color or racial identifications. It is third world 
women’s oppositional political relation to sexist, racist and imperialist 
structures that constitutes our potential commonality.  
           
Central in the critiques formulated by black feminist18 activists in the early 
seventies in the U.S. was the argument of the simultaneity of different yet 
related forms of oppression black or coloured women endured. White feminism 
had omitted to include the question of racism into their theories of oppression 
and inequality. Although historically many black women in the U.S. had always 
partaken in struggles against oppression and inequality, it was not until the 
seventies that gender inequality became to be an important issue for many black 
women. Following the gradual gains of the black liberation movement many 
women began to problematise sex-discrimination among black men (Brewer 
1992: 65). In the context of the academy, both the institutionalisation of black 
studies19 and women’s studies marginalised the experience and study of African 
American women, until some of the writings by black feminists became to be 
noticed in feminist scholarship. Titles of publications by black feminists of the 
early eighties such as Ain’t I A woman: Black Women and Feminism 20 and All 
the women are white, all Blacks are men, But some of us are brave: Black 
Women’s Studies21 in the U.S. and ‘White Women Listen! Black Feminism and 
the Boundaries of Sisterhood’22, attest to the marginalisation of black women in 
feminism. Their experience of ‘triple oppression’ called for analyses of 
inequality to deal with racism, sexism and classism as interlocked, and mutual 
reinforcing systems of oppression. Thus bell hooks (1984: 1) exposes the 
racism, classism and sexism in Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique as 
applicable to ‘the plight of a select group of college-educated, middle and upper 
class, married white women – housewives bored with leisure, with the home, 
with children, with buying products, who wanted more out of life’. Hooks sees 
sexism as an institutionalised system of domination, yet affecting women in 
different ways. According to hooks, sexism is always itself imbricated in racial 
hierarchies, which in turn can be related to class relationships in capitalist 
society (1984: 3).  
Aída Hurtado (1996: 9) claims that despite the abolition of slavery in the 
U.S., and the periods in which black women’s experience could not easily 
compare to the expectations of white women’s behaviour and the construction 
of white womanhood, even till date the difference of the relationship of white 
women to white men and of women of colour to white men persists. The 
differential conditions in which most black women are in a subordinate status 
compared to most white women is firstly expressed in their low economic status 
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and concrete material situation. They are mostly employed in low-paid service 
occupations, historically with much less opportunities for intellectual work and 
higher education, and far removed from the call for work as liberating and a 
road to economic self-sufficiency in liberal ‘bourgeois’ white feminism (Collins 
1990; hooks 1983). One of the most fundamental slogans characterising white 
second wave feminism, ‘the political is personal’, has similarly been applicable 
to many black women’s oppression and grounds for resistance. Middle- and 
upper-class white feminists have critiqued this distinction on the basis of being 
excluded from the public sphere, yet experiencing oppression in the so-called 
non-political personal or private sphere. According to Hurtado (1996: 18) 
however, by contrast working class women of colour have continuously 
experienced state intervention into their private lives through welfare 
programmes, the restriction of reproductive rights, the criminal system, etc.: 
 
White feminists’ concerns about unhealthy consequences of standards 
for feminine beauty, their focus on the unequal division of household 
labour, and their attention to childhood identity formation stem from a 
political consciousness that seeks to project private sphere issues into 
the public arena… Feminists of color focus instead on public issues such 
as affirmative action, racism, school disintegration, prison reform, and 
voter registration – issues that cultivate an awareness of the distinction 
between public policy and private choice.       
 
Whilst white feminists campaigned for the right to free abortion and 
contraception in the seventies and eighties, for many black women 
contraception and sterilisation enforced by the state provoked an altogether 
different formulation of the demand for reproductive rights (Weedon 1999: 
161). The white feminist ‘attack’ on the family has similarly been critiqued by 
black feminists who have defended the black household as a space of resistance 
and solidarity in the face of racist society (hooks 1984; Maynard 2001b [1994]; 
Nain 2001 [1991]).  Black feminist activists and scholars have therefore been 
severely critical of the way feminist movement and feminist theory has often 
been racist and has completely neglected black women’s issues, promoting 
false ideals of universal sisterhood based on the ‘notion of a generic woman 
who is white and middle class’. Collins (1990: 6) illustrates how important 
feminist research which sets out to unmask androcentric theories excluding 
women’s experience and subjectivity, to show how it too excluded many black 
and working-class women’s experience, as the samples rely greatly on middle-
class white women.23  
Apart from this growing critique upon black studies and women’s 
studies, both critical of the exclusionary practices and biases of mainstream 
academic scholarship, black women’s resistance has taken many forms. 
Important in this resistance has been their reconceptualisation, and the 
reclaiming and celebration of black women’s history and experience. This has 
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included rediscovering and reinterpreting the work of Black women writers and 
intellectuals of the past, the reinterpretation of histories of oppression but also 
positive interpretations of women’s resistance, agency and subjectivity. Similar 
to the variation and developments within white feminist scholarship, black 
feminist work has also included endeavours to emphasise black women’s 
‘difference’, the construction of black female traditions, and a ‘black female 
aesthetics’ (Weedon 1999: 161). Hurtado (1996) remarks how the struggle for 
consciousness and the process of (re)claiming or (re)constructing an identity 
has also diverted from that of many white feminists’ trajectory. Consciousness 
of exclusion and oppression begins early in life for many black women or 
women of colour whose political and structural marginalization is the condition 
of their lives.  
In contrast to white women, the building of identity and community is 
different for black women who can refer to historical moments of tradition, 
community and cultural roots invested with empowerment before colonisation, 
slavery and subjugation. The problematic position in many women of colour’s 
relationships to both their own communities, where they also experience 
oppression and sexism as women, and simultaneously their confrontation with 
exclusion and racism from white privileged men and women, shows how the  
(re)construction or (re)invention of identity is not a straightforward task. For 
lesbian women of colour, exclusion in both their own and white communities 
takes on another level, as the case of interethnic or interracial identities 
similarly problematise the search for acceptance and a the sense of belonging to 
a community (e.g. Cherríe Moraga (1998 [1983]), as a half Chicana, half 
Anglo, and a lesbian).     
The distinctiveness of what Patricia Hill Collins (1990: 9) – borrowing 
Foucault’s term – calls African-American women’s ‘subjugated knowledges of 
Black women’s culture and resistance’, has also involved challenging white 
feminist epistemologies. Besides the redefinition of intellectual formats, against 
traditional classifications and boundaries between activism and scholarship, or 
‘thought and action’ (Collins 1990), including non-academic forms such as oral 
traditions, Hurtado (1996: 28) suggests that while women’s studies has 
focussed on the production of knowledge, feminist theory by women of colour 
by contrast has been sceptical of knowledge construction without wisdom.24 
Presently the work of black feminist writers such as Audre Lorde, Alice 
Walker, bell hooks, Hazel Carby, Barbara Smith, Patricia Hill Collins and 
Chicana feminists (of Mexican descent living in the U.S.) such as Gloria 
Anzaldúa, Cherríe Moraga and María C. Lugones, Patricia Zavella and many 
other feminists from non-white, other ‘ethnic’ or ‘racial’ backgrounds or colour 
in both the U.S. and the U.K. has been included in many a women’s studies 
curriculum. Feminist theory has increasingly acknowledged the importance of 
including ‘race’, class, sexual orientation, but also age, (dis)ability, etc. as 
categories of oppression, intersecting with sex/gender as an axis of oppression. 
However, critiques of exclusion and mere tokenism of ‘the holy trinity’ of 
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‘race’, class and gender (Weedon 1999: 169) in much contemporary feminist 
theory continue (see also chapter one).  
While many feminist theorists may acknowledge the importance of 
taking the differences between women and the different systems and effects of 
oppression into account, the question of actual integration, beyond the mere 
additional lesson on ‘women of colour’ in women’s studies classes for example 
remains problematic. At the level of feminist epistemology, as Sandra Harding 
(1990: 194) notes, ‘adding women of colour’ to existing  - feminist - theories 
and analyses brings with it just as many terminological, conceptual and political 
problems as the ‘add women and stir’ approach did when applied to mainstream 
androcentric theories and frameworks. According to Hurtado (1996: 6) when 
contemporary white feminist theorists do give attention to writings by women 
of colour, ‘they either fit [them] within the existing white frameworks or claim 
that writings by feminists of Color, while descriptive are not theoretical.’ Chela 
Sandoval (2000 [1995]: 380) similarly claims that what she calls ‘US Third 
World feminist criticism’ is often understood as ‘a demographic constituency 
only… and not as itself a theoretical and methodological approach that clears 
the way for new modes of conceptualizing social movement, identity and 
difference’.  
At the same time, towards the end of the twentieth century, debate 
among black feminists or women of colour is developing regarding the 
possibilities of alliances between these different feminisms in their relation to 
postmodern theory. Finally, the emphasis on the differences between women 
and the critique of essentialist understandings of sex/gender, ‘race’, sexuality, 
etc., the constructed nature of categories of ‘blackness’ and ‘whiteness’ has 
been carried through with the development of feminist strands of postcolonial 
theory. The debate on ‘difference’ and on the way multiple forms of oppression 
between different ‘categories’ of people exist has enabled both profound self-
critique and a further development of feminist scholarship. The 
reconceptualisation of feminism and feminist theory in a global context beyond 
the boundaries of the West is increasingly becoming central to any 
contemporary form of feminist theory that must therefore deal with much more 
than the problem of androcentrism for a certain group of women in a certain 
place of the world.                         
 
To what extent does Rosalind Shaw’s assessment and critique of the failure of 
contemporary feminist research in religion to move beyond the employment of 
a unitary and essentialist category of ‘woman’, actually refer to the 
destabilisation of the category through the notion of ‘diversity’? Has 
essentialism been tackled through an acknowledgement and theorisation of the 
intersections of dimensions of oppression, as in the movement within feminist 
theory that problematises the differences between women and foregrounds the 
diversity of women’s experience as summarised above? Albeit somewhat later 
and maybe less extensive than in other areas of feminist research, the issue of 
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‘difference’ has nonetheless gradually been taken on in the feminist study of 
religion. The diversity of women’s religious experience has certainly been an 
important issue ever since the publication of anthologies such as Womanspirit 
Rising, which not only covered internal debates and directions in the feminist 
reinterpretation of religion, but also included more than one religious tradition 
(namely both the Christian and the Jewish religious tradition).  
The early participation of both Christian (and Post-Christian) and Jewish 
(or post-Jewish) feminist scholars in the field of feminist research in religion, 
has allowed for an attention to the diversity of women’s experience, at least the 
religious diversity of two major Abrahamic traditions practised in the 
contemporary U.S. The main interpretative framework that organises the 
contributions in Womanspirit Rising, the reform-revolutionary divide, is 
nevertheless already somewhat problematic in its application to even Judaism 
as a close neighbour to Christianity. This becomes apparent in the general 
introduction to the part on reformist interpretations, which differ substantially 
in Christian and Jewish religious tradition (Christ and Plaskow 1979a: 134):  
 
Since Judaism is a religion of ritual, law, and study, rather than 
theology, creed, and doctrine, Jewish feminists have devoted their 
efforts not so much to defining and overcoming the patriarchal 
structures of Jewish thought as to criticizing specific attitudes toward 
women and to working for the full incorporation of women into Jewish 
religious life. Feminist contributions to the reconstruction of tradition 
most often focus on creation of new rituals. (Hence the absence of a 
Jewish article in the last section.) Even those Jewish thinkers who are 
most theoretical frequently express a practical concern.  
 
As described in a previous paragraph, the last section of Womanspirit Rising 
culminates in the feminist revolutionary approach in constructing new feminist 
religious traditions that totally abandon what are held to be ‘hopelessly 
patriarchal’ biblical traditions. Apart from Judith Plaskow’s own contribution, - 
that is introduced as more on the threshold between a reformist and a 
revolutionary stance - a Jewish revolutionary feminist religious reconstruction 
appears to be problematic, which the authors attribute to the primacy of ritual 
above theology in Judaism. This insight however, is not problematised any 
further, nor does it appear to have raised any questions on the organisational, 
epistemological framework that underlies the book, with feminist theology 
understood and defined from the perspective of the context of only one tradition 
– Christianity. Furthermore, this insight  - or its possible consequences - does 
not appear to have been raised in the greater part of the development of the 
feminist study of religion in the following decades.25   
As a Jewish feminist and one of the pioneers in the feminist study of 
religion in the U.S. since the early seventies, Judith Plaskow brought attention 
to the diversity and differences between women, much in the line with the 
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critique from women of colour on feminist theory and research developing 
during the same period. In referring to Naomi Goldenberg’s critical reading of 
Mary Daly’s understanding of ‘sisterhood’, Plaskow similarly warns that the 
feminist critique of androcentrism by male theologians must not entail a false 
universalisation of the experience of women (Plaskow 1977: 27): 
 
I would argue, that is, that the real impact of our criticism of the 
universalizing tendency of much theolo gy should send us delving more 
and more deeply into the experiences of all kinds of women – black 
women and white women, middle class women and working women, 
Jewish women and Christian women, and so on. This is the only way to 
avoid the pitfalls of a ‘universal’ analysis of women’s experience which 
is really an analysis from the perspective of the dominant (white middle 
class) group. It is also the way to educate ourselves to the genuine 
diversity of women’s experiences, experiences which are necessarily 
diminished and falsified when reduced to a single theme.  
 
Almost a decade and a half later, in a book dedicated to the feminist 
reconstruction of Judaism, the need to repeat similar words points to the 
persistence of the problem of the concept of ‘women’s experience’ and 
negligence of the differences between women, even within  the boundaries of a 
religious tradition (Plaskow 1991: 11-12): 
 
The problem with the phrase ‘women’s experience’ is that it implies 
uniformity where – even if we restrict ourselves to  Jewish women – 
there is great diversity. … It is too easy for one dominant group – in this 
case, the North American Ashkenazi Jew – to define women’s 
experience for all women, forgetting that even Jewish women’s 
experience is a great tapestry of many designs and colors. Since no 
woman’s work can ever include the whole tapestry, each must 
remember she speaks from one corner, the phrase ‘women’s experience’ 
qualified by a string of modifiers that specify voice.   
 
So a call for attention to the diversity of women and the dangers of 
essentialising and universalising women’s experience, in terms of a minimal 
presence of religious diversity – albeit limited to Christianity and Judaism – can 
be detected in the voices of some authoritative scholars in the feminist study of 
religion since the very beginnings. To a certain extent, the same can be said for 
issues of ‘colour’ and class diversity. Whether this has accompanied any 
epistemological or methodological changes remains another question, which 
will be dealt with after first taking a closer look at another type of literature that 
does incorporate a kind of diversity, the ‘women-in-religions’ genre…    
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Diversity and Methodology: The ‘Women-in-Religions’ Genre 
 
Although one can certainly not speak of a dearth of anthropological or cross-
cultural research on women in different religious traditions (see above), the 
‘women in different religions’ type of publication in religious studies usually 
remains at the level of description and introductory overview. The ‘women 
in…’ type of book – usually limited to the so-called world religions – often 
consists of consecutive chapters (by different contributors) dealing with 
women’s status within officially institutionalised religious traditions (e.g. 
Cornille 1994; Klöcker and Tworuschka 1997). The problem with this type of 
literature is that it often remains highly superficial. The individual articles often 
cover a whole time span from the very emergence of tradition, ending with the 
position of women within the tradition today, including the gains or setbacks of 
feminist voices within the tradition. The very set-up can be called essentialist in 
that an a-historical, universal category of ‘woman’ is employed. This kind of 
work also fits in with Shaw’s assessment of feminist ap proaches carrying 
hangovers from the mainstream in the reification of a collective religious 
subject viewed from above, in this case the feminised homo religiosus. 
Additionally, a textual emphasis in many of these collections is by far the 
dominant approach, overlooking not only the differences between women, but 
also the whole question of lived religious experience and practice and female 
religious agency. 
The type of literature on women and religion discussed earlier revealing 
the androcentrism of mainstream religious studies as in the understanding of 
‘religion as text’, by employing more social scientific oriented methodology to 
study women’s religious agency, does not quite employ an essentialist category 
of ‘women’ as the type of publication referred to above. However, apart from 
acknowledging the necessity of employing alternative methodologies in order 
to recover or recentre women’s religious experience or agency, diversity 
remains undertheorised even in this work (e.g. Holden 1984; Atkinson 1985 in 
Parvey 1987). Again diversity is limited to the level of the presentation in the 
form of separate contributions on women and religion, however diverse the case 
studies taken as whole often are. The differences that inevitably emerge 
between women or perhaps  ‘feminine imagery’ in the different religious 
contexts that form the subject of inquiry may then function as material for 
cross-cultural comparison as to women’s status in religion and society in 
general. Whereas the earlier, primarily anthropologically oriented or influenced 
publications among these (e.g. Hoch-Smith and Spring 1978; Sanday 1981), 
frequently pose the question for comparison in the search for correlation and 
universals on ‘women’, cross-cultural analyses such as these are nowadays 
rather rare. In general, feminist research has abandoned this type of question on 
discovering the universals of women’s status altogether, precisely in view of the 
danger of overgeneralisation on the issue of women’s status or subordination 
and woman as a universal category of analysis.26  
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In Caroline Walker Bynum’s (1986: 4) introduction to another well-
known volume, Gender and Religion: On the Complexity of Symbols (Bynum, 
Harrell and Richman 1986) the author explicitly makes clear that although the 
focus is on women’s  - or better on gendered - religious experience, the 
question of ‘remedy[ing] the earlier scholarly neglect of women by examining 
and comparing woman’s religious experiences across cultures’ is not the main 
purpose of the book. As an important reference work in the area of the feminist 
study of religion, even if for the sake of the argument on the integration of 
diversity it can formally be categorised among the ‘women and religion’ genre, 
the theoretical perspectives in Bynum’s introduction are definitely indicative of 
a shift as was alluded to in chapter one. Bynum furthermore claims the volume 
does not attempt to discuss the extent of or explanations for male dominance in 
religious traditions, – the type of question providing the very impetus for earlier 
feminist scholarship27 - and similarly refuses to endorse the hypothesis of 
universal sex asymmetry and its implications as an a priori.28 The theoretical 
framework guiding Gender and Religion therefore differs from the other works 
in the genre under discussion. The influence of feminist theory29 is much 
greater and gender as a cultural construct is the primary category of analysis 30 
and at least functions as a point of departure for the different contributions, 
rather than a more essentialist or untheorised notion of ‘women’ or the 
‘feminine’, let alone questions of oppression or universal subordination. This 
volume and the way in which in the introduction an attempt is made to integrate 
insights from feminist and gender theory into the study of religion, until 
recently has been perhaps one of the first, but as remarked in chapter one, 
regrettably also one of the rare attempts to undertake such an endeavour.                              
Since the late eighties through to the present, the women-in-religion 
anthology genre continues to be widespread, including a popular series (McGill 
Studies in the History of Religions) of volumes edited by Arvind Sharma and 
Katherine Young.31 As becomes clear in the introduction (Young 1987) to the 
first book Women in Religions (Sharma 1987) and was pointed out in an earlier 
paragraph, the research stance is entirely that of the history of religions 
methodology and phenomenology. The religion-as-text approach is prioritised, 
regardless of admitting to the constraints such an approach brings for focussing 
on women’s agency within the patriarchal religious traditions of the world. 
Most of the essays by different contributors in the book follow the familiar 
pattern of the religious studies approach, describing the ‘role of women’ 
throughout the ages in a particular religious tradition through an examination of 
the earliest or ancient texts sometimes ending with observations on reform for 
women within the religious institution or practice in modern times.  
Apart from some remarks on religious studies methodology, Young’s 
general introduction does not contain any references to feminist theory or 
methodology, nor is the concept of gender applied. Although the problem of 
recovering women’s religious agency and ‘women’s religious lives’ within such 
an approach is noted, the volume thus remains at a descriptive level, apart from 
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an attempt to account for the rise of patriarchal world religions based on 
existing models suggested in earlier cross-cultural research (such as that of the 
already mentioned Peggy Reeves Sanday 1981). In the introduction to one of 
the more recent volumes in the series, Feminism and World Religions (Sharma 
and Young 1999), cross-cultural comparison or generalising models are absent 
(Young 1999). Instead, in the introduction a brief overview is presented of 
‘intellectual trends’ (from Romanticism to Deconstruction and Postcolonialism) 
and the way ‘feminism’ has borrowed or critiqued these different theoretical 
perspectives. The short summaries contain hardly any references (apart from 
mentioning the names of some ‘French feminists’ under the rubric 
‘deconstruction’) and there is barely any reflection on the way these 
perspectives are appropriated in the individual contributions.  
In short, we can concur with Rita Gross’s (1996: 57) description that the 
majority of the women-in-religion anthologies hereto mentioned are merely 
‘information gathering exercises’. They do not incorporate feminist theoretical 
concerns such as the importance of the category of gender and the questioning 
of ‘women’ as a universal, unproblematic category of analysis, including the 
issue of the ‘difference’ between women that has become so central since the 
early eighties. The only diversity is that at the level of the presentation of 
information about different religious traditions next to one another, and 
sometimes by way of introduction or conclusion then brought into a general 
framework of cross-cultural comparison on the question of women’s universal 
status or universal subordination. Thus, it is reminiscent of an earlier phase of 
the ‘anthropology of women’               
 
 
From the Differences within to the Differences across… 
 
Judith Plaskow’s (1991) call to theorise and integrate the diversity among 
women in terms of differences between them along the axes of ‘race’, class and 
sexual orientation has effectively been heeded in one particular area of the 
feminist study of religion during the last two decades. The growing attention to 
diversity itself however, has mostly taken place and therefo re been limited to 
what can easily said to be the most dominant strand of feminist religious 
studies, that of the Christian tradition. What was already a diverse field with 
conflicting views and varieties of theologies since the very onset of second 
wave feminist critique, has become even more diverse through the critique from 
women against the exclusionary white, middle-class and heterosexual character 
of Christian feminist movement and theology.  
In the North American context, from this critique by black feminist 
Christian women, the movement of ‘womanism’ has emerged. The term was 
coined by the writer Alice Walker and first introduced in the collection of 
essays In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens: Womanist Prose published in 1983 
(Kanneh 1998; Smith 1998; Thomas 1998). That the boundaries between 
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secular opposed to religious feminism evident in white second-wave feminism 
are not so easily drawn in the case of non-white forms of feminism becomes 
apparent in the literature regarding the meaning of womanism in  its relation to 
black feminism. Reflecting on the diversity of the contributions to the important 
volume This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color 
edited by Moraga and Anzaldua and published in 1983, Kanneh (1998: 87-88) 
refers to the ‘spiritual visions’ underpinning many of the essays in their attempt 
to formulate alternative forms of feminist identity. In their glossary of feminist 
theory, Andermahr, Lovell and Wolkowitz (1997: 19, 238) for example, simply 
equate womanism with black feminism, including figures such as Alice Walker 
and Audre Lorde as central to this movement in general terms. Walker would 
have rejected the term feminist altogether precisely for its exclusionary 
connotations in favour of womanism, articulating the particularity of black – or 
referring to her own background that of Afro -American - women’s experience, 
history and community. A womanist is ‘to feminist as purple is to lavender’ in 
Walker’s definition (Collins 1990: 22; Gross 1996: 52; Smith 1998: 2), yet also 
(Smith 1998: 2): 
 
…bold, brassy, ‘universalist’,… committed to survival and wholeness of 
entire people, male and female. A womanist is also – thoroughly erotic: 
‘A woman who loves other women, sexually and/or nonsexually’ and 
exultantly ‘Loves music. Loves Dance. Loves the moon. Loves the 
Spirit. Loves love and food and roundness. Loves struggle. Loves the 
Folk Loves Herself. Regardless’.       
      
Womanist theology and Christian social ethics often draw on sources by black 
women writers who do not necessarily see themselves as theologians or 
ethicists – bell hooks and Audre Lorde for example (Martin 2001 [1993]). The 
spiritual elements in the (re)construction of black feminist identity in their work 
nonetheless forms the inspiration for the development of what is called a  
distinct womanist theology. Womanist theology shares with black feminism or 
feminism of colour the general feature in that it both ‘associates and 
disassociates itself from black (male) theology and (white) feminist theology’ 
(Thomas 1998: 4). Opposed to separatist forms of white feminism, such as the 
Feminist Spirituality movement (Sered 1994: 27), through its attention to ‘race’ 
and class, womanism is universalist or inclusive in being committed to the 
liberation of all women, men and children who are all oppressed under 
hegemonic white patriarchy. Womanist theologians such as Dolores S. 
Williams critique black liberation theology for ignoring the experience of black 
women and for its disregard of the sexism of the Bible and Christian tradition 
(Ruether 1998: 231). The challenge of womanist biblical interpretation is thus a 
critical hermeneutics of all ideologies of dominance and subordination, 
focussing on the marginalisation of both women and men (Martin 2001 [1990]). 
At the same time, as with the institution of the family, the black church is to 
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seen to have functioned as an important institution of survival for black people, 
yet according to womanist theologians it is also accountable for often excluding 
and exploiting black women. 
Mujerista theology has developed as a distinct form of feminist theology 
among Hispanic or Latina Christian feminists living in the U.S.. Mujerista 
theologians such as Ada María Isasi-Díaz (2001 [1993]) similarly critique much 
of the liberation theology fro m Latin America for not taking sexism into 
account. Isasi-Díaz has described mujerista theology as dedicated to liberation 
and salvation as two aspects of the same process, as a communal practice and 
not an individual affair for groups of Hispanic women in  the U.S.. For Isasi-
Díaz, mujerista theology is not limited to theoretical reflection or a strict 
disciplinary method by theologically educated professionals, but must be 
theology ‘placed at the heart of Latinas daily life’ (2001 [1993]: 506-507). 
Together with Chicana activist Yolanda Tarango, Isasi-Díaz has used a praxis-
oriented methodology, by collecting retreats by Hispanic women that 
‘interconnect storytelling, analysis, liturgizing and strategy.’ More independent 
of Catholic or Protestant churches, mujerista theology also turns to women’s 
traditions of popular religion, mixing popular Spanish Catholicism, Amerindian 
and Afro -Caribbean practices (Ruether 1998). Finally, Asian American 
Christian feminists like the Asian Women’s Network (since 1984) have been 
organising themselves in the U.S., and a group of Asian American Women in 
Ministry and Theology have started to write their own feminist theologies 
(Gross 1996: 55; King 1994b: 15-16). 
   A glance at the tables of contents ever since the first issue in 1985 of 
the internationally authoritative Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion , edited 
by Judith Plaskow and Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, would suggest that the 
issue of ‘diversity’ and its integration into the field of the feminist study of 
religion has by no means been a peripheral affair. From its very inception, 
almost every issue has not only contained contributions on religious traditions 
other than Christianity, but also on womanist, Asian, mujerista and lesbian 
theology. Besides individual articles, various issues often contain ‘special 
sections’ (e.g. ‘Asian women theologians respond to American feminism’ in 
1987, vol. 3, nr. 2) or ‘roundtables’, with various participants commenting on 
each other’s pieces on topics such as racism, anti-Judaism, womanism, 
mujerista theology, etc.  
Periodical roundtable discussions in the journal have also focussed on 
the issue of methodology, and although issues of androcentrism in mainstream 
religious studies and theology, feminist theory and practice, and the notion of 
women’s experience have often been central in these dialogues, the issue of 
women’s diversity has repeatedly been voiced and included as central to these 
debates. Cheryl Townsend Gilkes (1985) for example, emphasises the 
importance of social analysis in the feminist study of religion, which she 
directly relates to the necessary inclusion of black women’s voices towards 
feminist scholarship that must be ‘inclusive and holistic in its approaches’ in 
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order to overcome racism, eurocentrism and classism. As a post-Roman 
Catholic feminist from a Reform Jewish background, Patricia Shechter (1987) 
citing Audre Lorde’s famous statement ‘The master’s tools will never dismantle 
the master’s house’, calls for feminist religious scholarship which must look to 
‘alternative, non-traditional “tools” – sources, methodologies, processes’. 
Giving life stories as a starting point for feminist theologising and thealogising, 
Shechter refers to work by Alice Walker, Monique Wittig, Audre Lorde, 
Winnie Mandela, Sojourner Truth, Mother Ann Lee and others as life stories 
which can be seen as theological texts and starting points. In the same 
roundtable discussion, Kwok Pui-lan (1987: 100) concurs with Shechter’s plea 
to begin theology with the stories of women’s lives. However, Pui-lan is also 
critical of the way Shechter easily lumps together some names, claiming ‘the 
danger of today is that it has become fashionable to quote a few sayings from 
women-of-color without acknowledging our differences of race, class and 
culture’. For Pui-lan, herself an Asian Christian woman, in the feminist critique 
of androcentric paradigms, attention must be paid to the ‘harsh reality’ of Third 
world women, towards a liberation from ‘a very parochial understanding of 
Christianity’.  
Finally, in a roundtable celebrating the tenth anniversary of JFSR 
(1990), not one contribution omits the issue and importance of the diversity 
between women that has ever increased over the last decade. María Pilar 
Aquino (1995) claims feminist theoretical models must still make sure to be 
accountable to the interactions of ‘race’, culture, class and religiosity, whilst 
Sheila Greeve Davaney (1995) applauds the move to a more historicised 
subject, attending to the differences between women above presuppositions 
about unitary and of an essentialist nature. Nantawan B. Lewis (1995) employs 
the concepts of ‘dewesternisation’ and ‘decolonisation’ in calling for a 
reassessment of the approaches that have claimed purportedly to ‘integrate and 
interpret the experiences of women of color’. Central to many of the 
contributions in this issue however, - next to warnings of tokenism or women of 
color or poor women as mere ‘addendums’ to feminist analysis - is also the 
question of multicultural perspectives, transversality, commonality and 
alliances among women. Judith Plaskow’s (1995) response in particular, is 
suspicious of ‘postmodern’ approaches that celebrate multiple subjectivity and 
fragmentation in which ‘real power differentials’ may become obscured. The 
danger that ‘the differences between differences can become homogenized’ 
must be avoided and work towards solidarity is advised. 
Diversity as in the differences between women practising or writing 
feminist theology has also expanded and become more known in the form of 
scholarly publications in the West in a cross-cultural global context. With the 
publication of a collection of articles from feminist theologians from ‘Third 
world’ countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, editor Ursula King (1994a) 
attempts to make the work available of women from different countries and 
colours, beyond that of U.S. women of colour. According to King (1994b) in 
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her general introduction, although black women’s criticism against both sexism 
and racism has become crucial for the development of feminist theology in the 
U.S., the intersections of gender, ‘race’, and class have also become widely 
debated among feminist theologians in the Third World. King describes the 
‘cross-cultural connections’ and the development of a ‘feminist consciousness 
among Christian women’ on a global scale that has evolved. This is partly due 
to the many initiatives of several Christian world organisations, such as the 
World Council of Churches (WCC). Separate conferences, networks and 
publications32 of women theologians from all over the world have grown since 
the issue of sexism became a more prominent theme of the agenda of The 
Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologians (EATWOT founded in 
1976) and women’s participation has greatly increased throughout the eighties 
and nineties.  
Although King’s attempt to represent what may be understood as a 
recent global form of diversity among feminists, referring to and suggesting the 
promise of cross-cultural connections and transnational alliances across the 
differences between feminist activists and scholars in religion throughout the 
world, an important caveat is to be taken into account.33 In spite of all the 
diversity which is suggested in King’s general endeavour and introduction, this 
diversity itself takes place within the context of one particular form of theology, 
that of the Christian religious tradition. King refers to this in her introduction in 
the following way (1994b: 4): 
 
The term ‘feminist theology’ can be understood both in a broader and 
more narrow sense. It has been applied to the work of Jewish and 
Christian feminists and also to writings on new forms of feminist 
spirituality. I do not use the term in this wider sense, but apply it more 
narrowly as referring to the experience and reflection of Christian 
women from the Third World. However, these women belong to many 
different Christian churches and work closely together in an open, 
ecumenical, sisterly spirit.         
 
A concise review of the attention for and the integration of the differences 
between women as a crucial step in the development of feminist scholarship 
and theory in the last two decades within the specific area of the feminist study 
of religion can be summarised as follows. Basically, the women-in-religion 
genre of publication focuses on ‘diversity’ in the cross-cultural sense: studies of 
different religious traditions and the role of women or the ‘feminine’ therein are 
brought together. However, more recent feminist theoretical insights on notions 
of essentialism, difference and comparison are for the most part lacking and 
diversity remains at the level of description or presentation. On the other hand, 
the critique initiated by lesbian women and women of colour in the U.S. and the 
U.K. against the exclusionary white, middle class and heterosexual character of 
feminist activism and theory was in fact taken up at an early stage in the 
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feminist study of religion as an emerging field of scholarship. Both anthologies 
and especially the contributions and dialogues in the important Journal of 
Feminist Studies in Religion, show how the differences between women and the 
intersections of gender, class, ‘race’, sexuality were and continue to be seen as 
important and not mere additive issues in the field.  
It is possible that this process of integration and cross-fertilisation was 
facilitated compared to other fields of feminist scholarship, due to the role of 
religion and spirituality which appears to be a prominent issue in many black 
feminist writings. As was extensively argued in chapter two, second-wave 
feminism has for the greater part not only been exclusionary in matters of 
‘race’, class and sexuality, but is has also been dominantly secular and often 
strongly anti-religious. Taking into account that feminist research in the area of 
religious studies may be more open to the work of women of colour, such as 
womanism or mujerista feminism, another suggestion can be made. It can be 
questioned whether the very problem of the integration of the ‘critique from 
diversity’ into Western feminist scholarship which continues to the present also 
rests on the question of difference in terms of secularity and religiosity, besides 
culture, ethnicity, ‘race’, ‘etc.’  
However, the most important insight hereto gained regarding the 
acceptance and integration of diversity among women is the following. Both in 
the case of women of colour living in Western countries, and in more recent 
attempts to bring in the global dimension of women’s differences into feminist 
scholarship on religion, ‘diversity’ has been theorised in only one particular 
way. With the exception of some attention to Jewish feminism in the U.S. and 
various individual contributions in JFSR throughout the years, diversity itself 
has been defined mostly in Christian or post-Christian terms. Despite the focus 
on class, ‘race’, or cultural differences – whether in the context of minorities, 
migration or in transnational contexts – religious differences themselves have 
not been greatly theorised from the perspective of feminist theory and 
methodology, not only in feminist research in general, but especially within the 
feminist study of religion as a distinct field. 
One of the rare voices to be heard on this very issue is that of the well-
known feminist religious studies pioneer, Rita M. Gross. In Feminism and 
Religion  (1996), Gross argues that feminist scholarship and theology should 
become genuinely cross-cultural, and should attempt to look beyond the 
horizons of Western religions and their precursors in the Ancient Near East or 
pre-Christian Europe (56-57): 
 
In my view, the single greatest weakness of feminist thinking about 
religion at the beginning of its third decade is that so much of it is 
primarily Western, and even primarily Christian. … Understanding 
diversity among religions is at least as important as understanding 
diversity within  religions. … Of all the calls to affirm and appreciate 
diversity, the call for genuine, serious cross-cultural interreligious study 
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and thinking in feminist theology and scholarship has been the least 
heeded.          
 
Only very recently have there been some signs that this issue will be taken more 
seriously and be a matter for theoretical reflection within the field. In another 
roundtable discussion ‘Feminist Theology and Religious Diversity’ in JFSR 
(2000), the same author has attempted to initiate a debate in a provocative essay 
entitled ‘Feminist Theology: Religiously Diverse Neighbourhood or Christian 
Ghetto?’ As a feminist Buddhist ‘theologian’ and scholar of comparative 
religion, Gross laments the exclusion and negligence of non-Christian 
perspectives in feminist theology, expressed at the level of academic forums 
and positions within the academy (73):  
 
Yet as the world becomes more aware of and sensitive to diversity of all 
kinds, the feminist theology movement, like much mainstream (or 
malestream, as some feminists would say) theological writing and 
education, is oblivious to the reality of religious diversity and acts as if 
all theology were Christian theology.                  
 
The situation is particularly ironic, as in Gross’s experiences in many forums 
for interreligious dialogue (such as the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies) 
much attention is paid to gender issues, yet Christian women and Christian 
feminists remain uninterested to participate, retreating ever more in a 
institutionalised Christian feminist ‘ghetto’. As one of the pioneers, Gross 
furthermore claims that initially feminist religious studies scholarship was truly 
committed to include all forms of diversity, with Christian and non-Christian 
feminist scholars (such as Judith Plaskow, Carol Christ and Naomi Goldenberg) 
as central figures of the movement. In other words, even if the development and 
further institutionalisation of feminist religious studies scholarship may have 
followed general trends in feminist theory towards cultural, ‘race’ and class 
diversity, attention to religious diversity itself has decreased considerably.     
Despite the observation that developments in feminist theory and 
methodology – from diversity through to postmodernism - have definitely been 
taken on in the feminist study of religion, this appears to have been limited to 
and taken place within predominantly one religious tradition. Even if all kinds 
of debates on differences and diversity take place at a global level, these do not 
cut across different religious contexts themselves. Gross does not delve deeper 
into the reasons why this is the case, although both the discourse in her essay 
and some of the reactions to it do contain some clues that require further 
analysis. As I will argue in the following chapter, the answer to the question 
why religious diversity is marginalized, is directly related to some other 
observations which underlie and account for the incompatibility between 
mainstream religious studies and feminist perspectives, and the consequent 
im/possibility of a paradigm shift of the first under influence of the latter.  
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1 See chapter two under 2. Religion and Women’s Liberation until the Second Wave The First Wave: 
Anglo-American and British Religious Feminism. 
2 Another possibility in distinguishing between these two strands is Iris Young’s (from an essay 
‘Humanism, Gynocentrism and Feminist Politics’ published in 1985). She divides of feminist theory 
into humanist feminism and gynocentric feminism. Erikkson (1995: 16-17) characterises this scheme 
as ‘a shift from claiming equal treatment and possibilities for women compared to men, to claiming 
equal value for the two genders.’ Humanist feminism hereby refers to a first phase of the differences 
between women and men as socially constructed and a source of oppression (the equality option), 
whereas gynocentric feminism focuses on the differences themselves which conversely are seen to be 
‘the seeds of women’s liberation’.    
3 See chapter two, under 3. The Second Wave: A Fissure: Discovering Patriarchy, where Kate Millet 
is placed under the strand of anti-liberal, radical feminist sexual difference thought.   
4 For recent discussions see e.g. ‘Interchanges’ in the first issue of Feminist Theory: Ahmed (2000); 
Ermarth (2000) and its third issue in which Stanley and Wise (2000) call for an autocritique and 
transformation of the current status of feminist theory. See also the replies to their article in 
‘Interchanges’ such as Humm (2001); Marchbank and Letherby (2001) and Stacey (2001). 
5 Although initially designed for the social and natural sciences, Harding’s classification of feminist 
epistemologies has been widely applied in all kinds of academic scholarship, including the humanities.   
6 This work includes Slocum, Sally, ‘Woman the Gatherer: Male Bias in Anthropology’, in: R.R. 
Reiter (ed.), Toward an Anthropology of Women, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975, pp. 36-50, 
in: di Leonardo (1991: 7), and Tanner, Nancy and Zihlman, Adrienne, ‘Woman in Evolution, Part I: 
Innovation and Selection in Human Origins’, in: Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, vol. 
1, nr. 3, 1976, pp. 585- 608, in: Nielsen (1990: 16) and di Leonardo (1990: 7), and Sarah Blaffer 
Hrdy’s The Woman That Never Evolved published in 1981. See also Hrdy’s more recent feminist 
challenge to the prevailing androcentric bias in evolutionary biology in Mother Nature: Natural 
Selection and the Female of the Species (1999).  
7 See the beginning of chapter one for more on Ursula King’s Religion and Gender. 
8 See Christ’s 1979a and 1979b and her more recent work such as ‘Rebirth of the Goddess’ (2001). 
9According to Gross (1996: 108), the same authors partly retract their earlier distinction between 
reformists and revolutionaries, in an answer to this criticism in Weaving the Visions: Patterns in 
Feminist Spirituality published a decade after Womanspirit Rising in 1989.   
10 See also chapter one, under 1. A Millennial Fantasy: On the Verge of a Paradigm Shift towards 
Gander Inclusiveness. 
11 Surprisingly, Christ does not refer to Saiving’s article, regardless of the fact that they are both 
concerned with the exposure of general androcentric bias in Eliade’s work. Christ in fact arrives at 
similar conclusions concerning the (over)emphasis on aggression in Eliade’s theories of religion, even 
though the religious traditions under study vary significantly (see further).      
12 Contributions on the Christian tradition in both volumes include the interpretation of female imagery 
in Scottish Pentecostal churches (Maltz 1978), the position of women in Scottish Evangelical churches 
(Borker 1978), the religious participation of Mexican women (Arnold 1978) and an article on village 
women in the Greek Orthodox Church (Rushton 1983). Papers on Judaism include an article on a 
women’s Sabbath service in the U.S. (Prell-Foldes 1978), sex roles among Eldery Jews (Myerhoff 
1978), women rabbis in Liberal Judaism (Neuberger 1983) and women, custom and halakhah (Jewish 
law) (Webber 1983). In Holden’s (1983) volume, one paper deals with Islamic women’s gatherings in 
Turkey (Tapper 1983).   
13 AmaraSingham’s (1978) article deals with the representation of women in Sinhalese Buddhist myth 
and in Holden, the theme of women and Hinduism is explored by Leslie (1983) in ancient Indian texts 
and by Thompson (1983) on fertility and worship in a Hindu village.   
14 Articles focussing on women and religion in Africa are those by Spring (1978) on spirit possession 
in Zambia, spirit mediumship among Black South African women (Middleton-Keirn 1978), Yoruba 
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female sexuality (Hoch-Smith 1978), the participation of women in masking societies in West Africa 
(Tonkin 1983) and women and ‘little spirits’ among the Nyole of Uganda (Whyte 1983).  
15 Campbell (2001) discusses the late Dorothy Day, founder of the Catholic Worker Movement. 
Neudel’s (2001) study concerns the development of an unusually egalitarian Jewish congregation, the 
Upstairs Minyan of the University of Chicago Hillel Foundation during the early decades of the 
women’s movement. Ross’ (2001) article focuses on Victoria Way DeLee, an African American civil 
rights activist from South Carolina. Strasser (2001) describes the struggle of the Catholic nuns of the 
Pütrich convent. 
16 Although Rosalind Shaw focuses on the ‘history of religions’ as a discipline, her arguments hold for 
what I refer to as ‘religious studies’ in general, which covers what is referred to as the history of 
religions or the field of comparative religion (see introduction).  
17 See also chapter one under: 2. Constructing, Deconstructing and Reconstructing Gender: Political 
and Postmodern Appropriations 
18 Both ‘black feminist’ and ‘women of colour’ will be used as generic inclusive terms. 
19 bell hooks (1984: 39) refers to eminent political thinkers such as Franz Fanon, who in his Black 
Skins, White Masks published in 1967 omits sexism altogether in discussing oppression only in terms 
of the relation between the white male colonisers and colonised black men.   
20 By bell hooks, first published in 1982. The often quoted phrase ‘Ain’t I a Woman?’ comes from a 
speech made by the black feminist activist Sojourner Truth at a women’s rights convention in Ohio in 
1851 (Collins 1990: 13-14): 
The man over there says women need to be helped into carriages, and lifted over ditches, and 
to have the best place everywhere. Nobody ever helps me into carriages, or over mud-puddles, 
or gives me any best place! And ain’t I a woman? I could work as much and eat as much as a 
man -  when I could get it – and bear the lash as well! And ain’t I a woman? I have borne 
thirteen children, and seen them most all sold into slavery, and when I cried out with my 
mother’s grief, none but Jesus heard me! And ain’t I a woman?   
According to Patricia Hill Collins (1990), this phrase expressed the contradictions in the term ‘woman’ 
and challenged the very standards of what being a woman meant. In modern terms, it refers to a 
‘deconstruction’ of the concept of woman, hence the actuality of the question for black feminists 
during the second wave who were confronting similar questions and posing the same critiques vis-à-vis 
white women’s struggles against oppression.        
21 Edited by Gloria Hull, Patricia Bell-Scott and Barbara Smith, New York, The Feminist Press, 1982. 
22 Hazel Carby in: Centre for Contemporary Culture Studies (ed.), The Empire Strikes Back, London: 
Hutchinson.  
23 Examples are Nancy Chodorow’s work on sex-role socialisation (1997 [1979]) and Carol Gilligan’s 
research on women and moral development (1982, 1997 [1977]). 
24 Another difference in many Black feminist writings which may contribute to the difficulty and 
unease with their integration or acceptance by white feminist theorists is also any emphasis on 
spirituality, especially in womanism: see further.   
25 See also chapter four, under 1. Feminist Studies in/of Religion: Transgressing Sacred Boundaries: 
Interdisciplinarity and Interreligiosity  
26 An exception is the already mentioned Priestess, Mother, Sacred Sister by Susan Sered (1994a) that 
seeks to compare women’s status in different religious traditions. However, the focus is on female 
agency and power instead of women’s oppression, which had been the dominant focus in earlier work.   
27 Bynum refers to Peggy Reeves Sanday’s (1981) Female Power and Male Dominance as a classic 
example.  
28 Bynum (1986: 5) hereby refers to Ortner and Whitehead’s (1981) Sexual Meanings, whom she 
claims have ‘devoted their attention to what they call the ‘hegemonic (male-biased) ideology’ and have 
avoided the question of women’s perspective.  
29 In Bynum’s (1986: 8) introduction, the choice for French feminism, is made ‘which focuses on the 
fact and experience of genderedness, rather than with American feminism, which focuses on cause’.   
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30 ‘…all the chapters in this volume share with cultural anthropology and with recent feminist 
psychology an emphasis on the distinction between gender and sex. […] Gender is the term used to 
refer to those differences between male and female human beings that are created through 
psychological and social development within a familial, social and cultural setting. All human beings 
have gender as well as sex, and this gender is culturally constructed’. (Bynum 1986: 7)       
31 These include Women in World Religions (Sharma 1987), Today’s Women in World Religions and 
Religion and Women both published in 1994, Feminism and World Religions (Sharma and Young 
1999) and most recently a book on Women Saints in World Religions (Sharma 2000). 
32 A well-known example is the Asian Christian theological journal In God’s Image first published in 
1982 (Gross 1996: 55; King 1994b: 13).  
33 Although King does not mention any of the general and recent feminist theoretical discussions on 
global feminism and transnational feminist practices, the book itself can definitely be seen to be 
aligned with these trends in recent feminist scholarship. The movement and perspectives will be 
discussed later.    
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DE-THEOLOGISING AND DE-ORIENTALISING THE FEMINIST 
STUDY OF RELIGION: INTRODUCING A REFLEXIVE AND 
POSTCOLONIAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
 
 
In this chapter I will argue that there may be additional, and deeper reasons 
underlying the problematic relationship between feminism and the study of 
religion, and in particular the im/possibilities and stakes in the engendering of 
mainstream religious studies than those put forward in the recent literature such 
as Hackett (2000), Joy (2000, 2001), Shaw (1995) and Warne (2000, 2001, 
2001 [1998]). Although Rosalind Shaw’s diagnosis of the character of the 
mainstream as a priori inhibiting the possibility of a feminist approach is 
concurred with, additional epistemological issues underlying the 
incompatibility will be identified. These will be shown to be directly related to 
Shaw’s diagnosis of the essentialist character of the feminist study of religion, 
the genealogy of which was fully elaborated by way of the typologies presented 
in the previous chapter. I will argue that the ways these critiques of essentialism 
and calls for ‘diversity’ that have hereto been put forward as necessary steps in 
the feminist study of religion vis -à-vis contemporary developments in feminist 
theory, or even as a possible solution to the central problem of the engendering 
of the mainstream, ultimately fail to meet these expectations. A closer look will 
be taken at some of these recent critiques attempting to account for the 
incompatibility between religious studies and feminist scholarship. I will argue 
how and why some particular features inherent in both feminist scholarship and 
religious studies as a discipline, that contribute to the ‘toxic’ relationship 
between, them have been overlooked. 
In particular, the insider/outsider problem or the debate on 
essentialism/reductionism in mainstream religious studies is juxtaposed with 
feminist approaches in which the boundaries between insiders/outsider, 
theory/practice, but also the religious versus the non-religious viewpoint are 
conflated. The question becomes whether a feminist study of religion instead of 
in  religion is conceivable at all. The chapter proceeds with a close inquiry into 
some features of ‘postmodern’ feminist epistemology that underlie the problem 
of the ‘transgression of sacred boundaries’, but also where some possible 
solutions can be found for a further de-theologisation and de-orientalisation of 
the feminist study of religion. I turn to postcolonial critique and concepts such 
as ‘reflexivity’, ‘situated knowledges’, and ‘deconstruction’, which I feel may 
aid in transcending the essentialism/reductionism debate. The final part of the 
chapter therefore returns to the question of diversity, but here in the context of 
the differences between researcher/researched. I argue that it is this kind of 
diversity which is desperately in need of further theorisation in the feminist 
study of religion from the perspective of a social science, rather than a 
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confessional point of view. Again, I support that we must look to feminist 
anthropology for inspiration, in which this form of diversity stands central.      
 
 
1. Feminist Studies in/of Religion 
 
 
In these tempting views, no insider’s 
perspective is privileged, because all 
drawings of inside-outside boundaries in 
knowledge are theorized as power moves, not 
moves towards truth. 
Donna Haraway (1991 [1988]: 184)     
 
 
In order to build my case further, I will first return to the question posed: of 
Rosalind Shaw’s (1995) assessment of the failure of contemporary feminist 
research in religion to move beyond the employment of a unitary and 
essentialist category of ‘woman’. My review of the literature in the previous 
chapter however, showed that ‘diversity’ in its most current meaning in feminist 
theory as the methodological and epistemological debate on the differences 
between women, is by no means absent in the feminist study of religion. What 
Shaw calls the ‘universalizing and essentializing tendencies’ of contemporary 
feminist religious studies therefore do not refer to the kind of diversity 
discussed above. Nor, I argue, will this kind of diversity, which has functioned 
as an antidote, or as ‘deconstructive’ of the universalisation of the category of 
‘woman’, or the essentialism of ‘women’s experience’ in other areas of feminist 
scholarship, be likely to provide a solution to the existing problem of 
essentialism that Shaw is referring to. In her article, Shaw identifies the 
problem of essentialism and notions such as that of a ‘universal female reality’, 
by briefly pointing to one particular type of writing in the area of feminist 
religious studies, namely that of feminist spirituality or ‘thealogy’. The work of 
Carol Christ is taken as exemplary1, for regardless of Christ’s critique of 
androcentrism in mainstream religious studies such as the homo religiosus of 
Mircea Eliade2, Shaw (1995: 74) argues that in ‘replacing God the Father with 
God the Mother’, Christ is in fact simply universalising ‘a female spiritual 
essence in which all women participate’ (74-75): 
 
Christ’s approach – to use her own experiences of reconstructed goddess 
rituals as the basis for her interpretation of prehistoric goddess worship 
… - is no less totalizing. … Through such appropriation of the 
experience of women in other times and places, a feminized homo 
religiosus lives on.  
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As noted earlier, Shaw attributes this form of essentialism which lives on in a 
particular strand of the feminist study of religion, and more generally what was 
identified as the revolutionary approach in the typologies set out in the previous 
chapter, to the inherent ‘view from above’ character of the mainstream study of 
religion on the undifferentiated religious subject. However, I will argue that by 
directing her accusation of essentialism towards strands of feminist religious 
studies which ap ply a feminist revolutionary - or what I will call a 
‘reconstructionist’ – approach, unaffected by the call for ‘difference’, Shaw is 
only touching upon the surface of what may be more fundamental 
epistemological problems underlying the thesis of incompatibility. Moreover, 
these problems and the accusation of essentialism, apply to more than just this 
specific branch of feminist religious studies.  
Contra Shaw, I put forward that the reason feminist reconstructionists 
have a great tendency to be essentialist is not so much because mainstream 
religious studies is so essentialist, but because these feminist scholars are in fact 
practising rather than studying religion. The universal woman is thus upheld for 
religious/ideological/feminist reasons, whereas Eliade’s universalising 
framework is supposedly done for scientific reasons. All the more relevant is 
Shaw’s final plea for a feminist religious studies which ‘incorporates 
differences between women, and in particular between the researcher and the 
women she writes about’ (1995: 75). As argued towards the end of the previous 
chapter, the feminist study of religion has not only failed to theorise the 
religious differences between women; ‘difference’ in the context of the 
researcher-researched relationship is an issue which is desperately in need of 
further elaboration and thought. For ‘difference’ viewed from this angle raises 
some challenging questions when juxtaposed with the well known 
‘insider/outsider debate’ within the mainstream, such as the distinction between 
theology and researching religion from a non-religious perspective. Next to the 
‘view-from-above’ thesis formulated by Shaw, I suggest that this particular 
juxtaposing also underlies the situation of incompatibility between the 
mainstream and feminist approaches. From the position of the non-religious 
feminist researcher, the reformist/reconstructionist divide turns out to be 
different sides of the same (religious) coin. That reconstructionist or reformist 
perspectives should therefore be essentialist is not surprising. After all, they are 
religious viewpoints. 
 
 
Against Reconstructionism 
  
I build my argument by taking a critical look at two articles which were quite 
independently published in the same year (1999), in two prominent mainstream 
religious studies journals, and by two well-known scholars in the area of 
feminist religious studies scholarship in North America. The first is a review 
article of Rita M. Gross’s introductory book to Feminism and Religion  (1996), 
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entitled ‘Having Your Cake and Eating It Too: Feminism and Religion’ by 
Katherine K. Young (1999b, 1999c). Young is also known as co-editor with 
Arvind Sharma to the popular ‘women-in-religion’ series (McGill Studies in the 
History of Religions)3 discussed earlier, and the Annual Review of Women in 
World Religions (published since 1991). The second article to be discussed is 
by Marsha Aileen Hewitt (1999). This is not a review article, but nonetheless 
again concerns a highly critical reading of the work of Rita Gross, in this case 
focussing on her Buddhism After Patriarchy: A Feminist History, Analysis, and 
Reconstruction of Buddhism (1993a). In particular, its first appendix ‘Here I 
Stand: Feminism as Academic Method and as Social Vision’ (1993b) in Gross’s 
book is referred to. It includes some of Gross’s ideas on methodology in the 
feminist study of religion, which are also discussed in her following book 
Feminism and Religion.  
Both Hewitt and Young are deeply concerned with, and outright reject 
what they see as a grave fallacy in the feminist study of religion, when what 
should be the feminist scholarship of religion proper is conflated with 
‘advocacy’ (Young), or ‘ideology formation’ (Hewitt) in both religious and 
feminist terms within the academy. Hewitt’s (1999: 47) main concern is to 
‘mark those areas where feminists in the study of religion run into danger of 
converting ideology critique into a new ideology when reconceiving religious 
traditions’. Young (1999b: 168) argues that ‘the impact of feminism on the 
history of religions amounts to nothing more or less than the attempt to 
transform an academic discipline into a secular worldview in the guise of a 
religion’. Both authors draw on the work of Rita Gross (1993a, b, 1996) to 
make their case, and in particular the way Gross ‘reconstructs’ Buddhism from 
the perspective of feminist analysis and critique. However, their sharp criticism 
is equally directed at the same area of feminist religious studies scholarship 
Rosalind Shaw claims to be ‘essentialist’, that was categorised under the rubric 
of ‘revolutionary’ or ‘reconstructionist’ approaches earlier (feminist spirituality, 
Goddess studies, post-Christian theo/alogy, etc.).                  
Hewitt draws on Marx and Engels’s notion of ‘ideology critique’ in 
proposing a feminist critical theory of religion that ‘both inquires into and 
exposes the ways in which religious traditions harbour mechanisms of power 
that result in the subordination and oppression of women without attempting to 
erect a new theological interest’ (1999: 51). Such a feminist analysis must 
further necessarily consider religion as a cultural phenomenon that informs, 
mediates, underlines, sustains and reproduces dominating practices and 
relations throughout the larger social fabric, both religious and non-religious 
(52). At first glance, Hewitt’s understanding is compatible with Rosalind 
Shaw’s that a gendered approach towards religion is not possible viewing 
religion as sui generis, non-reducible to its political, social, and historical 
matrix. Hence, the suspicions of both authors towards feminist reconstructions 
of religion, such as post-Christian and feminist spirituality, and that of the kind 
proposed in Rita Gross’s Buddhism after Patriarchy (1993).  
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According to Hewitt, Gross who refuses to take a reductionist approac h 
to study religion, is incoherent in arguing that religion ‘occupies some 
ontological position beyond culture’ (52). Gross does this, in a typical 
reconstructionist manner, in order to argue that Buddhism is somehow 
authentically feminist at its core. Hewitt notes that this move is similar to a 
number of ‘feminist religious thinkers’ within Christianity, who maintain that 
Christianity originally harboured a egalitarian, non-sexist teaching and vision, 
both for which there is no conclusive evidence. Agreeing with Hewitt’s analysis 
up to this point, problematic nonetheless, is the way in which  it is concluded 
that these scholars in religion are ‘mistaken’ in importing external ideologies 
(here feminism) into religions, ‘hereby rendering them unrecognizable’ (55). 
Hewitt sees Gross’s reconstruction of Buddhism, as an attempt to transform 
Buddhism into a modern Western feminist philosophy, an instance of what she 
calls mere ‘ideological colonisation’ (57).  
My impression is that Hewitt is paradoxically drawing boundaries 
around the very category she deems necessary to place in its wider matrix when 
it comes to the question of women. The question is, what is counted as the true 
religious tradition at any place and time that Hewitt is referring to, and from 
whose perspective? Hewitt speaks of ‘Christianity’ and ‘Islam’ as unitary 
traditions, in the very type of rhetoric that makes a gendered approach 
impossible according to the arguments Shaw put forward (e.g. ‘religion as 
scripture’). In spite of her anti-essentialist approach, I shall argue, Hewitt still 
holds on to a ‘view from above’ perspective of religion, seen as influencing all 
other social and political phenomena, but itself to be ‘untouched’ by the very 
same context it is inextricably bound to. This is further shown in statements 
within her critique such as: ‘Thus feminist reconstructions of religion 
unreflectively strive to engender traditions into conformity with an external, 
independent, political, and ethical set of values and goals which have arisen 
from, and be formed by, very different contexts than the religions themselves’ 
(60). Regardless of Hewitt’s insistence on a contextualised view of religion as a 
cultural phenomenon, connected to, and bound to other social phenomena, 
Hewitt obviously has some difficulties with the reconstructionist approach in 
somehow going too far. 
The same line of reasoning can be deferred from Katherine Young’s 
(1999b) critique of Gross’s methodology and feminist reconstructionist 
approach. Again, an a priori idea of ‘true’ religion or the religious ‘phenomenon 
in its own right’ (182), underlies the critique of feminist interference and the 
illegitimate trespassing of separate domains (1999b: 181):  
 
Because feminists are creating a new worldview, I suggest, their role is 
functionally equivalent to that of religious founders. And when feminists 
systematically explore their new worldview, they do so as the functional 
equivalents of theologians – which is why feminist ‘revisioning’ or ‘re-
imagining (as in the ‘Goddess’ and ‘Sophia’ movements) have been 
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called ‘thealogy’ (thea referring to goddess, theo to god). But, as I 
observed at the beginning of this review, the new feminist religion is 
religious only on the surface. Lurking beneath it is an implicit secular 
value system related to feminist politics and psychology.   
 
As suggested above, problematic in both Young and Hewitt’s critiques is not so 
much their observation that scholars like Gross are injecting feminist secular 
values into their vision of religious tradition, (re)constructing rather than 
critically studying and analysing religion itself. This I concur, is an important 
insight, on the one hand ‘obvious’, yet one that has been barely addressed or 
problematised in feminist religious studies’ scholarship so far. The problem 
with these critiques I find, lies in the particular manner in which both authors 
have a problem with feminist reconstructions such as these. The point is that is 
not so much a question of proving reconstructionist approaches false or 
‘mistaken’, as these studies can be viewed as internal to the practice of religion. 
For these scholars are foremost conducting – or constructing - theology. Both 
authors in fact come to the conclusion that scholarship such as that of Gross is 
the ‘conflation of the study of theology, the religious point of view, and the 
study of religion’ (Hewitt 1999: 58). My argument is that the main problem 
with the reconstructionist approach is not so much its heterodoxy towards 
whatever is conceived of as the authoritative, cumulative, or even ‘true’ 
religious tradition. This I view as a matter internal to theology or a religious 
debate. Especially problematic is that approaches like these claim to be 
religious studies (of the feminist kind). 
The question where lines can or must be drawn between the religious 
and the non-religious viewpoint, or between theology and religious studies 
proper is scarcely matter of debate within the broad field of feminist studies of 
religion. Boundaries are often drawn quite differently, as was shown in the 
previous chapter. Although many typologies of the feminist study of religion 
can be shown to follow classifications of development in feminist theory and 
research more generally, in the literature reviewed, it was argued that it is not at 
all clear exactly how the direction of the stages from ‘critique of androcentrism’ 
to ‘epistemological transformation or reconstruction’ is conceptualised by many 
an author. For those scholars taking a reconstructionist stance, the basic 
distinction between the reformist and the revolutionary or reconstructionist 
approaches first introduced by Christ and Plaskow (1979a) serves as an 
developmental scheme, opposed to other feminist theologians committed to 
reforming their religious tradition ‘from within’. However, it was also noted 
that in the more recent literature on the status of research on religion and gender 
(e.g. King 1995b) regarding ‘reconstruction’ or ‘transformation’ as a 
fundamental epistemological problem vis-à-vis the mainstream study of 
religion, any clear positioning whatsoever is missing whether a paradigm shift 
of a scholarly discipline, or religion itself is envisioned. In short, in what is 
generally understood to be subsumed under the title of the feminist study of 
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religion, any distinction between the insider perspective, the practice of religion 
in terms of studies in religion or ‘theology’ on the one hand, and the strictly 
scholarly outsider perspective such as in the mainstream history of religion’s 
methodology, falls flat. A distinction between feminist studies in religion and 
feminist studies of religion appears not even to exist. Further questions to be 
raised therefore, are why this is the case and whether at all such a distinction is 
conceivable.  
 
 
Critiquing Androcentrism or Patriarchy? 
 
Assessing a status quaestionis of the field of feminist religious scholarship from 
the viewpoint of the insider/outsider distinction and debate throws an entirely 
different light on some of the directions in the existing scholarship dealt with in 
the previous chapter. More often than not, there appears to be a complete 
blurring of boundaries, and sometimes one that is explicitly defended as a 
methodological feature of feminist scholarship. In a recent article for example, 
feminist anthropologist and religious studies’ scholar Fiona Bowie (1998: 40), 
claims to follow feminist standpoint theory, since ‘it is important to situate the 
subject within the discourse rather than to speak in false abstractions’. Bowie’s 
insistence on ‘situating the subject’ and more ‘self-reflexive writing’ appears to 
be linked to a view of blurring the boundaries between theology and the study 
of religion, attested in statements such as the following (41): 
 
While I was seeking to explore methodologies that transcend a 
straightforward insider/outsider approach to the study of religion, and to 
break down the stereotype that the religious studies specialist engages in 
detached phenomenological description of others people’s religions, 
whereas the theologian engages in catechesis within a faith context, the 
influence of personal history in determining individual perceptions and 
praxis became apparent.    
 
In accordance with the basic typologies of the feminist study of religion 
outlined in the previous chapter, Bowie furthermore claims that after and 
besides the focus on women’s experience, symbols and female agency as a 
corrective approach to androcentrism, feminist work must also look to the way 
in which subjects are studied (43): 
  
Faced with constructs of knowledge that privilege the masculine and 
define subject boundaries according to a patriarchal dichotomizing of 
experience (science versus religion, theology versus feminist theology, 
high art versus popular culture, women’s studies versus ‘real’ subjects, 
and so on), women scholars are well placed to start asking pertinent 
questions of accepted paradigms. Discovering their own agency and 
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listening to women’s experience and knowledge, women scholars pose a 
profound challenge to the rhetoric both of objectivity (in religious 
studies) and of accepted revelation (in theology).                      
 
Underlying Bowie’s view of the way feminist studies in religion should 
proceed, I believe, are precisely the debates surrounding issues of objectivity, 
reflexivity, positioning and politics, which play a central part in the shift 
towards the question of epistemology in feminist theory and scholarship 
introduced in chapter three. Evident in Bowie’s rhetoric are also postmodern 
tendencies with a clear emphasis on deconstruction, especially of all kinds of 
dualistic thought as in the quote above. Before I turn to the question of the 
impact of postmodernism and poststructuralism on feminist theory and 
scholarship in relation to the question of boundaries in the feminist study of 
religion in more detail, some more examples will serve to illustrate how an 
insider position is automatically implicit, or sometimes explicitly implied in the 
field of feminist religious studies.  
Returning to the initial critique of androcentrism in the mainstream 
history of religions by feminist scholars in the seventies, Rita M. Gross (1977a) 
was among the first to formulate the problem as a basic yet fundamental issue 
of methodology and call for a shift towards a more inclusive ‘androgynous’ 
perspective.4 The focus of Gross’s critique in the article discussed earlier, 
appears to be not religion itself but the way the discipline of religious studies 
proceeds in an androcentric manner. Gross’s implicitly assumes that this 
androcentrism can be corrected once the biases underlying categories and 
methods of research are uncovered. In the previous chapter it also became clear 
how in various typologies of the feminist study of religion, after critique and 
correction, finally ‘transformation’ should follow. However, in these 
typologies, the phase of transformation appeared to apply to religion itself 
rather than the discipline and its methodology. Exemplary is perhaps June 
O’Connor’s (1989) classification of the three Rs of ‘rereading, reconceiving, 
and reconstructing traditions’.5    
Sue Morgan’s (1999) overview of feminist approaches in a general 
reader on the study of religion is another clear and recent example of how the 
feminist study of religion may imply the feminist transformation of religion, the 
very type of conflation writers such as Hewitt and Young oppose. To begin 
with, the article is included in a volume, which apart from one contribution 
entitled ‘Theological Approaches’, according to the editor limits itself to non-
confessional, viz. ‘outsider’ approaches (Connolly 1999: 2): 
 
In terms of religious affiliation, all the approaches described in this 
volume, with the exception of the theological, are essentially (though 
not always entirely) ‘outsider’ approaches. That is, they do not assume a 
religious commitment on the part of the in vestigator; they can be 
adopted by the religious and the non-religious alike.  
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Morgan’s (1999: 42) introductory sentence to her contribution suggests this 
classification would be accurate: 
 
The feminist approach to the study of religion seeks nothing less than a 
critical transformation of existing theoretical perspectives through the 
introduction of gender as a primary category of analysis.   
 
In the second paragraph however, again the question arises what the object of 
feminist critique and transformation is (42-43): 
 
The term ‘critical transformation’ indicates the two distinct but related 
aspects of the feminist approach discussed throughout this chapter. The 
critical dimension confronts religion with its historical perpetuation of 
unjust, exclusionary practices that have legitimated male superiority in 
every social domain. The transformative aspect subsequently 
reappropriates the central symbols, texts and rituals of religious 
traditions so as to incorporate and affirm the neglected experiences of 
women. For some feminists, the magnitude of the critical task has 
rendered hopeless the potential for transforming religion. … Whilst 
many of their critical insights will be referred to, this chapter will focus 
primarily on the methodological approaches of those women who have 
opted to work for change or reform within their respective religious 
traditions.   
 
Again lines are drawn between reformist and reconstructionist approaches 
towards the feminist study of religion, whilst both approaches can equally be 
viewed as insider perspectives, committed to the study of religion in order to – 
in varying degrees - reform or transform it. There appears to be no difference 
between the critique of androcentrism in the study of religion on the one hand, 
and the critique of patriarchy in religious traditions on the other. For the 
feminist scholar of religion, the steps to be taken may vary in terms of which 
path to choose; yet both points of departure, destination and the overall route is 
without doubt a religious one.   
In her earlier article on androcentrism by contrast, Rita Gross (1977) 
made clear that the distinction between androcentric methodology and 
patriarchal religion is an important one. Gross emphasised that from the 
methodological point of view in the history of religions, the fact whether the 
religion under study was, or was not male-dominated or androcentric in its 
teachings, the level of ‘data’ itself was irrelevant opposed to the questions 
asked and the presuppositions underlying these questions and methods. What 
Gross in hindsight was aiming at, was what Sandra Harding calls feminist 
empiricism. This refers to the feminist demand for the inclusion of women as 
the data for empirical research in order for this research to be more inclusive – 
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covering all of humanity and not just half – or in Harding’s view of science 
proper, to attain more rather than androcentric ‘false’ objectivity. Although 
Gross at this stage does not discuss the notion of objectivity, her goal of 
transforming mainstream scholarship at the level of its presuppositions and 
methodology is clear. Not only will the ‘women in religion’ approach 
ultimately fail to solve the problem of androcentric methodology, the 
marginalization of women within religious traditions or particular religious 
contexts does by no means warrant their exclusion at the level of correct and 
complete analysis.  
In Gross’s later writings on methodology (1993b; 1996), - the focus of 
harsh criticism by Hewitt and Young – she to some extent carries on a 
distinction between methodology and subject matter in her delineation between 
women’s studies and feminism. Under women’s studies, Gross includes 
‘feminism as academic method’, whereas ‘feminism as a social vision’ is 
defined as the perspective of feminist philosophy. Her own feminist 
reconstruction of Buddhism (1993), Gross explains as follows (1993b: 291): 
 
The women studies perspective is more relevant to historical discussions 
while the perspective of feminist philosophy is more relevant to the 
post-patriarchal reconstruction of Buddhism. Though the values and 
insights of these two perspectives are intertwined and closely linked, 
they are not identical. The women studies perspective is less radical, 
claiming only that scholars must include women in their data base if 
they wish to claim that they are discussing humanity (rather than males). 
Feminist philosophy in its many varieties proposes reconstructions of 
current religions and societies to render them more just and equitable to 
women, and thereby, also to men.    
   
Apart from the issue of terminology on women’s or feminist studies, the 
distinction Gross wants to make is clear, although the initial focus on the past 
(historical discussions) versus the present (post-patriarchal or the future) does 
somewhat divert the issue of the reconstruction. As repeatedly emphasised 
elsewhere however, in this particular text on feminist methodology, Gross 
acknowledges the existence of a distinction that must apply to the study of 
religion as an academic discipline. This is expressed in statements such as 
‘feminism as academic method does not inherently entail any social philosophy 
regarding what women’s position in society should be’ (298). In her book 
Feminism and Religion (1996: 21) the same distinction is defended: feminist 
scholarship ‘only entails a requirement to study women thoroughly and 
completely’, as an academic method, ‘not a socio -political perspective’. In her 
review article of the latter, Katherine Young (1999b: 169) draws attention to the 
inherent contradictions in the distinction Gross makes, and particularly one that 
she does not apply to her own  - reconstructionist – ‘analysis’. Young’s focus of 
critique however, evidently and equally accompanies her own personal views 
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on both terminology (especially the meaning of ‘feminism’), and how the study 
of religion should be undertaken: 
 
By her [Gross’s] own definition, ‘women’s studies’ clearly refers to 
scholarship. ‘Feminism,’ on the other hand, clearly refers to advocacy. 
The term ‘feminist scholarship,’ therefore, is an oxymoron. Why 
introduce the latter when the term ‘women’s studies’ would suffice? 
Gross’s preference for the term ‘feminism’ even in connection with 
scholarship indicates that her goal is not scholarship at all but what 
could be called informed advocacy - that is, feminist transformation of 
society and its religions.   
           
In particular, Young is annoyed with the way Gross, as a trained scholar of the 
history of religions, on the one hand propagates its methods of description and 
interpretation opposed to the evaluative and normative elements of theology 
and ethics, yet at the same proceeds to conflate these two distinct approaches 
and disciplines. Next to above distinction between women’s studies and 
feminism, Young refers to certain passages in Gross’s book in which the 
traditional or standard features of the academic study of religion are defended. 
These include phenomenological methods of employing empathy, which entails 
the ‘bracketing’ of one’s own worldview, values, and preconceptions. Young 
refers this technique as epoché, the need to ‘imaginatively enter’ the 
phenomenon under study, or more precisely to – temporarily - enter the 
perspective of the insiders.6  
Young goes on to argue that Gross does not hold on to her own 
distinction between description based on empathetic understanding and 
evaluation, which in turn is tied to her understanding of objectivity and value-
neutrality. In Gross’s opinion, – and that of many other feminist scholars of 
religion to which I shall return – although empathetic understanding and 
neutrality should precede evaluation (1996: 12), complete value-neutrality is 
impossible to achieve. This insight may furthermore be viewed as a 
consequence of the uncovering of pseudo-objectivity in the form of 
androcentrism, the very kind Gross has shown to apply to mainstream religious 
studies scholarship (12): 
 
Being objective and neutral when discussing controversial issues does 
not mean being value-free. On closer inspection, ‘objectivity’ often 
turns out to be nothing more than advocacy of the current conventions 
and not a neutral position at all. Some perceive feminist scholarship as 
adversarial because it challenges such conventions; still, feminist 
scholarship can claim to be more ‘objective’ than male-centred 
scholarship, because it is more inclusive and therefore more accurate.  
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Young’s (172) critique of what she sees as the inherent contradictions in 
Gross’s account is the way in which she ‘tries to have it both ways’, by both 
what Young refers to as the ‘deconstruction’ of objectivity on the one hand, yet 
retaining it as a historian of religions, ‘but only when it suits her’. Young’s 
critique furthermore suggests that she suspects that Gross’s denunciation of the 
false objectivity and neutrality of ‘current conventions’ in male-centred 
scholarship not only refers to androcentric worldviews, but also patriarchal 
religions: 
 
She [Gross] suggests that male scholars (and their supporters) 
consciously create the illusion of objectivity, because their real purpose 
is to advocate traditional religion (presumably because it ‘excludes’ 
women and serves their interests). Even though ‘some’ (presumably, 
these same men and their supporters) consider feminism adversarial 
because it attacks them and their religion, according to Gross, feminism 
is actually more ‘objective’ simply because it pays more attention to 
women – even though it usually pays exclusive attention to women on 
the dubious grounds that just as women have been ignored in the past, 
now men can be ignored [italics mine].  
 
Hence, Young sees Gross’s approach as containing a double standard, with bias 
being considered ‘illegitimate when it comes from ‘sexist’ authors but perfectly 
legitimate when it comes from feminist authors’ (175). The quotations from 
Young so far also make clear that her problem with Gross’s approach is not 
only its conflation of a scholarly discipline with advocacy as such, but 
particularly feminist research and advocacy, of which Young obviously has 
both limited knowledge and an overgeneralised viewpoint, conflating 
‘feminism’ with popular radical feminism and gynocentrism.7 In her own view 
of the study of religion as an academic endeavour that is not conflated with 
advocacy, Young’s suggestions would in fact be to fulfil Gross’s own ‘original’ 
project of distinguishing women’s studies from feminism, description from 
evaluation, the ‘church from the state’, the ‘university from the public square’, 
and at least hold on to the ideal of objectivity. Young wishes to remain true to 
the traditional methods of epoché and empathy employed in the 
phenomenological approach and the history of religions, claiming the methods 
themselves must not be blamed for ignoring women (182): 
 
There is a reason why scholars have clearly distinguished the history of 
religion from theology and ethics. By bracketing out questions of 
existence or nonexistence and truth or falsity, they have tried to avoid 
prefabricated interpretations and thus to see this or that phenomenon in 
its own right (including the categories offered by insiders). This does not 
rule out discussions of power relations or gender. Nor does it rule out 
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the possibility of writing additional works on ethics or theology [italics 
mine].  
        
Marsha Hewitt’s (1999) arguments that lead to a proposal for a ‘feminist critical 
theory of religion’ that does not conflate the academic study of religion with 
theology or any other ‘religio -ideological activity’ are markedly similar to those 
of Young. As noted above however, Hewitt’s focus is primarily on Gross’s 
reconstruction of Buddhism itself (1993a) in order to only then reveal its – 
misplaced - theoretical underpinnings. Hewitt is particularly adamant and 
persistent in her condemnation of the usage of feminist methodology and theory 
in the construction of new ideologies (what Young refers to as ‘advocacy’). 
Similar to Young, and also not until the final part of her essay does Hewitt state 
that these feminist reconstructions of religion are not so much ‘wrong’ or 
should be forbidden, yet should be reserved for adherents rather than scholars 
in religious studies (62).  
In the tradition of the disciplines of religious studies or history of 
religions that delineate themselves from theology, this would logically entail 
that feminist reconstructions of religion and their perpetrators as ‘insider 
perspectives’, potentially form part of the data  or provide the subject matter for 
the religious studies’ scholar.8 From the outsider viewpoint that must refrain 
from evaluation therefore, movements such as that of the Goddess, feminist 
spirituality, thealogy, and any postpatriarchal (re)construction of religion, need 
not be and logically should not be condemned nor applauded. The 
contradictions lurking in both Young’s and Hewitt’s accounts however, is that 
their condemnation of these movements for not being scholarly is so fierce that 
it becomes suspect and questionable if the authors harbour any additional 
motives. Particularly Hewitt’s choice of a reconstruction of an Eastern religious 
tradition by a Western feminist, where the attempt to reconcile two independent 
ideologies could not be more far-fetched, strikes me as not being coincidental. 
Young similarly focuses on those feminist religious practices that are the most 
removed from ‘authentic’ tradition. It would be interesting to know if according 
to both Young and Hewitt reformist theological feminism must share the same 
fate.  
If feminist reconstructions and feminist critical theories (Hewitt) or 
women’s studies (Young) of religion are distinguished by the refusal of the 
latter two ‘to study religion from a religious or theological point of view’ 
(Hewitt 1999: 62), then surely reformist feminist perspectives must also be 
excluded, as here also both theological and feminist interests are advocated. Or 
are these perspectives less ‘heretical’ as they are not going so far as to be - I 
quote - ‘colonising religious traditions by refashioning them in a feminist 
image’? (Hewitt 1999: 61). Again, further elements in Young’s argumentation 
lead to the same suspicions. In her condemnation of Goddess studies and 
feminist spirituality, and as cited earlier, Young (1999b: 181) claims that the 
role of these feminists is ‘equivalent to that of religious founders’, them acting 
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as the ‘functional equivalents of theologians’. Again the author appears to have 
major problems with feminist reconstructions of religion, which I suspect are 
related to more than just the fact that these approaches claim to be religious 
studies, or claim to belong in the context of the academy. As outsiders, these 
authors appear to show very little empathy and do seem not very willing to 
‘temporary enter’ into an insider’s stance. My impression is that both Hewitt 
and Young are in turn themselves condemning these movements for ideological 
reasons, for implicit in their critique is an understanding of what the ‘true’ 
religious tradition is and how it can be delineated from the secular, untouched 
by feminist critique.             
I repeat that I do not disagree with Hewitt’s conclusion that theories 
such as Gross’s are in fact religious enterprises themselves, on the contrary. My 
point is that this then must hold for a variety of areas, feminist and non-
feminist. By visualising only this type of research however, one gets the 
impression to be drawn in a religious debate, with the enemy not just being bad 
research but bad religion. In the process, however unconsciously or maybe 
unintentionally, the reification of an – androcentric - a priori construction of 
what is and is not accepted as ‘religion’ and ‘tradition’ takes place.  
 
 
Between Objectivity and Advocacy 
 
The conflation between the critique of androcentrism in the discipline of 
religious studies, in theology and in religion itself, is evident in much of the 
literature discussed in chapter three. For Ursula King (1995b) for example, the 
question of a paradigm shift in the study of gender and religion is itself related 
to the epistemological challenge which feminist approaches to the study of 
religion bring with them. In borrowing June O’Connor’s (1995: 48) argument 
that feminist work must be much more than ‘investigatory’, but truly 
‘transformative’, the insider/outsider conflation is clear in King’s (1995b: 22) 
proposal: ‘The feminist paradigm is one of transformation. Its critique of 
traditional sources and content of an established field involves an alternative 
vision which transforms both the subject matter and the scholar at the same 
time’. Although feminist reconstructionist scholars themselves may reject 
reformist approaches for obvious religio -ideological reasons, overviews such as 
that of King and many of the other typologies or classifications of existing 
scholarship in feminist religious studies that were reviewed, simply treat the 
different directions as varieties and possibilities internal to the field. The JFSR 
is once again exemplary of a ‘tolerance’ for difference and diversity by 
including both theological contributions and sociological analysis.  
It is of course by no means necessarily the case that in envisioning the 
impact of decades of feminist scholarship, all writers would consider the 
transformative potential of the latter in terms of reconstructing religion in the 
revolutionary post-patriarchal sense. However, it does become clear that an 
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alternative view of epistemology, including the meaning of ‘objectivity’, 
insider/outsider, science/politics and other divides, is minimally included in any 
possible vision of change as radical as a paradigm shift. In order to ‘catch up’ 
with the developments in feminist theory and other areas of feminist research in 
general, it is but unavoidable that the question of epistemological 
transformation is increasingly being addressed in feminist religious studies 
scholarship. According to Carol P. Christ (1992: 87) for example: 
 
The challenges posed to the field of Religious Studies are profound and 
substantive. They cannot be addressed by the simple addition of a book 
here and a course there, nor by time at annual meetings, nor by the 
hiring of one or two women in departments. The study of women and 
religion questions the established priorities in the field, and foundations 
of the religious which are studied, and the notion that the study of 
religion is and should be objective and value free [italics mine].                      
 
That the epistemological and broader methodological transformation includes 
both the critique of androcentrism in mainstream religious studies, and 
patriarchy in religion, is similarly expressed by Ursula King (1997: 650): 
 
Women scholars in religion are developing a different kind of 
methodology where the researcher’s existential participation and 
commitment enter into the interpretation of what is being researched and 
call into question much of the assumed ‘objectivity’ of previous 
methods, thus inviting a new reflection on what religion is about and for 
[italics mine].   
  
The crux of the issue is that in the feminist critique of the notion of objectivity 
and value-neutrality in religious studies as an academic discipline, an 
undermining of the ‘phenomenological/confessional division’ (Bowie 1998: 
42), or the blurring of boundaries between the insider and the outsider point of 
view, between religious studies, theology and religious practice is implied. 
According to the scholars who propagate this viewpoint, a feminist study of 
religion that does not set out to reform or reconstruct religious tradition to the 
benefit of women, would not even be worthy of its feminist name. Womanist 
Emilie M. Townes (1995: 129) for example, claims that ‘feminist studies in 
religion attempts to articulate a theoretical critique of cultural hegemony 
through a call for the re-imagining of the roles of men and women in religious 
practices as well as in secular society’. In discussing the problem of forging a 
paradigm shift of the study of religion and theology after some fifteen years of 
feminist scholarship, Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza (1985: 74) is convinced that 
a paradigm shift in the study of religion and theology would entail a shift ‘from 
an androcentric to a feminist construction of the world, religion and theology’: 
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If the so-called value-free stance and patriarchal institutions of the 
academy guarantee the structural perpetuation of the androcentric-
dualistic paradigm, then we have to ask what kind of institutional bias 
and research strategies or methods the feminist paradigm needs to create 
in order to overcome androcentric dualism and to support women in our 
liberation struggle. How can the JFSR contribute to such a shift from an 
androcentric to a feminist paradigm of scholarship in religion and 
theology? How should we realize our commitment to women’s struggle 
for liberation in editorial policy, process, and content? How can we 
move from scholarship on women and religious symbol systems or 
traditions to scholarship for women in our struggles for social and 
religious change and liberation? 
  
The feminist critique of objectivity that would necessarily accompany a 
dissolution of the dualisms of androcentric scholarship, according to Fiorenza 
(1985: 73) is furthermore linked to a feminist deconstruction of the divide 
between theory and practice:   
 
We have critically analyzed and discussed androcentric language, 
symbol systems and concepts as well as patriarchal societal and 
religious structures. We have defined ourselves vis -à-vis organized 
biblical religions and theologies as radical or reformist feminists, as 
postbiblical feminists, as scholars of religion, as promotors of Goddess 
religions or as feminists committed to Jewish or Christian traditions. 
Although in theory we have criticized dualistic mindsets and oppositions 
as well as searched for nondualistic and holistic alternatives, in actuality 
we have been in danger of perpetuating them among us. It seems to me 
that one of the roots or our inability to overcome the dualistic mindset 
and perspective in women’s studies in religion is our acceptance of the 
academic division between theory and practice.     
 
What the authors above share with some of the current debates in feminist 
theory, and what substantiates their defence of the blurring of boundaries, is a 
critique of many of the epistemological and methodological underpinnings of 
traditional mainstream/malestream scholarship that claimed – false – 
objectivity, universalism and value-neutrality. Well-known feminist scholars of 
religion like Fiona Bowie, Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza and Rita M. Gross are 
fulminating against the idea and possibility of ‘detached phenomenological 
description’ by the non-involved scholar. They not only favour the inclusion of 
women’s experience and subjectivity, but also of the scholar’s values, and 
commitment, to the point of advocacy. In line with postmodern feminist 
epistemology, they believe that the individual life history, positioning and 
subjectivity of the scholar her/himself affect the subject matter under study to 
the degree that objectivity becomes not only impossible but undesirable. None 
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of the scholars cited however, to any great extent refer to any feminist theory in 
which the debates on epistemology and politics have taken and are currently 
taking place.9 In a recent article in a special issue on ‘gender and the study of 
religion’ in the well-known ‘mainstream’ journal MTSR, Rita M. Gross (2001: 
225) defends the transgression of boundaries as a ‘feminist scholar-practitioner’ 
of religion on the basis of what she sees as the impossibility of separating her 
own scholarship from her views on spirituality and politics: 
 
My scholarship as a comparative scholar of religion, my life as feminist, 
and my spiritual practice as a Buddhist are not three separate aspects of 
my experience, sealed off from each other in sep arate compartments of 
my brain and my being, but an integrated mosaic whose different parts 
are always interacting with and affecting each other.     
     
Gross’s (2001: 234-235) questions the ‘conventional division of labour between 
“religious studies” and “theology”’, which rests upon the insight that 
supposedly neutral and objective scholars of religion are ‘in fact, fully invested 
in maintaining a self-serving androcentrism, which dictated what data they saw 
and how they interpreted them’. This leads her to conclude that scholarship 
‘always hides and includes a normative position, a worldview, and a set of 
values…’ (1996c: 311). Gross does not seem to give up the notion of 
objectivity however, and redefines it in terms of that at the least one’s values 
and interests must be declared openly. Furthermore, in Gross’s view, a 
distinction between women’s studies and feminism is ultimately unattainable, 
as intersection and interpenetration cannot be avoided, in as much as 
‘descriptive and normative approaches to religion or feminism’ can initially, but 
not ultimately be separated (Gross 1999: 192). As explained above regarding 
other work by Gross (1996), this type of ‘engaged scholarship’ which ‘moves 
over the borderline from descriptive studies to world-construction’ (1993b: 
312), is clearly a source of frustration for those who remain committed to clear 
distinctions between insiders and outsiders, like Katherine K. Young (1999b; 
1999c).  
In a lengthy ‘Postscript’ to the compilation Feminism and World 
Religions (Sharma and Young 1999), Young (1999d) makes her case for 
maintaining the distinction between women’s studies and feminist advocacy on 
the presumption that it is related to a particular view on the insider/outsider 
epistemology. Thus Young (1999d: 279) begins her postscript by claiming that 
‘insiders to the world religions have made important contributions to 
discussions of religion. But some feminists claim that only insiders can 
legitimately discuss their own groups.’ Again, references are completely 
lacking, but it can be guessed that Young is referring to and then generalising 
upon the insight that feminist scholarship must ‘start from women’s lives’. 
What is seen as the basis for numerous debates and directions in feminist 
theory, for instance the idea that experience, positioning and the subjectivity of 
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the scholar will affect the research process, Young (280) reduces to an 
essentialist-biologicist view that ‘feminists have argued that only a woman can 
describe adequately the experience of being a woman.’ In the field of religious 
studies Young notes the situation is complicated further by what appears to be 
the stance of ‘women scholars’ - that is feminist women scholars - that insiders 
must additionally be defined in terms of what Young calls ‘culture’. For the 
sake of my argument, I would add here that ‘religion’ would suffice. 
Concurring with Young that there indeed is a problem at hand, I have tried to 
show by contrast that feminist scholars in religion simply appear to be insiders. 
Thus, the conflation is assumed, rather than that feminist scholars of religion 
would proclaim – which rarely occurs - that they must necessarily be insiders to 
the religion they are studying as Young suggests.   
However, on the basis of what Young sees as the feminist pollution of 
the traditional phenomenological-descriptive method in religious studies as a 
proper academic discipline, all forms of feminist scholarship, feminist 
theoretical debates - and feminism itself I might add - are thrown overboard. 
Rather, they are not even consulted by Young in the first place. They are 
reduced to what Young terms ‘subjective epistemologies’ which abandon 
rationality and create the impression that ‘anything goes’. Young asks for 
example ‘can it really be claimed that insiders are always correct?’ (279), and 
demands that there ‘should be some academic forum for testing statements 
made in the name of feminism’ (284). The problem with Young’s argument is 
that in applying these questions and demands to the discipline of religious 
studies and its status as a scientific, objective discipline which she so adamantly 
defends, equally complex problems and issues arise to which I shall return. For 
the moment, I will argue that in Young’s failure to see many feminist religious 
studies’ scholars just for what they are, that is ‘insiders’, coupled with a fierce 
rejection of feminism in the academy and in the public domain, Young equally 
cannot ‘escape’ her biases, values, and positioning, and is herself importing 
‘politics’ into her scholarly work.  
As with Marsha Hewitt’s (1999) critique of Rita Gross’s reconstruction 
of Buddhism (1993), Young appears to be annoyed with the way some 
feminists are corrupting religious traditions and is thereby herself participating 
in a religio-political debate. Upon the debate between ‘feminists demanding 
religious reform and feminists demanding religious revolution’, Young (1999d: 
294) comments the following: 
 
At the moment, some feminists are trying to establish indirect worship 
of ‘the Goddess’ within Judaism and Christianity. After so many Jewish 
and Christian, ethos-building centuries, it surely makes sense to expect 
goddess-oriented ‘reformers’ with any integrity to establish their own 
religious communities.    
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Young (295) warns that ‘historians of religion… might consider the possibility 
that some new religious movements are actually secular ideologies 
masquerading as religions’. The author thus not only appears to have – 
personal, political or religious? – problems with what some (feminist) ‘insiders’ 
are doing, but with the fact that these movements may not even be really 
religious. The question is how can this be determined according to the 
phenomenological method that sets out to understand and describe the insider’s 
viewpoint, whilst ‘bracketing’ one’s own preconceptions? Young furthermore 
has the following opinion on what religious adherents or ‘insiders’ of real 
religions should do (ibid.): 
 
It requires the members of religious communities to examine carefully 
the scope for reform in the name of justice (and men, as I will argue). 
Justice presupposes, however, a much deeper understanding than 
commonly found so far of the complexity and ambiguity involved in any 
study of gender (including both biological and cultural asymmetries). 
We must learn to view the world through both the ‘female eye,’ as it 
were, and the ‘male eye.’ When this is done, seeing from both points of 
view altogether, we begin to see stereoscopically. Only on this basis, I 
think, can we develop a worthy gender ethic for the future. The ocular 
analogy can be extended, of course, to all groups in relation to their 
counterparts.           
 
Regardless of her limited view of feminist scholarship and a denunciation of 
feminism as gynocentrism, what Young is doing here is in fact ‘advocating’ a 
particular kind of feminism, or ‘gender feminism’ if you like, for which the 
politics and scholarship are meanwhile abundant, and advocating so in both the 
academic, public and religious domain. It appears to me that she does not 
adhere to the very distinctions between women’s studies and feminism, 
between scholarship and advocacy or between ‘detachment’ and 
‘proselytization’ which she herself adamantly defends. The contradictions are 
all the more peculiar when taking into account the book in which Young’s 
postscript is published. Feminism and World Religions (Sharma and Young 
1999) co-edited and introduced by the same author is in fact a collection of 
articles from women from different ‘world religion’ traditions (including one on 
Buddhism by Rita M. Gross), all clearly and explicitly written from the 
perspective of feminist religious insiders. The question to be asked therefore, is 
why Young has not stuck to the usual descriptive women-in-religion type of 
anthology in the first place, if this is all a ‘women’s studies’ or ‘gender studies’ 
approach to the study of religion can possibly be. In short, is such a thing as an 
‘outsider’ feminist studies of religion conceivable?   
Marsha Hewitt’s (1999) critique of the conflation between feminist 
ideology or advocacy and the academic study of religion is similarly based on a 
refutation of feminist reconstructions of religion. She also takes a political 
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stance by not dismissing feminism in its entirety. As shown above, Hewitt 
repudiates taking the ‘the religious point of view’ which she conceives of as the 
‘methodological instantiation of ideology in the academic process’ … 
‘reinscribing ideology, since one is advocating on behalf of a particular interest’ 
(1999: 58). Hewitt also faults scholars like Gross for their viewpoint on the 
study religion as itself a religio-ideological activity. As with Young however, in 
trying to avoid a theological viewpoint, Hewitt’s apparent claim to a feminist 
commitment and proposal for an alternative viewpoint becomes highly 
problematic.  
Accusing Gross of her pretence to be engaged in a ‘dialogue’ between 
feminism and religion, Hewitt states that dialogue ‘allows the “other” to be 
while working as a critical tool to uncover the attitudes and conceptualisations 
of, and about, women, demonstrating how these notions affect and reflect the 
lived experience of women’ (60). First the question can be raised what Hewitt 
exactly means by ‘letting the other be’. Presumably this refers to the object of 
religious research, which in this case can mean either the oppressor or the 
oppressed woman. The first perhaps broadly incorporates religious ideologies, 
texts, institutions, practices, etc. and the people that construct and/or use them 
to the disadvantage of that category of humans designated as ‘women’, a 
category which is not specified any further. These texts, events or people need 
to be read or described, observed, analysed and somehow be left ‘as they are’. I 
question how such an approach can simultaneously remain – or indeed, pretend 
to remain – both critical, yet merely descriptive, and finally, even claim to be 
feminist. 
Opposed to Young, who – in an inconsistent way - dismisses the notion 
of feminism altogether, Hewitt proclaims a feminist critical theory of religion, 
borrowed from Marx’s notion of ideology critique, that examines ‘the ways in 
which religions interact and intersect with non-religious dimensions and 
thereby produce and sustain various forms of domination’ (49). This inquiring 
into and exposing of ideology can also apply to counter-discourses, which 
themselves can become new forms of ideology (50). So Hewitt’s objective of 
showing that feminist reconstructions of religion are not feminist critical 
theories of religion – regardless of whether they themselves claim to be this – 
can also be viewed as an example of a feminist ideological critique itself. The 
issue at stake again however, is which implications Hewitt’s conception of 
feminist critique and analysis may have for any other forms of non-theological 
feminist studies of religion or their possibility tout court.  
Following her rejection of feminist reconstructions of religion, Hewitt is 
clearly not entirely content when she states that a feminist critical theory will 
‘have to settle’ with the analysis and exposition of sexism and oppression when 
it comes to religion (62). Does this entail that serious feminist scholars in any 
kind of field will have to settle with mere description or, does this only pertain 
to the study of ‘religion’? We can assume that Hewitt most likely strongly 
opposes the oppression of women (or any other human beings) and would 
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prefer the world we live in to be very different. The only solution to the 
dilemma is to hold on to an isolated entity or construct called ‘religion’ that 
cannot be influenced from the ‘outside’, yet does continuously penetrate other 
social and cultural realties. Only the influence of the former into the latter can 
be described, whereas presumably the advancement of women and 
transformation of society in general is desired and pursued, where the 
researcher herself cannot claim to be external to or positioned to as an 
‘outsider’.  
In order to avoid the instantiation of ideology, Hewitt similarly decides 
the ‘other’ must remain the same in the name of tradition. As I have noted 
above, this move is not altogether consistent, as the power of ‘religion’ pertains 
to many spheres of society, where the transformation of inequality is probably 
viewed as justifiable. This can only be conjectured however, because Hewitt is 
reticent on the practical purposes any feminist ideology critique of religion may 
serve. I claim that Hewitt’s attempt to be more scientific and less ideological is 
not achieved by limiting herself to a mere exposition of sexism and staying at a 
level of description. At first sight her proposal may even seem depoliticised or 
for some maybe not even feminist because real change, for real women, is not 
envisaged. It can equally be questioned how any kind of research into 
‘inequality’ and the dynamic of power in general, whether critical theory, 
feminist, etc. can ever be viewed as non-ideological. Or non-political in the 
sense of claiming the description and analysis of power as an academic process 
does not affect or import or construct towards social and thus even religious 
reality. What could the purpose be of locating and exposing sexism and for 
whom, and how can this in itself be viewed as a non-ideological undertaking? 
Furthermore, how can the feminist anthropologist for example, claim to 
objectively know that certain cultural practices - that may or may not be 
sanctioned by ideology - are harmful to women? Which are the criteria to 
determine subordination or suffering and who gets to determine them? With 
these questions I hope to make clear that for feminist research, and accord ing to 
a feminist critique of science for any form of research, it can be argued that 
politics already are implicated at an epistemological level.      
In short, the problem with Hewitt’s analysis is not so much her 
perspective on the relationship between religion and politics as subject matter, 
which she does acknowledge by expanding her definition of ‘politics’ by 
politicising all spheres of human activity, including religion. What I question is 
her attempt to distinguish politics from theory when it comes to the feminist 
study of religion. The consequences of the insider/outsider or science/(crypto-
)theology debate within mainstream religious studies, paradoxically leaves the 
feminist scholar with the choice between being a ‘religious feminist’ or to 
contend with a restricted version of a feminist theory of ‘religion’, the latter 
which I have shown to be equally politically invested.     
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Transgressing Sacred Boundaries: Interdisciplinarity and Interreligiosity  
 
The problem of conflations and the blurring of boundaries has not completely 
gone unnoticed by some feminist scholars in the field, although as I have noted, 
some of the underlying stakes and issues have barely been addressed. 
Moreover, the transgressing of boundaries appears to take place in both 
directions, as pointed out by feminist sociologist of religion, Linda Woodhead 
(2001). In discussing what Woodhead calls second wave feminist scholars 
engaged with ‘spiritualities of life’, - that is feminist thealogians and goddess 
scholars like Daly, Christ, Plaskow, Goldenberg and Starhawk – she (2001: 71-
72) notes how this thealogical work draws on methods from religious studies: 
 
Such studies epitomize an approach that has become typical in this field, 
and that employs techniques typically associated with the scientific 
study of religion within a framework of commitment and even advocacy 
of the forms of spirituality described. Like studies of Christianity made 
by second wave feminist theologians, these second wave studies of 
spiritualities of life therefore combine a theological – or ‘thealogical,’ as 
followers of the goddess prefer to say – agenda with more ‘scientific’ 
methods of exegesis and interpretation which may leave many 
sociologists feeling a little uneasy. The distinction between science and 
theology is blurred too by the fact that the spiritualities of life which are 
the subject of these studies tend to be highly reflexive and to be shaped 
in part by an awareness of work in the scientific study of religion.         
 
Woodhead refers to the way Carol Christ draws on anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz’s (1966) definition of religion in defence of, and in the construction of 
Goddess spirituality. The interdisciplinary nature of feminist research and the 
way even ‘reformist’ or less radical feminist theologians draw on methods 
outside of the boundaries of classical theology and exegesis was noted in the 
previous chapter and shows how the blurring of boundaries goes both ways. In 
an overview of the intersection between sociological and feminist hermeneutics 
in Biblical scholarship, Patricia Dutcher-Walls (1999) shows how feminist 
biblical scholars not only draw on non-traditional sources and methods from 
disciplines such as archaeology and cultural anthropology, but also how this is 
often shaped by and in turn shapes ‘current hermeneutical and/or activist 
feminist agendas’ (448). Referring to the work of Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza 
for example, Dutcher-Walls (450) notes that her historical reconstructive and 
theologising work: 
 
…is an example where a project in social history is motivated 
consciously by articulated modern feminist concerns in a struggle 
against patriarchal domination and for gender equality. The 
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reconstruction is in turn employed to further these same goals in current 
hermeneutics, theology and practice in the church.   
           
In a roundtable discussion in JFSR – a journal especially renown for its 
embrace and openness to all possible sorts of feminist religious studies 
scholarship – there is much talk of the need to de-essentialise the notion of 
‘women’s experience’ and incorporate diversity as was noted in the previous 
chapter. Miriam Peskowitz (1995: 112) hints that this may include more forms 
of difference and diversity beyond those along cultural or even religious/non-
religious divides: 
 
This fact of difference and dissent is, simply, but not simply, a starting 
point for today’s feminist studies of religions. I mean to call this 
endeavour feminist studies of religion, not feminist studies in religion, to 
re-emphasize feminist scholarship on non-Christian topics, to stress 
feminist work that is critical of religious authorities in a wide variety of 
ways, and in order to raise questions about the absence from this forum 
of feminist scholars of religions such as Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, as 
well as those feminist scholars who treat Christianity not theologically 
but as a historicized religion that demands critical attention.     
 
Peskowitz calls for an expansion of the horizon of the feminist study of religion 
to include more diversity, among which the incorporation of religious diversity, 
which has most explicitly been formulated in an essay referred to earlier by Rita 
M. Gross (2000). In the different contributions commenting upon Gross’s plea 
for religious diversity which together constitute a special Roundtable 
Discussion in this recent issue of JFSR, it can be inferred that such an 
expansion would minimally involve a ‘de-theologisation’ of feminist religious 
studies. Whereas most of the commentators appear to agree that feminist 
theologians should be much more open to religious diversity apart from just 
intra-Christian diversity, Gross’s starting point of ‘theology’ becomes 
problematic. This I believe, is related to the problem of the insider or religious 
viewpoint assumed in such an endeavour. Grace G. Burford (2000: 87) for 
example, comments upon the etymological roots of ‘theology’ (as theos, ‘god’+ 
logos, ‘discourse’), questioning if this would entail a limitation to monotheistic 
religions or ‘theisms’ of the world religions: 
 
If we are to carry out the kind of all-inclusive conversation about 
religions Rita calls us to engage in, we must either go with this 
expansion of the term, or find another term to use that would include 
(theistic) theology and creative, systematic thought within non-theistic 
religions. … I would prefer the latter option: to find a more inclusive 
term. We need a way to refer to this activity that falls somewhere 
between the supposedly objective ‘academic study of religions’ and the 
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theistically loaded ‘theology.’ The exclusion within feminist theology 
Rita calls attention to in her essay unfolds all the more easily when this 
enterprise goes by an inherently exclusive label.              
 
Susan Sered’s (2000) comments upon Gross’s essay refer to the same limits and 
inherent ethnocentrism in the usage of the term ‘theology’. Drawing on her own 
research on the religious life of Jewish women, Sered (2000: 107) notes that 
ritual rather than theology predominated among the religious groups she 
studied10: 
 
The silencing that Rita Gross notes, then, is not so much a matter of 
privileging truth claims as a matter of privileging certain religious 
genres and barely recognizing others. The issue, as I see it, is that of 
honoring a certain kind of conversation, the vocabulary and syntax of 
which are tied to certain elite, western, Christian discursive frames.              
 
Gross’s wish to achieve religious diversity within feminist theology movements 
and scholarship, and which has been exposed at various moments in this 
chapter, is that this goal is to be achieved for (feminist) religio-political reasons. 
She (2000: 76) demands for instance that ‘we religious feminists need to return 
to our original inspiration – the desire to overcome the monopoly of one voice 
on the process of creating theology and to open the forum to a diversity of 
voices.’ That such a plea is far from evident in the context of not only cultural, 
but especially religious diversity emanates from various comments on the 
essay. Gross (77) herself points to the stakes involved from the religious or 
insider’s point of view, by Christian feminists and Christian theologians alike:  
 
It is so easy for Christian feminists to ignore religious diversity probably 
because so many Christians do not take non-Christian religions seriously 
and do not regard their practitioners as equal partners in religious life 
and in the quest for meaningful answers to life’s dilemmas. Behind this 
lack of consciousness regarding the significance and value of non-
Christian perspectives lies the specter of a long history of exclusive 
Christian truth claims and the tremendous suffering wrought upon the 
world by such claims. … One might hope and expect that feminist 
theology, with its sensitivity to diversity and to the pain of exclusion, 
would be among the leading movements to condemn exclusive truth 
claims in religion and to manifest a different, religiously diverse stance.        
 
Grace Burford’s (2000) doubt whether ‘even feminist Christian theologians will 
be so willing to abandon exclusive truth claims’ and her questioning of Gross’s 
demand that seminaries and schools of theology should refrain from ‘othering’ 
non-Christian religions hits the mark, I suggest: ‘How can Christians stop 
“othering” non-Christian religions without ceasing to be Chris tians?’ (89). 
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Gross’s plea for feminist studies in religion to include religious diversity would 
on the one hand require a de-theologisation, and perhaps even a deconstruction 
of the truth claims of the religious viewpoint. Yet this plea can be located and 
interpreted only in the context of interreligious dialogue. In this particular call 
for the expansion of the feminist study in  religion, for the inclusion of both 
cultural and religious diversity, once again the methodological debate is 
simultaneously limited to that of the religious point of view.                      
 
In the previous chapter the question was asked whether the incorporation of 
‘diversity’ would provide a solution to the failure of the feminist study of 
religion to move beyond essentialism, following an assessment of the field by 
Rosalind Shaw (1995). A review of the literature showed that attention to the 
class, cultural, sexual, ‘etc.’ differences among women and its methodological 
consequences for the feminist study of religion for some time now are being 
debated in various publications and forums. A persistent form of essentialism 
nevertheless perseveres, which Shaw attributes to the inherent character of the 
mainstream study of religion and its ‘view from above’ approach to religious 
phenomena. Concurring with Shaw that the ‘view from above’ approach with 
its emphasis on ‘religion as text’ and ‘religion as sui generis’, in this chapter, I 
have nevertheless argued that Shaw’s accusation of feminist reconstructionist 
approaches for being ‘essentialist’ is made for the wrong reasons. This points to 
an additional and much more fundamental problem underlying the 
incompatibility between the mainstream and feminist approaches. Although 
attention to and the integration of ‘difference’ in the sense of the religious 
differences between women would appear to enable a de-essentialisation of the 
feminist study of religion, such a move necessarily implies a de-theologisation 
of feminist approaches and points to a questioning of the religious viewpoint.  
This in turn relates to a particular issue, which has hereto barely been addressed 
and centres on the problem of ‘difference’ in yet another sense, that of the non-
religious versus the religious viewpoint.     
Through a detailed critical analysis of some recent critiques of feminist 
reconstructionist approaches, I suggested that the fact that feminist 
reconstructionists have a great tendency to be essentialist is not so much 
because mainstream religious studies is so essentialist, but because these 
feminist scholars are in fact practising rather than studying religion. I argued 
that the real problem lies in the blurring of boundaries or the ‘conflation’ 
between insiders and outsiders, between the theological (or religious viewpoint) 
and the pretence of the ‘objective’ character of mainstream religious studies 
through its method of phenomenological description and analysis. Hence, an 
essentialist, universal ‘woman’ is upheld for religious/ideological/feminist 
reasons, whilst the universalising framework in mainstream religious studies – 
the very focus of the feminist unmasking of androcentrism – is supposedly done 
in order for the discipline to maintain its integrity as a scientific discipline, free 
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from religio-political ‘advocacy’. The question arises whether such a thing as a 
feminist study of religion is at all possible.  
The incompatibility underlying the impossibility of a paradigm shift of 
the mainstream is therefore related to some inherent features of both feminist 
and religious studies scholarship, which collide when attempts are made to 
intersect. However, as has become clear in the above account leading to this 
insight, both ‘religious studies’ and ‘feminist studies’ are by far homogeneous 
entities, but mere generalising names that cover a great variety of forms of 
scholarship. Both terms cover many internal and often conflicting debates on 
theory and methodology and even the questioning of the meaning and 
legitimacy of both as autonomous or interdisciplinary disciplines or fields of 
study in themselves. In the next part of this chapter, attention will be given to 
some of these discussions, arguing that the boundaries within respectively 
religious studies and feminist approaches are very much matter of debate. The 
im/possibility of a paradigm shift of the mainstream from the perspective of 
feminist theory is therefore but one aspect of even broader problems and 
methodological debates that are currently taking place in the social sciences and 
humanities.     
 
  
2. The Mainstream: Science or Theology? 
 
Rosalind Shaw’s (1995) critique that the ‘view from above’ perspective inhibits 
a gender-inclusive approach in the mainstream study of religion referred to the 
approach of Mircea Eliade, and the methods applied in the history or 
phenomenological of religions more generally. In spite of the congruence 
between the hermeneutic method (of empathy, experience and interpretation) in 
religious studies on the one hand, and what Shaw terms a critique of positivism 
in many strands of feminist epistemology on the other, the ‘view from above’ 
perspective in the first hampers compatibility. This takes place through what 
was identified as the textual and the sui generis definitions of religion. 
According to Shaw (68-69), both definitions lead to a decontextualisation of 
religion: 
 
In mainstream history of religions, understandings of the ‘uniquely 
religious’ are usually constituted by excluding or peripheralizing social 
and political content in defining what really counts as ‘religion’. 
Historians of religion who make the sui generis claim do not suggest 
that ‘pure religious’ phenomena can exist empirically, but that ‘certain 
experiences’ or phenomena exhibit a fundamental religious character 
and that our method must be commensurate with the nature of our 
subject-matter. … Thus desocialized, ‘the uniquely religious’ is deemed 
interpretable only ‘on its own terms’: studies of religion which entail 
social or political analysis are typically dismissed as reductionist.
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Both hermeneutics and phenomenology have to date been the dominant 
methods applied in mainstream religious studies, although in recent years 
considerable debate has developed as to whether theses techniques and their 
epistemologies are worthy for the study of religion as an academic discipline. 
What is often referred to as the ‘insider/outsider problem’ identifies this 
particular strand as belonging to the insider approach, in that it is built upon on 
the presumption that the scholar must ‘climb out of one’s skin’ into that of 
another (McCutcheon 1999) in order to be able to grasp, study and understand 
their beliefs and actions, from the ‘inside’.11 Phenomenology refers to the 
techniques for making descriptions of human behaviour, which can only be 
attained by using empathy in order to temporarily ‘enter’ into the other’s 
intentions and meanings. Central to the hermeneutical method is then the 
interpretation of these meanings, which draws back on the method of Verstehen 
in the practice of the Geisteswissenschaften opposed to the 
Naturwissenschaften, the first being introduced as a way to study human 
subjects through questioning their meanings and intentions.  
The tradition of the Naturwissenschaften by contrast, is characterised by 
an outsider-perspective on all empirically observable phenomena in ‘nature’, 
including humans. Opposed to issues of meaning and interpretation, this 
perspective holds that it is both impossible to get inside the experience and 
feelings of the subject under study and that the explanations the insiders 
themselves provide are irrelevant to the purpose of scholarly analysis. Rather, 
through observation, human behaviour and beliefs must be explained. Like 
nature, the ‘laws’ of human behaviour must be studied as to develop theories 
that can account for the regularities and causes of this behaviour in view of 
further generalisations and predictability. The naturalistic study of religion 
founded on such an outsider-position can be traced to the Enlightenment and in 
particular the work A Natural History of Religion (1757) by Scottish 
philosopher David Hume (1711-1776). Hume basically introduced the idea that 
religion must be studied as a human rather than a religious construct, reducing 
religious behaviours and beliefs to human fears and hopes (McCutcheon 1999: 
67).  
The German Protestant preacher Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) 
who published On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultural Despisers (1799), is 
referred to as the figure representing a critique of the rational-Enlightenment 
tradition in its reductive approach to religion in both scholarly analysis and 
society. For Schleiermacher, religion ‘eluded the critique of reason for in its 
essence it is not rational or irrational; instead, religion is an emotional state that 
possessed as much reality as did our experiences of the material world around 
us’ (McCutcheon 1999: 68). Schleiermacher therefore laid the basis for the later 
premise in the hermeneutical/phenomenological approach in the modern study 
of religion that religion as a highly private, personal feeling or state of 
consciousness and as a matter for the insider, could not be reduced to or 
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understood as anything other than a religious impulse itself. Twentieth century 
scholars of religion like Rudolph Otto (1869-1937), Joachim Wach (1898-1955) 
and Mircea Eliade (1907-1986), similarly regard religious experience as a 
private and personal phenomenon, the study of which can only take place by 
referring to the religious experience of the scholar. In denouncing both the 
possibility and validity of reducing religion to ‘external’ causes or emotions, the 
insider’s experience is not only authorised, but must be entered or even shared 
by the scholar. For Rudolph Otto (1999 [1950/1917]: 78) for example, what he 
calls the ‘numinous’ is defined in essentialist terms: 
 
This mental state is perfectly sui generis and irreducible to any other; 
and therefore, like every absolutely primary and elementary datum, 
while it admits of being discussed, it cannot be strictly defined. There is 
only one way to help another to an understanding of it. He must be 
guided and led on by consideration and discussion of the matter through 
the ways of his own mind, until he reach the point at which ‘the 
numinous’ in him perforce begins to stir, to start into life and 
consciousness. […] …it can only be evoked, awakened in the mind; as 
everything that comes ‘of the spirit’ must be awakened.     
 
Moreover, the outsider must be able to experience this religious feeling, or what 
Otto also called the mysterium tremendum et fascinans in order to understand 
and study it (ibid.: 78-79): 
 
The reader is invited to direct his mind to a moment of deeply -felt 
religious experience, as little as possible qualified by other forms of 
consciousness. Whoever cannot do this, whoever knows no such 
moments in his experience, is requested to read no farther; for it is not 
easy to discuss questions of religious psychology with one who can 
recollect the emotions of his adolescence, the discomforts of indigestion, 
or, say, social feelings, but cannot recall any intrinsically religious 
feelings.   
                                  
For Joachim Wach (1999 [1967/1935]), Mircea Eliade’s predecessor at the 
History of Religions Department at the University of Chicago during the fifties 
of the previous century, Religionswissenschaft is distinct from theology, which 
is ‘concerned with understanding and confirming its own faith’. Wach 
nonetheless appeals to the ‘inner experience’ of religion or ‘true religiosity’ of 
the scholar in that ‘he’ may be able to understand it. However, Wach (91) does 
not require that one ‘must actually belong to a community of believers if one 
wishes to grasp its actual concern’. The non-reductionist view of religion sui 
generis and the requirement of  ‘learn[ing] from our personal religious life in 
order to encounter the foreign’ is nonetheless clear (90-91):     
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An inner aliveness and broadness is necessary if we actually wish to 
understand other religions. In this connection it should be stated 
explicitly that the one-sided advancement of a particular point of view is 
bad for the understanding. As justified and fruitful as may be the co-
operative approaches of psychology, sociology, and typology, pure 
psychological, pure sociological, and pure typological answers do not 
help us to understand foreign religiosity. … It appears to be a truism to 
say that hermeneutics demands that he who wishes to understand other 
religions must have a sense (Organ) for religion and in addition the most 
extensive knowledge and training possible.  
 
Finally, the oft-mentioned Mircea Eliade’s (1999 [1969]) vision of the study of 
religion (what he calls the history of religions) within the academy is guided by 
the same non-reductionist methodological presumptions first initiated by 
Schleiermacher. This includes a focus on understanding the meaning of religion 
expressions and forms (hermeneutics), which according to Eliade must be 
studied and understood ‘from within’. After ‘collecting, describing and 
classifying his documents’, the scholar must attempt to understand them on 
‘their own plane of reference’. Similar to Wach’s point of view, this does not 
necessarily entail the exclusion of psychological or sociological dimensions of 
religious phenomena, but they are to remain secondary in any analysis (99): 
 
This does not mean, of course, that a religious phenomenon can be 
understood outside of its ‘history,’ that is, outside of its cultural and 
socioeconomic contexts. There is no such thing as ‘pure’ religious 
datum, outside of history, for there is no such thing as a human datum 
that is not at the same time a historical datum. Every religious 
experience is expressed and transmitted in a particular historical context. 
But admitting to the historicity of religious experiences does not imply 
that they are reducible to nonreligious forms of behaviour.            
 
For Eliade, religion or what he also following Otto often calls the ‘sacred’ 
opposed to the ‘profane’ (Antonen 2000), is not only sui generis, but an 
intrinsic and universal property of man, as homo religiosus. Thus for the above 
and many other contemporary scholars of religion applying the 
phenomenological/hermeneutical approach to date, religion, the ‘sacred’, the 
‘holy’, the ‘numinous’ or numen are sui generis ontological, or essentialist. 
They are simultaneously subjective and objective categories, non-reducible to 
their historical or social matrix. Such an approach is precisely the focus of 
Rosalind Shaw’s feminist critique, as with the exclusion or peripheralisation of 
social or political content, consequently, questions of power and inequality and 
privilege are deflected, as ‘the distinctively religious’ is constituted as apolitical 
(1995: 69).     
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Shaw points to how the hegemony of the sui generis or irreducibility 
conception of religion must be understood within the historical context of the 
politics of the academy. The study of religion as distinct from theology or the 
confessional approach in fact needs this conception of religion in order to retain 
and maintain its authority as an autonomous discipline. Defined as distinct in its 
subject matter, a unique methodology would serve to protect its otherwise 
‘dissolution’ into other disciplines and departments such as sociology, 
psychology, or anthropology, once approached reductionistically. On the one 
hand, Shaw stresses, the mainstream study of religion with its emphasis on 
meaning and interpretation was in many ways ‘ahead of its time’ up to the 
sixties and compared to the positivism and scientism that dominated other 
social sciences. However, since this period, its ‘institutional embattlement’ and 
continuous effort to claim autonomy has resulted in an intellectual 
marginalization from broader debates and paradigm-shifts taking place across 
disciplines such as feminism, structuralism, postmodernism, etc. It is in this 
sense that Morny Joy (2000: 117; 2001: 179) can claim that contemporary 
religious studies for the greater part appear to remain ‘unabashedly modernist’.               
As noted earlier, Shaw’s insightful, yet concise article does not reflect 
any further on actual implications and possible consequences of the 
incompatibility between this hegemony of irreducibility in the mainstream and 
a feminist approach to the study of religion. Does this imply that for any 
feminist or gendered study of religion to be possible, the only option would be 
to locate this in other social science disciplines harbouring the alternative 
reductionist or naturalist perspective? As Shaw notes on the position of 
positivism and scienticism in any case, these epistemologies were the first to 
undergo severe feminist critique. The possibility of a feminist critique and 
straightforward correction of androcentrism in ‘science as usual’ is anyhow 
usually perceived to be passed by in any current general typology of feminist 
theory, and as was shown in chapter three.  
In any case, in recent years the in sider/outsider problem in the 
mainstream is by far resolved. The critique of the hermeneutic, non-reductionist 
perspective of religion has increased, tied to even broader and far-reaching 
debates on how the study of religion should proceed, and whether such a study 
is possible at all. What McCutcheon (1999) calls ‘naturalistic’ or ‘scientific’ 
approaches to the study of religion, founded on the scientific method as 
developed by figures such as Francis Bacon (1561-1626) and René Descartes 
(1596-1650), and further influenced by Enlightenment principles of the primacy 
of reason over divine revelation, have returned with a vengeance in the modern 
study of religion towards the end of the twentieth century.  
In an article published in the Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion  in 1983, Robert A. Segal (1999 [1983]) issues a stark offence against 
Eliade’s position on the irreducibility of religion, or the claim that religion can 
only be understood in the terms of believers themselves. For Segal, Eliade’s 
approach is full of inconsistencies and often ‘entirely arbitrary’, for instance by 
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arguing that interpreting religion religiously can only be attained by describing 
or transcribing the believer’s own view of religious meaning for himself (143): 
 
Any distinction between the true meaning of religion and the true 
meaning of it for believers, is fallacious. … What he must therefore be 
saying, despite his profession of modesty, is that the conscious, 
irreducibly religious meaning of religion for believers is its true one, 
which means at once its true one for them and its true one in itself. 
Indeed, Eliade’s willingness to exceed and even violate believers’ 
particular conscious views of the meaning of religion for them suggests 
that he is concerned with more than its truth for them.                                         
 
Segal argues that all the typical methods applied in the history of religions that 
claims to delineate itself from theology or the confessional approach, such as 
the comparative method, the process of Verstehen and the phenomenological 
approach, ultimately fail to ‘justify an exclusively nonreductionist interpretation 
of human phenomena’ (151). The phenomenological approach to religion 
according to Segal, is no more than ‘in fact very personal appreciations of it, 
akin more to certain forms of literary and aesthetic criticism than to the natural 
or even social sciences’ (150): 
 
…the essence of religion constitutes metaphysical knowledge, and it is 
far from evident that any empirical method, which the phenomenology 
of religion purports to be, can provide it. A phenomenologist can 
certainly try to prove empirically than an irreducibly religious 
interpretation of religion either is more nearly adequate than any other 
one or captures a dimension of religion missed by all other ones, but 
when he maintains that his interpretation uncovers the essence of 
religion he exceeds the bounds of empirical evidence. He exceeds not 
simply the meaning of religion for believers but also its provable 
meaning in fact.  
 
For Segal, a nonbeliever studying religion in this way constitutes a 
contradiction in terms. In order to attain more than simply describing or 
transcribing the believer’s point of view and to actually be able to explain it in 
the believer’s own terms, the ‘appreciation’ – through empathy – of the reality 
of religion would require of the scholar to consider the divine itself (153): 
 
…a nonbeliever seeking to appreciate the religion of a believer must 
appreciate the truth, not merely the origin or function, of a belief, and 
must appreciate the truth of a belief which, even as an agnostic, he not 
merely does not happen to share but cannot accept.    
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In Segal’s conclusion then, underlying approaches such as that of Eliade which 
refute reductionist interpretations is merely the fear ‘that they reduce God to a 
delusion’. Such nonreductionist approaches in fact function ‘in order to 
preserve the reality of God’, which serves religious rather than scientific 
purposes. Hence, for nonbelievers or outsiders in the modern study of religion 
proper, only reductionist interpretations are possible, whilst for believers the 
latter is ‘impossible’. As can be deduced from Segal’s following comment 
however, the paradoxical situation precisely has to do with the particularity of 
the subject matter and the broader historical and cultural context of the 
development of the social sciences and the demise of religion in Western 
society itself  (158): 
 
Unfortunately, God is not, like pain, a reality to be explained but is 
rather, like atoms, an explanation itself of reality. The reality to be 
explained is religion, or its object. Where God is the explanation offered 
by nonreductionists, nature, society, and the psyche are among the 
explanations offered by social scientific reductionists. Those 
explanations, as rival ones to God, do challenge the reality of God, so 
that Eliade is justified in fearing them, even if he is not justified in 
rejecting them. These explanations may not refute the existence of God, 
but, if accepted, they may well render his existence superfluous – and in 
that sense threaten the reality of God.    
 
A reductionist approach such as that of Segal inevitably not only delegitimises 
the mainstream study of religion as an autonomous discipline, but poses the 
‘threat’ of having religion ‘explained away’, ‘leaving the scholar with nothing 
left to study’ (McCutcheon 1999b: 132). Many a religious studies’ scholar bent 
on maintaining the division between the theological and scientific approach 
have sought various solutions to, and alternative assessments of this dilemma, 
which by no means can be discussed in detail here. In an answer to Segal’s 
forceful charge that irreducible religion would be a ‘disguise’ for believers to 
smuggle their commitment into their work as scholars, Daniel Pals (1990 
[1986]) for example, puts forward that a certain level of understanding without 
commitment remains possible. Pals (98) hereby reverts to the understanding 
and study of the ‘inner logic’ of belief systems  - such as ‘truths’, relationships, 
textures and qualities -, and the way they ‘draw conclusions from premises we 
personally cannot accept’.   
Similarly, a well-known authority in the field of mainstream religious 
studies, and founder of the first religious studies department in the U.K. (Wiebe 
1986: 1), Ninian Smart for decades now has professed an allegiance to the 
phenomenological method and the principle of ‘imaginative participation’. 
Smart sets out to transcend the insider/outsider problem through what he has 
termed ‘methodological agnosticism’, that is through epoché or the ‘bracketing’ 
of issues of truth and validity. Arguing against the tendency in the sociology 
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and psychology of religion towards projectionist theories of religion, Smart 
(1986: 215) nonetheless refutes an explicit atheist perspective, claiming that 
‘the non-acceptance of the existence of God is not equivalent to the acceptance 
of the non-existence of God’. Rather, ‘suspension of belief’ or methodological 
agnosticism will allow for a non-theological, yet non-projectionist or non-
reductionist perspective. 
Although a committed phenomenologist interested in both the meaning 
of religion from the insider’s point of view, and the description and 
categorisation of religious phenomena, Smart simultaneously does not eschew 
the need for explanation according to a framework that is akin to the 
understanding of ‘inner logic’ which Pals refers to. However, what Smart terms 
as religious rather than theological (or ‘buddhological’ for example) 
explanations, involves the way in which ‘particular or general features of 
religion explain other features both of religion, itself and/or of something 
contained within another aspect of human existence’ (Smart 1999 [1973]: 211). 
This idea of ‘patterns of interaction’ or ‘recurring motifs’, by virtue of which 
the autonomy of Religionswissenschaft would be enabled, in Smart’s view can 
apply to both intra religious and extra religious explanations, stressing the 
comparative and structural dimension underlying his theoretical propositions in 
his later work (e.g., in Dimensions of the Sacred , 1997). 
Smart’s intermediate position also follows from his critique of figures 
such as Eliade, whom he faults for completely ignoring the anthropological, 
sociological and economic dimensions of religion (Smart 1999 [1978]: 142): 
 
Thus though I have much admiration both for Eliade’s work and the way 
he has given stature to the history of religions, my regret is that his 
creative hermeneutic is in the end restricted – the vehicle of a certain 
worldview, and a means of giving life to much of man’s archaic 
religious symbolism, and yet somehow cut off from the wider 
explanatory task which religion can and should perform.   
 
Concepts such as the sacred/profane distinction or Rudolph Otto’s definition of 
religion as ‘the experience of the Holy’ and his notion of mysterium tremendum 
et fascinans, are similarly criticised on grounds of them being derived from 
cultural presuppositions rather than universally applicable to, for instance, more 
mystical or contemplative traditions such as non-theistic Theravada Buddhism 
(Smart 1986 [1963]: 188; 1996: 29). Smart’s programme for the study of 
religion as a phenomenological and a comparative project that focuses on the 
differences between religious traditions, allows for a great diversity of religious 
concepts and practices including the so-called world religions. It also allows for 
the inclusion of religious traditions such as those of the more small scale 
cultures traditionally studied by anthropologists. To date these religious 
traditions are still often excluded or marginalized in many religious studies 
programmes and research paradigms (e.g., Gill 1994). As noted above, this 
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project aims to arrive at a framework that focuses on the ‘explanatory 
correlations between elements in the different dimensions of religion’ (1986 
[1967]: 182-183):        
 
But since religion has its wider milieu, as has just been noted, these 
explanatory correlations should be extended, for example through 
considering the psychological and sociological roots of certain religious 
phenomena, and the converse, the religious roots of some psychological 
and social phenomena. … In short, the comparative study of religion is a 
vital ancillary to other studies, just as they can be to it.   
 
Smart thus tries to avoid the essentialism in older phenomenological 
approaches, by paying attention and linking religious ‘phenomena’ to broader 
social and political contexts. However, for a reductionist such as Donald Wiebe, 
this is a false move. In a recent article, Wiebe (1999 [1994]) discusses and 
criticises Ninian Smart’s methodology, as part of a thorough defence of a 
naturalist, reductionist or ‘outsider’ approach to the study of religion. Wiebe 
argues that Smart’s proposal for religious studies which is ‘more’ than pure, 
objective, empirical science, yet ‘less’ than theology grounded in religious 
commitment and involvement, ultimately fails and reverts back into a form of 
insider scholarship. Following a similar line of argument to that of Robert Segal 
in his critique of Eliade, Wiebe attributes this failure to Smart’s appropriation 
of phenomenology combined with a principle of ‘bracketed realism’. This 
approach would allow for a description of religious phenomena including the 
reference to the object of worship in the life of the devotee or insider. Smart in 
as ‘neutral’ and comparative terms as possible refers to the object of worship as 
the Focus of religion, thereby leaving the question of the existence of the Focus 
unanswered and additionally unasked in Wiebe’s point of view. For Wiebe 
however, this methodological agnosticism and phenomenological description 
does not really ‘eschew ontological assumptions’ (57-58): ‘Ultimately Smart 
urges the student of religion, even though he or she is in search of natural 
explanations for relig ious phenomena, to leave open the possibility of 
alternative explanations going beyond the scientific’.      
Illustrating his point by making an analogy with ‘Father Christmas 
scenarios’ with children as the believers, Wiebe (64) argues that ‘the 
phenomenological description, to be sure, must involve a description of the 
“existence-belief” of the devotee, but it does not require acceptance of that 
belief. The latter would, in fact, define a philosophical or religious undertaking 
that the bracketing is designed to avoid.’ For Wiebe (65) then, Smart’s principle 
of bracketing is a ‘kind of crypto -theological enterprise, predisposing the 
student of religion to assume the “truth” of religion’ (that is, to assume that the 
Focus of religion exists)’. Wiebe’s (66) own view is clear: the only way religion 
can and should be studied in the academy is within the parameters of a 
scientific setting: 
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That ‘something more’ than the scientific should be sought obviously 
involves a recognition of at least the plausibility of religion’s truth; and 
such recognition could only be either to religious experience of some 
kind or to metaphysical or theological argument, neither of which is 
appropriate to the activity of academic departments set aside for the 
scientific study of relig ious phenomena.  
 
Underlying - and explicitly stated by Wiebe elsewhere – Wiebe’s view of how 
science and any academic discipline should proceed is not only the eradication 
of metaphysical or (crypto-) theological argumentation, but also any part for the 
‘moral’ or ‘political’ within the academy. It is precisely here where the paradox 
of the feminist non-confessional study of religion lies, as was shown in the 
inherent problems and contradictions underlying Hewitt and Young’s critique 
of feminist reconstructions of religion for being insider’s ‘advocacy’ that may 
not hold a place in the academy. As was elaborately shown earlier, and 
following Wiebe’s argumentation, an approach such as that of Young which 
claims to reject ‘feminism’, yet itself as true to the phenomenological method 
can be accused of crypto-theology. Yet, as would be the case for any feminist 
perspective, it can also be accused for the instantiation of the political into its 
epistemology.  
Wiebe (56) points to how Smart in many respects follows Eliade’s – 
more obvious – crypto-theological but also broader what I would call moral or 
political concerns implied in their religious studies programme : ‘He maintains, 
in agreement with Eliade, ‘[i]t would be artificial for the Religionist [that is, the 
student of religion] to present the meanings of faiths and cultures and then 
simply to contract out of the question of their significance in the larger 
perspective of human history and a new global humanity”’ [italics mine].12 
Historians of religion such as Joachim Wach and Mircea Eliade have likewise 
commented upon the broader and social relevance of their scholarly work 
(McCutcheon 1999: 70-71). Eliade (1999 [1969]: 96) explicitly alludes to the 
practical benefits of the history of religions which he envisions as ‘a new 
humanism’: 
 
This is why we believe that the history of religions is destined to play an 
important role in contemporary cultural life. This is not only because an 
understanding of exotic and archaic religions will significantly assist in 
a cultural dialogue with the representatives of such religions. It is more 
especially because, by attempting to understand the existential situations 
expressed by the documents he is studying, the historian of religions will 
inevitably attain to a deeper knowledge of man. It is on the basis of such 
a knowledge that a new humanism, on a world-wide scale, could 
develop.                                
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In the preface to Wiebe’s (1999: x) collection of articles it becomes clear that 
crypto-theology is not an isolated mistake. Wiebe is adamant on the 
‘unacceptable interference’ of all kinds of ‘politico-ideological concerns in the 
academic study of religions in the modern university context.’ (xiii): 
 
A study of religion directed toward spiritual liberation of the individual 
or of the human race as a whole, toward the moral welfare of the human 
race, or toward any ulterior end than that of knowledge itself, should not 
find a home in the university; for if allowed in, its sectarian concerns 
will only contaminate the quest for a scientific knowledge of religions 
and ultimately undermine the very institution from which it originally 
sought legitimation [italics mine]. 
 
One notes the similarities with Marsha Aileen Hewitt’s (1999) critique of the 
religious point of view, which as noted earlier is conceived as the 
‘methodological instantiation of ideology in the academic process […] 
reinscribing ideology, since one is advocating on behalf of a particular interest’. 
In taking accusations for ideological rather than disinterested scientific 
approaches - such as in Wiebe’s line of thought - to its end’s conclusion, a 
‘feminist critical’ perspective becomes rather awkward, as was shown above. In 
trying to avoid a theological viewpoint, Hewitt’s claim to a feminist 
commitment and proposal for an alternative was shown to be highly 
problematic.  
 
Although only a few arguments from a limited number of voices to the 
insider/outsider debate – which continues - and the future of religious studies in 
general have only been briefly presented, I hope to have shown that these 
discussions taking place in the ‘mainstream’ have functioned as a reason for the 
mainstream to be greatly untouched by feminist critique. Furthermore, in view 
of both the incompatibility and the question of any kind of transformation, this 
particular juxtaposing of the conflict between religious studies as a discipline of 
‘science or theology’ with feminist critique and epistemology broadens and 
complicates further the problems identified by Rosalind Shaw.  
Opposed to Shaw’s refutation of the phenomenological approach and its 
sui generis claim, and in light of the epistemological shift concerning the 
question of objectivity within feminist theory and research sketched in chapter 
three, the reductionist, naturalistic, disinterested, objective, outsider alternative 
approach proves equally problematic for any feminist or gender-inclusive 
perspective. Before I take a closer look at the more precise reasons for the 
incompatibility from the perspective of recent debates on the issue of 
objectivity within feminist theory and methodology, I will review some recent 
discussions on religious studies methodology that aspire to transcend rather 
than provide any straightforward solution to the insider/outsider problem. 
Contextualised in even broader debates taking place across disciplinary 
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boundaries, it is suggested that it may be at this conjecture where openings 
towards compatibility may be conceivable.  
 
 
3. Deconstructing both Reductionism and the Sui Generis Claim: The 
Reflexive Turn 
 
In the institutional embattlement of religious studies within the academy, the 
reproduction of the hegemony of the sui generis claim was somehow forced in 
order to safeguard its position and justification as an autonomous discipline. As 
noted earlier, Rosalind Shaw (1995) commented that one of the consequences 
of this move had been an ‘intellectual marginalisation’ from broader debates 
and paradigm shifts cutting across other disciplines. Besides feminist critique, 
these developments can be said to cover diverse movements of thought, 
critique, and even areas of study in themselves, including various ‘post’ 
movements such as postmodernism, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, but also 
under titles such as orientalism, reflexivity, cultural critique, deconstruction, the 
issue of representation, the linguistic turn, etc. All these developments have had 
an impact on theory and methodology in various disciplines in the humanities 
and social sciences, and have in turn greatly influenced and contributed to the 
development of feminist theory and feminist studies as a distinct field. As was 
shown in chapter one, the influence of poststructuralism and postmodern 
thought for the theorisation of gender as an analytical concept has been 
paramount, although the stakes and relationship between feminist politics and 
practice opposed to what is often conceived of as the inaccessibility of feminist 
postmodern theory remains a matter of debate, to which I shall return.  
In a recent article in Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, Morny 
Joy (2000: 111) laments the way in which religious studies appears to remain 
immune for all these shifts. According to Joy, mainstream religious studies 
continues to debate ‘on an abstract level’, vastly ignoring the changes taking 
place in other disciplines ‘where the “Eurocentric mindset” and its philosophic 
and methodological presuppositions are being submitted to critical 
examination’. Central to these critical debates nonetheless, are issues such as 
the relation between objects and subjects in the context of the research 
relationship, questions of the possibility or attainability of neutrality and 
objectivity, the way in which values and unequal power relations have 
circumscribed and participated in the cultural construction of the ‘other’, etc. 
These all concern epistemological issues which are highly relevant in view of 
the recent discussions on religious studies methodology, introduced above.  
Perhaps in light of the traditional comparative and cross-cultural or 
cross-religious character of mainstream religious studies, both Morny Joy 
(2000; 2001) and Russell T. McCutcheon (1999b) refer to orientalism and 
postcolonialism in situating the epistemological challenge religious studies 
must face. Edward Said’s (1995 [1978]) Orientalism can be perceived as one of 
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the foundational texts of postcolonial thinking, although Said was by no means 
the first to make the link between the material and intellectual in the colonial 
relationship between the West and the East, or what is known as the Third 
World (Loomba 1998: 45-46). Appropriating Michel Foucault’s concept of 
‘discourse’ however, Said made explicit what he saw as the intimate link 
between the production of knowledge and power in the context of colonial 
discourse, embodied in the discipline of Orientalism itself, the scholarly and 
literary texts through which the West had ‘represented’ and thereby 
‘constructed’ the non-Western ‘other’. The study of colonial discourse then 
interrogates how images, stereotypes and ‘knowledge’ of the colonial subject or 
culture are related to real material, economic, political or imperialist control 
which is simultaneously an epistemic process through which the Western or 
European dominant  ‘self’ is defined.       
The idea of the self/other binary in which the ‘othering’ always implies 
the denial of selfhood or even agency was in turn by no means wholly new, and 
it has been fundamental in second-wave feminist thought, particularly in 
Simone de Beauvoir’s existential feminism. The notion of woman as ‘other’ 
opposed to the normative male self (white, heterosexual, colonial…) has been 
addressed in the initial critiques of androcentrism, such as that of Rita Gross 
(1977) on the history of religions in chapters one and three above. The linkages 
between both feminist discourse analysis and (post)colonial discourse analysis 
through the analogy of the subordination of women and ‘colonial subjects’ are 
thus more than apparent, although ‘mainstream’ postcolonial thinkers have not 
always been apt to see these evident, often mutually reinforcing connections.13  
In his reader, Russell McCutcheon (1999b) does not discuss the possible 
implications of orientalism or postcolonial thought for religious studies in any 
detail. However, he does suggest that the idea of ‘reflexivity’ not only follows 
from the idea that the so-called neutrality or objectivity of scholarly studies of 
the ‘other’ can be questioned, but that Said has shown how such descriptions 
are not so much representations of the other, but rather productive of the 
identity of the subject making the description. Joy (2000; 2001) by contrast 
shows how many historians of religion themselves were often highly 
‘orientalist’ in their own studies of ‘exotic’ religious traditions. As a discipline 
dating from the late eighteenth and nineteenth century ‘which endorsed a 
particular approach that reflected its penchant for classifying things non-
Western’ (2000: 116) this may not be so very surprising. But, as for 
contemporary ‘male scholars’ in the field of religious studies, according to Joy 
these continue to be utterly eurocentric in their outlook (2000: 117): 
 
The strictly historical and textual approach involved in this enterprise … 
has undergone some realignment in the past few decades, much of it due 
to the incorporation of the methods of quantitative measurement and 
definition, structuralism (anthropology) and of phenomenology 
(philosophy). But, by and large, the status of the investigator and his/her 
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preconceptions have not, until recently, been subjected to serious 
scrutiny. Religious Studies has remained, for the most part, unabashedly 
modernist in its self-understanding and definition [italics mine]. 
 
Joy then turns to the work of Ninian Smart, who despite all attempts to 
‘decolonise’ or ‘deorientalise’ Western categories of analy ses, has not 
incorporated any form of postcolonial critique, nor addressed the issue of 
reflexivity (ibid.): 
 
Yet with a perfunctory nod in the direction of cultural diversity, and the 
recognition of the need for some self-analysis – along the lines of 
Habermas’ ideological critique – there is no further elaboration, let 
alone admission, by Smart, of the fact that a radical restructuring of the 
discipline might now be required. … Nor is there acknowledgement that 
what has been involved here is not simply the indiscriminate importation 
of dubious Western ideals, definitions and methods, but also a wholesale 
misconstrual of non-Western ways of thinking and acting, contorted to 
fit the Procrustean bed of the current Western rational categories and its 
self-serving classifications.  
                  
Although both McCutcheon and Joy introduce the issue of reflexivity in the 
context of postcolonial critique, I suggest that the general terms in which they 
are signalling this epistemological shift could be called ‘postmodern’. I thereby 
appropriate the term in the broadest possible sense of being situated in a 
historical condition of postmodernity14, with postmodernism  expressing ‘a 
critique of modernist agendas as they are manifested in various forms and 
locations around the world’ (Grewal and Kaplan 1997: 2). Postmodernism has 
come to refer to an enormous variety of ways in which this critique is 
expressed, ranging from ‘cultural practices, writers, artists, thinkers and 
theoretical accounts of late modernity’ (Waugh 1998: 177), from ‘weak’ forms 
of critique to more ‘radical’ ones, and expressed in differential ways between 
and within traditional academic disciplines in general. Postmodern critique is 
minimally defined as a questioning of the Enlightenment project and its 
commitment to the development and discovery of ‘objective’ science, and the 
‘grand narratives’ of universal knowledge and ‘truths’, based on the idea of 
unilineair progress of ‘man’ as a rational coherent subject.  
Many of the products of this postmodern critique have been questioned, 
such as the accusation of the failure of postmodern thought to develop an 
alternative theory of knowledge, or the problem of political emancipation and 
agency opposed to what is often associated with the relativism or even nihilism 
in much postmodern thinking. Nevertheless, I believe that postmodernity as a 
condition, as well as postmodernism, - minimally characterised as a kind of 
epistemological critique of the foundationalist and essentialist assumptions of 
modernist knowledge claims - can be appropriated for designating the general 
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shift forming the background to the current and fundamental critiques of 
mainstream religious studies, such as those of Russell T. McCutcheon and 
Morny Joy. ‘Reflexivity’, yet also deconstruction (derived more specifically 
from poststructuralist thought), or social constructionism can be understood as 
various ‘tools’ that can be appropriated in postmodern analysis. A postmodern 
analysis of the insider/outsider problem for example, does not so much seek to 
solve, but rather contextualise and deconstruct the debate itself (McCutcheon 
1999b: 289).  
In the previous paragraph concerning the insider/outsider problem and 
the debate between the reductionist and sui generis approaches in the study of 
religion it was argued that reductionists such as Donald Wiebe not only accuse 
non-reductionists of incorporating theological concerns, but also political or 
ideological concerns into what should be ‘objective’, disinterested scientific 
scholarship. In Manufacturing Religion , Russell T. McCutcheon (1997) is just 
as critical, but approaches the problem of essentialism in the 
phenomenological/hermeneutical study of religion from what I would call a 
postmodern – rather than a ‘modern’ – perspective and mode of analysis.15 
McCutcheon rarely employs the term ‘postmodern’ and claims to be 
‘unapologetically reductionistic’, for his book ‘advocates a naturalist, historical 
scale, where all human events and conceptual or textual productions – in a 
word, discourses – are understood to have socioeconomic and political origins 
and implications’ (1997: 17). Such an omission – including the terms 
poststructuralism and postcolonialism I might add – may not be entirely trivial, 
as critics of postmodern and poststructuralist analysis in particular often 
associate these movements with idealism or ‘textualism’ to the exclusion of the 
material, or the ‘naturalist’ which McCutcheon is precisely defending, an issue 
to which I shall later return.    
 In his assessment of the sui generis claim, McCutcheon nevertheless 
primarily draws on Foucault, as the main objective is to show how the 
conceptualisation of religion as autonomous, personal, private, unique and 
essential is ‘a highly discursive as well as political strategy’ (xi). What 
McCutcheon sets out to do is analyse the sui generis claim as a form of 
discourse in itself. In the process I think, McCutcheon both confirms Rosalind 
Shaw’s thesis on the incompatibilty of this claim with feminist approaches, yet 
also gives some more ideas on the implications of this claim. McCutcheon 
therefore indirectly offers some suggestions for any gendered approach, there 
where Shaw remains rather reticent: 
 
…what this book addresses are the various modes and sites of 
conceptual production in creating and reproducing the discourse on sui 
generis religion and their relations to the social production of humans as 
political subjects. It names and challenges the hegemony of scale that 
operates in the modern study of religion, which defines and 
manufactures religion as an essentially ahistorical human intuition 
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clothed in certain historical accessible categories, such as myth, symbol, 
and ritual. It identifies the various intellectual, institutional, social, and 
geopolitical implications that arise from this isolationist and idealist 
approach to the study of religion.  
 
McCutcheon does a deconstructive reading of Eliade’s methods and theories 
and secondary literature around his life and work. He also includes the 
reproduction of this sui generis discourse as employed in comparative religion 
textbooks and university classrooms, thereby examining the strategies and sites 
of this discourse on an intellectual, social, economic and political scale. Thus, 
next to the claim that religion is ‘an sich’, techniques of generalisation, 
dehistoricisation, universalisation, essentialisation and naturalisation have 
served to intellectually ‘construct’ religion. Religion has been simultaneously 
‘to a large measure constituted by the methods which are supposed to elucidate 
it’ (19), or in other words, ‘the scale makes the phenomenon’ (20). The social 
and economic scale refers to the way the sui generis claim has served to 
constitute and retain religious studies as an autonomous discipline – the 
‘institutional embattlement’ Shaw points to – yet also the stakes, benefits, and 
consequences surrounding these exclusionary strategies for the scholars located 
in the discipline. On the political scale the implications are profound and are 
again in accordance with Rosalind Shaw’s thesis regarding the abstract homo 
religiosus and the a priori detachment of politics, power and gender from any 
analysis (22): 
 
…the disembodied believer and the apparently apolitical hermeneut, are 
abstracted from the socioeconomic and historical particularity and 
turned into generic, disembodied minds… The historical minimalization 
characteristic of the discourse on sui generis religion constitutes the 
redefinition, reconstruction, and representation of human beings not as 
social, economic, and political beings with certain basic material needs 
and relations but as essentially believers of creeds.  
 
McCutcheon does not limit himself to the dominant 
phenomenological/hermeneutical, anti-reductionist approach constituting the 
autonomy of religious studies as a distinct discipline. He also partakes in a 
deconstruction of the insider/outsider divide in that the oppositional discourse 
challenging the sui generis claim is argued to be often just as essentialist and 
exclusionary of the sociopolitical scale (16-17): 
 
But by labelling aspects of this discourse of the discourse on religion as 
being in some way essentially theological, critics may in fact perpetuate 
the division of scholars of religion inasmuch as one group purports to 
study essentially religious data. In other words, much effort has been 
expended on critiquing the sui generis claim as if it were an essentially 
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religious claim, but not much energy has been exerted in critiquing it as 
a sociopolitical claim. [...] Rather, for the sake of intellectual and 
institutional demarcation [religion and theology versus science and 
theory], they [critiques of cryptotheology] function to isolate further, 
and thereby perpetuate the perception of, the essential autonomy of the 
religious phenomenon.       
 
In this particular attempt to offer a deconstructive or ‘postmodern’ reading of 
both sides, - the anti-nonreductionist sui generis scholars on the one hand and 
the reductionist, objectivist or even positivist on the other - McCutcheon shows 
how an alternative analysis of the insider/outsider problem is possible. He does 
this by maintaining what he terms a ‘naturalist’ perspective on religion as but 
one cultural aspect of real historical and contextualised – with Shaw I add 
‘differentiated’ - human beings, rather than ‘disembodied subjects’.   
As for the ‘dangers’ of postmodern analysis, one possible implication 
may be that of the dissolution of the insider/outsider divide in the sense that the 
insider’s viewpoint, subjectivism and the religious viewpoint is reinstated, 
which I will return to in the context of the relationship between postmodernism 
and feminism and the dilemmas of feminist anthropology. In the context of 
contemporary religious studies, in commenting upon advocates of ‘postmodern 
pluralism’ within the field, Johannes C. Wolfart (2000: 391) for example, states 
how ‘under the cover of postmodern pluralism (or, at least, relativism) they are 
seeking to reestablish theological judgements as intellectually creditable and 
otherwise legitimate determinants of public life’. Referring to one of the 
advocates of such a position (George Marsden), according to Wolfart (392), 
‘current pluralistic principles dictate that “faith-informed scholarship” must be 
recognized by public universities, especially since these have already accorded 
standing to women’s studies and gay studies’.  However, Wolfart also notes that 
the author in question here is perhaps conflating specific critical perspectives – 
he considers ‘modernist’ – ‘of say, feminism with perspectivalism in general’.   
It is in this context that I suggest for example Katherine K. Young’s 
(1999d: 287) resistance towards what she sees as the major problems with 
postmodernism and deconstruction: ‘the instability of all perspectives; the 
collapse into relativism and social inaction’ with ‘some feminists argu[ing] 
expediently for using deconstructionism only when it serves their own political 
purposes’. As I argued earlier however, many feminist scholars in religion, - 
including Young who additionally conflates feminism with gynocentrism – 
whether they would claim themselves to be ‘modernist’ or ‘postmodernist’ are 
conflating both the political and religious viewpoint. A ‘postmodernist’ meta-
analysis then again such as that of McCutcheon of the mainstream, shows how 
both sides of the divide are themselves – whether crypto-theological or 
objectivist – highly ideologically and politically informed. It is my suggestion 
that at least a much more reflexive, and situated view is necessary of all these 
perspectives, and attention is highly due to the diversity such terms as 
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‘modernism’, ‘postmodernism’, or feminism(s) cover, including a 
deconstruction of the way these are often appropriated in straightforward 
oppositional terms.                              
 
 
4. Beyond the God-Trick: Postmodern Feminist Anthropology and the 
non-Religious Viewpoint  
 
In this paragraph I will be exploring how the problem of essentialism in the 
feminist study of religion can be addressed, moving beyond the lacunae and 
various conflations in the juxtaposing of the ‘mainstream’ and existing feminist 
approaches to the study of religion. I suggest this would necessitate a turn to a 
reflexive approach, one that can be located in the more recent epistemological 
shift within feminist theory and methodology introduced in chapter three. For 
this, I will first briefly review some of the general debates and what I consider 
fruitful lines of thought generally subsumed under the header of ‘feminist 
postmodernism’. I will not so much present a straightforward solution to the 
insider/outsider problem, which in addition to the theses of Rosalind Shaw was 
identified as one of the main parameters underlying the incompatibility between 
mainstream religious studies and a feminist approach. Rather, I will turn to 
what I see as some parallel dilemmas, yet also some promising suggestions in 
contemporary feminist anthropology and feminist postcolonial critique. Debates 
on contemporary feminist anthropological methodology, I argue, may open 
some possibilities of conceiving a feminist study of religion from the non-
religious point of view, yet also serve as a general framework for empirically 
testing both Shaw’s and the additional hypotheses on the incompatibility, to be 
illustrated with a case study in the following chapters.          
 
 
From the ‘View from Nowhere’ to ‘Views from Somewhere’: Feminism 
Critically Appropriates Postmodernism 
 
In chapter three a number of typologies of feminist theory and research were 
presented, differentially characterising the most recent stage of development as 
‘deconstructive’, ‘reflexive’ or the ‘postmodern’ or even ‘poststructuralist’ 
phase. In many respects, feminist theory can be viewed to have been 
postmodern avant-la-lettre. Critiques of androcentric epistemology and ‘false 
objectivity’ were formulated as early as the seventies, whilst the unmasking of 
the supposed ‘neutrality’ of the academy and the links between science and 
power had already been underway since the emergence of critical theories and 
the ‘post-empirical crisis’ in knowledge (chapter two). Besides the development 
of social constructionist and later intersectionalist theories of gender (chapter 
one), women of colour had in turn initiated a critique of the false pretensions 
and universalisations of feminist theories by Western, white, middle-class 
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women. They had hereby demanded the inclusion of the representation of 
voices and experiences of different groups – ‘plurality’ - beyond those of 
‘women’ as a homogeneous category and in the process scrutinised ‘universal’ 
theoretical concepts and frameworks such as the public/private divide (chapter 
three).  
During the late eighties and nineties however, within the development of 
what may be termed postmodern philosophy, a more radical critique of 
objectivity emerged. This involved a denouncing of the modernist idea of ‘the 
view from nowhere’ or the Archimedean viewpoint, that is foundationalism , 
with knowledge understood as the reflection of ‘truth’, whether founded in 
God, reason or history (Andermahr, Lovell and Wolkowitz 1997: 81). The 
intersection of this critique of the metanarratives of modernity and ‘totalising 
frameworks’ with feminism has enabled a fruitful diversification of feminist 
theory. Yet it has also contained highly paradoxical features, feminism itself 
being a modern emancipatory ‘metanarrative’ and very much a product of 
liberal humanism and Enlightenment thought. On the other hand, feminism has 
always been both critical of and both critically engaging with both modern 
narratives, such as marxism for example. Such an engagement with postmodern 
philosophy moreover, has included and enabled radical self-critique in a 
reflexive mode. Initiated by the critique from women of colour, postmodernism, 
poststructuralism and deconstruction have allowed for further conceptual and 
theoretical sophistication and diversification of feminist theory. Through an 
interrogation of feminism’s own foundations, this has allowed for new tools of 
analysis and thought leading to possibilities for both expanding and 
incorporating the earlier critiques from ‘diversity’. Thus whereas women of 
colour had critiqued the ethnocentrism and ahistoricism of feminist theory and 
questioned notions such as ‘patriarchy’, ‘women’, ‘experience’ or ‘oppression’, 
postmodern critique and poststructuralism for many has provided both a 
philosophy and a vocabulary for critiquing this ‘false universalism’ and the 
essentialism that has been implicit within much feminist theorising.  
 Following the critique of the earlier ‘big three’ of feminism, feminist 
social, psychological, and anthropological theories from the seventies and 
eighties have been critiqued for their various forms of essentialism in both 
concepts and their approach, such as the search for a ‘key factor’ in explaining 
women’s ‘universal’ oppression through causal frameworks. As referred to 
before, well-known research such as that by Nancy Chodorow (1997 [1979]) on 
mothering and the development of gender identity, or Carol Gilligan’s (1982, 
1997 [1977])16 research on women and moral development, on the one hand 
appears to move beyond biological essentialism, in any case contravening the 
androcentrism and false generalisations in mainstream theory. However, from a 
feminist postmodern perspective these theories are criticised for their false 
generalisations and ‘meta-narrative overtones’ in terms of offering universal 
explanations and relying on essentialist concepts of gender identity, without 
contextualising these in terms of cross-cultural and historical sensitivities.    
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What can be considered a critical encounter or more of a feminist 
critical and selective appropriation of postmodernism, several authors in 
Feminism/Postmodernism  (Nicholson 1990), show how ‘the whole package’ of 
postmodern philosophy need not necessarily and perhaps should not be bought. 
Nancy Fraser and Linda J. Nicholson (1990) and Seyla Benhabib (1990) for 
example, offer critical readings of Lyotard, whose refutation of all 
metanarratives would imply only ‘plural, immanent and local forms of 
legitimation’ or a ‘justice of multiplicities’. This would preclude critiques of 
‘pervasive axes of stratification, for critique of broad -based relations of 
dominance and subordination along lines like gender, race, and class’ (Fraser 
and Nicholson 1990: 23). For Fraser and Nicholson however, a feminist 
appropriation of postmodern theory can incorporate critiques of traditional and 
foundational philosophy and epistemology, yet through retaining a ‘robust 
conception of social criticism’, it does not have to recede to either a view of 
criticism and political practice as merely ad hoc, nor abandon historical 
narratives or ‘large theoretical tools altogether’. Thus the authors argue a for a 
political postmodern feminist theory which (34): 
 
…would be explicitly historical, attuned to the cultural specificity of 
different societies and periods and to that of different groups within 
societies and periods. Thus, the categories of postmodern-feminist 
theory would be inflected by temporality, with historically specific 
institutional categories like the modern, restricted, male-headed, nuclear 
family taking precedence over ahistorical, functionalist categories like 
reproduction and mothering. Where categories of the latter sort were not 
eschewed altogether, they would be genealogized, that is, framed by a 
historical narrative and rendered temporally and culturally specific. 
Moreover, postmodern theory would be nonuniversalist. When its focus 
became cross-cultural or transepochal, its mode of attention would be 
comparativist rather than universalizing, attuned to changes and 
contrasts in stead of to covering laws.       
 
Often depending on what is understood under, or which authors – beyond 
Lyotard - are covered by ‘postmodern’ philosophy and critique, feminist 
theorists differ in their position on the possibilities of appropriation. This 
mostly relates to the question of retaining feminism as a political project or as 
often referred to as the problem of ‘agency’. According to Jane Flax (1990, 
1992) for example, and in accordance with Fraser and Nicholson’s optimistic 
viewpoint, feminist theory actually ‘belongs’ within the terrain of postmodern 
philosophy. Feminist theory is postmodern in that it shares ‘the growing 
uncertainty within Western intellectual circles about the appropriate grounding 
and methods for explaining and interpreting human experience’ (1990: 41). 
Feminist theory similarly raises important metatheoretical questions about ‘the 
possible nature and status of theorizing itself’. Others are more sceptical in the 
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possibility of a fruitful encounter, fearing the postmodern ‘depolitisation of 
philosophy’, relativism through eclecticism, the celebration of ‘differences’ and 
plurality, and ‘a view from everywhere’ which would undermine rather than 
further the feminist political project (e.g. Benhabib 1990; Bordo 1990; Di 
Stefano 1990). Critical feminist appropriation of postmodernism therefore 
comes in many forms, minimally distinguishing between postmodernism as an 
‘aesthetic practice’ and as a ‘critique of knowledge’ (Grewal and Caplan 1997; 
Waugh 1998), or by identifying and selecting preferable ‘weaker’ versus 
detrimental  ‘stronger’ forms (Benhabib 1990; Waugh 1998).   
  Perhaps what is considered one of the most influential postmodern 
feminist essays, – and also launching the development cyberfeminism - ‘A 
Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late 
Twentieth Century’ by Donna Haraway (1991 [1985]), in its title alone 
expresses how ‘postmodernism’ in feminism does not so much represent a 
seizure with traditional critical theory (socialist feminism). Moreover, it can be 
viewed as more of an engagement with earlier narratives in an ‘almost infinite 
variety of pathways and combinations’, to be viewed as more of ‘net which 
catches up most of the major social theorists of the second half of the twentieth 
century’ (Andermahr, Lovell and Wolkowitz 1997: 170). In its style at least, ‘A 
Cyborg Manifesto’ can be seen as typically ‘postmodern’. In its eclecticism and 
usage of metaphors, the ‘cyborg’, the hybrid of machine and organism, stands 
central as ‘a matter of fiction and lived experience that changes what counts as 
woman’s experience in the late twentieth century’ (Haraway 1991 [1985]: 291).  
The manifesto is an ‘attempt to build an ironic political myth’, which seeks an 
affiliation between feminism, postmodernism, socialism and materialism. The 
cyborg thereby functions as a metaphor for playfulness and pleasure but also 
the political power of the confusion of boundaries, between the human and the 
animal, the animal-human and the machine, the physical and the non-physical. 
It also refers to the confusion of boundaries between the natural and the 
artificial, and the mind and the body in a technological age in which ‘the 
certainty of what counts as nature – the promise of innocence – is undermined, 
probably fatally’ (294).  
The cyborg as a ‘promising and dangerous monster’ in a ‘post-gender 
world’ moves beyond ‘myths of original unity’, such as marxism and 
psychoanalysis, out of which difference and dominance are produced. It does 
not recognise the Garden of Eden, as the ‘illegitimate offspring of militarism 
and patriarchal capitalism, not to mention state socialism. But illegitimate 
offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful to their origins. Their fathers, after 
all, are inessential’ (293). For Haraway, the cyborg thus functions as a 
metaphor for a critique of meta-narratives, both scientist, humanist and 
religious and feminist ‘myths’ - ‘god is dead; so is the goddess’ (301) - and a 
deconstruction of boundaries and binaries out of which fruitful political 
positionings may emerge. In terms of identity constructed through the 
intersections of gender, ‘race’, class, etc., postmodern identities which even 
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though they are necessarily destabilised, specific, fragmentary, partial and 
contradictory, allow for possibilities for coalitions of affinity or ‘political 
kinship’ between women regardless of their differences. Thus ‘the acid tools of 
postmodernist theory and the constructive tools of ontological discourse about 
revolutionary subjects might be seen as ironic allies in dissolving Western 
selves in the interests of survival’ (297). The objective is to avoid ‘lapsing into 
boundless differences and giving up on the confusing task of making partial, 
real connection. Some differences are playful; some are poles of world 
historical domination. “Epistemology” is about knowing the difference.’ (300).                  
 The ‘deconstruction’ of the essentialist categories of binary difference 
and domination produced by meta-narratives and universalist theories is a term 
which perhaps more properly belongs under the heading of ‘poststructuralism’, 
as another general term, aligned and often overlapping what has hereto been 
defined as ‘postmodern’. Again this term designates many positions and infinite 
varieties, drawing on theoris ts as diverse as Ferdinand de Saussure, Jacques 
Derrida, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Louis Althusser, Julia Kristeva, and 
many others who may or may not have self-identified as ‘postmodern’ or 
‘poststructuralist’. Their theoretical insights have nevertheless been critically 
appropriated in new and diverse forms within feminist theory. Sharing with – as 
present in Haraway’s manifesto for instance -, but possibly more pronounced 
than in postmodern theory are the notions of the ‘subject’ and ‘subjectivity’, 
and their intersections with ideas of ‘agency’, ‘identity’, ‘language’, ‘meaning’ 
and ‘power’. Included among the general critique of meta-narratives, 
foundationalism and essentialism, objectivity and the ‘view from nowhere’, is 
the critique and deconstruction of the unified, autonomous, ‘sovereign’ 
‘subject’ within liberal humanism. Ideas of subjectivity and meaning, including 
binary oppositions and difference, seen as the products or ‘effect’ of language 
rather than ‘reflections of reality’ and ‘deconstruction’ (originating from 
Derrida) as a means of unravelling or revealing these constitutive or signifying 
practices, have mostly been appropriated in feminist literary criticism and many 
forms of ‘textualism’. Feminist poststructuralist appropriations of some of 
Michel Foucault’s ideas have overall been more applicable and therefore more 
popular in social and historical research.  
Central to the feminist appropriation of Foucault is the concept of 
‘discourse’, broadening and challenging the idea of ‘there being not being 
anything outside of the text’, or at least in a reconceptualisation of discourse as 
constitutive, yet more than merely ‘textual’. Additionally, as an alternative to 
the more humanist (Marxist/structuralist) notion of ‘ideology’ (Brooks 1997: 
49), discourse, ‘discursivity’ and ‘discursive practices’ are more than merely 
linguistic meanings, in that ‘discourses’ are related to context and materiality, 
being located in institutions, practices, and procedures of knowledge 
production, having real-world material and social effects. Discursive 
formations, whether they are academic disciplines - such as clinical or 
psychoanalytic discourse – or other coherent bodies of knowledge and practices 
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more generally, ‘construct’ or invent both the object of these knowledges, in as 
much as discourses and discursive practices constitute the ‘subject’ and 
subjectivity. Discourse is furthermore intimately connected with power, 
reconceptualised by Foucault as both productive and dispersed. As referred to 
in chapter one, there are obvious affinities with the feminist idea of domination 
and repression not merely taking place in the public sphere or institutional 
settings, but in the private and everyday practices and interactions – the 
personal is political -, often subtle, and constitutive and leading to 
internalisations of subordination. 
Regarding the feminist theorisation of gender, Foucault’s ideas have 
proved immensely fruitful, as they have contributed to a sophistication of an 
anti-essentialist, constructionist approach, unmasking the ‘naturalist’ discourse 
on bodies and sexuality and shifting the focus to discourses as mechanisms that 
themselves are actively involved in the essentialisation and ‘naturalisation’, 
thus constitutive of gender, gendered and embodied subjectivity. Judith Butler’s 
(1990a; 1990b; 1992) appropriation of Foucault is perhaps paradigmatic here 
(chapter one). She eloquently shows how the focus of feminist theory must shift 
towards a poststructuralist analysis of sex/gender and the way gendered identity 
and subjectivity is produced.  
As with postmodern philosophy however, the encounter between 
feminism and poststructuralism is seen by many as to be fraught with dilemmas 
and problems, again in relation to the question of feminist politics, agency and 
the politics of identity (e.g. Alcoff 1988; Marsden 1993; Nash 1994). One of 
these dilemmas has often been framed as the paradox involved in the 
poststructuralist deconstruction of the category of ‘woman’, ‘the central concept 
for feminist theory and yet it is a concept that is impossible to formulate 
precisely for feminists’ (Alcoff 1988: 405). Alcoff (419) for example, warns for 
a kind of neodeterminism or nominalism in the deconstructionism of Derrida 
and Foucault, which leads to the dilemma of how to ‘ground a feminist politics 
that deconstructs the female subject … [which] threatens to wipe out feminism 
itself’. Many feminist theorists have nonetheless interrogated possibilities of 
alliances that do not lead to relativism or political immobility, such as Alcoff’s 
notion of ‘woman as positionality’ (431): 
 
Gender is not a point to start from in the sense of being a given thing but 
is, instead, a posit or construct, formalizable in a nonarbitrary way 
through a matrix of habits, practices and discourses. Further, it is an 
interpretation of our history within a particular discursive constellation, 
a history in which we are both subjects of and subjected to social 
construction. The advantage of such an analysis is its ability to articulate 
a concept of gendered subjectivity without pinning it down one way or 
another for all time. Given this and given the danger that essentialist 
conceptions of the subject pose specifically for women, it seems both 
possible and desirable to construe a gendered subjectivity in relation to 
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concrete habits, practices, and discourses while at the same time 
recognizing the fluidity of these. 
 
The impact of both the critique from, and postmodernism and poststructuralism 
for feminist theory has thus shifted attention from essentialist notions of ‘shared 
experience’ and ‘shared identity’ to that of the processes under which identity 
and subjectivity are the outcomes of particular processes. Rather than ‘given’, 
identity and subjectivity are acquired and reproduced through changing and 
multiple hegemonic discourses and discursive practices. Various proposals have 
been made in order to frame agency and resistance in more strategic instead of 
essentialist and foundationalist ways such as in ‘temporary alliances’, ‘bonding, 
coalitions, interconnections’ (Braidotti 1994a), ‘affinity’ or ‘webbed 
connections’ (Haraway 1991 [1988]), or ‘politics of identification’ (Brah 1996) 
above identity. 
Epistemologically, the critical appropriation of the postmodern critique 
of objectivity in contemporary feminist theory has not lead to ‘the view from 
everywhere’, but various ‘reflexive’ forms of feminist epistemology, framed as 
the option of ‘partial perspective’ or ‘situated knowledges’ (as proposed by 
Haraway 1991 [1988]). In ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in 
Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective’, and in her familiar typical 
style, Donna Haraway (1991: 183) addresses the fundamental dilemma for 
feminist theorists in the postmodern age, being ‘trapped by two poles of a 
tempting dichotomy on the question of objectivity’. According to Haraway, on 
the one hand social constructionism and deconstruction have functioned as 
welcome tools for moving beyond the feminist critique of androcentric bias. 
They have showed the ‘radical historical specificity, and so contestability, of 
every layer of the onion of scientific and technological constructions’ and the 
way science can be shown to be a ‘contestable text and a power field’. 
However, the unmasking of the doctrines of objectivity has also resulted in 
cynicism, a kind of ‘epistemological electro-shock therapy’,  - ‘they’re just 
texts anyway, so let the boys have them back’ (186). Haraway (187) also 
phrases the dilemma as follows: 
 
So, I think my problem and ‘our’ problem is how to have 
simultaneously an account of radical historical contingency for all 
knowledge claims and knowing subjects, a critical practice for 
recognizing our own ‘semiotic technologies’ for making meanings, and 
a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a ‘real’ world, one 
that can be partially shared and friendly to earth-wide projects of finite 
freedom, adequate material abundance, modest meaning in suffering, 
and limited happiness.                
 
Haraway refers to Sandra Harding’s (1986, 1991) typology (introduced in 
chapter three) of feminist empiricism, standpoint epistemology and 
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postmodernism, locating the above dilemma at the intersection of the latter two 
perspectives. What Harding calls the dichotomy of ‘successor science projects’ 
versus ‘postmodern accounts of difference’, and Haraway ‘radical 
constructivism’ versus ‘feminist critical empiricism’, according to Haraway 
both ultimately miss a point. Haraway is firstly critical of standpoint 
epistemology, the grounding of theory from the ‘vantage points of the 
subjugated’. Whilst vision ‘from below’ is at least preferable to empiricism 
with its ‘various forms of unlocatable, and so irresponsible, knowledge claims’, 
standpoint epistemology is also problematic as it carries dangers with it, such as 
the ‘romanticizing and/or appropriating the vision of the less powerful while 
claiming to see from their positions’ (191). To the extent that standpoint 
epistemology minimally privileges women’s experience as a grounding for 
‘women’s ways of knowing’, it was argued in chapter three that this 
epistemology is aligned with a focus on ‘difference’. It can therefore be 
identified as the major framework or area in which the greater part of existing 
feminist research in religious studies or theology can be categorised.  
In its relation to the insider/outsider problem in religious studies 
however, feminist standpoint epistemology may arguably have little more to 
offer than the postempirical hermeneutical/ phenomenological method. From 
the perspective of postmodern critique of objectivity, the latter critiques 
objectivism through incorporating the subjectivity of others (the insider’s point 
of view), yet also ultimately endorses the subjective/objective distinction. This 
takes place through the application of techniques such as bracketing, so that ‘by 
suspending their own subjectivity, researchers can be “objective” about the 
subjectivity of others’ (Nielsen 1990: 8). In their critique of ‘science as usual’, 
however, both feminist empiricists and feminist standpoint theorists similarly 
share the presumption that objective and true knowledge is possible (Prins 
1997: 65). The problem thus lies in the premise that subjugated standpoints and 
knowledges would be epistemologically privileged, automatically being more 
complete, adequate and objective accounts of the world, ‘grounded in the 
Cartesian assumption that a single and unseamed social as well as physical 
reality exists “out there”’ (Stanley and Wise 1993: 189). Many of these 
critiques are not entirely fair once Harding’s entire oeuvre is taken into account. 
In The Science Question in Feminism  Harding (1986) in fact already addresses 
the problem in terms of the differences between women, neglected by earlier 
standpoint theorists such as Nancy Hartsock (1997 [1983]) and Dorothy 
Smith.17 In doing so, she immediately relates to the postmodern questioning of 
concepts such as ‘truth’, ‘reality’, and ‘experience’ (Harding 1986: 27 (citing 
Jane Flax)):  
 
Considered on its own terms, the feminist standpoint response raises two 
further questions. Can there be a feminist standpoint if women’s (or 
feminists’) social experience is divided by class, race, and culture? Must 
there be Black and white, working-class and professional-class, 
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American and Nigerian feminist standpoints? This kind of consideration 
leads to the postmodern skepticism: ‘Perhaps “reality” can have “a” 
structure only from the falsely universalizing perspective of the master. 
That is, only to the extent that one person or group can dominate the 
whole, can “reality” appear to be governed by one set of rules or be 
constituted by one privileged set of social relations.’ Is the feminist 
standpoint project still too firmly grounded in the historical disastrous 
alliance between knowledge and power characteristic of the modern 
epoch? Is it too firmly rooted in a problematic politics of essentialized 
identities?  
 
Liz Stanley and Sue Wise (1990) propose to solve the problem of feminist 
empiricism and feminist standpoint epistemology being successor sciences and 
non-relativist, versus the trouble with feminist postmodernism for being too 
relativist. Their critique of both foundationalism or relativism consists of 
pluralising the concept of standpoint and experience. They thereby refer to the 
work of black feminists, such as that of Patricia Hill Collins (1990), who adapts 
the notion of a ‘black feminist standpoint’. According to Stanley and Wise this 
notion allows for an ontological and contextual grounding of the multiplicity of 
distinct experiences of women, incorporating multiple feminist standpoints in 
the plural, including those of black and lesbian women. Thus, the differences 
between women and the category ‘women’ behoove deconstruction in order to 
focus on ‘ontological separations as well as similarities’ (34).                  
In her later work, Harding (1990: 97-99) sees feminist standpoint 
thinking (and feminist empiricism as matter of fact and to some extent) as 
already incorporating anti-Enlightenment tendencies, claiming it would argue 
against feminine essentialism and the idea of unitary consciousness, whilst 
‘feminist postmodernists [would] adhere to some powerful Enlightenment 
assumptions that even the feminist empiricists do not’. The insistence on not 
even interpreting the categories in her own proposed typology as mutually 
exclusive or developmental, becomes evident in further attempts (1991, 1993) 
to reconcile standpoint epistemology with feminist postmodernism towards 
what is sometimes called a ‘postmodernist standpoint approach’.18 Introducing 
the concept of ‘strong objectivity’ as an alternative to objectivism in the 
traditional conception of scientific knowledge, Harding comes closer to - and is 
perhaps to a large extent influenced by – Haraway’s proposed solution to the 
dilemmas of the encounter between feminism and postmodernism.  
Haraway’s (1991 [1988]) concept of situated knowledges, or ‘a doctrine 
of embodied objectivity that accommodates paradoxical and critical feminist 
science projects’, purports to offer an alternative ‘vision’ opposed to the ‘god-
tricks’ of relativism and totalisation, as mirroring twins in the problem of 
objectivity. Haraway claims objectivity ought to be about particular and 
specific embodiment, or ‘only partial perspective promises objective vision’ 
(190). Thus for Haraway, in the postmodern sense the knowing self is indeed 
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split and partial, inasmuch as subjectivity is multidimensional: ‘There is no way 
to “be” simultaneously in all, or wholly in any, of the privileged (subjugated) 
positions structured by gender, race, nation, class’ (193). Contra (traditional) 
standpoint epistemology that may be accused of essentialism and 
foundationalism, Haraway argues ‘subjugation is not grounds for an ontology; 
it [merely] might be a visual clue’ (ibid.). Haraway’s plea for ‘politics and 
epistemologies of lo cation, positioning, and situating, where partiality and not 
universality is the condition of being heard to make rational knowledge claims’, 
in other terms could be called ‘reflexive’ par excellence. In what Haraway 
literally refutes as the ‘view from above’, is replaced by ‘the joining of partial 
views and halting voices into a collective subject position that promises a vision 
of the means of ongoing finite embodiment, of living within limits and 
contradictions, i.e., of views from somewhere’ (196) (italics mine).  
Harding (1991) takes the de-essentialisation of standpoint epistemology 
further by pluralising the feminist standpoint notion and emphasising the fact 
that it should not be conflated with women’s standpoint. A feminist 
standpoint(s) rather, is something that must be achieved, (127) instead of 
automatically being rooted in women’s ‘biology’ or ‘experience’. Haraway’s 
(1993) influence becomes markedly clear in further attempts to rethink 
standpoint epistemology as forms of situated knowledges and as a way to 
generate stronger standards for objectivity. Here, the standpoint is rethought to 
be a necessary, though not sufficient starting point rather than an end-point for 
maximising objectivity. This simultaneously addresses the possible accusation 
of ethnocentrism and foundationalism: ‘Thus the claim by women that women’s 
lives provide a better starting point for thought about gender systems is not the 
same as the claim that their own lives are the best such starting points’ (1993: 
58). Considering the plurality of feminisms and the differences between groups 
of women, ‘standpoint theory argues that each of these groups of women’s lives 
is a good place to start in order to explain certain aspects of the social order’ 
(60). Although critical of Harding’s older work, I believe Stanley and Wise’s 
(1993: 191-192) idea of ‘feminist fractured foundationalist epistemologies’ and 
their notion of ‘feminist ontology’ is another attempt towards more of a 
synthesis between more situated, embodied and postmodern feminist 
epistemologies: 
 
Cartesian approaches, including feminist ones, ignore or deny their 
grounding in ontology: that is, in the interests, competences, experiences 
and understandings of knowledge-producers. Our feminist critique of 
knowledges argues instead for a materialistic, but not marxist, theory of 
knowledge, one irrevocably rooted in women’s concrete and diverse 
practical and everyday experiences of oppressions; and it insists that 
these analytic knowledges are reflexive, indexical and local: they are 
epistemologically tied to their context of production and are 
ontologically grounded.  
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Despite various attempts to reconceptualise feminist standpoint theory through 
postmodern critique and the burgeoning of feminist postmodern and 
poststructuralist theory, as Susan Hekman (1997) notes, standpoint theory is 
much less prominent and often discarded as an ‘older’ phase in the development 
of feminist theory, and as at first sight would be inferred from the very typology 
Harding originally proposed. With Hekman however, I agree that despite many 
a critique of standpoint epistemology, with for example its marxist roots 
contravening the antimaterialism of postmodern theory, a more careful reading 
of Harding and Haraway shows how some typologies have themselv es been 
somewhat simplified, overlooking what can be viewed as encounters between 
and reflections on different theoretical perspectives. If anything, standpoint 
theory must itself be contextualised as what Hekman (1997: 342) sees as the 
beginning of a paradigm shift in the concept of knowledge, minimally 
emphasising how knowledge is situated and perspectival and in its 
confrontation and integration of the differences between women, it offers ‘that 
there are multiple standpoints from which knowledge is produced’.  
Moreover, it is my expectation that feminist standpoint theory will 
reclaim some of its attention in the near future, as the ‘romance with 
(postmodern) epistemology’ diminishes and is currently itself being 
problematised in relation to the material and corporeality. Even feminist 
empiricism is similarly being rethought and reinterpreted since and in view of 
feminism’s encounter with postmodernism. This includes the redefining of 
objectivity, reincorporating notions of ‘reason and rationality’ and emphasising 
the contextuality of knowledges without relapsing into traditional gender 
essentialism and foundationalism, yet avoiding some of the relativist and anti-
materialist tendencies in some feminist postmodern strands of thought. Sylvia 
Walby (2001) for example, has recently argued that Harding’s view of science 
has been too limited and in it, science, empiricism and positivism are too easily 
conflated and that the idea of knowledge as socially created can be found in 
many contemporary sociologies and philosophies of knowledge. Whether 
feminism’s encounter with postmodernism should lead to de-relativisation and 
deeper materialisation of some postmodern epistemologies or alternatively 
return to a more de-essentialised and de-foundationalised model of standpoint 
theory or empiricism, I will leave aside. The point is that in this shift in 
epistemology in any case reflexivity, cannot be ignored in any form of 
contemporary feminist research, including that in the domain of feminist 
religious studies. 
With regard to the juxtaposing with the insider/outsider debate however, 
and my own analysis of the ways ‘difference’ functions on different and 
additional levels in the case of feminist non-theological research of religion, 
many of these discussions on epistemology do not provide concrete suggestions 
on how feminist research within the context of the social sciences may look. 
Moreover, they often assume a conflation between the researcher and the 
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researched in terms of feminism. Thus in the name of reflexivity, both 
Haraway, Harding and Stanley and Wise have all in one way or another argued 
for a levelling, rather than maintaining the boundaries between object and 
subject. Haraway (1991 [1988]) proposes for situated knowledges that the 
object of knowledge must not be seen as passive or inert, nor reduced ‘to the 
ephemera of discursive production and social construction’ (197). Rather, 
feminist accounts of objectivity and embodiment require that ‘the object of 
knowledge be pictured as an actor and an agent, not a screen or a ground or a 
resource, never finally as slave to the master that closes off the dialectic in his 
unique agency and authorship of ‘objective knowledge’. (198). Harding’s 
notion of ‘strong reflexivity’ (1991; 1993) holds that both observer and subject 
matter are put on the same causal plane, in order to achieve a more ‘reciprocal 
relationship’ between the agent and object of knowledge (1991: 161). 
According to Harding, opposed to the non-operationalisable forms of ‘weak’ 
notions of reflexivity and objectivity or ‘judgmental relativism’ frequently 
employed by anthropologists and sociologists (1991: 162-163), pleads for 
‘strong objectivity’, which requires ‘strong reflexivity’ (1993: 69): 
 
This is because culturewide (or nearly culturewide) beliefs function as 
evidence at every stage in scientific inquiry: in the selection of 
problems, the formation of hypotheses, the design of research (including 
the organization of research communities), the collection of data, 
decisions about when to stop research, the way results of research are 
reported and so on. The subject of knowledge – the individual and 
historically located social community whose unexamined beliefs its 
members are likely to hold ‘unknowingly,’ so to speak – must be 
considered as part of the object of knowledge of scientific method.                                                             
                  
Stanley and Wise (1993: 200) argue for a ‘morally responsible epistemology’ 
recognising the following:   
 
…the reflexivity of the feminist researcher in her research as an active 
and busily constructing agent; insistence that the ‘objects’ of research 
are also subjects in their own right as much as researchers are subjects 
of theirs (and objects of other people’s); acceptance that the researcher 
is on the same critical plane as those she researches and not somehow 
intellectually superior; and, most fundamental of all, no opinion, belief 
or other construction of events and persons, no matter from whom this 
derives, should be taken as a representation of ‘reality’ but rather treated 
as a motivated construction or version to be subject to critical feminist 
analytical inquiry.  
 
Whereas both Haraway and Harding’s views on epistemology mainly focus on 
the natural sciences and thus have little concrete to say on social sciences or the 
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humanities, Stanley and Wise, who are themselves sociologists, show how a 
‘postmodern’, social constructionist viewpoint must be combined with 
reflexivity and accountability: ‘feminist knowledge should be accountable 
knowledge, knowledge which acknowledges and reveals the labour processes of 
its own production’ (2001). For all these feminist theorists, reflexivity thus 
involves a reconceptalisation of ‘objectivity’, deconstruction does not 
necessarily lead to relativism but refers to contextualisation, situating 
knowledges and to accountability.  
As I have argued above, little of these discussions on feminist 
epistemology and the issue of reflexivity have been seriously applied to 
feminist studies of religion, although one may attempt to locate different types 
of research according to disciplinary boundaries within typologies, such as 
those suggested in chapter two. In the case of the insider/outsider problem and 
the question of feminist research on religion from the non-religious point of 
view, it at least becomes clear that any notion of a ‘postmodern standpoint’ 
must not be conflated with the ‘insider’ perspective, the first referring to 
women’s lives or experience as a starting point rather than religious experience 
or views. A more postmodern, constructionist perspective as proposed by 
authors such as Harding, Haraway and Stanley and Wise does away with an 
‘older’ more essentialist view of standpoint epistemology, one that does 
possibly make a conflation between the feminist as the insider’s point of view. 
It is precisely this kind of subjectivist epistemology that Katherine K. 
Young (1999d) in her severe critique of feminist research in religion, refutes. A 
reflexive approach however, one that avoids both the ‘god-trick’ and the ‘view 
from nowhere’, and as has been introduced in contemporary postcolonial, 
postmodern and feminist critique, would I believe be a starting point for 
rethinking the feminist study of religion. The main question how to remain 
reflexive, normative, to avoid the god-trick, to acknowledge one’s location, 
positioning, yet remain feminist without participating in religious discourse or 
crypto-theology, is, however, by no means ‘solved’ by the idea of situated 
knowledges. Additional problems and dilemmas remain, and in order to move 
beyond the ‘romance with epistemology’ in contemporary feminist theory, I 
will be looking at some of the developments and past discussions in the field of 
feminist anthropology, which I argue methodologically and epistemologically 
may offer some further suggestions for an alternative, reflexive feminist study 
of religion. The ‘reflexive turn’ has been paramount in mainstream 
anthropology, and in the case of feminist anthropology as a social science in 
which the study of ‘others’ stands central, some parallel dilemmas with feminist 
religious studies become apparent.            
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Feminist Research Dilemmas and Reflexivity: Feminist Anthropology 
 
In Marilyn Strathern’s (1987) account of the ‘awkward relationship’ between 
feminism and mainstream (chapter three), for the sake of her argument, 
Strathern drew on ‘feminist approaches’, generally characterized as those of the 
radical feminist kind. Despite their many methodological affinities, 
anthropology and feminist scholarship find themselves in a situation of mutual 
‘mockery’, based on a differential conception of and relationship to their 
subject matter or the ‘other’. For the radical feminist, in the taken-for-granted 
position of the subordinate standpoint, or the view from below, the non-feminist 
‘other’ is patriarchy. For the (innovative) anthropologist on the other hand, the 
‘other’ is the cultural ‘other’, and in light of postcolonial critique and 
postmodern self-reflexive critiques of the discipline, not the ‘other’ but the 
‘self’ is under attack.  
Anthropology - in the words of Rosalind Shaw (1995) - is attempting to 
effect an epistemological shift from a ‘view from above’, in order to de-
colonise and reinvent the discipline in various forms, through collaborative 
projects, ‘polyvocality’, techniques of experimentation, etc. In the ‘new 
ethnography’ in particular, as Strathern (1987: 290-291) noted, anthropology 
nonetheless mocks feminism as being a mere Western, and a particular cultural 
phenomenon and therefore presenting a limited view of the world: ‘If women 
construct subjectivity for themselves, they do so strictly within the sociocultural 
constraints of their own society. The establishment of self must endorse a 
worldview shared equally by the Other’. However, crucial in the refutation of 
feminism as ignorant to cultural differences, as ethnocentric and thus 
participating in, rather than struggling against orientalist forms of scholarship, I 
believe, is Strathern’s remark that this refutation takes place ‘from a vantage 
point outside their own culture’. This perspective, I counterpoise, is more 
aligned with a non-situated ‘view from above’ than any possible ‘view from 
below’.              
In the same paragraph in chapter three, I also noted that one of the main 
and more orig inal tensions underlying Strathern’s characterisation of the 
‘awkward relationship’, can be framed in terms of anthropology’s traditional 
‘liberal ideology of cultural relativism’ versus the claim of feminism as a 
universal politico-ideological and ethical project. Micaela di Leonardo (1991: 
10) defines the ‘feminist conundrum’ in the form of the question how to 
‘analyze critically instances of male domination and oppression in precisely 
those societies whose customs anthropology was traditionally pledged to 
advocate?’ Throughout the seventies and eighties there have been various and 
many responses in feminist anthropology to this conundrum, drawing on 
different theoretical models and taking different stances on the question of 
women’s subordination cross-culturally. Developments in feminist theory and 
scholarship in general during the ‘postmodern era’, have also had a significant 
impact on theorising in feminist anthropology, making Strathern’s juxtaposition 
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between radical feminism and innovative anthropology somewhat outmoded at 
present. 
Strathern does not take note of the internal developments within 
feminism and feminist theory referred to as the debate on ‘difference’ or the 
critique from diversity discussed in the previous chapter. Admittedly, the time 
of publication also proceeds most of the major discussions of the relationship 
between feminism and postmodernism, yet directly after the influx of 
postmodern and poststructuralist theory and discussions on reflexivity leading 
to the so-called ‘linguistic turn’ in anthropology. Strathern calls this 
development in mainstream anthropology the ‘innovative approach’, otherwise 
often referred to as the experimental or ‘new ethnography’ exemplified by 
publications by James Clifford and George Marcus (1986) and George Marcus 
and Michael J. Fischer (1986). The way in which these developments have had 
an impact on feminist anthropological theory furthermore shows how the issue 
of reflexivity has been played out in at least one social science in which 
multiple forms of difference feature centrally. As argued by feminist 
anthropologist Henrietta Moore (1988: 9), it is important to note that the notion 
of ‘difference’  - the critique from diversity - emerging in feminist anthropology 
is not the same as the concept of ‘cultural difference’ as central to the discipline 
of cultural anthropology. Whereas the basic tension between feminism and 
anthropology then lies in the primacy of either gender or cultural difference, 
one of the important contributions of feminist critique, is precisely the insight 
that cultural difference is ‘but one difference among many’. According to 
Moore (9-10): 
 
Feminist anthropology has recognized this insufficiency in so far as it 
formulates its theoretical questions in terms of how economics, kinship 
and ritual are experienced and structured through culture. It has also 
gone on to ask how gender is structured and experienced through 
colonialism, through neo-imperialism and through the rise of capitalism. 
But it must be said that it has, for the most part, still to confront the 
question of how gender is constructed and experienced through race.        
 
As argued in the first chapter, it is precisely in the intersection of feminism and 
anthropology that the most promising research and theoretical perspectives are 
to be found on the intersections between multiple forms of difference and their 
relationship to power and inequality. In a similar way to the critique from 
diversity on the ethnocentrism, racism and essentialism of earlier feminism, - 
for not taking the differences between women into account - anthropology has 
similarly provided a questioning of a feminism that assumes a universal identity 
and experience of women. However, this questioning is then located in the 
context of an empirical social science in which an immediate relationship with 
the ‘other’ is present. After a phase of the ‘anthropology of women’ followed 
by the ‘anthropology of gender’, a next phase for feminist anthropology 
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according to Moore would then involve coming to terms with the real 
differences between women, ‘opposed to contenting itself with demonstrations 
of the variety of women’s experiences, situations and activities worldwide’.19 
To deal with difference would mean to look at the way ‘racial difference is 
constructed through gender, how racism divides gender identity experience, and 
how class is shaped by gender and race’ (1988: 11). The benefits of such a 
feminist anthropology are for both mainstream anthropology and feminist 
theory itself (ibid.): 
 
Anthropology is in a position to provide a critique of feminism based on 
the deconstruction of the category ‘woman’. It is also able to provide 
cross-cultural data which demonstrate the Western bias in much 
mainstream theorizing. … The third, and current, phase of the 
relationship between feminism and anthropology is thus characterized 
by a move away from ‘sameness’ towards ‘difference’, and by an 
attempt to establish the theoretical and empirical grounds for a feminist 
anthropology based on difference.           
           
Opposed to Strathern’s (1987) more negative stance, Moore’s (1988) prospects 
on compatibility and mutual benefits may have been slightly too optimistic 
though, as subsequent publications and debates on the relationship between 
postmodernism, reflexivity on the one hand and anthropology and feminism on 
the other have meanwhile shown. For, the ‘reflexive turn’ in mainstream 
anthropology, perhaps best exemplified with the publication of Writing Culture: 
The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography edited by James Clifford and George 
Marcus (1986), leashed a severe response by many a feminist anthropologist. It 
has greatly influenced what can be seen as a very ‘special’ (Davids and 
Willems 1999: 5) relationship of contemporary feminist anthropology with 
postmodernism. The decolonisation of the ‘field’ had set in after the Second 
World War and this ‘field’ increasingly resisted being studied as a mere 
anthropological ‘object’ (Asad 1973; Wolf 1982). Although attempts to 
‘reinvent’ (Hymes 1972) and de-orientalise anthropology and other social 
sciences can be traced back to the sixties (Nencel and Pels 1991), issues of 
ethnographic authority and objectivity, cultural representation and power in 
particular became increasingly problematised in mainstream anthropology 
during the eighties under the influence of postmodern critique, known as a 
genuine moment of  ‘crisis of representation’. What appeared as a welcome 
development from the perspective of feminism, conversely both ‘infuriated and 
saddened’ many women anthropologists upon reading Writing Culture.  
According to Ruth Behar (1995: 4-5): 
 
No two pages in the history of anthropological writing have ever created 
as much anguish among feminist readers as did James Clifford’s uneasy 
statements justifying the absence of women anthropologists from the 
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project of Writing Culture. Pushed to account for this gap by the 
criticism of a feminist reader who reviewed the book in manuscript, 
Clifford now made the infamous claim that women anthropologists were 
excluded because their writings failed to fit the requirement of being 
feminist and textually innovative.  
 
Central to the book was the ‘incredibly obvious point’ that what anthropologists 
basically do is that they write. This writing – ethnographies – had to be 
understood in terms of ‘poetics and politics’, dependent, ‘on the words of 
(frequently less privileged) others for its existence and yet offer[ing] none of 
the benefits of authorship to those others who participate with the 
anthropologist in the writing of culture’ (Behar 1995: 4).  The general context 
for the reflexive turn in anthropology therefore included the questioning of the 
power relations involved in the practice - and origins - of anthropology and 
particularly in the representation of the ‘other’, very much in line with the 
critique of orientalism initiated by Said. The ethnographic text pretends to 
convey ‘objective’ knowledge, whilst the ethnographer him/herself is 
completely absent from the ethnographic account. This gives the text the 
authority and status of being true and factual rather than the product of a 
particular interaction and observation on the part of the researcher carrying and 
interpreting through his/her own cultural presumptions.  
The linguistic turn revolved around an exclusive focus on ethnographic 
representation and rhetoric, leading some to conclude that ethnography was 
more about inventing, creating ‘fictions’, rather than representing cultures 
through the usage of particular rhetorical strategies (Clifford 1986). The 
implications of this radical constructivist stance combined with the wish to 
further deconstruct the power inequalities between the ethnographic author, the 
invisible ‘self’ (the view from above) and the ‘other’ as the object of 
representation, was a shift in focus to the ethnography ‘as text’. This was to be 
analysed as a literary text with certain language styles, meanings and symbols. 
In order to solve this ‘crisis of representa tion’, proponents of the ‘ethnography 
of text school’ looked into alternative and experimental ways of writing in order 
to make the influence of the ethnographer upon observation and interpretation 
apparent, through techniques of dialogue, or by the integration of multiple 
voices, termed ‘polyvocality’.                       
The exclusion and rejection of work by feminist anthropologists in 
Writing Culture created such anguish, because ‘experimental’ techniques or 
‘textual innovation’ were proclaimed wholly novel. However both techniques 
of experimentation and the issue of power differentials in fieldwork and in 
representation had precisely been important to feminist anthropology preceding 
the so-called postmodern turn, - before ‘reflexivity was a trendy term’ (Wolf 
1992: 132) - yet without ever having affected or been taken seriously by the 
mainstream. In an article expressing their concern for the postmodern turn in 
anthropology from the perspective of feminism, Frances E. Mascia-Lees, 
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Patricia Sharpe and Colleen Ballerino Cohen (1989: 11) argue that what appear 
to be ‘new and exciting insights’ to postmodern anthropologists such as the 
editors in Writing Culture, are not so innovative at all: 
 
…that culture is composed of seriously contested codes of meaning, that 
language and politics are inseparable, and that constructing the ‘other’ 
entails relations of domination – are insights that have received repeated 
and rich exploration in feminist theory for the past forty years. 
Discussion of the female as ‘other’ was the starting point of 
contemporary feminist theory.         
 
Deborah Gordon’s critique (1988: 1) of the omission of feminist insights from 
Writing Culture and postmodern anthropology is equally harsh:  
 
For feminists, particularly feminist anthropologists and ethnographers, 
an important problem with experimental ethnographic authority is its 
grounding in a masculine subjectivity which encourages feminists to 
identify with new modes of ethnography, claiming to be decolonial, 
while simultaneously relegating feminism to a strained position of 
servitude.    
 
On the one hand feminism is credited by contributors such as James Clifford 
and Paul Rabinow, as a participant of movements of political and cultural 
critique, having profoundly influenced the academic climate towards the end of 
the eighties and the very location from which these authors speak. However, 
according to the editors the absence of feminist essays in the book is warranted 
by what Clifford sees as their ‘lack of textual innovation and experimentation’. 
Work such as Jean Briggs’ Never in Anger published in 1970 is then referred to 
by Clifford as an existing and older example of successful experimental 
ethnography, yet omitting that the book combined a feminist perspective with 
textual experimentation, and the fact that Briggs herself was a self-defined 
feminist scholar (Davids and Willemse 1999: 6). A whole host of earlier 
feminist anthropologist work by well-known and less-known authors (including 
the work of many an ‘anthropologist’s wife’) such as Ruth Benedict, Elsie Clew 
Parsons, Eleanore Smith Bowen, Margaret Mead, Zora Neale Hurston, Ruth 
Landes, Ella Cara Deloria, Marjorie Shostak, Barbara Myerhoff and many 
others can be said to have been focussed on issues of ‘textuality’, the problem 
of representation of the ‘other’ and participated in feminist ‘experimentation’ in 
their work (see Women Writing Culture edited by Behar and Gordon 1995).  
Nencel and Pels (1990: 17-18) similarly point to how Clifford 
contradicts himself by claiming feminist anthropology has not produced 
‘unconventional forms of writing’, yet simultaneously cites three important 
examples of it, thus attempting to ‘clean ethnographic experimentation of 
feminist stains, while making use of the insights put forward by feminism’. 
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Diane Bell (1993: 7-8) also comments out how ‘again we see the appropriation 
of a woman’s tradition, for awareness of self as an instrument of observation – 
that is, reflexivity – once named and analysed, is given a male genealogy and 
becomes central to the critiques of culture by the postmodernists’. According to 
Behar (1995: 4), throughout the twentieth century many women had crossed the 
border between anthropology and literature,  
 
…but usually ‘illegally,’ as aliens who produced works that tended to be 
viewed by the profession as ‘confessional’ and ‘popular’ or, in the 
words of Virginia Woolf, as ‘little notes.’ The Writing Culture agenda, 
conceived in homoerotic terms by male academics for other male 
academics, provided the official credentials, and the cachet, that women 
had lacked for crossing the border. Even the personal voice, undermined 
when used by women, was given the seal of approval in men’s 
ethnographic accounts, reclassified in more academically favourable 
terms as ‘reflexive’ and ‘experimental’.  
                      
Additionally, from the perspective of feminist theory and scholarship since the 
late seventies, the critique from diversity had involved similar issues such as the 
politics of authorship, representation and indeed experimentation with ‘form’. 
These issues were extensively addressed by women of colour in This Bridge 
Called my Back for example, a work including contributions such as poems, 
letters, stories, etc., fulminating against the alleged and possible separation 
between objective and subjective or ‘critical’ opposed to ‘creative’ forms of 
writing.20 
Women’s contributions are not only ignored by postmodern 
anthropologists, but in appropriating only the radical, essentialist, or old -style 
standpoint strands, feminism itself is rejected as a culture-bound ideology, a 
Western ‘meta-narrative’ – as in Strathern’s ‘awkward relationship’ – whilst 
other critical and political perspectives within the academy such as anti-
colonialism or anti-racism are taken for granted (di Leonardo 1991: 23). For 
many feminist critics moreover, absence and omission was not the only 
problem. For some, the new ethnography did not go far enough. Mascia-Lees, 
Sharpe and Cohen (1989: 8) suggest that anthropologists would better look to 
feminist theory, as the latter at least knows its politics. Both anthropology and 
feminist theory share the insight that the ‘other’ (women or non-Western men 
and women) is equally importantly ‘human’ and both are critical of so-called 
‘universal truths’ concerning human behaviour. Postmodern anthropologists 
attempt to deconstruct Western assumptions and categories in their new 
ethnography, as well as the general context of dominance and inequality in 
which the anthropologist stands opposite the to ‘other’. 
Instead of finding a way in which the ‘other’ can actually become a 
subject in the research process however, anthropologists turn to postmodern 
epistemology holding knowledge and truth are unattainable. The result is not 
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only an attitude of relativism or even nihilism. In practice, the reification of the 
author as a subject and authority takes place instead of its deconstruction. The 
experimental and eclectic form only makes the text accessible for insiders. 
Elaborate self-reflection, self-introspection and the localisation of the ‘other’ in 
the ‘self’ in an attempt to undercut the authority of the author/researcher, have 
the opposite effect of maintaining the author as the central subject, and leaving 
real-world  power inequalities unaltered (Abu-Lughod 1991; Wolf 1992).     
The critiques of postmodern anthropology by feminist anthropologists 
echoes many of the suspicions formulated by feminist theorists such as Sandra 
Harding, Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Hartsock discussed earlier, who warn for the 
dangers of lapsing into relativism in the ‘view from everywhere’, the 
abandonment of materiality, embodiment, of politics and indeed, the 
abandonment of theory itself.  In the context of a social science and empirical 
research however, the pitfalls of such a version of postmodernism become even 
more apparent. The problem for this kind of postmodern perspective in 
anthropology is the fact that one remains at the level of perspectivalism. A 
postmodern research stance in se does not bring with it an alternative theory or 
research methodology to anthropology (di Leonardo 1991; Pinxten 1997; 
Pinxten en Orye 1997). Thus Lila Abu-Lughod (1991: 143) argues: 
 
Despite a long history of self-conscious opposition to racism, a fast-
growing, self-critical literature on anthropology’s links to colonialism 
…, and experimentation with techniques of ethnography to relieve a 
discomfort with the power of anthropologist over anthropological 
subject, the fundamental issues of domination keep being skirted. Even 
attempts to refigure informants as consultants and to ‘let the other 
speak’ in dialogic … or polyvocal texts – decolonizations on the level of 
the text – leave intact the basic configuration of global power on which 
anthropology, as linked to other institutions of the world, is based 
[italics mine].  
                   
In the new ethnography therefore, we may conclude that ‘decolonisation’ or 
‘deconstruction’ thus only takes place at the level of the text, and with Margery 
Wolf (1992: 136) that the way mainstream anthropology has appropriated 
postmodern theory may have offered ‘better’ ways for writing ethnographies, 
but by no means any proposals for better ways of doing fieldwork. The problem 
of power and inequality in all stages of the research and writing-up process in 
anthropology have nonetheless been extensively – if not easily solved – 
problematised in terms of ‘feminist dilemmas’ (Wolf 1996) for the feminist 
anthropologist, yet also apply to any feminist social scientific research in 
general (e.g. Ribbens and Edwards 1998).              
The power differences between the researcher and the researched during 
the process of fieldwork are only one issue in need of reflection, whereas the 
subject of anthropological research mostly concerns cultural groups or 
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subgroups in a structurally and economically less privileged position than that 
of the researcher. Feminist ideals of co-operation, equality, reciprocity, mutual 
respect and general ‘empowerment’ turn put to be false illusions once the 
anthropologist appears, depending upon hospitality and spare time, only to 
disappear after a while with the knowledge gained. The anthropologist is the 
one to determine and justify the research agenda, the questions, the direction 
and especially the purpose and point of any research project. In such a context, 
research is for the greater part conducted by and is about women, but rarely 
with  and for women as in the traditional ideal of what feminist research should 
be about (see chapter two). Various feminist social science researchers, 
including anthropologists, have attempted to solve this contradiction by 
introducing more activist kinds of research, directed at structural changes 
among the research population and as desired and co-determined by the 
informants themselves. Such more applied forms of research nevertheless 
remain rare, and not merely due to the difficulties and demands of academic 
institutions and expectations. As remarked concerning the new ethnography, 
techniques such as ‘letting the other speak’, or often applied methods by 
feminist anthropologists such as the life history or oral narratives, do not 
automatically imply that the ‘other’ effectively becomes empowered. Many of 
these premises often push the other (woman) into a ‘victim-position’, 
reminiscent of many perspectives in development studies, perpetuating 
orientalism through eurocentric preconceptions on the ‘underdeveloped’ other.  
 Other dilemmas pertain to the ways in which information is obtained in 
the field. The position of the researcher allows her to be selective in self-
disclosure, whilst it is expected of ethnographic informants to provide detailed 
portraits of their everyday lives. In the case of researching women’s lives, this 
has been particularly problematic as feminist researchers are precisely 
interested in what mainstream science has often disgarded as uninteresting, not 
contributing or valid as a context of the production of knowledge itself. This 
frequently concerns the private, domestic, familial sphere where women in 
many societies are often situated. The dilemmas of making the private or the 
intimate and personal public, and how to translate these forms of knowledge-
practices into academic discourse are considerable (Ribbens and Edwards 
1998). 
The distance between the field and ‘home’, can allow for the researcher 
to reconstitute her identity in a strategic manner in view of gaining entrance or 
obtaining certain information (Wolf 1996). Various feminist anthropologists 
have admitted to the fact that they have consciously lied about their 
background, relationships (single, marital status, etc.), sexual orientation, or 
their economic means in order to continue, or at least not be prevented from 
continuing their research in the field. In a review article of Judith Stacey’s 
article ‘Can There Be a Feminist Ethnography?’ published in 1988, Elizabeth E. 
Wheatley (1994) summarises how Stacey locates the dilemmas for the feminist 
anthropologist in both the pro cess and the product of research. Despite the 
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apparent similarities between ethnographic and feminist premises for 
conducting research, applying methods that call for egalitarian relations, 
reciprocity and mutual respect, Stacey is of the opinion that the exploitation of 
the researcher’s subjects and many contradictions are inevitable. Informants are 
in actual practice placed ‘at great risk of manipulation and betrayal’ (Wheatley 
1994: 405): 
 
As an example, she [Stacey] outlines the dilemma she faced when one 
of her key informants, a fundamentalist Christian, requested that the 
details about her past lesbian status and relationship be kept in 
confidence for fear that such disclosure would be damaging to her. This 
informant and her former lesbian lover competed for Stacey’s allegiance 
and sympathetic understanding. Stacey faced difficult ethical decisions 
in relating to these women – she was in the awkward position of 
potentially betraying one or the other woman, not only in terms of how 
she interacted with them, but also how she accounted for them in the 
written product.              
 
The second paradox for feminist anthropologists in Stacey’s account is posed in 
the writing of ethnography, where elements of inequality and exploitation 
similarly enter the ethnographic product. As a feminist Stacey wanted to discuss 
and negotiate the final product with her informants, but this posed further 
dilemmas. Remaining reticent on her informant’s lesbian past for instance 
would have both unintended homophobic consequences and in general betray 
‘ethnographic truth’. In her critique on Stacey’s subsequent proposal to turn to 
the new ethnography nonetheless, Wheatley (1994) argues that although the 
latter may acknowledge paradoxes of representation such as the above, it does 
not do much to ameliorate them, consistent with other feminist critiques of the 
postmodern turn discussed above.           
 
 
De-orientalising a Feminist Social Science Approach  
 
That the dilemmas and paradoxes for feminist scholars studying lived ‘culture’ 
that do not feature centrally in recent discussions of feminist epistemology 
discussed in an earlier paragraph, cannot merely be attributed to the fact that 
contemporary ‘feminist theory’ in general does not bear upon empirical 
research or even empirical ‘reality’. Regardless of all in-built reservations and 
considerations due to the issue of ‘differences’, I believe, this theory still often 
presumes a conflation between ‘women’ and ‘feminists’, however culturally, 
racially, sexually, religiously or economically diverse or privileged. In 
anthropology and any other social science however, the differences between 
researcher and researched can also pertain to their diversity as women, not only 
as feminists. This holds for the kind of feminist study of religion that I propose. 
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The greatest challenge for the feminist social science scholar therefore, is 
perhaps research that focuses on non-feminist women , which characterises the 
case study in the following chapters.  
Important for the further reflexive turn within all forms of feminist 
research, but also in view of the development of global or, as it more recently is 
often formulated, transnational feminist movements, is what is generally 
termed as postcolonial feminist critique. Transnational feminist movements and 
scholarship aspire to refrain from reproducing orientalism, nor gender 
essentialism and cultural essentialism (see also my conclusion). In many 
respects, postcolonial feminist theory can be seen as aligned with or continuing 
the critique from diversity, yet this diversity takes place and is theorised from, 
in and on a global and historical scale, rather than being limited to ethnic, racial 
or other forms of ‘minority’ differences within Western locations. Postcolonial 
feminist theory can be broadly defined as a research area which aims to redress 
the lack of attention for gender issues in mainstream postcolonial theory 
through the ‘gendering of orientalism’, which involves the explication of the 
relations between racism, sexualisation, and gender in colonial, postcolonial 
and imperial representation. Postcolonial feminist writings in general 
simultaneously provide a critique of Western feminist theory, in particular the 
way the latter has often and problematically appropriated a homogeneous 
category of ‘third-world women’ (Gandhi 1998; Loomba 1998; Mills 1998; 
Quayson 2000).  
Certain writings by Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Trinh T. Minh-ha and 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak can be considered to be the most influential in 
bringing attention to Western feminist theory as participating in orientalism and 
therefore signal the development of postcolonial feminist critique during the 
nineties. In a chapter entitled ‘Difference: “A Special Third Women Issue”’ in 
her book Woman, Native, Other: Writing Postcoloniality and Feminism , and in 
her idiosyncratic literary style, Trinh (1989) points to how ‘Third World 
women’ are treated as a special category of ‘difference’ by many Western or 
liberal feminists, sustaining itself as the primary referent (82):  
 
Have you read the grievances some of our sisters express on being 
among the few women chosen for a ‘Special Third World Women’s 
Issue’ or being the only Third World woman at readings, workshops, 
and meetings? It is as if everywhere we go, we become Someone’s 
private zoo.          
 
Trained as an anthropologist, Trinh also refers to the way the image of the 
‘Third World Woman’ in the context of what Trinh calls ‘pseudo-feminism’ 
merges and is interconnected with that of the ‘Native’ in the context of (neo-
colonialist) anthropology. Chandra Talpade Mohanty’s (1991) article ‘Under 
Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses’, originally 
published in 1984, shows how the category of ‘Third World Women’ is 
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deployed in a variety of Western feminist texts and scholarship, only and 
similarly to contribute to a process of ‘othering’ in an ethnocentric and what 
Mohanty describes as a colonial fashion (53): 
 
…the feminist writings I analyze here discursively colonize the material 
and historical heterogeneities of the lives of women in the third world, 
thereby producing/re-presenting a composite, singular ‘third world 
woman’ – an image which appears arbitrarily constructed, but 
nevertheless carries with it the authorizing signature of Western 
humanist discourse.      
 
Although Mohanty does not question the descriptive and informative value of 
most feminist writings on women in the third world, her attention goes to the 
political implications and effects of a great deal of this work. Her concern is 
with the way ethnocentric universalism is often produced in such analyses and 
in particular the way the representation of Western feminism is then received by 
many third world women, who then conflate it with imperialism. Mohanty (55) 
delineates three analytic principles guiding feminist scholarly discourse on 
women in the third world, the first being ‘the strategic location of the category 
“women” vis-à-vis the context of analysis’. ‘Women’ are thus constituted as a 
homogeneous group across class and culture, and assumed to share the same 
needs, desires, equally and universally ‘oppressed’ or ‘powerless’ under 
‘patriarchy’. Third world women are thereby often discursively constructed and 
objectified as ‘victims’ of particular socioeconomic systems, including that of 
male violence, of Western colonisation, of the (Arab) patriarchal familial 
system, economic development process (the liberal ‘women in development’ 
literature), or religious ideologies such as ‘the Islamic code’.  
 In all these contexts, ‘women’ – and ‘men’ - are constituted as a 
homogeneous, internally undifferentiated ‘powerless’ group. It is as if they are 
sexual-political objects outside and prior to their entry into the arena of social 
relations, kinship structures within specific contexts, within specific varieties, 
rather than constituted through such structures. In the case of religious 
ideologies for example, ‘Islam’ is treated as an ideology ‘separate from and 
outside social relations and practices, rather than a discourse which includes 
rules for economic, social and power relations within society (62). ‘Islamic 
theology’ or ‘religion’ then becomes imposed on a separate and given entity 
called ‘women’ (64): 
 
What is problematical about this kind of use of ‘women’ as a group, as a 
stable category of analysis, is that it assumes an ahistorical, universal 
unity between women based on a generalized notion of their 
subordination. Instead of analytically demonstrating the production of 
women as socioeconomic political groups within particular local 
contexts, this analytical move limits the definition of the female subject 
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to gender identity, completely bypassing social class and ethnic 
identities. … Because women are thus constituted as a coherent group, 
sexual difference becomes coterminous with female subordination, and 
power is automatically defined in binary terms: people who have it 
(read: men), and people who do not (read: women). … Such simplistic 
formulations are historically reductive; they are also ineffectual in 
designing strategies to combat oppressions. All they do is reinforce 
binary divisions between men and women.            
 
As a second analytical presupposition in such feminist scholarship on third 
world women, Mohanty refers to the way particular methodologies are used to 
demonstrate universal cross-cultural male domination and female exploitation. 
For instance, the widespread practice of veiling as a descriptive generalisation 
is automatically equated with the control of women, without attending to the 
concrete meanings associated to veiling in specific cultural, social and historical 
contexts. The mere existence of the sexual division of labour is similarly taken 
to be ‘proof’ of the oppression of women. Finally, a political presupposition 
which underlies the analytical and methodological strategies implies that in this 
form of colonialist discourse on ‘third world women’, Western feminists in fact 
become the real subject of feminist discourse, with third world women never 
rising ‘above the debilitating generality of their “object” status’ (71), and 
ultimately robbed ‘of their historical and political agency’ (72).       
Finally, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s (1994 [1988]) famous essay ‘Can 
the Subaltern Speak?’ argues how through the representation of the ‘subaltern’ 
women in both imperial and feminist discourses, as ‘doubly oppressed’, they 
are always already absent or silent. As both ‘the object of colonialist 
historiography and as a subject of insurgency, the ideological construction of 
gender keeps the male dominant’ (82), (102):        
 
Between patriarchy and imperialism, subject-constitution and object-
formation, the figure of the woman disappears, not into a pristine 
nothingness, but a violent shuttling which is the displaced figuration of 
the ‘third-world woman’ caught between tradition and modernity.  
 
Through a postcolonial reading of Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre for example, 
Spivak (1995 [1985]) shows how the emergence of the female subject and her 
claim to individual autonomy, - that of the white female protagonist in the 
novel. It is simultaneously complicit with and situated in imperialist discourse. 
Thus as a novel representative of Western feminism, it is also ‘imperialist 
feminism’, existing through and participating in the erasure of the ‘third world 
woman’ or the colonial subject (symbolised in the figure of the half-caste 
Bertha Mason in the novel).   
Although these three writers and their work all greatly differ in 
background and in style, in all texts the tension between feminist theory and 
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postcolonial critique is important. On the one hand liberal and radical Western 
feminism is identified as colonialist or imperialist, as shown in the feminist 
academic practices and representations of the ‘third world woman’. From a 
feminist point of view then again, both mainstream postcolonial theory and 
anti-colonial movements21 can be faulted neglecting issues of gender, fraught 
with deeper problems such as ‘double oppression’ or the silence of the 
‘subaltern woman’. Postcolonial theory’s affinities with, and borrowings from 
postmodern and poststructuralist theories however, may point to more 
intersections between contemporary postmodern feminist theories and 
postcolonial critique, contributing to a decolonisation or de-orientalisation of 
the first. According to Ann Brooks (1997: 105) postmodern, postcolonial and 
feminist theories (engaging with deconstruction) all have in common their 
critique of and objective of the ‘dismantling or subverting [of] dominant 
hegemonic discourses’. All share a questioning of traditional epistemologies 
and meta-narratives employing binaries such as self/other, centre/margin, 
coloniser/colonised (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin 1995: 86) and critique a 
notion of the unitary subject.  
More so than many varieties of mainstream postmodern theory, feminist 
theory as well as postcolonial theories are explicitly political in the sense that 
they focus on the analysis of oppression of the ‘other’ and seek ways to 
dislodge structures of colonial/gendered domination. The problem of ‘agency’ 
and ‘resistance’ figures in both postmodern feminist theories and postcolonial 
theories, yet in both cases, this problem arises especially I believe, when the 
focus remains overtly textual and limited to the issue of ‘representation’. Thus 
although the problem of women as the ‘site’ rather than the ‘subject’ of various 
discourses and debates in (post)colonial contexts has been identified as a major 
issue in postcolonial feminist critique, particularly regarding the debate 
surrounding sati or widow immolation in certain parts of India in the past and in 
present times (Loomba 1998; Mani 1989; Narayan 1997; Spivak 1994 [1988]), 
the dilemma remains how to solve the problem of absence or the possibility 
whatsoever of ‘recovering’ the subaltern voice and agency. Whereas Spivak can 
be taken to be more pessimistic on this account, claiming the virtual 
impossibility of recovering the standpoint of the oppressed subject, - ‘there is 
no space where the subaltern subject can speak’ –, Uma Narayan (1997) using 
the same debate on sati, is more optimistic on the possibilities of non-
imperialist and decolonised feminist politics and agency.  
Narayan (1997) critiques the colonial representation of the ‘Indian 
tradition’ of sati, in particular as treated by the radical post-Christian feminist 
Mary Daly in her Gyn/Ecology: the Metaethics of Radical Feminism published 
in 1978. Daly gives the impression in her book that widow immolation would 
be a widespread and persistent phenomenon threatening the lives of many 
Indian women. According to Narayan, Daly does not pay any attention 
whatsoever to the contextual aspects of sati, the practice being limited to certain 
castes and regions and virtually unknown in many communities. The result is 
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‘the effacement of cultural change within historical time … with the effacement 
of cultural variations across communities and regions [to] suggest a “Third-
World culture”, that is “frozen” with respect to both Space and Time’ (50). 
Narayan’s problem is with the way women in third world countries are thus 
represented as victims of ‘tradition/religion/culture’ as if these are 
unproblematic and static complexes, whilst problems in the Western world are 
hardly ever presented or approached in a such a reductionist, simplistic 
manner.22 Firstly, colonialism probably greatly contributed towards the 
construction and spread of the practice as a ‘tradition’. Thus in the British 
colonial discourse of the nineteenth century concerning the start of a prohibition 
on sati, the first concern appeared to be the protest from the Indian population 
that would threaten Britis h hegemony. The colonisers assumed that the status of 
‘sati’ as a tradition could be determined by ‘religious sanction’, prompting a 
number of Indian religious specialists to look for religious scripture which 
could legitimise the practice. This strategy however, proved totally alien to the 
Indian context and a host of disparate perspectives could be justified by another 
host of ‘holy’ texts. According to Narayan, this urge for ‘cultural authenticity’, 
inasmuch as many other ‘native traditions’, contributed to their actual 
construction (63). The debate on sati thus generated a notion of ‘tradition’ that 
was constructed by British colonials and a number of their elite subjects, under 
the guise of ‘discovery’. 
According to Narayan, the growing Indian attention for sati since the 
nineteenth century can be compared to the way many local practices and 
‘traditions’ in third world countries were constructed as ‘national traditions’ as 
crucial components within movements of independence. Colonial 
representations were used in turn by anti-colonial movements as a form of 
‘reversed orientalism’ (Abu-Lughod 1991: 144). In Narayan’s view, some 
recent attempts to reinstate the practice of sati must be analysed as 
contemporary phenomena and not simply put into dichotomous framework of 
religions/tradition opposed to westernisation/modernisation. Two instances of 
sati during the eighties for example, show how many of the concerned accrued 
considerable benefits following the immolation of widows. At the local level 
the family gained a considerable amount of money and the site chosen for the 
pyre proved convenient for the erection of memorial signs and even sati-
temples, contributing to the growth of a lucrative religious tourism to the 
benefit of the family and direct surroundings. At the national level, the public 
and spectacular dimensions of the happenings have confirmed adoration and 
self-sacrifice as a visible nationalistic political ideal of ‘Hindu womanhood’. 
For Narayan, the fact that sati is not justifiable in terms of tradition or culture 
would not automatically imply that it is morally acceptable. From this kind of 
perspective, Narayan is arguing for a non-colonial form of feminism and 
feminist scholarship, one that must not be simply rejected as a culture bound 
ideology, but thoroughly de-colonised itself.   
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The field of postcolonial studies – with writers such as Spivak – is 
mostly located in the humanities and engaged with the analysis of (often literary 
colonial or neo-colonial) texts. By contrast, the postcolonial feminist critique 
such as that of Narayan and Mohanty appears to be more concerned with the 
material, social and political strategies and real-world contexts and 
consequences of such representation (through an analysis of social scientific 
discourse rather than literature), emphasising the need to both link and 
differentiate between the discursive and the material. In borrowing Teresa de 
Lauretis’s distinction between ‘Woman’ and ‘woman’23, Mohanty expresses the 
need to address the relationship between the first, ‘a cultural and ideological 
composite Other constructed through diverse representational discourses’ and 
the second, ‘real, material subjects of their collective histories’ (1991 [1984]: 
53). In some of Mohanty’s other work, becomes clear that an analysis of 
feminist colonial representation of ‘third world women’, is but one necessary 
aspect in a much broader project of identifying non-Western feminist politics 
and practices. This project in turn might contribute to a epistemological and 
political corrective of Western feminist analysis towards more transnational 
modes of feminism (Mohanty 1991; Alexander and Mohanty 1997). Such a de-
orientalising of feminist theory would thus involve a more intersectional and 
complex approach towards the feminist study of gender and power  (1991: 13):  
             
I want to suggest that it is possible to retain the idea of multiple, fluid 
structures of domination which intersect to locate women differently at 
particular historical conjectures, while at the same time insisting on their 
dynamic oppositional agency of individuals and collectivities and their 
engagement in ‘daily life’. It is this focus on dynamic oppositional 
agency that clarifies the intricate connection between systemic 
relationships and the directionality of power. In other words, systems of 
racial, class, and gender domination do not have identical effects on 
women in third world contexts. … It is also by understanding these 
intersections that we can attempt to explore questions of consciousness 
and agency without naturalizing either individuals or structures.      
 
Reflexivity can be found in both feminist appropriations of postmodern and 
postcolonial theories, as they share a basic critique of essentialism, and 
underline the connections between knowledge and power, culture and politics, 
and representation and agency in a global context. Overt textual approaches 
towards ‘discourse’ that see power as endlessly diffuse and differences as 
‘playful’ may run into danger of reifying these differences and keepin g the 
Western subject in place. Approaches such as Mohanty’s by contrast attempt to 
move beyond and incorporate postcolonial and postmodern insights in view of a 
different more nuanced and comparative approach that focuses on power and 
materiality, taking context and the intersectional construction of identity into 
account. Although postcolonial critique is foremost concerned with the ‘Orient’ 
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and feminist postcolonial research has focussed on the relation between the 
West and ‘third world women’, it is my contention that postcolonial reflexivity 
can and equally must apply to contexts in which the ‘other’ figures in a research 
relationship. The de-colonisation of anthropology similarly implies that all 
contexts in effect can be considered ‘postcolonial’, as is attested in the 
increasing focus of anthropological research ‘at home’.  
It is my contention that such a feminist postcolonial anthropological 
approach would be conducive in a gender-inclusive study of religion and 
gender, and I will be applying some of the basic suggestions made in the 
analysis and interpretation of empirical research in the form of a case study 
discussed in the following chapters. Theoretically, the methodology proposed 
appropriates an intersectional and praxeological notion of gender set out in 
chapter one, or in Visweswaran’s (1994: 75) words, one ‘displaces gender from 
the center of feminist theory, and starting from a consideration of how race, 
class, or sexuality determines the positioning of a subject – not with being 
“women,” but how women are different.’ In general, this proposal would 
borrow on the convergences between feminist anthropology and feminist 
postmodern, poststructuralist and deconstructive approach towards sex/gender, 
introduced in chapter one. Although the main perspective is that of social 
science and ‘lived religious identity and agency’, in line with anthropology, I 
also call for more cross-fertilisation between the humanities and social sciences 
as put forward by Susan Sered (chapter one). In very basic terms, this would 
involve the study of both the level of discourse, ideology, symbols, etc. 
regarding gender and religion, but also the way these are constructed, 
appropriated, contested and ‘put into practice’ in real people’s daily lives.       
  
At the end of the first and introductory chapter, three main observations 
concerning the contemporary status of the study of gender and religion 
underlying the problematic relationship between mainstream religious studies 
and a feminist approach were ascertained. In the same chapter that 
predominantly focussed on conceptual issues pertaining to the study of 
‘gender’, and in review of the recent literature, I stated how to date the 
mainstream remains ‘androcentric’, failing to make any ‘gender critical’ turn. 
On the other hand and in the second place, I argued that the field of the feminist 
study of religion in many respects appears to be ‘lagging behind’ in comparison 
with other areas of feminist research, and that there has similarly been barely 
any integration of what I called ‘feminist gender theory’ from a more 
comparative and cross-cultural approach. Thirdly, I remarked how in turn the 
feminist study of religion appears to be marginalised or even ‘ghettoisised’ in 
gender studies or feminist studies as a purportedly interdisciplinary field. In the 
following three chapters I set out to show how all these observations are not 
only related, but point to a deeper, multifaceted ‘awkward relationship’ between 
feminist scholarship and the mainstream discipline of religious studies. My 
thesis was that this relationship of apparent incompatibility could be attributed 
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to both internal features of feminist scholarship and of religious studies, but 
mostly in the juxtaposing of these two fields of study.  
Following the conceptual focus of chapter one, chapter two set out to 
explore the possible historical grounds for this awkward relationship, offering 
some initial insights on the diversified and complex relationship between 
feminist movements, religion, and the academy in Western society. In chapter 
three, some general typologies of feminist research and theory were applied to 
the contemporary feminist study of religion in order to assess the presence 
and/or character of any methodological shifts. Borrowing Rosalind Shaw’s 
(1995) hypothesis on the relationship between religious studies and a feminist 
approach, I concurred with her that a greater part of this scholarship can be 
viewed as essentialist, in as much as an engendering of the mainstream is 
hampered by its inherent essentialism due to a ‘view from above’.  However, 
although attention has been given to the issue of ‘diversity’, in phase with 
general developments in feminist research and theory, I argued that this has 
greatly taken place in the context of one religious tradition only, to the 
detriment of taking religious differences and its possible implications into 
account.  
In this chapter, I have delved deeper into the methodological and 
epistemological reasons underlying the relationship of awkwardness and 
incompatibility. First, I maintained how the problem of ‘difference’ versus 
essentialism in the feminist study of religion needs to be readdressed. Besides a 
re-theorisation of the religious differences between women, an inquiry into 
differences in the frame of insider/outsider positionings, or the religious versus 
the non-religious viewpoint of religious studies scholarship is required. 
Typologies of the feminist study of religion discussed in the previous chapter 
were reassessed in view of the insight that there appears to be no 
epistemological distinction between the insider perspective - the practice of 
religion in terms of studies in  religion or ‘theology’ - on the one hand, and the 
strictly scholarly outsider perspective such as in the mainstream history of 
religion’s methodology on the other. In the feminist study of religion in which 
boundaries are commonly drawn along the lines of reformist or revolutionary 
perspectives, I showed how there seems to be no distinction between the 
critique of androcentric methodology, and patriarchal religion as such. This 
conflation points to a profounder problem still, as in the fundamental 
epistemological critique that feminist scholarship poses to mainstream 
scholarship on notions of objectivity and value-neutrality, the blurring of 
insider/outsider boundaries cannot be escaped. Those scholars repudiating the 
feminist study of religion as a religio-ideological activity however, can 
themselves be shown to be incapable of being immune to the instantiation of 
politics and ideology into their proposal for ‘objective’ scholarship. The 
question shifted to whether a feminist study of religion is conceivable at all. I 
also argued that as some recent calls to include religious diversity in the 
feminist study of religion suggest, de-theologisation would be required. 
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However, even this methodological discussion does not take note of the 
problems feminist scholarship faces once juxtaposed with the insider/outsider 
debate in the mainstream. 
In the following paragraph, I argued how these problems are not 
isolated, but can be related  to internal debates in the mainstream study of 
religion, where discussions on essentialism and reductionism are by far 
resolved. Following up on Shaw’s assessment, I underlined how the traditional 
mainstream religious studies methodological programme (with techniques of 
phenomenology, hermeneutics, époche and bracketing, etc.) and in employing a 
sui generis conception of and essentialist approach to religion, inhibits 
questions of gender from the feminist point of view. However, I also 
demonstrated how the alternative reductionist approach that sees the preceding 
as ‘cryptotheology’, is similarly problematic as it rests on principles of 
objectivity and value-neutrality which are highly problematic from the 
perspective of feminist epistemology.    
I proceeded with a closer inquiry into the kind of ‘postmodern’ feminist 
epistemology that rejects this objectivism. It is also at this conjecture I argued 
that perhaps some possibilities towards alternatives in the study of gender and 
religion could be found, rather than any definitive ‘solutions’ to the problems 
involved in major paradigm shifts. This involved a look at some recent 
discussions of religious studies methodology that hope to transcend the 
insider/outsider debate beyond essentialism/reductionism and forge what I 
viewed as a ‘postmodernisation’ of religious studies. These discussions mostly 
centre on the notion of ‘reflexivity’, borrowed from primarily postcolonial 
critique and theory. At this point, I sought alliances with postmodern feminist 
theory where important notions such as ‘situated knowledges’ allow for a 
critique and refutation of the ‘god-trick’ or a ‘God’s eye view’, both in the 
sense of the omniscient ‘modernist’ scientific objectivist perspective and in the 
sense of the religious point of view.   
Finally, I pointed out how this epistemological grounding did not allow 
for the ‘difference’ in the context of researcher/researched relationship in any 
de-orientalised feminist social science, for which I once again turned to feminist 
anthropology. Although having to deal with its own problems and debates, a 
feminist anthropological approach to the study of religion and gender I argue, 
may in turn contribute to a further de-orientalisation or de-colonisation of 
feminist theory and research in general. Although progress is currently being 
made, I find the latter, on the whole continues to remain insufficiently attentive 
to questions of culture, but as I ultimately will argue, also and especially to 
those of religion and the religious differences between women (and men).         
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1 Shaw draws on a critical analysis by Marsha Hewitt on writings in feminist spirituality, 
including the work of Carol Christ (‘Cyborgs, Drag Queens, and Goddesses: Emancipatory-
Regressive Paths in Feminist Theory’, Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, 1993, 5, p. 
135-154). 
2 See chapter three, under: 3. Against Androcentrism: Critiquing Male Bias.  
3 These include Women in World Religions (Sharma 1987), Today’s Women in World Religions 
and Religion and Women both published in 1994, Feminism and World Religions (Sharma and 
Young 1999) and most recently a book on Women Saints in World Religions (Sharma 2000). 
4 See chapter one under 1: A Millennial Fantasy: On the Verge of a Paradigm Shift towards 
Gender Inclusiveness? And chapter two: 3. Against Androcentrism: Critiquing Male Bias. 
5 See chapter three under: 2. Situated Typologies of Feminist Research in Religion: General 
Classificatory Schemes. 
6 On these methods of mainstream religious studies, see next paragraph and further. 
7 Young (1999b) continuously generalises the term ‘feminism’ and ‘feminists’ which she sees 
as homogenic categories that hold men ‘responsible for all human problems’ (177). Young is 
clearly entirely ignorant of the development, vastness, and variety in feminist scholarship for 
three decades now, and her call for more attention to men and the problem of masculine identity 
and more ‘intersexual dialogue’ is all the more peculiar in that it completely sidesteps all the 
theorising and work being done in the field of gender studies and men’s studies institutionalised 
years before the publication of her review. See also Young’s (1999d: 298-299) ‘Postscript’ to 
the collection Feminism and World Religions (Sharma and Young 1999), in which she claims 
that ‘the task of feminism, its raison d’être, is to improve the status of women as a class in 
relation to men as a class. Because every problem of women as a class is blamed on men as a 
class, and because these problems have never been completely solved, some feminists assume 
that they must continue to undermine men as a class in every conceivable way.’ In Young’s 
view ‘gynocentrism’ ‘demonizes’ men as a class (302).  
8 Ninian Smart (1996: 20) for example claims that ‘constructive theology, which is a branch of 
worldview-construction, is more a part of the data of the descriptive and phenomenological 
treatment of religions.’    
9 Fiona Bowie (1998) briefly refers to Sandra Harding’s standpoint epistemology as noted 
earlier. 
10 The issue of religious differences in terms of doctrine/theology versus an emphasis on 
practice, especially from the perspective of gender in Orthodox Judaism, will be taken up in the 
case study in chapter seven.  
11 The two perspectives are also often categorised as ‘emic’ (insider viewpoint) and ‘etic’ 
(outsider viewpoint), words derived from ‘phonemic’ and ‘phonetic’ referring to respectively  
sound units and the cross-cultural notations representing these vocal sounds as used in the 
International Phonetic Alphabet (Pike [1967] 1999).     
12 Wiebe (1999 [1993]: 132) similarly joins the critique of Ninian Smart in his plea for the 
establishment of a ‘World Academy of Religion’, which he sees as another reintegration of the 
religio-theological study of religion within the academic, scientific study of religion. 
13 Said has often been critiqued by feminist writers for his ‘failure’ to pay attention to sexual 
and gendered metaphors in orientalist discourse (Andermahr, Lovell and Wolkowitz 1997: 156-
157). Orientalism is itself often a gendered process, with the effeminisation of the ‘other’ man 
and Western women ‘orientalised as the internal other’ (Moors 1991: 117). Race and gender as 
categories of hierarchical and mutual reinforcing difference have similarly shown to be 
prominent in both popular and nineteenth century scientific discourse (Loomba 1998: 160-161). 
Another example of a feminist critique and appropriation of the notion of orientalism is that of 
Reina Lewis (1996). In her study of orientalist representations by Western women, Lewis 
argues that access of the latter was different to that of white men, which produced a differential 
gaze on the orientalised ‘other’, their positioning as women itself ‘being contingent on the other 
shifting relational terms that structured the presumed superiority of the Western Orientalist’ (4). 
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In ‘Orientalism, Occidentalism and the Control of Women’, Laura Nader (1989) shows how 
images of ‘other’ women function to keep women subordinate in one’s own society. Nader also 
argues that these controlling processes work both ways. Through ‘Occidentalism’ the grip on 
women in Middle Eastern countries is similarly often justified.         
14 Coined by Jean-François Lyotard, the term postmodernity or the ‘postmodern condition’ in 
general refers to the features of contemporary Western society ‘after modernity’. In the first 
place it is a particular ‘temporal, historically specific social formation’ (Inderpal and Grewal 
1997: 4) characterised by a particular economic structure (of ‘post-Fordist production’ and ‘late 
consumer capitalism’), yet also the ‘cultural logic’, the ‘cultural forms’ and most aspects of 
‘contemporary life’ characteristic of these conditions.  
15 McCutcheon is obviously not the only author to have embarked on such a critique and 
himself refers (1997: 131) to scholars like Benson Saler, Hatjot Oberoi and Talal Asad who 
have from different perspectives and with different alternative proposals set out to critique 
‘religion’ as an essential ahistorical category of analysis.  
16 See e.g. the critique of Chodorow by Iris Marion Young (1997 [1989]), and Marilyn 
Friedman (1997 [1987]), Michele M. Moody-Adams (1997 [1991]) and Seyla Benhabib (1997 
[1986]) for critical readings of Gilligan.  
17 See chapter three.  
18 As Baukje Prins (1997: 69) notes, surprisingly Harding only seems to have used this specific 
term only once to characterise the dialectic between the two approaches as undertook in Whose 
Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women’s Lives (1991: 49).     
19 Due to their evident focus on cross-cultural data and sensibilities, feminist anthropologists 
were among the first to signal that concepts such as ‘oppression’ or ‘status’ were relative or at 
least needed careful situating within different cultural and historical contexts. Theories in search 
of ‘key factors’ for sexual inequality were found too simplistic. Evolutionary-Marxist 
perspectives were criticised for the way contemporary societies were seen as ‘underdeveloped’ 
on a time scale (Leacock 1978; Di Leonardo 1991: 15). MacCormack and Strathern (1980) 
questioned Ortner’s (1974) structuralist and dichotomous scheme which proposed that 
universally women were associated with ‘nature’ opposed to the – superior – association of men 
with ‘culture’. Strict theoretical divides between the private and the public sphere (Rosaldo 
1974) and their relation to gender difference and inequality were similarly critiqued on the basis 
of cross-cultural data and comparative theorising.  
20 See chapter three under: 6. Deconstructing Women through ‘Diversity’: The Differences 
between Women. 
21 For the relationship between nationalist anti-colonial movements and gender, see chapter 
eight and my conclusion. 
22 See Narayan’s essay on domestic violence in the U.S.A. in the same book (Narayan 1997). 
23 From Teresa de Lauretis’s Alice Doesn’t: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema, Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, in: Brooks 1998: 109. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
RELIGION AND GENDER IN A 
STRICTLY ORTHODOX JEWISH COMMUNITY 
 
 
 
The objective of the following three and final chapters is to present the results 
of a case study, drawing on both a literature study and an empirical study, 
carried out among strictly Orthodox Jewish women living in Antwerp, Belgium. 
The empirical research has been carried out, as far as possible, following the 
methodological framework of feminist anthropological research on gender and 
religion as proposed in the preceding chapter.  However, since this is an 
application of the theory, the following analysis also functions as an illustrative 
testing of the hypotheses set out in the previous theoretical part, concerning the 
relationship of incompatibility between mainstream religious studies and a 
feminist gender studies approach. The problematic ‘view from above’ 
approach, extensively discussed in theoretical and methodological terms, is 
countered through an analysis of religious agency and identity from the 
perspective of feminist gender theory. 
The choice of the religious tradition and community is furthermore 
warranted on the basis of the lacunae in the androcentric, mainstream study of 
religion, and the alternative proposal which looks at theory and methodology in 
feminist anthropology and postcolonial feminist critique. The challenge is to 
show how ‘religion as text’, religion sui generis, and the non-reflexive means of 
researching religion ultimately fail from the perspective of gendered critique, 
nevertheless by opting for precisely an empirical study in the context of a 
‘world religion’ and Mediterranean religious tradition as locally practised 
within the context of contemporary western society. In order to show the 
limitations of mainstream approaches from the perspective of a comparative, 
anthropologically based gender studies approach, one does not have to look ‘so 
far’ at more ‘exotic’ religious traditions or places as has often been the case and 
was extensively illustrated at several conjectures in my previous account.1 By 
focussing on a religious tradition and community where patriarchal 
traditionalist gender norms (the level of discourse and ideology) and roles (the 
level of practice) prevail (strictly Orthodox Judaism), the process of 
‘recovering’ women’s religious agency is most challenging in both 
methodological aspects and  in terms of feminist analysis and interpretation.  
This chapter consists of a study of literature, that, at different levels, 
reformulates the general charge of androcentrism in religious studies and 
anthropology, while pointing at the lacunae in feminist scholarship on religion 
that depart from what I termed an ‘insider’ or religious point of view. First, I 
briefly review the field of feminist religious studies scholarship on Judaism, by 
appropriating some of the axes of differentiation and typologies on gender and 
feminist research set out in chapters two and three. In the second paragraph I 
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turn to social scientific (anthropological) rather than ‘theological’ or insiders’ 
perspectives on strictly Orthodox Jewish ‘religion’. This research is shown to 
be characterised by an androcentric perspective, despite the fact that ‘lived’ 
religion and religious practice is the object of study. I finally point to the 
lacunae in existing social scientific research on women in strictly Orthodox 
Jewish communities that remains limited in its application of feminist theory 
and methodology of the kind I propose. In chapters six, seven and eight, an 
account follows of my own case study concerning strictly Orthodox Jewish 
women’s religious practice in Antwerp.                         
 
 
1. Jewish Feminists and Feminist Jewish Studies  
 
 
The question of Women and Judaism is more crucial today 
than all the political problems of the people and its state. 
Failure to deal with it seriously threatens the viability of the 
Judaism of Torah and Mitzvoth in the contemporary world. 
Yeshayahu Leibowitz (1992 [1980]: 128) 
 
 
In chapter two, under Jewish Feminisms, I briefly characterised the relationship 
between second wave feminism and Judaism as a religious tradition. In 
reviewing some of the first Jewish feminist literature dating form this period of 
the late sixties onwards, the complex and polysemic relationship of feminism to 
Judaism immediately became apparent. Whereas self-proclaimed feminists like 
Rachel Adler (1995 [1983/1973]) initiated a critique of Judaism as a patriarchal 
religion in much the same line as ‘Christian’ contemporaries such as Mary 
Daly, it can be stated that status of feminism vis-à-vis Judaism was historically 
much more problematic than in Christianity, and particularly in the context of a 
culture that was predominantly Christian. For example, I drew attention to the 
fact that debates on women’s status within Judaism predate, or take place 
independently of, explicit feminist movements and concerns. Moreover, the 
very relationship between Judaism and feminism has often been ‘antithetical’ in 
the sense that in Judaism and the ‘survival’ thereof, much more is at stake than 
it being a mere religious tradition. It can also possibly be viewed as a category 
of identity in much broader terms, or ethnicity in view of more recent historical 
shifts. 
In the previous chapter on the epistemological problems underlying the 
possibility of a feminist study of religion, and relating to the insider/outsider 
debate and the conflation of ‘studying and doing religion’, it was shown that 
both feminist reconstructionist/revolutionary and reformist approaches could be 
viewed as internally ‘theological’ or departing from the religious point of view. 
This hypothesis similarly applies, yet also gains a particular character in the 
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feminist study of Judaism. For it can be theoretically argued that all these types 
of studies, whether they seek to adapt Jewish religion to feminist concerns, or 
wish to critique the tradition as a whole as ‘hopelessly patriarchal’, all 
perspectives remain those of ‘insiders’. The focus in the following paragraph 
will first lie on the specific character, and in particular the lacunae in view of 
the insider/outsider problem in the feminist study of religion in the case of 
Judaism. Meanwhile, a critical overview of these studies will serve as an 
introduction of data on ‘the position of women in Judaism’ as relevant for the 
case study in chapters seven and eight.  
 
 
Judaism and Feminism: An Antithesis? 
 
 
My own synagogue is the only place in the 
world where I am not named Jew. 
 Cynthia Ozick (1995 [1983]: 125) 
 
 
In ‘Jews and Judaism in Contemporary Europe? Religion or Ethnic Group?’ 
Jonathan Webber  (1997) eloquently sketches the historical shifts that have led 
to the transformation of Jewish identity as a category of ‘religion’ to that of 
‘ethnicity’ in the outsider view, but also as internalised by many contemporary 
European Jews. Whilst these shifts are obviously fundamental to any discussion 
of Judaism or Jewry form the perspective of social science, it must be 
underlined that Judaism has always been an ethnically defined ‘religion’ to start 
with. From a gender perspective, it must also be noted that this particular 
patriarchal religion is furthermore – somewhat paradoxically - matrilineal 
defined. Although definitions of ‘who is a Jew?’ have historically, contextually 
and interculturally varied, the rabbinical definition holds that it is solely the 
mother who determines a child is a Jew. This particular cultural construction of 
Jewish identity combined with the more recent shifts that Webber outlines, 
form an important background to any discussion on the difficult relationship 
between feminism and Judaism, and repeatedly crop up as paramount in much 
of the feminist Jewish literature. 
In an overview of the ‘geopolitics of Jewish feminism’ for example, 
which – although being a personal account – can be viewed as a genealogy of 
the history of the Jewish feminism, Alice Shalvi notes that many ‘pioneers and 
leaders’ of the U.S. second wave feminist liberal movement were in fact Jewish 
women (Shalvi 1995: 231). Shalvi, however, does not reflect any further on this 
fact, apart from noting that this feminism in general revolved around the 
familiar liberal issue of women seeking self-fulfilment in the workforce rather 
than remaining in the confines of the domestic sphere, which was particularly 
the case for the traditional Jewish female role.2 This coincidental socio-
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historical ‘fact’ therefore stands apart from the question whether writers such as 
these in any way reflected on the relationship of their own Jewishness to 
feminism. Yet from the viewpoint of the author, at the same time the very fact 
of ethnicity somehow seems to warrant their inclusion in such a genealogy of 
‘Jewish feminism’ in an – albeit comparative - international context, both 
religious and secular.    
The question is in what way ‘Jewish feminism’ or ‘feminist Judaism’ 
converge or differ. Whereas both are determined by and converge in terms of 
‘Jewishness as ethnicity’, only the boundaries of the latter at first sight seem to 
be clear from the perspective of the radical feminist transformation of Judaism 
as a religious tradition, as put forward by the revolutionary or reconstructionist 
approach (see next paragraph). Even here however, these analytical boundaries 
around the distinct ‘theological’ perspective may turn out not to be so easily 
defined, which at this point can be illustrated with Judith Plaskow’s (1991 
[1990]: xviii) question: ‘At what point in the reinterpretation of Judaism does 
the Jewish tradition cease being Jewish and become something else?’  
As for ‘Jewish feminism’, the literature shows that apart from the 
minimal determinant of ethnicity, meanings are vastly diverse. Firstly, as in the 
non-Jewish case, many women’s organisations that are at least organised on the 
basis of both signifiers of gender and ethnicity are by no means necessarily 
‘feminist’ or at least would not self-identify as such, in that they do not per se 
focus on feminist or even distinctly women’s issues. In confining herself to 
large Jewish women’s national organisations in the U.S. for example, Shalvi 
characterises Hadassah, the largest women’s Zionist organisation as ‘non-
feminist’. She also depicts the National Council of Jewish Women (non-
Zionist) as ‘concerned with general social issues, not with Jewish ones’ (Shalvi 
1995: 233). In a footnote to an article on the feminist challenge to Judaism, 
Norma Baumel Joseph argues that the difference between Jewish feminists and 
feminist Jews is not ‘mere word play’ and ‘rests on which category is 
considered the noun and which the modifying adjective’. However, even this 
distinction does not entirely make clear whether it also rests on secular or 
otherwise religious identity: ‘while there are many feminists who are Jewish, 
only some are attempting to use feminist theory and methodology to transform 
(modify) Judaism’ (Joseph 1995: 65).3      
Characteristic for what can be termed the development of ‘Jewish 
feminism’ was that from its inception both Jewish religious and secular issues 
on women’s status were in practice often deeply intertwined, and to a far 
greater extent than was the case for the strictly secular women’s movement in 
the broader gentile society.4 Focussing on the impact of second wave feminism 
on the role of the synagogue in the U.S., Rela Geffen Monson (1992: 228) 
argues that it was especially in the arena of the synagogue, as a central public 
institution of Jewish life in general, where demands for Jewish women’s 
equality took a start. Although the movement that was directly inspired by the 
broader American feminist movement was initiated by a ‘small group of highly 
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educated, traditional Jewish women’, women who were not observant suddenly 
began to visit the synagogue and partake in the battle.5 According to Monson, 
these women ‘viewed their protest as a political as well as a religious act, even 
though it took place within the framework of a religious institution’ […] They 
saw a link between the ritual and the secular roles within the synagogue’.6 
That in the case of Jewish feminism the boundaries between the 
religious and the secular were immediately indistinct is no more apparent than 
in the Israeli context, where the literal boundaries of Israel as a state are infused 
with particular meanings of and connections between ethnicity, nationality and 
religion. The very fact that state and religion are constitutionally not separated 
as in the U.S., has to date been seen as the primary factor in the painstakingly 
slow advances and highly contradictory situations for women’s status of 
inequality.   
The complexity of the relationship between Judaism and feminism is 
further enhanced by the delineation and perception of feminism as both a non-
Jewish and a ‘modern’ phenomenon. This has been the case on grounds of 
nationality in Israel since the early seventies, where the first feminist activists 
were predominantly Anglo Saxons, and feminism was perceived as a ‘foreign 
import’, irrelevant in the context of the ‘myth of equality’ in Israeli society 
(Shalvi 1995: 235-6). Historically, second wave feminism as a predominantly 
secular and modern movement has furthermore often been viewed as a threat to 
Judaism, in both religious and ethnic terms and across national lines. Susannah 
Heschel (1995 [1983]: xli) interprets this perceived threat in a much broader 
context of Judaism as a religion coping with the challenges of modernity: ‘To 
an extent, the conflict emerging between feminism and Judaism today parallels 
the conflict between Jews and Western culture that begun to take shape with the 
Emancipation of Jews in Europe two hundred years ago’. According to this 
perspective, feminism is seen as but one extension of the Enlightenment 
critique of religion, and for Judaism, but one form of secularism’s challenge 
towards the place of halakhah, rabbinic and divine authority in the process of 
the struggle over the identity of Judaism as a religion no longer encompassing 
all of ‘life’. 
Heschel also emphasises the way in which second wave feminism was 
perceived as a threat to the very survival of Jewish ethnicity itself, both by the 
religious and the broader secular Jewish community (Heschel 1995 [1983]: 5). 
The development of feminism coincided with a period of struggle within the 
Jewish community that was dealing with factors such as ‘rising assimilation and 
intermarriage, declining population growth, decreasing immigration to Israel, 
and growing awareness of the Holocaust’ (4). This threat to the survival of Jews 
was interpreted in both a literal and a cultural sense in that feminism was – 
falsely - perceived as an attack on the ‘traditional family’ and more specifically 
on the women’s role within the family as the ‘traditional, self-sacrificing 
mother […] predominantly responsible for preserving the Jewish people 
throughout the centuries’ (5). In an article published in 1975, Paula Hyman 
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(1995 [1983]: 19) attempts to expose what Nira Yuval-Davis (1997) has more 
recently called the myth of ‘women as bearers of the colective’ in the context 
of Jewish identity. Hyman critiques the discourse in which the Jewish woman 
had supposedly played the central role in the transmission of Judaism to her 
children, and functioned as central to the Jewish family which had preserved 
Judaism as ‘a bulwark against further erosion of Jewish solidarity and 
consciousness’.       
Besides invoking the role of Jewish women as an ideological tool in 
counter-feminist discourse, the threat of feminism to Judaism or ‘Jewishness’ in 
terms of both religion and ethnicity has also been argued on the grounds of a 
similar ideology of equality between the sexes in traditional Jewish society. 
From a traditionalist Orthodox Jewish perspective this ‘equal but different’ 
notion forms the very basis of any discussion of gender roles,7 particularly 
when provoked on debates about women’s emancipation and its gains in the 
contemporary Western world. However, Jewish traditionalist, reformist and 
radical feminist critiques of Judaism will also often underline the his torical 
‘fact’ that Jewish women’s status was often higher than that of their non-Jewish 
contemporaries. Even Rachel Adler’s (1995 [1983/1973]: 16) landmark radical 
feminist critique of women as mere ‘peripheral Jews’ contains such a reference: 
‘Make no mistake; for centuries, the lot of Jewish woman was infinitely better 
than that of her non-Jewish counterpart. She had rights which other women 
lacked until a century ago’. In particular, Adler refers to women’s rights 
pertaining to marriage such as her right of consent, and contractually binding 
support by the husband (in the ketubah), monetary settlement in the case of 
divorce, and finally the much mentioned law of onah, man’s legal duty to 
provide for his wife’s sexual needs.8       
The status of feminism as modern, secular and generally non-Jewish has 
consequently not only been problematic for its diverse opponents, but was 
equally problematic for Jewish feminist critiques and reinterpretations. In 
virtually none of main feminist Jewish literature has feminism been presented 
as an unproblematic tradition of thought and social action to be 
straightforwardly imported or relevant for Jewish concerns. Any analysis of 
these reflections must therefore build upon developments within feminism and 
feminist theory where the differences between women and ‘diversity’, 
minimally in terms of what can broadly be called ‘cultural’ differences, are 
taken into account, as argued in the previous chapters.          
The question of the possible irreconcilability between feminism and 
Judaism by Jewish feminists is most strongly illustrated by evoking explicit 
forms of ‘feminist anti-Judaism’, as Heschel (1995 [1983]: xviii) does in the 
case of the referral to ‘Christian feminist anti-Judaism’, which ‘…hinder the 
efforts of Jewish feminists by magnifying Judaism’s sexism into an antisemitic 
distortion’. Heschel hereby focuses on the type of feminist pseudo 
‘scholarship’, as critiqued by other feminist scholars of religion on the so-called 
pre-historical matriarchal societies before the advent of patriarchal monotheism. 
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According to Heschel, Judaism is thereby held to be accountable for the ‘death 
of the Goddess’ and the introduction of patriarchy as the foundation of western 
civilisation. An equally explicitly anti-Semitic attitude by some Christian 
feminists is the claim that ‘Jesus was a feminist’ and would have liberated 
women from patriarchal Judaism (xix). Judith Plaskow (1986: 117-118) also 
refers to the precarious situation many Jewish feminists find themselves in, 
whilst ‘…feminist criticism of Judaism provides fuel for anti-Semitism’, 
whereas ‘according to the new feminist form of anti-Semitism, Christianity can 
perhaps be redeemed from sexism, but for some strange reason, Judaism 
cannot.’ Plaskow furthermore compares this form of ethnocentrism or racism 
which is inherent in many kinds of western feminism with the case of many 
Muslim women, whose traditions may be ‘oppressive’ towards women, yet in a 
different way and therefore no more sexist than Christianity.      
Rather than an outright rejection of feminism as a ‘foreign import’, 
those who nurture the possibility of ‘feminist Judaism’ or alternatively ‘Jewish 
feminism’ have nonetheless by no means seen the import of second wave 
feminist movement as an easy affair. These critical views shared by many 
Jewish feminists are therefore very much in line with other critiques from 
women other than the dominant white, western, middle-class, secular, or 
post/Christian, gentile feminism initiated in the last decades. They similarly 
attest to the untenability of any universal form of women’s experience or 
notions of global sisterhood that go across and above racial, ethnic or religious 
lines. Then again, for many self-proclaimed Jewish feminists, feminism and 
Judaism does not necessary have to be conceived of as ‘an oxymoron’ (Plaskow 
1991: ix). There are predictable dilemmas however, for the Jewish woman’s 
position as what Plaskow has called the ‘other’s other’ (1986: 11, 1991: 95), 
and problems involved in constructing a distinct Jewish feminist identity versus 
both gentile and Jewish patriarchy. 
For Plaskow (1986: 114), the Jewish feminist dilemma also explains 
part of the reason why Jewish feminists have been much less radical in 
criticising Judaism than Christian feminists have been of Christianity, in that 
‘we are afraid of being without allies’. In Plaskow’s later work (1991) the 
dilemma can be elaborated further by building on the issue of ‘difference’ and 
ideas of intersectionality as developed in less essentialist feminist theoretical 
insights. In a critique of the main liberal feminist ideology that has hereto 
ignored issues of difference pertaining to questions of ‘race’, class, and 
religious privilege, Plaskow aligns herself with the critique of minority women 
and ‘women of colour’ of this dominant kind of feminist theory which has 
‘ignored the multiple communities that shape women’s lives’ (1991: 91).9 
Plaskow is hereby clearly alluding to the fact that second wave feminism 
strategically needed to deny or underplay the differences between women in 
order to resist the notion of woman as ‘other’ to man. However, in politics of 
global sisterhood and unified women’s ‘experience’ as a suppressed ‘class’ 
founded upon gender alone, women from other minority groups have 
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experienced otherness and forms of domination through other relations of 
difference, which need to be acknowledged by the dominant feminist and 
broader community.       
                           
 
The ‘Great Divide’: Critiquing or Transforming Jewish Tradition?   
 
In chapter four it was argued that the so-called ‘great divide’ between reformist 
and revolutionary or reconstructionist approaches in the feminist study of 
religion appeared to be but two sides of the same ‘insider’s’ perspective on the 
study of religion as a (crypto-)theological quest. In the following paragraph, I 
will illustrate how this divide between remaining within or going beyond 
‘normative’ religious tradition can be characterised in the case of the feminist 
study of Judaism. This way I will show how these differential approaches share 
the general lacunae stated earlier, yet I will sketch in more detail how these 
surface in the study of a particular religious tradition. In the case of 
contemporary Jewish communities, for example, it will be noted how different 
approaches are directly tied to and determined by the denominational positing 
of the author. Finally, I will be reviewing some of the work that incorporates 
more recent frameworks in feminist theory, such as the perspective of ‘gender’, 
including feminist postmodernist and postcolonial appropriations. 
 
 
Discovering Patriarchy Revisited: Women as Peripheral Jews 
 
Parallel to the slow but certain development of a U.S. feminist Jewish 
movement in the early seventies10, the issue of women’s inferior status within 
Judaism and the relationship between feminism and Judaism was gradually 
taken up by Jewish feminist scholars in the academy. In a list of the ‘key events 
and milestones’ in the history of U.S. feminism, - after the ordination of the 
first Reform woman rabbi (Sally Priesand in Reform Judaism) in 1972 - Shalvi 
(1995: 232) mentions the event of the ‘first national conference of Jewish 
women’ held a year later, which according to Monson (1992: 229) was 
sponsored by the North American Jewish Students Network. The same year a 
special edition of Response was published, including Rachel Adler’s (1995 
[1983/1973]) essay ‘The Jew who wasn’t there’, often considered one of the 
first radical feminist critiques of Judaism and ‘basic reading’ on the subject ever 
since its first publication in 1973 (Heschel 1995 [1983]: 3).11     
For Adler, any discussion of ‘the woman problem’ in Judaism must start 
with a close examination of Jewish law, halakhah . Although many scholars 
may have been complementary on ‘women’s status in Judaism’ by way of 
making ‘lyrical exegeses on selected midrashim and aggadot’ (Adler 1995 
[1983/1973]: 12),12 Adler claims that a focus on this level of religious narrative 
alone does not suffice to address the problem of the inferiority of Jewish 
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women. Rather, the problem lies in the area of normative daily practice and 
behaviour, which in the case of Judaism is regulated by halakhah. In this brief 
essay, and in the tradition of primary insights of feminist scholarship as 
outlined in chapters two and three, Adler is therefore one of the first to question 
the status of women as mere objects within both a patriarchal religious tradition 
and in androcentric scholarship. Gail B. Shulman (1974), in a similar early 
radical critique of Judaism as a patriarchal religious tradition, argues that both 
biblical and rabbinical writings should be critically examined, whilst at the 
same time ‘keeping one’s historical perspective’ (143). Drawing on a variety of 
biblical and talmudic sources and sayings by contemporary rabbi’s, Shulman 
argues women’s status in Judaism has always been that of ‘other’, and although 
‘she may frequently be placed on a pedestal built of clever rationalizations, she 
is ever separate in “Woman’s Place”’ (Shulman 1974: 145).          
In focussing on halakhah, Adler builds her main argument that in Jewish 
law and practice women are mere ‘peripheral Jews’. She delineates certain 
factors which later become the main issues in any discussion on the position of 
women in Judaism and feminist studies perspectives on Judaism. Firstly, 
women are legally placed in the category next to children and Canaanite slaves, 
all of which are exempt from all positive commandments (mitzvot) which are 
bound to fixed times. Although all Jews share the responsibility of fulfilling the 
negative precepts, such as not violating the Sabbath, not eating non-kosher 
food, and general imperatives such as not to steal, murder, commit adultery, 
etc., according to halakhah women in particular are exempt from those positive 
mitzvot which can be characterised as the normative, paradigmatic 
commandments, which are absolutely incumbent upon men.13 These include the 
performance of rituals such as wearing tefillin and tzitzit14, the daily recitation 
of the Shema prayer, the hearing of the shofar on Rosh Hashanah, eating in the 
sukkah during the celebration of Sukkot (Festival of Tabernacles), and others, 
all which can be seen as paradigmatic - male – religious rituals (Longman 2000: 
6).  
Adler furthermore emphasises that according to Jewish law, women, 
children and slaves ‘have limited credibility in Jewish law [as] is demonstrated 
by the fact that their testimony is inadmissible in a Jewish court’ (Adler 1995: 
13). Women are also not counted in the minyan, the minimum requirement of 
ten male Jews that are necessary to perform a synagogue service, and perhaps 
most important of all, women are not obligated to study Torah15, or only in so 
far as it relates to the mitzvot they themselves have to perform. Adler in so 
many words argues that the latter particular religious obligations incumbent 
upon women, such as lighting the Sabbath candles and going to the mikvah 
(ritual bath), are ‘peripheral’ activities and therefore inferior in that they are 
only relationally defined to men’s activities and the broader community. Jewish 
women do not have the ability to ‘cultivate the relationship between the 
individual and God’, in the manner that is possible for men. Women are mere 
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‘tools’ and must sacrifice themselves in order that ‘others may actualise 
themselves spiritually.’ 
Both Adler (1995: 15) and Shulman (1972: 149) link women’s 
peripheral role and exclusion from important religious rituals with the fact that 
women must perform primarily physical activities, taking care of the husband’s 
and family’s physical needs, the opposite of men’s resolute potential for non-
physical spirituality. Apart from the fact that women are confined to the 
domestic sphere, able to ‘excel in their own domain, keeping clean homes, 
kosher kitchens, and close-knit families’ (Shulman: 145), this association of 
women with the body and her definition in terms of biology is most pronounced 
regarding her mitzvah of visiting the mikvah or ritual bath. Although the details 
to this practice will be explained in depth later, here it suffices to note how both 
Adler and Shulman view this practice as a thoroughly instrumental and even a 
degrading experience. According to Adler: ‘She goes to the mikvah so that her 
husband can have intercourse with her and she bears children so that, through 
her, he can fulfil the exclusively male mitzvah of increasing and multiplying’ 
(14). Shulman elaborates more extensively on the history and sources on the 
laws of niddah (surrounding menstruation and purity), yet is no less 
condemning of any kind of rationalisation: ‘This concern for holiness, for 
“cleanness,” may be admirable, but the inclusion of women as unclean 
individuals, sandwiched somewhere between lepers and those suffering from 
fluxes is not admirable; it is harmful and demeaning. It says, in effect, that for a 
great part of a woman’s life, a perfectly normal body function renders her 
unclean, diseased, taboo’ (152).    
Radical feminist criticism of the peripheral or object position of women 
in Judaism such as these by Adler and Shulman contains some of the primary 
issues that have inspired subsequent feminist Jewish scholars and activists. 
Despite their overt radical nature and obvious commitment to change, these 
critiques remain rather reticent on the ways in which exactly to go about the 
transformation of Judaism. Shulman for example, remains revolutionary 
inspired, yet rather vague in her concluding remarks: ‘The solution for Jewish 
women is not to join the Temple Sisterhood and wait patiently, but to join 
together in sisterhood to confront and change sexist traditions and institutions 
within Judaism.’ (160). Adler goes more to the core of the problem, yet refrains 
from taking any definitive stand, formulating what would seem to serve as the 
main starting point for the ‘great divide’ as this would take form in the case of 
Judaism: ‘All of this can quickly be rectified if one steps outside of Jewish 
tradition and halakhah. The problem is how to attain some justice and some 
growing room for the Jewish woman if one is committed to remaining within 
halakhah’ (Adler: 16).16 
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Judaism: Hopelessly Patriarchal? Reformists and Revolutionaries 
 
Although the divide between scholarly feminist critiques of religion according 
to a reformist or more revolutionary perspective as discussed in chapter three 
and four mostly took place within the context of (post-)Christian feminist 
theology, this taxonomy introduced by the post-Christian ‘revolutionary’ Carol 
Christ in the late seventies, has also been found applicable to the development 
of and divergences in the feminist study of Judaism. Carol Christ collaborated 
with Jewish ‘revolutionary’ Judith Plaskow in their edition of Womanspirit 
Rising in 1979, where in the introduction they both subscribe to the perceived 
disagreement among feminists on the ‘reformability of religious tradition’ in 
both Jewish and Christian theology (Christ and Plaskow 1979b).17 As noted in 
chapter three, Rita Gross emphasises their later refutation of the 
(mis)conception that these labels are ‘hierarchal’, implying that revolutionaries 
may be more ‘radical’ and therefore better than ‘reformists’. In reviewing the 
divergence in feminist approaches to Judaism since then, it can nevertheless be 
shown that the divide itself is only deemed relevant from the perspective of 
Jewish revolutionaries like Judith Plaskow. Those who can analytically be 
termed reformist scholars do not view the literature or positions by 
revolutionaries as particularly relevant to their own discussions.18  
From the perspective of revolutionaries however, reformist approaches 
may be considered but one first step, or as precursors to a much more radical 
and final feminist reconstruction of Judaism. Even those acknowledging the 
multiplicity of the meanings of Jewish feminism, i.e. by providing overviews of 
these approaches, also tend to follow a similar sequential structure. Ellen 
Umansky (1999) for example, does not explicitly position herself in her survey 
article on feminism and Judaism19, yet delineates three different ways in which 
Jewish feminism can be understood. This begins with a paragraph on Jewish 
feminism as ‘a call for increased participation and legal change’, followed by ‘a 
call for equal access’ and finishing with the likes of Susannah Heschel, Rachel 
Adler and Judith Plaskow under ‘feminism as transformation’, or the creation of 
a ‘feminist Judaism’ (Umansky 1999: 186).  
Although Plaskow joined ranks with Christ in a radical condemnation of 
the patriarchal nature of their respective religious traditions, according to Gross 
(1996: 45) Christ’s concluding essay ‘Why Women need  the Goddess’ in 
Womanspirit Rising (1979a), already reflected ‘her growing immersion in the 
goddess movement’. The article expresses how Christ found it ‘increasingly 
impossible to remain within the monotheistic framework’, culminating in an 
overtly post-Christian stance such as in Laughter of Aphrodite: Reflections on a 
Journey to the Goddess published in 1987 (Gross 1996: 53). Revolutionaries 
like Christ or Mary Daly who rejected patriarchal Christianity as inherently 
sexist and ‘hopelessly patriarchal beyond repair’ often opted for ‘non-Christian’ 
or ‘post-Christian’ constructions of feminist religion such as feminist 
spirituality, the Goddess movement or Wicca (see chapters two and three). 
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Jewish feminists coming to the same conclusions similarly applied this insight 
to monotheistic biblical religions including Judaism, and were left with no 
alternatives other than to ‘walk away completely’ (Joseph 1995: 47). In The 
Changing of the Gods: Feminism and the End of Traditional Religions (1979) 
Naomi Goldenberg, for example, argues that feminist critique and 
transformation of tradition ‘would alter it as to render it no longer recognizable 
as Judaism.’ Plaskow, however, also in her more recent work (Plaskow 2000a), 
will not relinquish Judaism and her own identity as a religious Jew, hoping to 
transform existing tradition, however radical her terms may be.           
Plaskow’s revolutionary approach consists of a rejection of the liberal 
‘equality’ model of women’s emancipation, and of the way this model made its 
entry among the first feminist voices and critiques within Jewish communities 
in North America during the second wave feminist movement. According to 
Plaskow, the Jewish women’s movement had focussed on both female imagery 
and status, and effected or at least pushed for change of women’s position 
regarding halakhah and religious institutions and practice. However, for 
Plaskow, this feminism had not gone far enough in questioning the fundamental 
causes of Jewish women’s oppression: ‘It has focussed on getting women a 
piece of the Jewish pie; it has not wanted to bake a new one’ (Plaskow 1995 
[1983]: 223).20 Judaism as a deeply patriarchal tradition, must be completely 
reformed in order to be inclusive of ‘women’s experience’, which cannot be 
attained by merely ‘adding women’ or giving them access to the existing male 
dominated patriarchal institutional framework. Although towards the end of the 
twentieth century Jewish women have - in theory - attained equality in all 
strands of non-Orthodox Judaism, this had ‘not turned Judaism into a feminist 
tradition’ (Plaskow 1991: xvi) (emphasis mine).  
The fundamental dilemma in the radical transformation of Judaism, 
however, remains as expressed by Plaskow’s question: ‘At what point in the 
reinterpretation of Judaism does the Jewish tradition cease being Jewish and 
become something else?’ (1991: xviii). Not only the degree and boundaries of 
feminist reinterpretation are disputable, but also the definition of what ‘Jewish’ 
means in the first place is at stake. This obviously depends very much on the 
background and positioning of the Jewish feminist critique in question and in 
what way feminist commitment is seen to influence the choice to remain within 
or the willingness to opt for a more ‘liberal’ and what is sometimes also called 
more ‘progressive’ denomination. Sue Jackson (1997) for example, takes a 
similar revolutionary transformative approach to that of Plaskow, and likewise 
is discontent with the model of equality as institutionalised in what she calls 
those strands of ‘progressive Judaism’, as it [progressive Judaism] ‘still does 
not feel at home. The language, the stories, the prayers, the rituals, often deny 
me, making it difficult for me to always name myself Jew. Yet, I do want do to 
so’ (Jackson 1997: 139). Whilst rejecting Orthodox Judaism as ‘hopelessly 
patriarchal’, Jackson therefore still longs for ‘more than progressive Judaism is 
at present able to give’ (140).  
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The problem Jackson seems to have with these progressive forms of 
Judaism, not only lies in her unfamiliarity of a community and experience 
which she experiences as alien to her own, but also her need for religious 
practice and a deeper spirituality from the standpoint and experience of being a 
Jewish woman. Jackson thus agrees with Plaskow that in the Reform 
synagogue, formally granting women equal rights of participation and their 
status of ‘honorary male’ does not offer them any satisfying mode of religious 
experience and identity, whilst liturgy, services and god-language derive form 
‘men’s experience’ alone. Whereas for revolutionaries progressive forms of 
Judaism remain patriarchal at their core, Orthodox Judaism hardly appears to be 
worth mentioning, in essence excluding any possibility of reconciliation with 
feminist premises (Jackson 1999: 139). From the perspective of feminist 
‘reformists’, who identify with progressive denominations, Orthodox Judaism is 
also seen as archaic, sustaining patriarchal structures that continue to 
subordinate women in the religious sphere and in the contemporary world.  
Pnina Navè Levinson (1990) for example, clearly takes a stand in 
offering an introductory overview of beliefs and practices pertaining to women 
as developed in Progressive Jewish congregations, and ‘contrasting them to 
beliefs and practices of Orthodox Judaism’ (Levinson 1990: 45). For Levinson, 
the ‘tragedy of Orthodoxy’ has been its refusal to apply the process of change 
and adaptation in the area of halakhah, as a reaction to nineteenth century 
religious modernisation. What Levinson terms ‘non-fundamentalist’ 
interpretations however, are those that do not view halakhah as divinely 
ordained and therefore ‘immutable legislation’, but rather as man-made, ‘often 
inspired’, open to change, adaptation and democratic debate. From the 
perspective of Progressive Judaism therefore, Levinson understands the ‘true 
definition’ of Jewish tradition as the counterpart to Orthodox or 
‘fundamentalist’ strands, namely ‘the usual process of halakhic change and 
adaptation to life conditions’, with change as a prerequisite rather than 
heterodoxy in order to ‘assure a continuation of Jewish life’ (Levinson 1990: 
46).     
As summarised in chapter two, the issue of Jewish women’s equality 
and emancipation predated second wave feminism in the case of the 
development of Reform Judaism in nineteenth century Germany. Reform 
ideology itself, in its alliance with Enlightenment principles of liberal equality 
and emancipation, from its inception made the issue of women’s status part of 
its agenda. At a rabbinical conference held in Breslau in 1846 demands were 
made to change women’s position in halakhah. God’s blessing to men ‘for not 
having made them women’ was eradicated from the morning prayer, girls 
became religious adults at the age of twelve next to boys, and also eligible to be 
counted in the minyan. These and other changes were not immediately, but 
rather gradually introduced, and developed further in the U.S. where local 
congregations independently decided on the implementation of these 
adaptations.21 
A CASE STUDY: RELIGION AND GENDER 
IN A STRCTLY ORTHODOX JEWISH COMMUNITY 
 242
The Conservative movement in the U.S., unwilling to undertake the 
process of adaptation of tradition to the extent that Reform had taken, 
nevertheless also placed problematised the exclusion of women from religious 
public rituals before the onset of the women’s movement in the sixties and 
seventies. In very general – and relative - terms, in the Reform ideology, 
halakhah may be considered divinely ‘inspired’, yet fundamentally man-made 
and therefore malleable. As Leonard Gordon (1995: 3) notes, ‘feminist critiques 
of Jewish law (halakhah) have, for the most part, rejected the law altogether on 
much the same grounds as liberal Judaism’s rejection of halakhah as a mode of 
religious expression’. Conservative Judaism by contrast, chooses to remain true 
to halakhah, yet does accept the possibility of human subjectivity in halakhic 
decisions, therefore not completely opposing to the idea of multi-
interpretability. Contemporary responsa to traditional sources thus remain 
within the halakhic framework, ‘using the same methods of reasoning as did the 
rabbis of the past to arrive at new conclusions’ (Hauptman 1992: 171). As 
pertaining to women’s status for example, Conservative Judaism has not 
entirely abolished the ‘degrading’ part of the morning prayer, but altered it into 
more gender neutral terms (thanking God for having made me ‘an Israelite’) 
(Cornille 1994: 38).  
In 1955 members of the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards, the 
official halakhic body of the Conservative Movement discussed the possibility 
of women to be granted aliyot22 (Hauptman 1992: 171; Umansky 1999: 204). In 
practice, individual rabbis and their congregations consequently decided for 
themselves whether women could be granted aliyot. The impact of second wave 
feminism for both the Conservative and the Reform movements was most felt 
in the arena of the religious institutions and its leadership positions. As noted in 
chapter two, the first woman Reform Rabbi was ordained in 1972. In 
Conservative Judaism, as ‘forced to reevaluate the roles and status of women as 
a whole as well as within its particular rabbinical, cantorial, and lay institutions’ 
(Umansky 1999: 203), after officially granting women the right to be counted in 
the minyan in 1973, the first debates on women’s ordination began, not to be 
positively finalised until 1980. Finally the most progressive, recent and smallest 
(2% in U.S.) of the Progressive Jewish movements, Reconstructionism from its 
inception proclaimed gender equality on all levels, and only recently has been 
incorporating further feminist concerns such as gender inclusive language in 
prayer, besides introducing new blessings, poems and commentaries by Jewish 
feminists (Umansky 1999: 202-3).     
The major feminist transformations that have taken place in the 
Progressive Jewish denominations revolve around gender equality in the 
institutional sphere in terms of ‘equal access’ and participation in roles and 
positions which were formally exclusively reserved for men. As for the area of 
halakhah, transformations have mostly taken place pertaining to the eradication 
of law and practices that have been interpreted as detrimental to women’s status 
from the perspective of feminism. Both Reform and Conservative Judaism have 
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found solutions to the problem of the ‘get’, where according to halakhah, 
women need a bill of divorce (the get) from their husbands in order to be able to 
remarry in a religious ceremony.23 Other ‘archaic’ commandments have been 
abolished or modified such as levirate marriage (the duty of childless widows to 
marry a brother of their deceased husband). Parallel rites-de-passage to those 
for boys have been introduced, such as more public rituals by mothers of 
thanksgiving on the birth of a child, and the celebration of the birth of a 
daughter and bat mitzvah as a parallel to boy’s bar mitzvah, marking the 
transition to adult religious responsibility. Finally, the laws of niddah , or the 
laws surrounding the menstruating women, one of three traditional exclusive 
mitzvot incumbent on married women, have been completely abolished in 
Progressive Judaism.  
For both reformist and revolutionary Jewish feminists, the 
condemnation and abolishment of the laws of niddah or ‘family purity’ appear 
to be the conditio sine qua non of any feminist critique and transformation of 
Judaism, interpretable entirely in the patriarchal control of and fear for female 
sexuality. In her refutation of the possibility of a reconciliation between 
feminism and Orthodox Judaism, Levinson (1990: 59) states that in the Reform 
tradition ‘the private dates of women are not pried into when setting the 
wedding date. The Mikveh, or ritual bath, likewise is no more practised. 
Instead, sexual ethics are taught and discussed’. In general, this ‘open’ attitude 
can be partly attributed to the direct influence of the place of female sexuality 
and biology within the second wave feminist movement and critiques. In the 
context of the feminist transformation of male-dominated institutions in Jewish 
communities in terms of equal access, this can also be explained by the 
traditional ‘belief’ that menstruating women are prohibited by Jewish law from 
touching a Torah scroll and participating in the synagogue prayer service 
(Cohen 1992). This would therefore necessitate a feminist deconstruction of the 
patriarchal framework wherein the laws surrounding female sexuality have 
been understood as a barrier to women’s inclusion in the public religious 
sphere. Such critiques often base their arguments on detailed studies of the 
menstruation laws and notions of purity and impurity through taking a historical 
approach towards the context in which the laws and ‘beliefs’ surrounding 
niddah have historically developed, in order to delegitimise contemporary 
‘suppressive’ halakhic practices in Orthodox communities (Cohen 1992; 
Wasserfall 1999). Revolutionary critiques of the model of equal access and 
‘honorary males’ then again, do follow this line of argument, yet are also 
currently seeking ways to reinstate female sexuality and sexuality tout court 
within new forms of feminist Jewish religious expression (Plaskow 1991, 
2000).                 
Contrasting the concept of God as male in Christianity as irrelevant in 
the context of Jewish God language, Cynthia Ozick (1995 [1983/1979]: 123) 
proclaimed in 1979 that ‘the right question’ on the status of women in Judaism 
is not so much a theological issue, but a sociological problem. The solutions to 
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the problem of Jewish women’s status therefore, according to Ozick should be 
sought within the legal framework of halakhah. The answer to Rachel Adler’s 
question ‘how to attain some justice and some growing room for the Jewish 
woman if one is committed to remaining within halakhah’ (Adler 1995 
(1983/1973): 16), has as illustrated above consequently been addressed within 
Progressive denominations, and on many issues debates continue to this day. 
For these feminist transformations to be possible within Progressive Jewish 
denominations however, the changes that have effectively been forced have 
been dependant on the very redefinition of ‘tradition’ and particularly the status 
of halakhah. The feminist challenge therefore has greatly depended on the 
extent to which ‘Judaism’ has been considered as a historically contingent - 
patriarchal - system of law in its relationship to the surrounding, changing 
society, and this according to the definitions within each particular 
denomination. Feminist transformations have therefore been successful to the 
extent that particular redefinitions of Judaism and Jewish communities in their 
response to modernity (including feminism) have actually approached halakhah 
itself. Most notably, in Reconstructionism, which has redefined Judaism as a 
‘civilisation’ rather than a religion, halakhah has been given the status of ‘only 
a vote and not a veto’ (according to its founder Mordecai Kaplan, in: Heschel 
1995 [1983]: xlviii). Yet, in Reconstructionism, and its accommodation of 
‘modern science and philosophy’, even the requirement of belief in a 
supernatural deity has been questioned.24 
One could therefore argue that for Judaism in its confrontation with 
modernity, in ord er to become more feminist, it has had to become more 
‘secular’. From a feminist revolutionary perspective, Heschel thus claims that it 
is not that feminism poses insoluble problems to Jewish law, but that Judaism 
itself has undergone a (and must continue this) transformation, with the ‘real’ 
conflicts emerging from ‘the weakness of theological responses to modernity, 
which are thrown into relief by the challenge of feminism’ (Heschel 1995 
[1983]: xlii). As for the changing status and definition of halakhah that is being 
put forward by these modern redefinitions in various progressive 
denominations, Heschel claims that ‘modernity strikes not so much at the 
specifics of traditional theology, but at the general concept of theological 
absolutism’ (xliii). For Plaskow however, the difficulty of the topic of halakhah 
for feminists is precisely the fact that it ‘evokes and gets caught in 
denominational differences’ (Plaskow 1991: 60). From the revolutionary 
perspective, whilst non-Orthodox Jewish feminists see halakhic change either 
as ‘relatively straightforward or as irrelevant’, Plaskow claims that ‘Orthodox 
feminists have focussed their quarrels with Judaism largely on halakhic issues. 
Non-Orthodox feminists, myself among them, have often expressed impatience 
with narrowly halakhic feminist analysis’ (61). Therefore, for Plaskow, any 
feminist transformation of halakhah, determined within the parameters of 
denominational acceptance and definition, is besides the real issue, taking the 
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question a step further to the relevance and tenability of retaining halakhah 
itself within the creation of a truly Jewish feminism. 
In the same collection of essays with Ozick’s argument that the ‘right 
question’ on the status of women in Judaism is sociological, to be solved within 
the framework of halakhah, Plaskow (1995 [1983]) responds with an essay 
titled ‘The Right Question is Theological’, refuting Ozick’s argument by 
claiming women’s ‘otherness’ functions as an absolute and central 
presupposition in Jewish law. For Plaskow, any denominational attempt 
towards women’s equality within halakhah, will not solve the fact that halakhah 
as a male and patriarchal creation, sees the male religious actor as the norm, and 
the woman as the ‘other’, the deviation from the generic within a legal category 
of peripheral social status and disability. The otherness of women in halakhah is 
symptomatic of yet a deeper level of what Plaskow considers a theological 
problem in Judaism, to be found in the Torah and concept of God and Israel 
itself.           
From this radical perspective, women’s inferior status in Judaism is 
therefore not conceived of as a mere ‘legal’ or even sociological problem, but 
an ontological problem, which Plaskow locates in Jewish ‘theology’ in general. 
As in major feminist critiques of Christianity, Plaskow hereby problematises 
‘God language’ and the image of God as masculine in Judaism. Rita M. Gross 
(1979) had already formulated a similar critique in the seventies, inspired by the 
post-Christian feminist Mary Daly’s call to ‘move beyond God the Father’. 
Fully realising the fact that ‘God is not really either female or male or anything 
in between’ (Gross 1979: 168), Gross nonetheless argues that in Judaism as a 
theistic religion, the fact that female images of God seem degrading or 
alienating, is proof that male God language and images of God as male, both 
mirror and serve to legitimate women’s oppression. For Gross, Judaism is 
therefore ‘blind’ to its own androcentrism in the automatic, unreflective usage 
of male God language. A feminist strategy in order to correct the situation 
would be to incorporate female God language, such as the name ‘God-She’ to 
religious vocabulary: ‘If we do not mean that God is male when we use 
masculine pronouns and imagery, then why should there be any objections to 
using female imagery and pronouns as well?’ (Gross 1979: 170-1). Plaskow 
refers to anthropologist Clifford Geertz’ (1966) definition of religious symbols 
as both ‘models of’ ultimate reality and ‘models for’ the social order.25 The 
same correlation is made between male God-language and the maleness of 
God's image in relation to woman as ‘other’ and her inequality within the 
religious community.26 From this revolutionary feminist perspective, not only 
halakhah presupposes the ‘otherness’ of women, yet even more 
problematically, this is reflected in God speech and deeply in Jewish theology. 
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Reconciling Orthodox Judaism and Feminism 
 
Above it was made clear that many feminists within Progressive and Orthodox 
Jewish denominations are searching for various ways of solving difficult 
problems and challenges pertaining to women’s inferior status, yet by 
attempting to remain within their own denominational tradition or community. 
Modern Orthodox Jewish women are increasingly putting problems such as that 
of the agunah , and the injustice done to many observant Jewish women who are 
barred from remarrying on the agenda. Many of them are often highly educated 
activists and scholars, sometimes they are even Talmud specialists themselves. 
Blu Greenberg (1998 [1981]) was one of the first Orthodox feminists to publish 
a full-length analysis on the possibility of a fruitful relationship between a 
traditional Jewish way of life and feminism in the form of a collection of essays 
in 1981. By self-identifying as ‘traditional’, according to Umansky (1988: 357) 
however, Greenberg’s views have been labelled as too radical, or non-Orthodox 
by many male critics within the Orthodox community, yet they have been seen 
as nowhere near radical enough by Progressive and Revolutionary Jewish 
feminists. 
As an Orthodox Jew, in contrast to both dismissals and redefinitions of 
the status of halakhah in Progressive and in revolutionary perspectives on 
Judaism, Greenberg fully acknowledges halakhah as divinely ordained. Any 
change in view of the amelioration of women’s position, must therefore take 
place within the framework of halakhah itself. As for her view on feminism as a 
secular modern movement which has been strongly refuted in by traditional 
Jewish institutions, Greenberg proposes a ‘dialectical’ relationship between 
Jewish and feminist values, seeking room for women’s concerns within 
halakhah, yet also to imbue women’s concerns with Jewish values. Together 
with all Jewish feminists, Greenberg pleads for immediate rabbinic solutions to 
the problematic issues in family law such as the get and women’s inability to 
testify in court. Greenberg also regrets and acknowledges women’s inferior 
position within religious life, such as the restriction of their religious 
responsibilities and their limited rights in prayer, life-cycle ceremonies, 
communal life, and especially halakhic education and knowledge. At the same 
time however, she understands the perceived threat of feminism to Judaism and 
underlines those ‘destructive elements’ that pose an ‘attack on the family’, 
which after all, is the ‘primary source of strength and support in coping with an 
often dangerous and hostile world’ (1998: 12).  
Central to Greenberg’s account are also the consistent referrals to the 
historical fact that Jewish women were never completely oppressed, but were 
legally guaranteed protection and care (41), a situation which improved through 
time (67), yet was also always negatively influenced by universal sex 
asymmetry in the surrounding society. On the other hand, Greenberg sees a 
redefinition of women’s status within halakhah as necessary and unavoidable in 
contemporary society, justifiable by viewing halakhah as a fluid system that 
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was never entirely closed or static, her central argument being ‘where there was 
a rabbinic will, there was a halakhic way’ (44). Regarding women’s exemption 
of mitzvot such as prayer and study for example, Greenberg proposes a reduce 
the period of exemption so as to allow for the possibility of women to 
participating in traditional men’s religious responsibilities. However, Greenberg 
simultaneously vindicates the view which sees the raising of (young) children 
as an expression of women’s religiosity, in contrast to her view of feminism as 
child and family -negative. A related issue in which Greenberg remains adamant 
on the downside of feminism, is the issue of abortion, which she sees as an 
overreaction and overemphasis on self-interest and disregard for the holiness of 
life. Here Greenberg argues, there is sufficient halakhic room for both abortions 
and birth control, yet this must not diminish the importance of children and 
family life as a means to individual self-fulfilment.   
As with the feminist reformist perspectives in Progressive strands of 
Judaism, Greenberg also views the issue of women’s subordinate status in 
Judaism not a theological ‘truth’, but as a sociological problem to be solved 
(46). Radically different to Progressive Jewish feminists however, Greenberg 
does not adhere to the particular model of gender equality, which emphasises 
the notion of sameness between men and women, inspired by the liberal 
feminism and seeking to minimise the question of sexual difference between 
women and men. For Greenberg, the biological difference between women and 
men is an absolute given (91, 173)27, the basis which has served for different 
social and religious roles for men and women. Due to historical circumstances 
this has changed nevertheless, and in the contemporary world no longer implies 
a hierarchical system of difference (Greenberg 1998 [1981]: 20).         
 
…we must reject the notion that equality means androgyny. From the 
perspective of Judaism there can be separate, clear-cut roles in which 
men and women may function as equals without losing separate 
identities. Male and female are admittedly difficult concepts to define, 
but we must be aware in each instance whether we are dealing with the 
dignity of equality, which is an essential value in Judaism, or the 
identity of male and female, which is not.  
 
Although Greenberg demands for equality in certain spheres of religious 
practice and positions in religious institutions traditionally reserved for men 
(including ordination and other positions of authority in the community), at the 
same time, certain principles in both biology, social reality and law which 
emphasise and build upon the differences between women and men must be 
preserved. The general principle of ‘separation’ which is central to Judaism and 
equally applies to the separation of the sexes, must therefore not be completely 
abandoned, as in itself, Greenberg considers this necessary for a ‘healthy sense 
of sexual identity’ (52). Regarding the mehitzah28 for example, Greenberg 
perceives that the separation between women and men does not necessarily or 
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inherently imply the subordination of women, it can also enhance ‘the mystery 
of sexuality’, opposed to surrounding society and daily life where equality and 
androgyny are sometimes ‘confused’ (95). Distinctiveness in women’s and 
men’s roles can still be expressed in for example the lightening of the Sabbath 
candles by women. As for the mitzvah of the laws of family purity, Greenberg 
provides an historical development of the laws, which led to the current practice 
whereby married women must monthly ritually purify themselves in the 
mikvah. Despite the historical association of niddah with impurity and 
defilement in rabbinical interpretations, Greenberg also emphasises other 
interpretations of the laws connecting it to ideas of life renewal, marital love 
and the holiness of sex. Greenberg also defends this exclusive female mitzvah 
as an act of self-definition for the Jewish woman and a way of continuing 
tradition that must not be rationalised but accepted like many other hukkim form 
the Torah (rituals and rules for which there is no given ethical or logical reason 
(121)). In this different-but-equal model then, Greenberg hopes to see the gains 
of feminism implemented, eradicating outdated subordinating laws and 
practices. Yet she also wishes to leave room for the distinct differences between 
men and women in certain areas, particular those that bear to women’s 
sexuality and their child-rearing and domestic roles.    
 
  
Sameness or Difference: Across Denominational Divides 
 
Reviewing the feminist critiques and transformations of Judaism until halfway 
through the nineties, Norma Baumel Joseph (1995: 55) suggests that there are 
three distinct modes available for female ritual expression in Judaism. First 
there is the integration of women into a previously male sphere, secondly the 
construction of parallel but separate modes of ritual expression for women, and 
alternatively the creation of totally new practices. None of the options in this 
perspective can be straightforwardly aligned or placed under any of the 
different feminist critiques within, or beyond – in the case of the feminist 
revolutionary viewpoint – particular strands of contemporary Judaism. Nor can 
these options be categorised in any kind of evolutionary or hierarchical 
framework from past to present in the development of the relationship between 
feminism and Judaism. As has been central to any discussion of feminism in 
any sphere of life, the tensions between the ‘sameness’ and the ‘differences’ 
between women and men resurface in all of these perspectives. 
As argued above, in Progressive strands of Judaism, the equality model 
of women as equal in worth and in role was gradually imported or already 
included as part of the denominational identity. These ideas of equal access 
were directly inspired by the second wave liberal feminist predicament of equal 
rights in spite of difference. Not only has this equality not entirely been attained 
in all Progressive institutions and positions; practice does not always live up to 
the theory. As noted earlier, many of the major changes in the Progressive 
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denominations in favour of bettering women’s status have only been very 
recent, and therefore it could be argued that complete equality as reflected in 
numbers of women in prominent positions within the institutional sphere and 
the broader community is but a matter of time. In the early nineties however, it 
appears that despite women’s ability to become ordained a rabbi in Reform 
Judaism since 1972, women rabbis today still have not achieved prominent 
positions of leadership, such as those on the most important committees of the 
Central Conference of American [Reform] Rabbis (CCAR) (Umansky 1999: 
196-7). 
Umansky (1999) argues that since the eighties and nineties, many 
female rabbis and increasing numbers of male rabbis have opted for a career 
that is in balance with family life, thus reflecting the developments and changes 
in mentality after the ‘superwoman’ ideology in the broader society. Umansky 
further suggests, that the reason women rabbis appear to be choosing to work in 
smaller congregations rather than the more prestigious pulpits many men aspire 
to, because they place greater value on intimacy and close relationships with 
their congregants. Their greatest impact on the Reform movement, will 
therefore take place ‘from below’ on a day-to-day basis. For Umansky, this 
aspiration to replace hierarchical structures by the sharing of responsibilities, 
privileges and power can be labelled as a relational, and therefore as a 
distinctive feminist model, in that it aspires towards the empowerment of others 
(of both women and men).    
Changes within the Progressive movements that have slowly but surely 
embraced a model of liberal equality between the sexes based on a notion of 
‘sameness’, in practice may have maintained inequality. Opposed to Umansky’s 
observations on the Reform movements in the U.S., which themselves are 
institutionally changing precisely because of the ‘difference’ women seem to 
make, the revolutionary perspective obviously rejects the model of liberal 
equality and especially the principle of ‘sameness’. For these radical critiques 
of Judaism, the problem of ‘women’s difference’ so deeply ingrained in 
Judaism as a religion, needs to be both thoroughly addressed and placed at the 
heart of any possible kind of feminist transformation of patriarchal institutional 
structures and ideology.    
Among revolutionaries like Judith Plaskow and Rita Gross (in her older 
work), Judaism may turn out to be ‘hopelessly patriarchal’, yet women’s 
‘difference’ may also serve as a basis for a reconstruction of tradition in 
generating new forms of religious experience and the definition of religious 
community. This implies a process of rediscovering ‘suppressed’ elements of 
femininity in Torah, such as the image of God as female (Shekhinah)29 in the 
mystical tradition of Judaism (Plaskow 1995 [1983]: 231, 1991: 138; Gross 
1979) and trying to conceive of new non-hierarchical patriarchal forms of 
‘thealogy’. This may also entail leaving certain patriarchal elements of tradition 
behind, such as abandoning halakhah altogether, as ‘adding’ women’s voices 
may not change the fundamental structure of a legal system in which women 
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had no part in creating, but were only defined as objects or the ‘other’ to the 
normative male (Plaskow 1991: 63). This may even involve a new concept of 
community, in which differences and ‘diversity’ are not denied, but can be 
celebrated in non-hierarchical ways (Plaskow 1991: 75-120).  
Since they are opposed to the principle of liberal equality that 
minimalised sexual difference and women’s sexuality in Progressive feminist 
transformations, Orthodox feminist critics committed to remaining within the 
traditional halakhic framework have sought to retain sexuality as the marker 
that makes women’s difference. Rather than viewing women’s sexuality as that 
which is accountable for much of their subordination within Judaism, in 
particular regarding the laws of family purity, Orthodox feminists like Blu 
Greenberg choose to revalorise the laws and practices surrounding women’s 
reproductive capacity, retaining a framework of laws and practices which are 
demarcated according to gender as defined by sexual difference. More recent 
revolutionary perspectives denounce the way women’s sexuality in the halakhic 
definition has become defined as an area to be controlled and feared, yet also 
point out to the more positive views in Judaism with sexuality as a potential 
source for the sacred and ‘divine unification’ (Plaskow 1991: 186, 2000). 
Feminist writings on sexuality and the female body can serve as inspirational 
models for rethinking the relationship between sexual, embodied selves and 
God, beyond the ambivalent, yet deeply patriarchal energy/control model in 
Judaism.     
Besides the introduction of rituals for women parallel to those of men, 
such as the bat mitzvah celebration, Jewish women and feminists of divergent 
strands have also sought ritual celebrations that are women-centred in the 
liturgical calendar, such as the reclamation of the Rosh Hodesh or the New 
Moon celebration. According to Joseph (1995: 51), the rediscovery of this ‘lost 
women’s holiday’ by many Jewish women’s groups throughout the western 
world, ‘speaks to the pervasive need for communal religious experiences in 
which women are at the centre and can focus on their religious lives as Jews’. 
As indicated by rabbinic documents, women would have taken a holiday once a 
month during the new moon, although the celebrations and the association of 
this holiday with women supposedly fell into disuse during the middle ages. 
Some of the contemporary women’s groups are reclaiming the holiday as a sort 
of ‘herstory’, some as study groups, some as prayer groups exclusively for 
women.30  
Prayer (tefillah) is one of the important mitzvot women in traditional 
Jewish denominations are not exempt from, apart from the recitation of the 
Shema and wearing tefillin. Nevertheless, as Greenberg (1998: 79) notes, it is 
precisely one of liturgical activities women in Orthodox communities do not 
participate in frequently, caused by their peripheral role – such as their non-
inclusion in the minyan – in communal prayer in the synagogue. Women in 
Orthodox synagogues may furthermore not lead public prayer (receive aliyot 
and read the Torah), serve as cantors or sing in a synagogue choir. Those 
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Orthodox women who have not found much satisfaction in the merely private 
forms of prayer, have recently sought to create a halakhic way of participating 
in communal prayer by forming women-only prayer groups, where they can 
lead prayers and read Torah (Haut 1992) amongst women. Much contro versy 
has surrounded these tefillah groups, and especially the issue whether these 
groups are to be counted as minyanim. Although this issue has not been 
halakhically resolved, the prayer groups themselves do have complete Torah 
readings, and allow menstruating women to approach a Torah scroll which 
would otherwise be forbidden in the space of the synagogue (Haut 1992: 141-
142).    
Despite the critiques and sometimes rabbinic resistance towards these 
women’s prayers groups, innovations are taking place such as the celebration of 
bat mitzvah, engagements, marriages and baby naming celebrations, even 
incorporating new prayers, thereby adding distinctive ‘feminine experience’ 
(Haut: 143) wherever permissible under halakhah. The formation of the 
umbrella organisation ‘The Women’s Tefillah Network’, has furthermore 
stimulated the exchange of information and provision of support between 
prayer groups all over the U.S. Joseph (1995: 52-53) notes that recently, even 
though Progressive congregations offer equal access and participation in public 
religious settings, some women appear to have the need for similar women-
prayer groups, including even secular women. 
The above overview focussing on the axis of sameness/difference, gives 
another perspective from which to view the different feminist critiques and 
transformations of Judaism. Whilst ‘sameness’ stands central to Progressive 
Judaism as in Reform, Conservative and Reconstructionist congregations, 
women’s difference seems to be the basis from which both (modern) Orthodox 
feminist critiques and initiatives, and revolutionary thinking are emerging. For 
modern Orthodox feminists, patriarchal rabbinical and halakhic constructions of 
difference as sexual difference rooted in biology are reaffirmed, yet often 
reinterpreted in a positive light. In her recent work, revolutionary Judith 
Plaskow seems to be drawing on more recent feminist theoretical thinking on 
sexual difference and embodiment from non-biologistic and non-essentialist 
perspectives, yet only at the level of what Plaskow calls Jewish theology. 
Initiatives such as the Rosh Hodesh and women’s tefillah groups in Orthodox 
Judaism on the other hand, are actively seeking new forms of religious ritual 
and celebration, which maintain and reproduce women’s difference and the 
traditional separation of the sexes. That women from Progressive strands and 
additionally even secular women are becoming attracted to these women-
centred spaces, may suggest that these celebrations and get-togethers are in fact 
forms of effective spiritual and communal empowerment for Jewish women as 
women, and they are therefore perhaps experienced as somewhat threatening to 
the male Orthodox rabbinical authorities (Haut 1992).  
The dilemma of sameness and difference in the relationship between 
feminism and Judaism are articulated by Joseph (1995) as a major problem that 
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pervades feminist critique. Whilst the Progressive movements have made 
important gains in a development towards ‘integration’, not a single 
denomination has been completely reformed, suggesting problems might be 
more profound. On the other hand, as illustrated by a phenomenon such as the 
Rosh Hodesh groups, which have developed across denominational lines, these 
expressions of ‘female bonding’ and the creation of sense of ‘special 
femaleness’, may be considered by some as but an interim step towards full 
equality (Greenberg 1998: 95). Even so, this separatist model is a strategy 
‘fraught with danger’ (Joseph 1995: 57), preserving and maybe even 
reinforcing traditional patriarchal structures of gender segregation.        
Presenting her views based on personal experience in italics throughout 
an overview of developments in the relationship between feminism and 
Judaism, Joseph (1995: note 2) shifts from the ‘invested scholar to involved 
participant’ with the following reflection on the recurring problem of sameness 
versus difference:  
 
I am still troubled by the thorny problem of separation versus 
integration: should we continue our distinctive services? Should we 
have separate women’s studies departments or ‘mainstream’? How does 
this differ from the existence of separate Jewish studies departments? 
(Joseph 1995: 52)  
 
By expressing these doubts, Joseph not only touches upon the issue of sameness 
and difference as it pertains to much broader questions of identity determined 
by axes of gender, religion and ethnicity. She also cognitively groups social 
reality (the feminist impact on religious institutions and ritual) together with 
methodological and disciplinary issues of how we should study these 
developments. This quote is furthermore indicative of the problems and 
therefore the lacunae, characteristic of all approaches within the feminist Jewish 
studies of religion as hereto overviewed. The divergent approaches can be 
delineated regarding their differences in terms of their understanding of the 
relationship between feminism and Judaism, i.e. some starting from a 
denominational perspective, others seeking to create a ‘feminist Judaism’. 
Other approaches can be compared in the way they deal with the tensions of 
sameness and difference. However, all these types of study, which are 
considered the most important and ‘canonical’ in this field, and regardless of 
their internal disagreements, all seem to be of the type of feminist study in 
religion, as hypothesised in the previous chapters.  
In the above-mentioned types of feminist studies in Judaism, not only is 
the line between insider and outsider perspectives blurred. In the case of the 
relationship between feminism, feminist studies and Judaism, the boundaries 
between the religious and the secular in terms of identity and identification are 
also blurred. This occurs because Judaism and ‘Jewishness’ are also bound to 
what nowadays is called ‘ethnicity’, which appears to be existentially and 
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historically problematic in the development of feminist critique and 
transformation of Judaism as a religious tradition. Judith Plaskow and others for 
instance have called for a refutation of the boundaries of the religious and 
secular in Jewish feminism ‘insisting rather that feminism is always political as 
well as spiritual’ (Cohen 2000: 3). In Plaskow’s (2000b: 12) revolutionary 
view, Jewish feminists should move beyond ‘a single-minded focus on internal 
religious issues and synthesizing the concerns of religious and secular Jewish 
feminists’. For those starting from a particular standpoint within and both 
defending a particular denomination this factor is less problematic, yet for those 
who are more radically critical of Judaism as ‘hopelessly patriarchal’, the 
redefinition of tradition brings up questions that are highly problematic 
regarding Judaism as a patriarchal and ethnically defined religious tradition or 
community.  
                    
 
The Gendering of Jewish Studies and Postmodern Interventions  
 
 
I see Jewish Studies as a perpetual pursuit of truth that I 
take to be a religious activity informed by contemporary 
science and philosophy. 
Hava Tirosh-Samuelson (2000: 9) 
 
 
If the main hypothesis argued in chapters four on the absence of a 
demarcation between insider and outsider perspectives in feminist studies of 
religion also holds for feminist studies of Judaism, then it is be expected that 
the same particular consequences of this hypothesis apply. It was argued that 
the paradigmatic transformations within the feminist study of religion itself 
under the influence of theoretical developments in feminist theory are 
problematic due to some main features of religious studies as an autonomous 
discipline. First, women as an essentialist category appear to remain central 
rather than a movement to more social constructionist theories of gender. Work 
that is more recent does try to address the move towards gender rather than 
women as a category of analysis, but often this is reflected in titles of 
collections of essays or their introductions only. The analytical insight of 
gender as a socially constructed category proves particularly problematic in 
view of the argument that feminist studies of religion are always simultaneously 
in the process of ‘doing religion’. This is not to say that more recent work does 
not contain the desire to reformulate and rethink feminist transformations of 
religion that are more gender inclusive. The above dilemmas on the issue of 
sameness and difference have shown this, but again, this only  takes place at a 
level that is intrinsic to religion itself, such as the discussion on God language. 
Umansky (1999: 197) for example, chooses to sever any straightforward 
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relationship between feminism and women per se, by choosing to label the 
recent changes ‘from below’ in Reform congregations in the U.S. that are 
challenging hierarchical structures as feminist rather than feminine, in which 
both female and male rabbis are partaking.  
In the previous chapters it was also suggested that the slow paradigmatic 
transformation internal to the feminist study of religion was problematic not so 
much because of the essentialising and universalising tendencies of the 
mainstream, but the fact that religion was being practised rather than studied. 
Consequently, I assume that the fact that these feminist approaches often show 
essentialist tendencies, can in turn be often attributed to the essentialist or sui 
generis nature of a particular ‘religion’ – especially in regards to gender – itself. 
As the above overview has made clear, this also turns to be the case for 
traditional rabbinic Judaism, where gender roles are often essentialistically, 
biologically, and most importantly sexually defined and seem to form the very 
basis of the traditional patriarchal religious framework and its theology. For 
those religious feminists who wish to remain within the framework of halakhah, 
‘biology as destiny’ is sometimes called into question, yet at other times 
accepted as the central premise for retaining women’s difference, as it is 
fundamental to halakhah and therefore divinely ordained. Recent revolutionary 
critiques such as those of Judith Plaskow look to social constructionist positions 
on sexuality and gender in feminist theory, in order to explain historical 
developments from a scholarly perspective, and then simultaneously 
appropriate these ideas in envisioning reconstruction of religious tradition and 
spirituality. 
Very telling is perhaps T.M. Rudavsky’s (1995) relatively recent collection 
of articles titled Gender and Judaism: The Transformation of Tradition . The 
title captures the diversity of the contributions to the book, ranging from 
explicit feminist critiques to research on Jewish masculinity. Leonard Gordon 
(1995) in an essay titled ‘Toward a Gender-Inclusive Account of Halakhah’ for 
example, like Plaskow pleads for the usage of gender as an analytical category 
in the historicity of halakhah, by asking what role women have to play in its 
development. Gordon also uses the concept of gender however in order to avoid 
any kind of ‘gender essentialism’ that may lead to a feminist refutation of 
halakhah as ‘irredeemably’ male. This is then followed by an - equally gender 
essentialist - feminist reconstruction of feminism and Jewish feminist 
spirituality: ‘When feminism joins liberal Judaism in self-exclusion from 
halakhah, feminism risks reinforcing the characterization of women as ‘Other’ 
within Jewish systems. Halakhah, like American law, still requires feminist 
revision’ (Gordon 1995: 11). For Gordon, the categories of gender and ‘gender 
inclusiveness’ therefore serve to take a particular position within the debate on 
the possibility of a transformation of tradition. Yet this position is one that is 
conservative-liberal as recent feminist critiques of the political conservative 
usage of ‘gender’ (see chapter one) show, in that it seeks women’s inclusion in 
halakhah as to be reformed, yet retained in Judaism.  
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The feminist study of rabbinic law is particularly problematic, again in 
that boundaries are easily transgressed between insider and outsider 
perspectives, once women’s (religious) agency is taken as the object of study. 
From the perspective of historical research, Shulamit Magnus (1990: 34) argues 
that Jewish women’s history must not be ‘distorted’ through ‘mythologization 
for propagandistic purposes’: 
 
Suffice it is to say that the call for Jewish women’s history is not a call 
for yet more studies of the status of women in rabbinic law. The depths 
of that particular area of inquiry may well not have been plumbed, but 
that is also a subdivision of rabbinics; it is not women’s history. 
Needless to say, apologetics for the status of women in rabbinic law are 
neither rabbinics nor women’s history.     
 
If the place of feminist interpretation of rabbinic law is the prerogative of 
rabbinics only, approaches still diverge in their appropriate methodologies. In a 
book review of three recently published feminist studies of rabbinic texts31, 
Deborah Glanzberg-Krainin (2000) for example, argues how these works show 
how feminist questions challenge both the idea of ‘objective’ readings of texts, 
yet another may also be ‘actively writing theology’. Judith Hauptman’s work 
explores the way women and women’s concerns are handled in Talmudic law, 
through a careful contextual and ‘intertextual’ reading, arguing a 
‘depatriarchalisation’ of the Talmud is not possible. However, according to 
Glanzberg-Krainin, Hauptman does show that rabbis did struggle to change the 
law in a way that ‘is sympathetic to women and responsive to their concerns’. 
Hauptman thereby makes a distinction between sociocultural history and 
context, and the dynamic construction of Jewish law itself. In Miriam 
Peskowitz’s work however, law is not separated from sociocultural context in 
arguing rabbis’ thinking about gender ‘can only be understood in relation to the 
historical and cultural world of which they were a part’. In this perspective, 
noting that the scholar is always in the process of constructing gender during 
the reading of texts complicates the notion of scholarly objectivity. Finally, 
Rachel Adler’s concern is to ‘engender Judaism as a spiritual and ethical 
practice’. Halakhah is found sexist and damaging to both women and men, and 
cannot be easily ‘fixed’. Adler calls for the generation of a ‘new halakhah’ that 
is both engendered and liberatory.  
Moving from the field of religious studies of Judaism to the general field 
of what is called ‘Jewish Studies’ in general, gender inclusiveness has only 
been addressed during the last decade. Wissenschaft des Judentums developed 
during the nineteenth century, purporting to challenge the ‘scholarly legitimacy 
of Christian scholarship that drew conclusions based on faulty stereotypes 
regarding Judaism and ignorant of Jewish sources’ (Heschel 1990: 254). 
Preceding yet parallel to the development of Religionswissenschaft32, the 
modern study of Judaism set out to apply a strictly scientific or non-religious 
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approach in the study of Judaism, one that was interdisciplinary – ‘adapting 
Enlightenment categories of philology, history and other European academic 
categories’ (Peskowitz 1997: 34) – yet clearly motivated by certain current 
concerns of the politics of identity. According to Peskowitz and Levitt (1997: 
3), as Jews producing knowledge about Jews, these ‘Wissenschaft scholars 
were making an overt claim (and conscious) bid for Jewish membership in the 
community of the “Europeans”’.33 Meanwhile what is generally called the field 
of Jewish Studies, has substantially expanded its interdisciplinary character to 
include more approaches from the humanities and social sciences, including 
sociology or anthropology of Jews or Jewish communities and culture. 
However, according to Susannah Heschel (1990: 243) writing only one decade 
ago, there is still no proper intersection between Jewish studies and women’s 
studies:  
 
For example, although the study of Jewish women calls into question 
commonly assumed categories, methodologies and conclusions in the 
field of Jewish studies, the major textbooks in Jewish history rarely 
mention women. At the same time, most studies of Jewish women pay 
little or no attention to feminist theory, just as some major studies of 
women’s history ignore Jewish women.   
          
Shulamit Magnus (1990) in an article addressing the failure of intersection 
regarding women’s studies and Jewish historiography illustrates the extent to 
which the reconceptualisation in ‘integrating the study of Jewish women into 
the study of “the Jews”’ must go. In the case of Jewish religious history for 
example, questions such as ‘Did Jewish Women have a Talmudic Era?’ recast 
the methodological issue of standard periodisation. Whole categories of inquiry 
hitherto not taken seriously will have to be respected, for instance by looking at 
‘inarticulate but pervasive and powerful expressions of Jewish identity as 
expressed in ritual observances, child -rearing and healing practices, and in 
official and unofficial community service’ in order to uncover women’s reality 
and beliefs (30-31). The differences in the periods of Jewish assimilation in the 
modern era in Western Europe and the U.S. are similarly being reconceived 
from the perspective of gender. For instance, in German-Jewish assimilation 
women were not affected the same way as men in the liberalisation of the 
synagogues, liturgy and observance of festivals. Women’s jewishness not only 
showed more continuity in that it remained centred in the private sphere of the 
home, but arguably women did not assimilate to the extent that men did, with 
the home in effect replacing the synagogue as a site of religious practice. In 
imperial Germany the transmission of Jewish identity therefore shifted from 
‘men to women, from public to domestic areas and from actions to subjective 
and emotional feelings’ (Heschel 1990: 245). Paula Hyman (1995) places this 
development in the broader context of the way in Western Europe Judaism had 
adapted to the ‘prevailing bourgeois model of female domesticity’, with 
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religion and religious identity being transposed to women’s domain, women 
becoming the guardians and transmitters of moral and religious consciousness.  
Jewish history is presently also being reconceived through intersectional 
approaches towards gender, ‘race’ and ethnicity. Studies taking a 
constructionist approach have focussed on both histories of assimilation both in 
Western Europe, later the U.S., particularly the way in on the one hand in anti-
Semitic discourse at the beginning of the twentieth century the ‘woman 
question’ was linked to the ‘Jewish question’. According to Pellegrini (1997: 
50) the ‘racial’ difference of ‘the’ Jews was articulated through the ‘sexual’ 
difference ‘man/woman’, with ‘Jewishness becoming as much a category of 
gender as race’. Increasing attention has been given to the way in historical 
discourse Jewish masculinity has been constructed as ‘effeminate’ discourse 
(e.g. Hyman 1995) through to representation in modern popular culture (e.g. 
Brod 1995) or the intersections between constructions of nationalism, 
militarism and masculinity in contemporary Israel (e.g. Mayer 2000). 
Finally, a (de)constructionist notion of gender has been applied in 
feminist Jewish studies work, accompanied with tools of analysis from 
postmodern and poststructuralist theory. In the editors’ introduction to Judaism 
since Gender (1997), religious studies’ professors Miriam Peskowitz and Laura 
Levitt (1997: 3) identify two main characteristics of the field of Jewish Studies, 
which have prevented the reconstitution of ‘the production of Jewish 
knowledges as a feminist project’. Not only has the field of Jewish Studies been 
characterised by an exclusive ‘masculinist’ framing in the privileging of men 
and ‘maintaining commitments to the values and categories of specific kinds of 
masculine intellectuality’. Intertwined with this frame is its epistemology of 
rationality, scientism and objectivity which has defined the discipline since its 
foundation as the Wissenschaft des Judentums in the nineteenth century. The 
second observation is clearly influenced by feminist postmodern theory on the 
notion of objectivity as set out in the previous chapter. This introductory remark 
testifies to other attempts in an incorporation of recent feminist theory and 
gender theory in the study of Judaism throughout the collection of essays. 
In Peskowitz’s own essay on the ‘Engendering of Jewish Religious 
History’ for example, Peskowitz (1997: 18) is highly critical of those ‘many 
feminist studies of Judaism [that] still work within the categories (and utilize 
the methods) of Enlightenment-based scholarship’. For Peskowitz this must 
entail going beyond the earlier ‘add and stir’ technique, which replicates a 
liberal model where the ‘categorical structures that had marginalised women in 
the first place’ are ignored. Secondly, the incorporation of gender as a central 
category of analysis is required, whic h according to Peskowitz remains 
untheorised in most studies of women, gender and Judaism, continuing older 
forms of feminist research on ‘women’, yet under a new name (20, 30).34  
In elaborating further on how to engender Jewish religious history using 
more recent and sophisticated feminist theory, Peskowitz then goes on to 
critique Judith Plaskow’s chapter in her theological reconstruction of a feminist 
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Judaism and her viewpoint on reconstructing and redefining Jewish women’s 
history as a part of this project. Peskowitz’s problem with Plaskow’s approach 
is however not the fact that this alternative feminist historiography should serve 
theological purposes, but that Peskowitz disagrees with Plaskow’s reproduction 
of Enlightenment categories and oppositions such as ‘history’ versus ‘memory’ 
or ‘objective evidence’ versus ‘subjective selective memory’ (27). Peskowitz 
furthermore rejects Plaskow’s strategy of reshaping Jewish memory by ‘letting 
women speak’ as a potential essentialising project that ignores the social 
construction of voice and the differences between women (29). The influence of 
feminist poststructuralist theory on the deconstruction of binaries, the 
deconstruction of the unified subject and identity can be read in Peskowitz’s 
critique of Plaskow: ‘we must allow our notions of identity to contain more 
complexity and ambiguity. Subjectivity need not be based on a model wherein 
identity and desire and the past are understood as necessarily unified, 
congruous, harmonious, and coherent’ (29).  
The poststructuralist ‘linguistic turn’ and the issue of ‘diversity’ 
between women is particularly apparent in an article by Laura Levitt (1995). In 
this essay, Levitt models her ‘reading’ of a section of the ketubah (the Jewish 
marriage contract) and a portion of an article by Plaskow on sexuality, on a 
‘reading’ of an essay by Minnie Bruce Pratt by ‘diversity feminists’ Chandra 
Mohanty and Biddy Martin (1986). Levitt aims to focus on the ‘notion of 
positionality by drawing a connection between notions of “home” and 
“identity”’ (Levitt: 1995: 39.). Similar to Peskowitz’s critique of Plaskow, 
Levitt claims that Plaskow’s appeal to the notion of ‘mutual consent’ in her 
radical critique of the institutional marriage arrangement in the ketubah, 
remains liberal and in this way only serves to ‘reinforce current Jewish marital 
practices’ and gender inequality (46). For Levitt in contrast, feminist Judaism is 
a question of non-essentialist identity ‘subject to the continuous ‘play’ of 
history, culture and power’ and positioning oneself in reaction to specific texts 
and narratives.  
The introduction and application of feminist postmodern and 
poststructuralist theories to the reformulation of the feminist study of Judaism 
has made place for a more social constructionist and less essentialist approach. 
However, that these deconstructions and ponderings on new forms of Jewish 
feminist identity or subjectivity seem to take place at the level of the text and its 
readings only, raises the same kind of critiques in other fields of feminist 
research alluded to in previous chapters regarding this ‘linguistic turn’. For one 
of the central feminist critiques of disciplines such as religious studies and 
Jewish studies (Wenger 1997: 113) was precisely the limitations of their 
traditional text-oriented approach. On the other hand, the very first feminist 
scholarly critiques of Judaism focussed on both increased religious participation 
in its broadest meaning of both practice (ritual and law), structure, and 
(re)reading and reinterpreting these texts as one essential dimension of Judaism 
as a religious tradition. Also, since postmodern and poststructuralist feminist 
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theories from the literary disciplines are slowly being applied within the 
feminist study of Judaism, the latter appears to develop into an exclusive 
academic activity. Laura Levitt (2000: 8) herself refutes critiques of her 
deconstructive work in that attending to writing would be ‘conservative’: ‘I 
believe that slowing down or resisting certainty might be a more honesty 
feminist politics, at least for now as we work to reformulate Jewish studies’. 
Yet these academic enterprises do still promise to offer solutions to the same 
questions of sameness and difference and feminism for the experience of 
religious Jewish identity. They thereby remain ‘insiders’ perspectives’, but 
probably in even a stricter sense of the term. The rhetoric offered is only 
accessible to those within the academy who are familiar with this rhetorical 
technique and terminology, a point which Peskowitz and Levitt in fact raise in 
their very own editorial introduction (1997: 6-7).    
In the same introduction, Peskowitz and Levitt reproduce this emerging 
divide between Jewish feminism in - ‘scholarship’ - and outside – ‘activism’ - 
of the academy. In a footnote citin g important contributions during twenty-five 
years of feminist scholarship, works such as Christ and Plaskow (1979), 
Heschel (1995 [1983]), and Plaskow (1991) are included in a particular part of 
the list after the following remark: ‘In emphasising a certain kind of feminist 
scholarship, we find ourselves in a bit of a bind. … Despite its difficulties, the 
academy has been a more fruitful terrain for Jewish and feminist writing. 
Nevertheless, much writing has also been produced on these topics by women 
who are not connected to the university’ (1997: note 8). The above works which 
I have discussed earlier as of the ‘revolutionary’ kind, are thus understood by 
the authors to be of a different sort of feminist scholarship, despite the fact that 
all the authors mentioned do hold academic positions in U.S. universities in 
religious or Jewish studies.   
 
 
2. Studying Strictly Orthodox Jewry  
 
 
Traditional ethnographic studies of ‘Hasidim’ 
typically portray Hasidic men to the exclusion of 
women. 
     Janet S. Belcove-Shalin (1995a: 17) 
 
 
In the previous chapter a methodological framework was presented which built 
on the hypotheses on the problematic relationship between religious studies and 
a feminist gender studies approach. I then argued that a ‘reflexive and 
postcolonial feminist anthropology of religion’ could enable the possibility 
towards a reconceptualised gender inclusive study of religious traditions. In this 
paragraph, I shall first take a closer look at some of the major existing – 
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primarily anthropological - qualitative social scientific studies on the type of 
religious community that will also serve as the tradition under study in the 
following chapters. As in the previous paragraph, this overview will function as 
an introduction to the type of community in the case study, but it will also be a 
critical analysis of that literature in the sense that this literature will be read 
through a ‘gender lens’. For I will be identifying where and why this work on 
strictly Orthodox Jewish communities fails to pay attention to the question of 
gender. Considering the argument made for an anthropological approach in the 
gendered study of religion, the research discussed in this paragraph cannot 
entirely be characterised as ‘androcentric’ for entirely the same reasons as those 
set forth in the chapters on the androcentric study of religion. As regards the 
type of religious community under study, however, the typical anthropological, 
methodological focus on ‘people and praxis’ rather than texts does by no means 
automatically render the anthropological study of religion as attentive to 
questions of gender or a paradigm of gender inclusiveness.   
 
 
Defining Religious Traditions and Religious Communities 
 
The argument for the necessity of an anthropological methodology in a non-
theological/confessional study of religion can be proven most poignantly in the 
case of a male-dominated religious tradition. In such a tradition women appear 
to feature as ‘the other’ in terms of an object position, and often do not feature 
at all in the dimensions which form the analytically relevant categories of 
‘religion’ in the mainstream religious studies approach. This is certainly the 
case in those contemporary religious communities that practise a form of 
traditionalist religion that can be defined as highly ‘patriarchal’. The case study 
in the following chapter focuses on such a religious community that can be 
broadly characterised as belonging to a form of ‘strictly Orthodox Judaism’. In 
particular, the case study draws on interviews held with female members of a 
local community, affiliated with the Orthodox Jewish congregation of the 
‘Machsike Hadass’ in Antwerp, Belgium. 
 
 
Strictly Orthodox Judaism and Jewry: On Appropriate Terms 
  
Strictly Orthodox Judaism has been the subject of much academic inquiry, both 
in its definition as a ‘community’ in the social sciences and history, and in the 
meaning of a ‘religious tradition’, both in historical accounts – the rise and 
development of the tradition –, and finally as the subject of religious studies. 
Many of these studies have furthermore combined approaches, including 
discussions of history, doctrine and myths, sometimes accompanied by more 
sociological descriptions of contemporary Hasidic society, such as the 
organisation of a particular Hasidic community (e.g. Fischer 1988; Rabinowicz 
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1970; Robberechts 1990; Safran 1988). However, this particular ‘denomination’ 
in the modern forms of Judaism as a religion, has not been discussed in the 
context of the confrontation of feminism with Judaism and Jewish Studies such 
as discussed in the previous paragraph. For the religious Jewish feminist 
needless to say, this strand of Jewish religious belief, practice and community is 
experienced as anti-feminist and patriarchal, yes even sexist and misogyn at its 
core, irreconcilable with any progress in the status of Jewish women and their 
emancipation in the modern era. 
It is therefore this type of religious tradition and community which 
carries the most interesting challenges in view of the main hypotheses. Strictly 
Orthodox Jewish women do not partake in what is often considered central to 
the representation of religious tradition in the classical religious studies 
approach (texts and elites), nor in actual religious practice (public ritual, official 
institutional positions and leadership, etc.) from the anthropological point of 
view. However, terms such as ‘strictly Orthodox’ and especially ‘ultra-
Orthodox’ and their boundaries in terms of which traditions and communities 
can or cannot be subsumed under these categories is a matter of debate. Here, I 
shall limit the discussion of definition and focus on the historical development 
of religious tradition, in function of the lacunae in current research. I will be 
leaving some broader issues, such as the concept of ‘fundamentalism’, 
particularly in its relationship to the issue of gender and feminism, for a later 
chapter.   
Samuel Heilman (1992: 12) notes that what has been termed ultra-
Orthodox in much contemporary literature, is in recent years coming to be 
replaced by the label haredim. Haredim as a term would be less pejorative, and 
also more of a ‘native’ category for those Jews who can be considered 
traditionalist35 in that they are distinguishable from non-Jews and other secular 
and religious Jews (including the modern-Orthodox), ‘by way of their dress, 
attitudes, worldview, and the character of their religious life’ (Heilman and 
Friedman 1991: 197).36 Jonathan Webber (1994: 27) on the other hand, claims 
that the term ‘ultra-Orthodox’ is coming to be replaced by ‘strictly  Orthodox’, 
the same as Haredi. The usage of the term ‘Orthodox’ moreover, is similarly 
more of a name appropriated for religious Jews in the context of the 
transformations in the nineteenth century in central and Eastern Europe, where 
the first denominational strands developed in the context of the growth of 
assimilation and the challenge towards the modernising surrounding society. 
Contemporary Orthodox Jews can therefore be characterised as religious Jews 
who continue to follow halakhah according to the rabbinical tradition. Willem 
Zuidema (1993: 150) for example, prefers the term ‘halakhic Judaism’ above 
‘Orthodox Judaism’, terms such as ‘orthodox’ being etymologically derived 
from Greek and therefore not native concepts. From the historical-sociological 
perspective however, and according to Orthodox Jews themselves, Orthodox 
are those religious Jews who did not adapt or transform Judaism as a religion, 
but are rather continuing Judaism as lived and practised in its fundamental 
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historical form dating back to the installation of rabbinic Judaism in the 
Hellenistic period (Cohn Sherbok 1996: 25). However, all these descriptive 
categories are both relative and dynamic in their appropriation and 
internalisation by both ‘outsiders’ and amongst insiders themselves, both from 
the perspective of the scholar and contemporary daily usage by Jews and non-
Jews alike, in a complex of historical and sociological shifts and contexts 
(Webber 1987, 1997). 
Heilman (1992: 12) claims that whilst the labels ‘Orthodox’ and ‘ultra-
Orthodox’ are outsiders’ constructions in that ‘they come from a language 
foreign to Jewish experience’, “haredi” resonates with Jewish meaning.’ Haredi 
was apparently first used in modern Hebrew to describe any religious, 
observant and pious Jews, yet later came to be used for those religious Jews that 
had not accommodated to modern lifestyles and western culture, denoting their 
emphasis on traditionalism. The Hebrew term ‘Haredi’ and the plural 
‘Haredim’ etymologically derives from Isaiah 66:5 in the passage ‘Hear the 
word of the Lord, you who tremble [haredim] at His word’. The word refers to 
those to whom ‘the Lord will pay heed’, those who defend the faith and uphold 
the law in their special relationship to God (Heilman and Friedman 1991: 198; 
Heilman 1992: 12). Despite Heilman’s argument for the use of this term as it is 
less of an outsider label; the term is not completely a native category. Although 
it is used by many Jews, it is not used by Haredim themselves, who call 
themselves ‘erlicher Yidn’, thus defying that they would be some separate sect, 
but simply the ‘true Jews’. 
Further questions arise to the preferable usage of the term above ‘ultra-
Orthodox’ or the more recently coined ‘strictly Orthodox’. The first is the 
question of locality. Both Heilman and Heilman and Friedman’s research is 
located in the Israeli context, and it is not clear whether ‘Haredi’ can 
straightforwardly be applied in the case of strictly Orthodox communities 
outside of Israel, in surroundings where the term is altogether foreign to the vast 
majority of non-Jewish society. One other term that is used ‘internationally’ for 
the vast majority of traditionalist religious Jews is ‘Hasidic’ (singular: a Hasid 
or plural the Hasidim and the rarely used Hasidista  for female singular). 
Hasidim is furthermore used as both an insider and outsider generic category to 
refer to both a religious tradition and a type of community. The vast majority of 
both religious studies and social scientific research also focuses on this 
particular branch of strictly Orthodoxy or Haredism. Hasidism as a living 
religious tradition also has a historical genealogy as a movement which 
developed two centuries ago and is characterised by tangible institutional 
continuity to the present. In this respect, Hasidism as a religious tradition 
predates what could be called ‘Orthodoxy’ as an organised and identifiable 
movement, which Heilman and Friedman (1991: 199) locate in the last third of 
the nineteenth century, entirely in the context of the Haskalah37 or 
Enlightenment. Strictly speaking, not all contemporary traditionalist Jews 
neither are, nor do they identify as ‘Hasidic’. That these distinctions are 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 263
important, and the historical reasons for these distinctions furthermore show 
how Hasidism in itself is by far a unified term with internal differences in terms 
of both community and tradition.  
 
 
Hasidim, Misnagdim and Other Traditionalists: A Brief Overview of Historical 
Development 
 
Depending on the explanatory framework of the author, the earliest identifiable 
roots for the religious movement which was to be called Hasidism – translated 
as piety - can be located in seventeenth century Eastern Europe. These authors 
emphasise the particular historical, political and sociological context as highly 
relevant for the early development of the Hasidic movement. After 1648, the 
Jewish communities living in Poland, White Russia and the Ukraine became 
victims of the pogroms, organised by Ukrainian nationalists (Cossacks, lead by 
Boris Chmielnicki) who were at war with the Polish authorities.38 In this 
climate, travelling mystical preachers offered protective amulets, curing the 
sick and performing miracles (Gutwirth 1999: 603). These Baal Shem , ‘masters 
of the Name’ [of God], became increasingly popular, as they promised 
‘indiv idual salvation’ – through piety – which was welcomed above rabbinical 
legalism. 
Another historical event that is often appropriated as one of the factors 
that facilitated many Jews’ receptiveness to this form of religion, is the despair 
following the collapse of messianism, after the conversion of the popular 
‘messiah’ Sabbatai Zvi to Islam in 1666 and his death in 1676. This climate of 
spiritual crisis accompanied economical deprivation, and a growing gap 
between poor and rich Jews, the latter gaining control over the kehilla 39, who 
were joined by rabbis who neglected the religious needs of the poor immersed 
in their own world of the study of the law (Armstrong 2000: 118). Hasidism 
thus also grew as a part of a ‘backlash’ (Heilman and Friedman 1991: 207) 
against the neglect and contempt by rabbinic scholars for the ‘ignorant masses’ 
in Eastern Europe. This culminated in the rise of a folk religion, prioritising 
ritual, prayer and emotion, including elements of mysticism and devotion to 
charismatic leadership (also present in the messianic movements), a stark 
contrast to the rabbinical understanding of piety as the intellectual study and 
learning of the law.                 
The Baal Shem and preachers to the common folk attempted to educate 
the needy Jews, pro testing against the rabbis and often formed disparate cells 
and prayer groups, refusing any ties with the synagogues. Armstrong (2000: 
118) calls these groupings of revolutionaries ‘Hasidim’, although the movement 
itself is mostly attributed to one particular foundational figure. In 1735 the poor 
Jewish innkeeper Israel ben Eliezer (1700-1760), who was born in the small 
town of Okop (near Kamenets on the border of Podolia and Moldavia), declared 
himself to be a Baal Shem on grounds of a revelation. During his travels and the 
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performance of various miracles, his popularity steadily grew as he gathered a 
considerable number of disciples (Cohn-Sherbock 1996: 51). Presenting 
himself to Hasidic circles as the ‘Besht’ – an acronym of Baal Shem Tov, or 
‘Master of the Good Name’, he became their rabbi. Around 1740 Hasidic cells 
were erected in towns in Podolia, Volhynia, Galicia and the Ukraine and by the 
time of his death, the Besht was supposed to have had some 40.000 followers, 
all praying in their own separate synagogues (Armstrong 2000: 118).   
The Besht taught that God could not only be attained by study and 
prayer, but also through ‘an uplifting melody, a spirited dance, or an inspiring 
story, if the Almighty was praised’ (Belcove-Shalin 1995a: 4). The spiritual 
element of Hasidism was mythical, drawing on the Lurianic kabbalistic 
symbol40 of the ‘sparks’ of divine light that had been captured in material things 
according to Luria’s version of creation as a primal catastrophe (Armstrong 
2000: 119). The Besht transformed this vision into a positive insight into the 
omnipresence of God. Everywhere there was a spark of the divine to be found. 
The Hasidim had to become aware of this hidden divine dimension by practice 
in concentration and by the Hasidic ideal of devekut, communion or attachment 
to God. Devekut was furthermore attainable for everyone through a practical 
kind of mysticism: ‘Authentic spirituality, taught the Besht, could be attained 
by the common folk, the am haaretzim, provided one is willing to worship  the 
Almighty with humility (shiplut), joy (simchah), and enthusiasm (hitlahavut)’ 
(Belcove-Shalin 1995a: 5). All daily, seemingly mundane activities could 
therefore mitzvot in themselves and were endowed with divinity. Hasidim 
could at all times experience this omnipresence of God and make it visible, 
such as in the loud and ecstatic performance of prayer. 
Under the influence of the Besht’s successor, the Talmudic scholar Dov 
Ber of Mezerich (by Volhynia) (1704/10-1772)41, Hasidism spread to Southern 
Poland, the Ukraine and Lithuania. The movement also institutionalised, in the 
codification of the Besht’s teachings and the development of a new form of 
religious leadership in the figure of the rebbe. The rebbe was considered to be a 
zaddik (holy person) and his authority was based on piety and charisma, and he 
was seen as a mystical intermediary to God. The role of the rebbe eventually 
becoming dynastic, with leadership passing from father to son. Before the 
development of the different courts or dynasties with their own personal rebbes 
though, the movement had to deal with an aggressive confrontation with 
rabbinic authorities. During the leadership of the ‘Maggid’ Dov Ber, when the 
Hasidic movement reached Lithuania, under the initiative of head (Gaon) of the 
Academy of Vilna, Elijah ben Solomon Zalman, who had rejected the Hasidic 
contempt for Torah study, in 1772 a herem (decree of excommunication) was 
issued against the movement followed by a second decree in 1781 (Cohn-
Sherbock 1996: 53-54). The followers of the powerful Gaon were called the 
Misnagdim the ‘opponents’ (of Hasidism) by the Hasidim, who did not consider 
them ‘true’ Jews. The Misnagdim conversely, remained faithful to the primacy 
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of Talmudist’s reading of the law and scholarship, denouncing the cult of the 
zaddik, and its emphasis on spirituality and mysticism. 
One Hasidic rabbi from White Russia and a disciple of the Maggid, 
Shneur Zalman (1745-1813) tried to reconcile the conflict with the Misnagdic 
Gaon, but to no avail. Zalman’s writings include the mystical treaty ‘Tanya’ 
(1791)42 that was to form the basis for new Hasidic thinking as followed by the 
Chabad , which was much closer to the spirituality of the Misnagdim. The 
Chabad viewed rational thought as the starting point for attaining spirituality 
(Armstrong 2000: 121). The conflict between Hasidim and Misnagdim 
nonetheless sharpened rather than diminished – Zalman even being jailed 
following a complaint by the Misnagdim to the Russian authorities – at least 
until the beginning of the nineteenth century when the common threat of the 
Haskalah (Enlightenment) finally began to encroach upon Eastern Europe. 
Meanwhile, the Hasidic rebbes began to develop different courts, taking 
their names from the community in which they were based, such as the Satmar 
in Hungary, the Belz in Galicia, the Lubavitcher in Russia (Chabad)43, the Ger 
in Poland, etc. The courts differed from each other over such issues as the 
abilities of the rebbe, the best ways of reaching salvation, the study of 
mysticism and the Talmud, but also in their outward appearance in daily and 
ceremonial clothing and in their hairstyle for instance. The cult of the rebbe was 
one of complete devotion and absolute authority, followers turning to him for 
their spiritual, personal, psychological and financial needs. The different 
Hasidic communities continued to grow and new dynasties continued to be 
founded into the late nineteenth century. It was also during this period that the 
disputes and differences between the Hasidim and the Misnagdim began to 
diminish. The Misnagdic rabbi, the rav, was gradually attributed similar 
characteristics as the rebbe, such as a charisma besides his scholarly authority 
(Heilman and Friedman 1991: 210). The idea of separate courts and 
communities was also applied, yet in the Misnagdic case the yeshiva became a 
central point. Yeshivas such as Etz Hayim in Volozhin (1802), and later 
Knesset Yisrael in Slobodka (1882) and Knesset Beit Yitzhak in Kaminetz 
(1897) became large institutions attracting many young men who lived separate 
from their families, socialised and subordinated to the view of the rosh yeshiva 
(head of the yeshiva) (Heilman 1992: 24).     
The traditional Jewish communities in Eastern Europe (kahalim) were 
not unaffected by the forces of secularisation after the impact of the French 
revolution started to seep eastwards. Jewish inhabitants of the larger cities could 
not remain unsusceptible to these changes and after the Enlightenment, and 
later in the nineteenth century under the influence of socialism, communism 
and Zionism (Gutwirth 1999: 604). Hasidic and Misnagdic communities which 
were mostly located in the smaller towns, apparently were somewhat protected 
from these processes of modernisation and the growing Jewish assimilation into 
the surrounding society, although as Heilman and Friedman (1991: 208) argue, 
separatism from the surrounding society in itself always formed an essential 
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and defining characteristic of what of meant to be Hasidic. In this it therefore 
remains to be debated whether the Hasidic movement could be interpreted as a 
revolutionary movement, setting ‘the stage for some of the individualistic and 
revolutionary actions of Jewish modernity’ (Heilman and Friedman 1991: 208). 
Armstrong (2000: 120) for example claims that although Hasidism was a 
movement of ‘the people’ there was nothing ‘democratic’ about it. According to 
Heilman and Friedman (ibid.) the separate communities and later the institution 
of the yeshiva in both Misnagdic and Hasidic communities which developed:   
 
… made totalistic Jewish demands on its members, Hasidism also 
conformed to what would become an essential element of contra-
acculturative Orthodoxy. Yet whatever the revolutionary implications of 
the concept of Hasidism, in practice Hasidim were always very much a 
part of non-assimilated Jewry – Orthodox Jews.   
 
From the ‘perspective of modernity’ therefore, the newly category of those 
religious Jews who resisted assimilation and secularisation, amongst the 
‘Orthodox’, the Hasidim and Misnagdim who were once ‘revolutionaries’, 
would two centuries later come to embody the most stubborn resisters to the 
changes in the surrounding society, in order to preserve their unique identity 
and way of life. In this historical context, the contra-acculturative Hasidim and 
Misnagdim somehow had to set aside their differences and disputes in order to 
join ranks in face of the common enemy of secular modern culture. Even the 
ghetto walls could not stop these influences, as Jewish identity and religion 
became transformed into a matter of ‘individual choice’ – voluntaristic – and 
privacy (Heilman 1992: 15; Webber 1997: 264). Whereas in western Europe 
many Jews, as national citizens, assimilated entirely into their host societies – 
‘ceasing to be Jews’ (Heilman and Friedman 1991: 201), others sought a form 
of acculturation that did not sever all ties with Jewish religion and tradition, yet 
did involve full participation in modern society.44 This model set forth by the 
maskilim, of the Haskalah (Enlightenment) also reformed or modernised 
‘religion’ itself, making fundamental changes in order, often based on the 
Christian model of worship (morals and ethics) rather than ritual praxis 
(Heilman 1992: 17) and can be viewed as the context for the development of 
Progressive (Liberal/Reform) strands of Judaism.45  
Those resisting both assimilation and the acculturation by the maskilim, 
came to be called ‘Orthodox’, holding on to tribal ties and the traditional way of 
life. Obviously the changes and innovations in Western Europe did not reach 
the East till much later into the twentieth century, nor was their impact as great 
in these parts. Here, the Hasidim and Misnagdim were those communities most 
resilient to these historical changes, later to be called the ultra or strictly 
Orthodox as one end of the line, opposed to the neo-Orthodox and the modern-
Orthodox on the other. The latter were minimally willing to make some forms 
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of compromise, leaving the ghettos and claiming a place within civil society; 
yet not by relinquishing their Jewish ritual praxis and communal ties. 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, Hasidic leaders and their 
followers similarly took on Misnagdic aspects, such as the emphasis on Torah 
study and yeshiva learning, sometimes de-emphasising radical mysticism. 
However, Heilman (1992: 26) notes that these differences were merely 
‘neutralised’ on the eve of the Second World War, only to resurface some three 
generations later when tradition seemed more secure. However, in 1912 in 
Kattowicz in Upper Silesia, Orthodox Jews concerned with the development of 
both Reform Judaism and Zionism joined to overcome the differences between 
Misnagdim, Hasidim and both Orthodox east and West European Jewry in the 
foundation of the Agudat Israel union, including its own council of leading 
rabbis.  
By the end of nineteenth century, of the six million Jews living in 
Europe, approximately a third of this population would partake in a mass 
migration, following the anti-Jewish outbreaks, and the devastation of many 
communities during the First World War and finally the severe measures 
imposed upon Jewish traditional way of life by the U.S.S.R. government. The 
vast majority of east and southern European Jews moved to the U.S., 
considered a trefe medina, an unkosher state by the religiously observant 
(Heilman 1992: 29; Gutwirth 1999: 605). Objections to those that chose to 
emigrate to Israel were motivated by the rejection of secular Zionism, 
unacceptable to the strictly Orthodox view of the notion of a ‘Jewish state’, 
which was not established on Torah foundations (Heilman 1992: 29). 
Traditionalist Jews were therefore among the last to emigrate before the Second 
World War. Belcove-Shalin (1995a: 8) nevertheless argues that the history of 
Hasidism in North America does date back to the nineteenth century. Minor 
rebbes or ‘shiktl rebbes’ – persons claiming a distinguished ancestry or descent 
to established Hasidic leaders, or simply noted for their charismatic authority – 
and Hasidic congregations were then established and flourished, most notably 
the fist ‘American’ Hasidic court in Boston in 1916.  
Cohn-Sherbock (1996: 65-66) notes that in the period in-between the 
great wars, Poland contained the largest number of European Jews, more than a 
third of these being Hasidim and associated with Agudat Israel. The most 
important court at the time was that of Ger, whose rebbe escaped to Israel in 
1940. The Holocaust finally almost destroyed Eastern European Jewry, 
including many of the Hasidic and Misnagdic communities. After 
modernisation and Zionism however, Heilman (1992: 31) notes that 
paradoxically, this destruction simultaneously: 
 
…created the conditions which enabled the spread of ultra-Orthodoxy. 
This trauma intensified the sense of breach that mass migration and the 
social changes that accompanied it had already aroused in Jewish 
consciousness. After the Holocaust there was no going back. Now even 
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the most traditionally oriented of Jews were forced to reincarnate the 
past. A new religious framework was created by the survivors.     
 
Only a few rebbes and their followers survived the Holocaust, some returning 
to Poland from the U.S.S.R., Romania and Hungary, but the vast majority of 
them left for America and later on for Israel, where ‘weak’ forms of Orthodoxy 
were surrounded by an undermining secular culture, to be rekindled by the 
traditionalist survivor immigrants. In Israel then again, there had been a long 
settlement of Orthodox Jews, particularly in Jerusalem where the traditionalist 
way of life was upheld. Here however, this world was also surrounded by 
secularism and particularly in its Zionistic form. The ‘new world haredim’ as 
Heilman (1992) calls them, as survivors had a ‘special sense of mission’, in 
bringing the image of a mythical past back to life. They continued to dress as 
their forebears had done, spoke Yiddish and even identified themselves with the 
European names of the Hasidic communities before the war.  
In the U.S., New York became the city where most of the Hasidim 
would settle and re-establish their courts.46 Until this day these growing 
communities are for the most part concentrated in three areas of Brooklyn. 
Williamsburg is home to mostly Hasidim of Hungarian and Romanian origins, 
with the extremely ultra-Orthodox anti-Zionist Satmar being demographically, 
politically and religiously the most important group. There already lived many 
Jews in the area of Borough Park before the war, yet afterwards the 
neighbourhood became very Hasidic (some 80% of the 75.000 Jews). Finally, 
the Lubavitcher are the most prominent group in the area called Crown Heights. 
After the war, many Hasidim settled here, but since the sixties, they have 
become a minority amongst the Afro-American population. Outside of New 
York, Hasidic communities live spread throughout the U.S. and Canada, some 
in isolated communities, others in particular neighbourhoods in major cities.       
The rebbe of Ger managed to escape from Nazi persecution and settled 
in Jerusalem, like the rabbi Jehiel Joseph Rabinowicz carried on the traditions 
of Binla and Przysucha (Cohn-Sherbock 1996: 67-68). Jerusalem attracted 
many Hasidim, also because here strictly Orthodox communities had been 
present before the war (such as the neighbourhood Mea Shearim). Another 
known community, that of Belz, revived since the establishment of the rabbi 
Aaron Rokeah of Belz who has similarly managed to escape from the Nazis. 
The largest Israeli population of Hasidim is concentrated in Bnei Berak, some 
five kilometres from the centre of Tel Aviv, where numerous Hasidic 
communities and their rebbes live. Bnei Berak is also the centre of the 
Vischnitz dynasty, originating from nineteenth century Moldavia. Chabad or 
Lubavitcher settlements are to be found in Kfar Chabad (five miles from Tel 
Aviv) and Nahalat Har Chabad.  
Outside of North America and Israel, Hasidic and Misnagdic 
communities are to be found virtually everywhere, from Australia, Western 
Europe, and South America to South Africa. Most notable is the Hasidic 
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population in North-west London, where Belzer, Bobower, Gerer and Satmarer 
live in Stamford Hill and Golders Green. Manchester, Glasgow, Leeds and 
Liverpool are also home to smaller Hasidic communities. Other Hasidic 
communities thrive in numerous cities and places from Paris to Montreal 
(Belz), and from Switzerland to Antwerp, Belgium.         
 
                 
Studying Communities: The Hasidim 
 
In the introduction to a recent compilation of ethnographic studies on Hasidic 
Jews in America, Janet S. Belcove-Shalin (1995a: 13) notes that despite the 
Hasidim being the subject of historical, philosophical, and popular accounts 
dating back to the nineteenth century, the social scientific study of Hasidim is a 
far more recent endeavour. Even in contemporary religious studies approaches, 
the focus is often on Hasidism in its historical and theological content. Typical 
is the detailed description of the development of the movement since its 
foundation in eighteenth century Eastern Europe and its central characteristics 
such as its emphasis on hitalahavut (enthusiasm and joy) above formalism in 
prayer and study and the cult of the zaddik, and the development of the diverse 
courts under the figure of the dynastic charismatic rebbe. Belcove-Shalin 
argues that the dearth of contemporary and social scientific approaches until the 
seventies was influenced by the secularisatio n/modernisation thesis that 
dominated American ethnography and sociology of religion. It was assumed 
that religion was dying and that Jews in western society were progressively 
becoming assimilated with Judaism evolving further into a ‘civil religion’. At 
the very least, it was expected that in the U.S. religious Jews would increasingly 
become affiliated with Progressive redefinitions of Judaism such as 
Conservative and Reform in an accommodation of religious belief and practice 
modelled on the dominant modern forms of Christianity in the broader society. 
In the sociology of Jewry, this thesis explained the relegation of Orthodox 
Jewry to the position of ‘a residual category’ of research (Mayer 1973).  
Particularly strictly Orthodox Jewish communities such as the Hasidim, 
a minute minority within the already small minority of Orthodox Jewry, and 
especially since the holocaust, were conceived as remnants of the past, destined 
to gradually disappear under the influence of modernisation.47 Confronted with 
the demographical facts of the growth of Hasidic populations around the world 
and other traditionalist movements more generally, to this date the survival and 
therefore the relevance of studying such religious communities is hardly 
superfluous. Authors like Dan Cohn-Sherbok (1996: 70) nevertheless believe 
that due to the conflict between the Hasidic belief in divine authority and 
contemporary biblical scholarship and ‘scientific facts’, that ‘despite the 
efflorescence of Hasidim in contemporary Jewish society, it is inconceivable 
that Hasidism could provide an overarching framework for Jewish living in the 
twenty-first century’. 
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The pioneering ethnographic studies on Hasidim such as Williamsburg: 
A Jewish Community in Transition  by George Kranzler published in 1961 and 
The Hasidic Community of Williamsburg: A Study in the Sociology of Religion 
by Solomon Poll in 1962 even expressed doubts as to the survival of these 
otherwise thriving traditionalistic communities. In retrospect Belcove-Shalin 
(1995a: 14) argues that these doubts were completely unfounded. Since the 
sixties to the present day, ethnographic studies of Hasidic communities have 
been limited in number, yet less doubtful as to the their survival and growth. 
The vast majority of this traditional ethnographical monographic work has 
furthermore predominantly focussed on North America, followed by a much 
smaller number of more recent studies on or including the Haredim in Israel 
published during in the nineties (Heilman 1992; Landau 199348; El-Or 1994). 
Finally, the ethnographic study of strictly Orthodox Jewish communities in 
Europe has been limited, save Jacques Gutwirth’s research on the Belzer 
Hasidim in Antwerp (1968; 1970), and Harry Rabinowicz’s recently published, 
yet more historical account of the Hasidim in Britain.49 
Belcove-Shalin’s (1995a) review of the ethnographic literature on 
Hasidim not only points to the relatively small number of studies, but also their 
rather ‘traditional’ approach. Besides the absence of more new lines of inquiry, 
such as ‘feminist theory’ and anthropology of religion, much of this research 
has employed the ethnographical holistic technique of detailed descriptions of 
the beliefs and practices of a particular neighbourhood or dynasty, tending to 
‘avoid comparisons with other religious communities, Hasidic or non-Hasidic’ 
(16). As a general editor Belcove-Shalin then claims that the ethnographic 
articles that follow the introduction in her book help to fill in these important 
lacunae by moving beyond earlier traditional approaches. Leaving the question 
whether more contemporary research has taken on perspectives influenced by 
‘feminist theory’ or comparison aside at this point, one may wonder whether 
past research has given attention to the issue of gender at its very first level of 
critique as explained in chapter three: do women in this research figure as 
religious agents? Notable for example, is that in the foreword to the very same 
volume, Samuel C. Heilman (1995: xiv) writes on the contemporary ‘Hasid’ in 
a way that parallels the most basic kind of androcentrism in religious studies 
and other disciplines which from the very beginnings feminist scholars were 
most critical of: 
 
To be a Hasid today means more than simply following a rebbe. It 
means spending extended time in a yeshiva, plumbing texts and 
insulating oneself and one’s family (especially children) from the 
attractions of the world outside its walls. It means staying away from the 
rough and tumble of making a living or else investing it with ontological 
inferiority – with the inevitable compromises that it engenders. In Israel 
it means staying out of the army with the erosion of religious authority 
and the mixing of secular and religious, boy and girl that occasions. 
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In this statement Heilman is taking the male Hasid for the normative Hasid, as 
Hasidic women do not spend any time at all in a yeshiva, ‘plumbing’ the texts 
of the Talmud, which is entirely a male activity in Hasidic communities. 
Reviewing the older traditional ethnographic material shows the same lacunae.  
 
 
Locating Hasidic Women in Traditional Ethnographies 
 
In two such traditional ethnographical studies of Hasidic communities it can be 
illustrated how both Jerome M. Mintz (1968) and Jacques Gutwirth (1970) take 
man as the normative Hasid, viewing woman as ‘other’. Jerome M. Mintz 
(1968) in a study of the Hasidic community in New York in the late fifties and 
early sixties takes a somewhat different approach than the classical structure of 
an ethnographic monograph, in that it takes a Boasian approach in studying the 
culture of a community through its oral tales and legends. First tales were 
collected among informants from a variety of the New York Hasidic courts, 
followed by a distillation of the particular themes. This served as an inroad for 
more general questions on other subjects, values and attitudes: ‘The narratives 
were therefore used as a mirror of belief and custom, and also as an 
investigative tool, serving at times as a means of obtaining value judgements’ 
(Mintz 1968: 16). Towards the end of the introduction and in commenting on 
the applied methodology it becomes clear that the vast majority of more than 
150 informants interviewed were male (19): ‘Unfortunately, very few women 
were interviewed and opportunities to observe infant care were limited. (The 
law prohibits a woman from being alone with a man other than her husband or 
father.)’ The fact that women were hardly interviewed, and the reason for this 
discrepancy is thus merely noted in brackets. Mintz’s book is divided into two 
parts, the first on the Hasidic people themselves, including chapters on the 
history and settlement of the community, followed by the life in the courts, 
youth and marriage, the figure of the rebbe, the mitzvot, supernatural beings 
and magic and relationships with gentiles and non-Orthodox Jews. Chapter 
three on ‘court life’ departs entirely from the male as the normative Hasid, 
illustrated by sentences similar to that of the quote by Heilman above (Mintz 
1968: 48-49): 
 
Like all orthodox Jews, the hasidim meet at the besmedresh50 for three 
daily prayer services – at any time from dawn until noon for the 
morning prayer (sharis), and at dusk for the afternoon prayer (minheh) 
and the evening prayer (mairev). The morning prayer appears to be the 
most solemn as the talis (prayer shawl) and tefillin (phylacteries) are 
worn. Since only ten men are required for a minyen (quorum) to begin 
services, there may be several morning services, sometimes overlapping. 
During the week, when the strict Shabbes prohibitions are not in force, 
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the scene is one of ease and bustling activity: collections for charity are 
made; some-one may be selling yarmelkhes, books, or pens; another 
may be passing out political or religious broadsheets; men are studying 
aloud in pairs or in groups; small groups may be chatting, exchanging 
jokes and confidences, and smoking cigarettes before prayer; and 
children may be racing through playing tag. Many of the men come to 
besmedresh early in the morning before prayers or return late in the 
evening in order to study and discuss talmudic writings.    
 
Despite the fact that Mintz’s views the besmedresh as the ‘central point for the 
activities of the hasidic court’ (48), this passage does not at all make clear what 
role Hasidic women play in the besmedresh, or in which of the more or less 
serious social activities they are included. Nowhere in the entire description of 
the Hasidic social structure patters does it explicitly become clear that in fact 
the women both traditionally, as in all Hasidic communities to date, do not 
participate in these prayer services, and wear ‘talis and tefillin’. What we know 
is that they are not counted in the minyan. It is not clear if women are present 
during the weekly ‘ease and bustling activity’ of making jokes and smoking 
cigarettes, although children do seem to be present. The style of Mintz’s 
ethnographical description is that it is assumed that women do not participate in 
the learning of the Talmud. Not until a description of the ‘outward signs’ of 
‘yiddishkeit’ do we learn that contradictory to Hasidic men’s peyes, beards and 
black kaftan, women ‘wear long-sleeved though fashionable dresses, and 
married women wear wigs or other head coverings’ (57). Under the listing of 
the professional occupations by Hasidic men, we only learn that while in 
Eastern Europe Hasidic women attended to business so men could engage 
exclusively in study and prayer, this pattern has shifted in the New World, with 
men being main providers and studying less hours to spend more time on 
‘family affairs’ (62). 
Gutwirth’s ethnology of the Belzer Hasidim of Antwerp (1970) Belgium 
is an extensive and detailed study based on methods of interviews and 
participant observation, including historical and demographical analysis of one 
of the six Hasidic communities of the late sixties in Antwerp51, the Belzer 
counting 418 individuals in 1963 (Gutwirth 1970: 12). Gutwirth’s main 
objective is to provide as complete as possible a description and analysis of this 
community in its social and religious aspects, and secondly to approach a 
scientific explanation of the general factors which contribute to the cohesion 
and ‘balance’ of the community (422). As in an earlier article by the same 
author (1968), much attention is paid to techno-economical activities (in 
particular the diamond trade and industry) of the community, which are 
strikingly similar to those of the Eastern European shtetl (village), which 
contributes to the strong sense of religious and social identity of the 
community. As opposed to Mintz’s study, first hand quotations are very limited 
and the author clearly wishes to provide complete and ‘objective’ detailed 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 273
descriptions and analysis, rather than an insight into the native point of view. 
Nowhere is it stated how many women were actually interviewed, how much 
access was gained into familial life and the domestic sphere, or how the gender 
of the researcher influenced the research results. Similar to Mintz, the first fact 
we learn about Hasidic women is stated in the introduction after a short 
description of men’s attire as illustrative of the extent to which this community 
strictly adheres to Jewish law (13-14): 
 
Les hommes ont notamment les barbes touffes et des “papillotes” 
(mèches de cheveux près des temps), ils portent des chapeaux noirs 
d’une type particulier et des lévites. Les femmes dissimulent leurs 
cheveux coupés très court sous un foulard ou sous un perruque. Les 
jeunes garçons ont des papillotes et portent des képis de velours noirs.  
 
In the third chapter on the formation and growth of the Antwerp community, we 
learn Gutwirth’s main interpretation of the place of the Belzer women, which 
will be repeated in the following chapters (40):  
 
La formation de la communauté fut essentiellement un fait masculin. 
Chez les hassidim de Belz, les femmes se cantonnent surtout dans les 
fonctions familiales et elles ne furent pas des protagonistes actifs de la 
mise en place de l’organisation communautaire. Elle n’en faisaient (et 
n’en font encore) partie que dans la mesure ou elles appartiennent à la 
famille d’un fidèle en tant qu’épouse, fille, mère ou belle-mère.  
 
Gutwirth thus clearly defines the ‘community’ itself in terms of the public 
sphere, observing women as but passive objects, belonging to the family of a 
‘believer’, paradigmatically defined as male. This view of woman as other is 
testified in expressions throughout the whole monograph, such as: ‘…les 
adeptes, leurs femmes et leurs enfants…’ (133).  
In Mintz’s monograph, not until half way through the fourth chapter on 
‘youth and marriage’ do we learn what the main religio us duties for the woman 
consist of: ‘the preparation of the food, the bearing of children, the religious 
training of the young, and the maintenance of the purity of the home by careful 
attendance at the mikveh and observation of the attendant sexual regulations’ 
(79). In certain passages throughout the chapter, relations between men and 
women are discussed, such as the strict separation between the sexes and the 
taboo on the topic of sexuality. In the final paragraph on ‘the upbringing of 
women’ we finally learn more about the different education for girls, and the 
secrecy and shame surrounding the ritual of visiting the mikvah. The following 
reason is given for the fact that girls do not study Talmud (Mintz 1968: 83): ‘In 
the hasidic hierarchy of values, women are accorded less importance than men. 
As a result education is considerably different for hasidic girls than for boys. As 
the hasidim do not regard the intellect of girls to be equal to that of boys, it is 
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considered sufficient if they learn about the Bible, the religious holidays, and 
the dietary laws.’ The first statement is grounded in a footnote that refers to two 
seemingly contradictory sources, – fact or legend? – perhaps referring to some 
doubts by the author as to women’s complete inferiority or more ambiguous 
status in Hasidic culture: ‘See Maimon’s Autobiography52, p. 176, where the 
hasidim threaten to whip one of their fellows whose wife had given birth to a 
girl. In Praise of the Besht53, no. 107, a hasid would go to the Besht for an 
amulet and give him money even  when his wife gave birth to a girl’ [author’s 
emphasis] (Mintz 1968: 83, no. 10). 
Gutwirth’s ethnology consists of five-hundred pages of detailed 
analysis, divided into chapters on demographical facts, professional activities, 
organisation of community life, separate chapters on the daily, yearly religious 
cycle and the Sabbath, the marriage ceremony, the cult of the rebbe, 
matrimonial system, social integration, etc. In all these chapters, the focus lays 
on the male Belz Hasid and his main function within both ethnographically 
observable and official religious rites and roles. Chapter seven consists of 
nearly forty pages of description of male daily and ceremonial Hasidic 
appearance and attire, in chapter twelve, the ‘sociocultural integration of the 
male child’ is studied. In contrast to Mintz, Gutwirth does devote one chapter 
(chapter thirteen which is the shortest of the whole book) to ‘la femme’, which 
begins with the statement that ‘seuls certains aspects de la situation féminine 
seront évoqués ici’ (323). It does not entirely become clear if and/or in what 
way the invisibility or irrelevance of Belzer women in Gutwirth’s study is a 
reflection of their actual status in the community, or that this is determined by 
male bias in the research process, and the definition of what counts as the 
important religious and social and educational parameters of the community. 
Gutwirth notes that the woman only participates in a ‘marginal, secondary’ way 
in community life and the religious cycle. However, she is to be found ‘au 
coeur de la vie du foyer, dont elle assure le caractère conforme à la tradition, 
mettant par ailleurs au monde de nombreux enfants qu'elle doit élever et 
soigner’ (323). Opposed to the socio -cultural integration of the male child, no 
singular equivalent rite such as circumcision or bar mitzvah exists for the girl. 
The absence or marginal role of girls in what Gutwirth counts as the normative 
forms of community and religious life thus furthermore leads him to conclude 
that ‘chez les Belzer, la condition subordonnée de la femme est un fait établi…’ 
(ibid.)  
The remainder of the chapter on Belzer women describes women’s 
appearance and attire, the school system for Hasidic girls in Antwerp of the 
sixties, women’s professional activities and their social position in general, and 
finally a few notes on sexuality and married life. Essential to women’s 
appearance is their conformance to the rules of ‘decency’ and ‘non-sexual 
provocation’, which according to Gutwirth starts from childhood. This entails 
the covering of the neck, and knees and elbows with three quarter or full-length 
sleeves. Married Belzer women will cut their hair short after their wedding, and 
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cover it with a kerchief, turban or a wig. As for education for girls, Gutwirth 
emphasises the limits placed on religious education compared to boys, which is 
compensated by the exposure to more profane subjects, albeit both geared to 
girls future roles as housewives (328): 
 
Le savoir reste axé sur la formation nécessaire à un future épouse de 
hassid, qui élève ses enfants, tient un ménage et aide éventuellement son 
mari à écrire une lettre, à tenir des comptes, sans que de telles 
connaissances, du moins selon les valeurs traditionelles, lui assurent une 
quelconque supériorité sur les hommes. […] En vérité, le caractère de 
l’enseignement féminin relève entièrement de la conception des 
hassidim quant à role de la femme dans la vie juive. A la femme 
reviennent les connaissances ménagères et pratiques, un acquis religieux 
utile à la familiale; à l’homme revient le savoir noble et élevé, celui qui 
concerne un véritable approfondissement des textes sacrés et des lois. Et 
cette division complémentaire est basée sur une conception de la 
supériorité de l’homme auquel, seul, sont ouverts les domaines les plus 
importants [emphasis mine]. 
 
That the Belzer themselves harbour this view is then illustrated with – a rare – 
quote by the headmaster (cited by name) of the Belzer school for girls ‘Benos’ 
that was founded in 1955 (328-329): 
 
‘Si une femme pratiquait la circoncision ou était abatteur rituel, nous 
n’aurions jamais la certitude qu’elle observe correctement les 
prescriptions.’ … ‘De toute façon, elles ne sont pas aussi douées pour 
les études que les hommes.’ Ce fidèle ajoute: ‘Pour la paix du ménage, il 
vaut mieux qu’une femme ne soit pas trop savante; elle ne doit pas 
discuter avec son mari, il ne faut pas qu’elle puisse lui dire: Tu es un 
ignorant’. 
 
Gutwirth adds to this that opinions such as these are the doctrine of the 
community and largely shared by all male believers, yet does not give any 
insight or mention of what women have to say. The writer even applies the 
notion of ‘apartheid’ in the description of this sex-segregated system based on 
male superiority and female dependence. As for the code of decency and its 
impact on the sexual relations between women and men, Gutwirth remains 
short: the Hasidim are strongly reserved on this highly private subject. 
Sexuality itself is sanctified and this sexual morality with the ideology of 
monogamy and procreation and the division of labour, which according to 
Gutwirth is linked to and reinforces the type of socio-economic system and 
division of labour within a commercial and capitalist environment (334).         
Mintz’s ethnographical descriptions of the Hasidim, both women and 
men of Williamsburg are less extensive and detailed than those of Gutwirth. 
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Although like Gutwirth, Mintz does take the Hasidic male to be the normative 
Hasidic person, as is reflected in both the research process and the style of 
ethnographic writing and representation, some passages in Mintz’s work do 
seem to point to instances of women’s agency and perhaps insight as to the 
influence of ‘male bias’ due to the methodological limitations. Apart from the 
introductory remark noted above that Mintz hardly interviewed any women, 
this instance of male bias is alluded to concerning the tales, which form the 
content of the second part of the book: ‘Since the tales are told by men rather 
than by women, they contain the accepted male attitudes’ (86). Mintz’s most 
insightful observations as to the life of Hasidic women in the New York 
community, is the fact that women are more than men exposed to secular 
culture. This not only results from the fact that they have the opportunity to 
follow secular education (college) whilst boys visit the yeshiva, but also from 
the difference of their life style from that of Hasidic women in Eastern 
European life of the past. While Hasidic women no longer are the main 
providers or the ‘business women’, but more focussed on the home, they do go 
to movies, read secular books, listen to the radio, and watch television, which is 
unknown terrain for boys and men. Hasidic women also seem to be ‘coming to 
demand a larger role in hasidic life’ (85), expressing their resentment when 
husbands spend too much time away from home fulfilling their public religious 
obligations. The main areas in which women do briefly feature in this chapter 
on ‘youth and marriage’ are those of courtship and marriage, the ‘reverence 
towards mothers’, sexuality and the laws of family purity.  
The laws of family purity are one area that Gutwirth remains reticent 
about, despite his treatment of the important rules of decency and women’s 
proper role within the family sphere. Nowhere in Gutwirth’s extensive 
monograph is there any mention of the monthly visit to the mikvah, or the laws 
of niddah, which besides women’s mothering and domestic obligations, consist 
of the most important religious obligation women must perform. Mintz does not 
give any precise details on the sexual regulations married women must follow, 
yet does note their importance as illustrated by the ‘tales’ that tell of the 
consequences women face who ignore them (Mintz 1968: 79): ‘One tale notes 
that neglect in attending the mikveh may result in harm to one’s offspring. 
Punishment can be even more direct for those who despise their obligations, as 
one tale of a fiery bath indicates.’ 
 
 
Has Anything Changed? Androcentrism in Contemporary Studies of Hasidim   
 
Nearly twenty five years after Hasidic Legends, Jerome R. Mintz (1994) 
published a new book on the Hasidim of New York, this time in the form of a 
‘social history’, based on interviews, ethnographic observation and secondary 
material such as newspaper files and court records. According to Mintz, central 
to this study are the Hasidic people themselves, concerning ‘family life, social 
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organization, social change, and conflict within the Hasidic community’ (1). 
The history and the conflicts are primarily understood and represented as the 
intra-communitarian struggles between the different New York Courts, such as 
the Satmar, M’lochim, Lubavitch, Bobov, Stolin. These even involve conflicts 
between the Hasidim and the broader community, such as the ‘race relations’ in 
Crown Heights, or the participation of New York Hasidim in local politics and 
their usage of the secular courts.   
Despite this broad focus on the politics and history of the New York 
Hasidic communities in the contemporary ‘new world’ and their struggles to 
retain their traditional way of life and distinct identity vis-à-vis each other and 
the surrounding secular society, Mintz’s ethnography definitely provides much 
more insight on the lives of Hasidic women compared to earlier work. This is 
reflected in his research methodology and a variety of topics, ethnographic 
citations and descriptions. From the list of cited informants at the end of the 
book  (413-415) it can be inferred that approximately a quarter of the 
interviewees were in fact women, ranging from Hasidic ‘housewives’ and 
‘young women’ to social workers and therapists. In the subject index the 
category ‘women’ is included, relating to more than twenty ‘related features’, 
such as education, clothing and wigs, synagogues, mothers, kosher foods, 
abortion, driving cars, working outside the home, marriage and mikvah, etc 
(434). The lives of Hasidic women are most extensively discussed in three 
chapters on ‘families’ (chapter 6) and ‘family problems’ (chapters 16 and 20, 
the latter from the perspective of therapists).      
After describing and actually citing some female informants on their 
experience and views on the education of boys and girls and the process of 
courtship, compared to the more traditional ethnographies discussed above, it 
becomes more explicitly clear what women’s main responsibilities are. These 
stand opposite to religious learning, the ritual role and the political and religious 
leadership positions that are the prerogative of men alone:  
 
Women care for the children and maintain the purity of the marriage and 
the household. They visit the Rebbe to ask for a blessing. Women help 
raise funds for the needy, and look in on the sick, shop and cook meals 
for them. They light the Shabbes candles and prepare the house for the 
holy days.  In earlier times in some courts, the day before Yom Kippur 
the ladies’ auxiliary would bring in wax, roll it out, and place wicks in 
the newly made candles. Religious ceremonies in the besmedresh, 
however, are carried out only by men. The women prepare food for the 
Rebbe’s tish and for the melave-malke, but only the men attend these 
gatherings. Men crowd the main floor for prayer and study, while a 
smaller space set off from the main floor, or often a balcony, is reserved 
for the women. A curtain or a woven wooden lattice shields the women 
from the men’s sight. On holy days some of the women congregate 
behind the lattice to pray and watch the activities on the main floor of 
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the besmedresh. In the social as well as the religious spheres men and 
women remain apart. When families attend a wedding or a bris 
(circumcision) the men and women celebrate the occasion in separate 
rooms. There is, however, a clear harmony in ceremonial and ritual 
occasions. In shul on the fast day of Yom Kippur the women supply the 
wailing and the tears that augment the cries and means of men (Mintz 
1994: 66).      
 
In this description of Hasidic women’s proper role, women’s activities that do 
not take place in the actual male defined centre of religious public life, at least 
do not remain invisible nor are they trivialised, such as in Gutwirth’s approach 
above. Mintz nonetheless infers that women do hold a subservient position, by 
referring to the proper conduct when a couple pays a visit to the Rebbe (67): 
‘The Rebbe is even more circumspect toward women than are his followers. He 
will not shake a woman’s hand or even look directly at her. The husband is seen 
as the head of the family’. Although this form of proper conduct and the 
husband’s primary role in the interaction with the Rebbe is then supported by a 
quotation by a Hasidic woman herself, Mintz is the one to interpret this as an 
act expressing women’s inferior status. From the statement ‘women’s lower 
station in the religious sphere is considered to be balanced by the respect they 
receive for their role in the household’ (67), it can then be assumed that there is 
some ambiguity on the part of the author as to the Hasidic viewpoint on 
women’s inferiority or equality in value. However, again the household and the 
women’s activities therein are themselves not to be conceived of as religious 
activities or to be included as what counts as the religious sphere. 
More so than in the older studies discussed in the preceding paragraph, 
Mintz discusses and cites Hasidic women on, or in the context of topics such as 
arranged marriages, having and educating children, the ‘religious mitzvah and 
social benefit’ of having large families, and attitudes towards birth control. In 
two chapters on ‘family problems’, both Hasidic women, men and therapists are 
cited on conflicts in families, including a few critical or rebellious women who 
may experience the rules of modesty as a burden, or who are critical of the 
expectations for their roles as mother and housewife. Mintz attributes some 
rebellious or critical attitudes to the fact that in recent years a number of 
Hasidic women are working outside of the community and thereby have 
become exposed the changes in women’s status in the outside world. Contact 
with secular society is limited though, and most knowledge is gained by 
exposure to the media such as magazines and sometimes the TV. According to 
Mintz however (183), although ‘community mores and standards are stretched 
and sometimes broken […], these lapses do not appear to call into question 
religious faith and acceptance of the Hasidic world view.’  
Another known male researcher who has continued to conduct and 
publish on strictly Orthodox Jewish communities since the seventies is the 
sociologist Samuel Heilman, also contributor to a piece on Jewish 
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fundamentalism in Marty and Appleby’s famous Chicago fundamentalism 
project (Heilman 1999). Heilman’s 1979 publication on synagogue life amongst  
Hasidim has been criticised (e.g. Sacks 1995: 303) for its male-centred focus of 
the strictly Orthodox world. Heilman’s (1992) more rec ent book on the Hasidim 
of Jerusalem, offers a portrait of what Heilman calls the Haredim in Israel, 
based on methods of participant observation as both an ‘insider and an outsider’ 
to Jewish communities (361). Whilst making these conceptual distinctions in 
terms of analysis, Heilman’s ethnography reads much like a travel story, written 
in the first person and clearly influenced by the ‘new ethnography’ in 
recognising the researcher’s own subjectivity and experience as central to the 
research process (e.g. Heilman refers to James Clifford’s innovative approach, 
138, 361). Heilman thus emphasises ‘epistemological empathy’, acknowledges 
the filter of the observer’s interpretation, and in general rejects traditional 
ethnographic objectivism. Heilman also reflects on his own positioning, such as 
his own personal motivation for the undertaking of this study, as an American 
Orthodox Jew in search of his ‘roots’. However, gender does not feature as any 
relevant parameter to the research process or its results. Although ‘women’ are 
featured in the book, as the category ‘women’ is to be found in the index like in 
Mintz’s work, and they appear in between the ‘grander narratives’ on 
synagogue life. However, there where they are commented upon, this usually 
involves Hared i women’s appearance, or concerns the segregation between the 
sexes in general, such as with mehitzah in the synagogue or in the educational 
system. Not until the very last chapter - on sexuality -, does it become known 
whether Heilman, and if he did, why he did or did not interview any women 
(332): 
 
Because as a haredi woman Breindel could not be alone with a man who 
was not her husband, Beryl was our constant companion throughout our 
conversations, although to give his wife some freedom he had 
sometimes gone to another room or when he was with us immersed 
himself in a book. Indeed, during all my conversations with haredi 
women, their husbands were within sight as we spoke, a fact that 
undoubtedly played a part in all I heard.  
 
The three main analytical motifs in Heilman’s ‘ethnographical bricolage’ 
consist of respectively ‘community’, ‘education’ and ‘passages’. Again, the 
community, ‘I follow them to their celebrations and gatherings to find out what 
is important to them and how they bond together’ (xx), is defined as the male 
dominated public sphere of the synagogue and yeshiva. This is testified in an 
account of the author’s participation in a visit to the men’s mikvah on the day 
before Yom Kippur, or in the discussion of the celebration of a bar mitzvah or 
the gathering of male Hasidim around the Rebbe’s Tisch on Sabbath. Heilman 
describes the presence of women at the bar mitzvah celebration as follows in 
terms of their outward appearance only (56): 
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The little girls wore their most elaborate finery; their mothers wore 
fancy dresses and, in line with the custom of the married keeping their 
own hair under cover, finely coiffed wigs on their heads. Indeed, the 
attractive women were perhaps the most striking sight of all as I 
approached. As I looked at these women, I could not help thinking to 
myself that I did not know they all had husbands who looked as if they 
came out of an earlier century, I would suppose their spouses to look as 
up-to-date as the women did.                          
 
Haredi women’s appearance is also described in a chapter on a pilgrimage, 
noting on the rules of modesty and the injunction for covering their hair (122): 
 
Although all the women had their heads covered, and each wore a high-
necked, long-sleeved dress, even on the warm spring day, to cover all 
hint of nakedness, they did manage to find ways of displaying their 
femininity and attracting attention. It was the way they wiggled 
themselves when they moved or even more in the way they decorated 
themselves. Dressed in their finest, many of the wigged ladies sported 
large brooches, sparkling necklaces, diamond rings, and jeweled 
bracelets. Even those in austere black kerchiefs had pierced their ears, in 
which they wore small but glimmering earrings. 
 
In a chapter on a men’s gathering at the Rebbe’s table on the Friday Sabbath, 
women’s participation in the community is interpreted as follows (84): 
 
Women were not actually locked at home on Sabbaths, although after 
preparimg [sic] the multicourse meals and caring for their many 
children, they might not have much sense of their own freedom. Still, 
they sometimes did go out for a walk with the children on long summer 
Sabbath afternoons, but that was a different type of community activity, 
something not endowed with religious or spiritual significance. […] 
Even on those special occasions when women did come to a rebbe’s 
tisch (as at the Belz bar mitzvah), they commonly were kept at the 
margins of the crowd: upstairs in a gallery or outside on the street, 
peeking in at a window. For them communion emanated from the home 
and hearth and was experienced through their husbands and children – 
which is why marriage and a family were an absolute prerequisite for 
being a haredi woman.  
 
The second major part of Heilman’s ethnography on the education of Haredim, 
is based on participant observation in various classrooms and interviews with 
male students and teachers, from kindergarten, through to primary school and 
the yeshiva. The education of girls is only mentioned in that there is a strict 
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segregation of the sexes, and that even only teachers will teach children of the 
same sex. In brackets, Heilman remarks that increasing numbers of Haredi 
women have been entering the teaching profession in the last forty years; This 
fits in a general trend of women working outside the home due to economic 
pressures (181). In the final part on rites of passage, the process of 
matchmaking, a wedding and a funeral are described. Again, women are only 
occasionally described and seldom is their own voice heard. In one paragraph 
titled ‘Moshe’s daughter’ for example, Heilman tells a story of how a Hasid’s 
sixteen-year-old daughter became betrothed, yet the tale is solely based on an 
interview with her father Moshe (280).  
Unlike the ethnographers discussed above, however, Heilman digresses 
on the topic of sexuality, which first becomes apparent in a chapter on the 
posters which are prominent on the walls in Haredi neighbourhoods, which 
beside being important announcements and advertisements, also contain 
prescriptions for proper conduct regarding the ways to dress, eat, and they offer 
moral guidance and political advice. Referring to those posters urging women 
to dress modestly, which list appropriate dress and behaviour for girls and 
women, Heilman sees these outward and public warnings that function to 
regulate and control (women’s) sexuality as an almost Freudian repression of 
sexual instincts (308):  
 
For haredim nothing so much embodied sexuality as a woman. Her hair, 
arms, legs, and voice were enough to arouse the basest instincts. Thus, 
in public, on the street, in the presence of men, women had to be 
properly covered. Signs proclaimed this message again and again.  
 
And (309): 
 
Modesty has to be inculcated again and again, for sexual appetites were 
always lurking below cover, at all times and ages, ready to burst through 
and confound erlicher Yidn. 
 
Heilman’s final chapter, ‘The Triumph of Sex’ is wholly devoted to the topic of 
Haredi notions of the body and sexuality between women and men. Whilst the 
author expected this ‘normally unspeakable region’ would be difficult to learn 
about, he notes that as an outsider, he had the advantage in for that a number of 
informants, he served as the ‘perfect stranger’ with whom they could share 
some of the private secrets they would not speak of with other members of the 
community (314-5). For the greater part of the chapter, Heilman relies on the 
interviews conducted with a married couple of the strict Hasidic community of 
the Reb Arlech. Heilman quotes both husband and wife, yet notes that in all 
conversations with Breindel, her husband Beryl was always present according 
to the rules of the interaction between men and women, which applies to both 
insiders and outsiders.   
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Heilman describes how and which kind of sexual education both 
individuals received, and the way sexual relations and restraint are imbued with 
spirituality and thereby idealised and contrasted with sexual immorality in the 
secular world. Heilman interprets and counters the viewpoint put forward on 
modesty and sexual restraint by his informants, by insisting sexuality is 
repressed and therefore central to the Haredi way of life. This in then also 
founded on Heilman’s own experience in one of his rare encounters with the 
Haredi woman Breindel (341): 
  
Yet with all this covering on, she occasionally hitched up her leg to 
tighten her thick brown stockings, which went up to her knees. I found 
this moment which allowed me momentarily to see her bare legs, 
arresting – almost suggestive. Certainly, it was not the shape or sight of 
her leg that attracted me. It was rather the thought of it. How Ironic. 
Precisely because they so emphasised covering it up, haredim, far more 
than any other group I knew, had succeeded in transforming a woman’s 
body into a sex object.    
 
In summary, and with exceptions, the greater part of the older and 
ethnographical research on Hasidic or strictly Orthodox Jewish communities, 
yet also some more recent accounts can in general be characterised as sharing 
many androcentric features. The male Hasid and his activities are counted as 
normative or paradigmatic of what it means to be a Hasid and in the practice of 
Hasidic ‘religion’. Hasidic women have clearly been researched, observed and 
interviewed to a far lesser extent than men, although this can be ascribed to the 
(male) sex of the researcher which prevents access due to rules on interaction 
between women and men in these traditionalist and gender segregated 
communities. However, the authors do not particularly reflect on this important 
factor despite the willingness of some to engage in a reflexive approach. The 
ethnographical representation does provide some insight into Hasidic women’s 
lives even if this may be limited and their activities that are sometimes 
trivialised on the part of the author. This is problematic, for in particular 
concerning the interpretation on women’s supposed inferior status or 
subordination, it does not always become clear if this concerns the author’s 
perspective or conversely the ‘native’s’ - men’s or women’s? – point of view. 
Whereas some of the older work remains rather reticent on issues of sexuality, 
Heilman’s recent work – since the ‘sexual revolution’ – in an almost voyeuristic 
sense devotes a whole chapter to the topic of sexuality, although again the laws 
of family purity are not discussed from the Hasidic woman’s point of view. 
 
 
3. Placing Women at the Centre: The Voice of the Hasidista54 
 
Before taking a closer look at the lacunae of some of the recent research that 
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does take Hasidic women as object of study, it is worthwhile to include another 
‘exceptional’ contemporary ethnographical monograph of a Hasidic 
Community that aspires to be gender inclusive. In this particular study, a whole 
chapter is devoted to Hasidic women, drawn on an extensive survey of 
participant observation, formal and informal interviews with some 175 single, 
married, widowed, and divorced women of the Hasidic community of 
Williamsburg in New York. In contrast to the above discussed researchers such 
as Mintz and Heilman, in this study of the Hasidim of Williamsburg, George 
Kranzler (1995) notes the necessity to focus into more depth on the role of 
Hasidic women as compared to his study of Hasidim in the sixties (discussed 
above) (167): 
 
My report (1961) did not deal with the women of Jewish Williamsburg 
in a separate chapter. Yet throughout the discussion of the process that 
changed the structure and dynamics of the old Jewish neighbourhood 
before, during, and after World War II, significant comments from 
women highlighted their role in each phase of the transformation that 
replaced the earlier Jewish population with groups of more intensely 
Orthodox residents. The radical developments, which evolved from the 
impact of the crises that threatened to destroy the Jewish community and 
the turnabout resulting from the decision of the Rebbe of Satmar and 
other Hungarian hasidic leaders to make a stand and fight the forces of 
blight and disintegration, require separate treatment of the role and 
status of the women. Their values and attitudes are a major factor in the 
successful rebirth of the neighborhood. 
 
Kranzler is therefore one of the few amongst the main ethnographers of Hasidic 
communities to conduct an extensive research on Hasidic women55. Not only 
does he treat Hasidic women as a separate category of informants, but also in 
his interpretation of these women as agents in their own right and their 
fundamental role in the development and maintenance of the community and its 
specific identity. The study of the ‘essential Weltanschauung and life-style’ 
(167) of these women covers topics such as demographics, courtship and 
marriage, education, social structure, economic patterns, social welfare, leisure 
and cultural activities and political attitudes. A separate paragraph discusses the 
situation of divorced, widowed and single women. In contrast to the above 
studies, the interviews with Hasidic women themselves allow their own voices 
to be heard on their values and attitudes as to their activities and their status in 
the community. As in other Hasidic communities, the women in Kranzler’s 
study do not follow religious education to the extent that their husbands do, 
they do not have a voice in the administration of the synagogue, or any other 
‘policies’ pertaining to religious or ritual life. However, Kranzler maintains that 
all interviewees saw the raising of a family and their role as mother and 
homemaker as the fulfilment of their proper destiny. Kranzler furthermore 
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concludes that even though outsiders may consider these women discriminated 
and inferior, they are not simply (193): 
 
…caught in ignorance and lack of understanding of the world about 
them. They are not blindly following the line fed to them by their 
leaders because they do not know any better and are unwilling to leave 
the shelter of the East European shtetl, which their parents and 
grandparents had brought with them from deepest Hungary.  
 
In other words, based on the informants’ responses, Kranzler seems to reject the 
idea that these women are mere victims of a patriarchal ideology or 
indoctrinated with ‘false consciousness’, but have actively chosen to embrace 
and accept the strictly Orthodox Jewish gender norms. They hereby consciously 
reject ideas of women’s liberation and self-fulfilment outside of the home that 
prevail in the surrounding society (204). Despite the replication of this native 
viewpoint, however, there are some echoes of doubt in Kranzler’s account. 
Although ‘nothing in their responses suggests any form of rebellion or the 
hidden desire of getting out of this highly structured life’ (205), in a discussion 
of the sample of single women, Kranzler does allude to the efficiency of the 
way these women have been educated into internalising Hasidic gender 
ideology (205): 
 
The overwhelming impression  one gets is that these seventeen young 
ladies are intelligent and fully aware of what is going on in the world 
beyond the invisible walls of their voluntary ghetto. But their education 
has done a good job convincing them of the great value and meaning of 
the life-style of the ultra-Orthodox community into which they have 
been born or brought at a very early age [emphasis mine].    
 
Kranzler not only portrays Hasidic women’s agency by virtue of treating them 
as ethnographic subjects, yet also pays closer attention to areas bypassed by the 
above researchers. Among others, this concerns the extent to which the Hasidic 
women of Williamsburg work outside of the home in jobs such as bookkeepers, 
sales personnel, in management, as teachers, computer programmers, or as 
clerks (181-187). Whilst many of the married women work with their husbands, 
Kranzler notes that a portion of the women interviewed have also established 
their own shops or stores, usually providing services for the own community, 
such as in sheitl (wig) or clothing boutiques, jewellery and house furnishing 
stores. 
The most prominent area where women are active outside of the home is 
that of social welfare, another subject that the previous authors hardly discuss. 
Almost without exception, all the women in the survey were in some way 
involved in the charity and kindness projects in the community. Many women 
are members of the numerous charity and service organisations, visiting or 
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preparing food for patients in hospitals, fundraising projects, organising and 
hosting lunches, teas, auctions and bazaars. According to Kranzler, this charity 
work is also one of the major avenues for women to gain a measure of 
prominence and public recognition. The women themselves nonetheless 
interpret all these forms of official, but also unofficial or private forms of 
charity and kindness (helping neighbours or the elderly and sick in need) as 
‘hesed work’ (mitzvah of ‘loving-kindness’) (189): 
 
While the study of the Torah is the first and foremost challenge of the 
men, the women have been educated to think of themselves Eishes 
Hayil, women of valor, who dedicate their lives to the duties of the 
home, the family, and the needy. ‘This is our mitzvah,’ many of the 
women responded when questioned about their keen interest in welfare 
activities.       
 
Kranzler does not further elaborate on the fact that many Hasidic women 
interpreted their welfare activities as a religious obligation in itself. His research 
can nonetheless be acclaimed for at least – in one chapter – considering Hasidic 
women important agents in the community. This shows a contrast to the other 
studies discussed, where the society of scholars from which women are 
excluded is repeatedly seen and represented as the centre of the community. 
One issue which these authors did allude to more or less extensively, and 
Kranzler strangely enough fails to discuss, is the most important ‘official’ 
mitzvah for women, the laws of family purity. Nowhere in the chapter on 
Hasidic women is there any mention of the mikvah, the laws of niddah or any 
of the regulations on sexual conduct or education of women or men. The 
absence of any discussion of the family purity laws seems to have functioned as 
a prerequisite for the Hasidic women’s co-operation on the survey and the 
extensive results on many other topics, yet nowhere is this explicitly stated 
(169): 
 
Obviously, the survey had to respect the particular sensitivities of the 
respondents and their families; certain questions could not be asked.    
 
In this respect, Kranzler’s research can be viewed as the opposite to that of 
Samuel Heilman (1992) and his chapter on sexuality, both in its methodology 
and style of ethnographic interpretation. The author himself will not even state 
what these ‘sensitive’ questions may have been, and the subject of women’s 
monthly visit to the mikvah is not mentioned at all, despite the usual guarantee 
of anonymity as in any regular ethnographic monograph. Kranzler in general 
does not comment on his personal position (including gender) whatsoever 
throughout the entire book, which makes his work strikingly different from 
Heilman’s more reflexive study.  
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Beyond Adding Women: Feminist Perspectives?   
 
In the previous chapter, under the paragraph ‘Studying Communities’, Belcove-
Shalin’s (1995a) introduction to the study of contemporary Hasidic 
communities in the U.S. was appropriated in an assessment of the status 
quaestionis and lacunae in the theoretical frameworks of existing ethnographies 
of Hasidim. Belcove-Shalin furthermore argues that the contributions to the 
volume that she is the editor of rectify the absence of both comparative and 
feminist approaches. Belcove-Shalin claims a number of the essays redress the 
imbalance in the portrayal of only men in traditional ethnographic research on 
Hasidim, the contours of which were explored in the preceding paragraph. In 
the book, four articles take Hasidic women as the main ethnographic subject of 
inquiry: Ellen Koskoff (1995) on women’s musical performance, Lynn 
Davidman and Janet Stocks (1995) in a comparison between Lubavitch Hasidic 
and fundamentalist Christian approaches to family life, Debra R. Kaufman 
(1995) on newly Orthodox women, and finally Bonnie Morris (1995) on 
Lubavitcher women of Crown Heights.  
These researchers (Koskoff; Davidman; Kaufman and Morris) are said 
to be the first to address the problem of male bias in ethnographies of Hasidim 
and publish accounts of their own studies of Hasidic women during the nineties. 
The first book to capture the public imagination on women’s role in Hasidic 
communities dates from the eighties, when journalist Lis Harris (1995 [1985]) 
published a personal account of her encounters with Hasidim of New York, 
many of her conversations being with women and about their life at home. In 
the early nineties though, two of the above contributors to Belcove-Shalin’s 
volume (1995c), Lynn Davidman (1991) and Debra R. Kaufman (1993 [1991]) 
independently began to publish on their similar research on Hasidic women of 
the Lubavitcher group in the United States. This culminated in two academic 
books, both first published in 1991. Bonnie Morris (1995, 1998) is the third 
major researcher on Lubavitcher women in the U.S. who can be added to this 
list. She was also contributor to Belcove-Shalin’s volume, whose historically 
oriented work was published in 1998. Outside North America, (and other than 
the study of the Lubavitcher Hasidim), the only extensive ethnographic study 
that takes Hasidic women as the object of study can be attributed to the Israeli 
scholar Tamar El-Or (1994), whose monograph in Hebrew on women of the 
Gur Hasidim of Israel has been translated into English.56         
In the following paragraph, the books mentioned above will first be 
briefly screened in view of the main hypotheses, and the detection of the 
particular lacunae that characterise this research. While these studies are very 
much informed by feminist epistemological and methodological critiques and 
use frameworks borrowed from the discipline of women’s studies, some 
lacunae can be noted in function of my main hypotheses. The question is to 
what extent these studies can be viewed as the type that merely ‘adds women’ 
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or go further into the application of feminist theoretical frameworks as 
suggested by Belcove-Shalin. Secondly, the fact that most of these studies have 
focussed on one particular type of Hasidic community – the Lubavitcher – is 
highly relevant for the question of reflexivity and in particular the importance 
of reflecting upon the relationship between the identity of the researcher and 
that of the researched.  
It must be added that recently a few other female researchers have 
studied Hasidic communities, who did not set out to intentionally focus on 
women only as ethnographic informants. These researchers do not take the 
concept of gender as the main focus in or guiding their research, nor do they 
draw on feminist theories or methodology, yet contrary to the previously 
discussed ethnographical work by many men, both Belcove-Shalin (1988) and 
Laurence Podselver (2000) have reflected on gender as a fundamental issue in 
their research process. Podselver (2000: 161) for example, who conducted 
fieldwork among the North African Lubavitcher Jews in the Parisian suburb of 
Sarcelles, as a French scholar without any background in women’s studies did 
not consciously set out to study women as specific group. Podselver 
nonetheless claims to have been ‘led … to a specifically women’s subject, the 
lives of ba’alot teshuvah. The decision to study women rather than men and to 
deal with the separation of the sexes was out of my hands.’ Podselver states that 
as an outsider, she was sometimes allowed to interview men in public places or 
in certain families, but ‘had real access only to the female sector of Hassidic 
society’ (ibid.). 
Belcove-Shalin (1988: 77) in her study of the Hasidim in the New York 
community of Boro  Park, reflects on how she anticipated gender to be a 
problem in her research: ‘I was relieved to discover that my fears were only 
partly justified. The very handicaps I had [as a single woman in a sex-
segregated society and a non-Orthodox Jew in an ultra-Orthodox Jewish 
community] most feared proved at times to be hidden assets. No male 
anthropologist could establish nearly as good rapport with a hasidiste (a female 
Hasid), whose modesty must be safeguarded, as I could.’ As with Podselver, the 
female sex of the researcher did not necessarily preclude interviews with male 
Hasidim: ‘As long as I strictly adhered to these norms [of modesty] and kept all 
my interactions with men public, I did not have any problems interviewing 
them’ (Belcove-Shalin 1988: 95). Nevertheless, Belcove-Shalin could not fully 
participate in or closely observe the public religious world that was only open 
to men (ibid.):  
 
Despite my ability to interview both male and female Hasidim, in a 
community such as Boro Park where sex and lifestyles articulate so 
strongly, my gender carved out for me a well-defined niche. I had to 
resign myself to the fact that I could not pray or study with men or 
attend storytelling gatherings. On shabes, yontev, and other ritual 
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occasions, I was consigned to a place behind the mekhitse (a barrier 
dividing the sexes in the synagogue) with the women.   
 
Both these studies on Hasidim by female researchers did not set out to 
specifically focus on women or gender issues, but were (originally) directed at 
the ethnographic study and representation of Hasidic communities in their 
entirety. Despite rather than because of the sex segregation, at least the 
relationship between the sex of the researcher and the research process and 
access to informants divided according to gender is problematised. Neither the 
male, nor the female Hasid is in any way taken as the ‘normative Hasid’ in the 
same way as was the case in earlier ethnographic studies that could be 
characterised as ‘androcentric’.  
 
 
Ba’alot teshuvah and ‘Frummies’        
 
Davidman’s (1991, 1995), Kaufman’s (1993 [1991], 1994, 1995) and Morris’ 
(1995, 1998) studies of Hasidic women all share two main basic characteristics 
that are relevant for the main hypotheses. Firstly, they all employ some of the 
feminist epistemological premises that were argued as necessary for a feminist 
postcolonial anthropology of religion as suggested in the theoretical framework 
offered in chapter four. All three authors minimally take women’s experience 
and women’s voices (as ethnographic informants, or in the case of Morris as 
authors of written texts), as the starting point for conceptualising (religious) 
agency. All of these studies indirectly challenge both the notion of religion as 
‘text’ and religion as a sui generis, decontextualised phenomenon. Not only do 
they employ a social scientific methodology. By focussing on people and their 
lives rather than holy scriptures, they additionally move beyond the ‘scholars’ 
society’ and the institutional public religious sphere as the centre of Hasidic 
tradition and community which form the subject of mainstream ethnographies 
of Hasidim that take the male as the normative Hasid and agent of religious life 
and the broader community. 
Both Kaufman’s (1993 [1991]) and Davidman’s (1991) early studies of 
Lubavitcher or alternatively ‘Chabad’ Hasidic women are not only unique in 
being the first studies of Hasidic women, but in particular the first to study the 
ba’al teshuvah movement or ‘newly Orthodox Jews’ from the perspective of 
women. The ba’al teshuvah consist of a specific phenomenon in the Hasidic 
world, as they belong to the only Hasidic community that actively practises 
proselytisation, in hoping to attract secular Jews to ‘return’ to a strictly 
Orthodox Jewish lifestyle and community. The majority of Hasidic 
communities that originated in Eastern Europe such as the Belzer, the Ger, etc. 
do not practise any kind of ‘missionary’ activity, nor are they interested in non-
Orthodox secular Jews or Gentiles alike outside of their community. However, 
the Lubavitcher in Israel and North America and one group of followers of the 
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Bostoner rabbi in the U.S. have in recent years intensified their programmes for 
attracting secular Jews to adopt a Hasidic life style. Especially in the late sixties 
and early seventies climate of the counter culture and ‘hippie religious 
sentiment’ in the U.S., many secular Jews became attracted to the spiritual and 
ritual components of the movement and started to travel to Israel where 
educational outreach programmes were formed (Kaufman 1993 [1991]: 15-17). 
To date, the Lubavitcher practise what some would call almost 
‘aggressive’ proselytising campaigns, which were initiated by the late rebbe 
Menachem Schneerson, who from his main offices in Crown Heights has 
launched different organisations, such as the Jewish Peace Corps and youth 
organisations that operate the so-called ‘mitzvah-mobiles’ or ‘teffilin-tanks’. 
These mobiles drive around Jewish neighbourhoods and turn up at public 
manifestations. Lubavitcher youths then walk up to individuals, and after asking 
if they are Jewish, they are invited to engage in a religious ritual such as putting 
a mezuzah57 on their door post; men are helped in putting on tefillin, 
encouraged to wear a yarmulke (skullcap), and candle sticks are offered  to 
women for the Sabbath lights. Their outreach programmes and educational 
facilities are numerous all over the world, which obviously plays a part in their 
much greater visibility in the secular world.58 New recruits can then spend time 
at residential houses (called Chabad). Returnees are provided with ‘new’ 
parents who act as their sponsors. 
The Lubavitcher are not only much more visible through their 
interaction with the secular world, but it can furthermore be argued that 
compared with other Hasidic groupings, the Lubavitcher are much more 
accessible to curious outsiders, including ethnographic researchers who are 
often viewed as potential ‘converts’, or at least are often received in a 
hospitable manner.59 It must be emphasised however, that as all other studies of 
Hasidic communities, these researchers have been secular Jews themselves, and 
this factor of accessibility must therefore be questioned regarding the identity of 
non-Jewish researchers. The literature barely makes mention of Lubavitchers’ 
attitudes and activism towards gentiles, although one may wonder whether 
theirs is an activism interested in converts in the strict sense of the term. 
Except for Tamar El-Or’s (1994) research on women of the Gur Hasidic 
community of Bene Barak by Tel Aviv in Israel then, the vast majority of 
ethnographic research on Hasidic women has been undertaken on the 
Lubavitcher community, and by secular Jewish women themselves. Davidman 
(1991) and Kaufman (1993 [1991], 1994, 1995) in particular do not focus on 
so-called ‘frum-born’ women, sometimes referred to as ‘frummies’ within these 
communities, but rather the process of ‘conversion’ or returning itself. The 
focus of their research is the broader framework of women’s agency and the 
‘paradox’ of women actively and consciously choosing to become part of 
patriarchal religious communities. Epistemologically and methodologically 
then, it can be argued that both authors take a feminist perspective in that the 
focus of their research is on women as ‘minded, social actors’ (Kaufman 1993 
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[1991]: 132), that women’s ‘experience’ is taken as central, rather than 
marginal to the ‘construction of social reality’ (157). For Davidman in her 
research on ba’alot teshuvah the starting point for her research is similarly 
‘women’s experience’ from the perspective of the ethnographic informants (43, 
50). Kaufman is more explicit, though not elaborate on the application of 
premises of feminist methodology in her own research. In a much shorter 
version of her ethnography on ba’alot teshuvah (1995: 149-150): 
 
In my study on newly Orthodox Jews I have relied heavily on feminist 
and interpretive epistemological and methodological models. I describe 
these newly Orthodox Jewish women in their own voices and from their 
own perspectives. I focussed on their everyday world ‘by taking it up 
from within,’ from the standpoint of them as ‘knowers actually and 
locally situated.’ 
 
Morris’s (1998) study of Lubavitcher women, is not limited to newly Orthodox 
women, but is a more historical study of the history of the Lubavitcher women 
of Crown Heights, based on sources such as the communities archives, 
including publications by the Lubavitcher Women’s Organisation, pamphlets 
by rabbis on the role of women, cookbooks, marriage manuals, teachers’ 
guidelines, etc. Opposed to Kaufman and Davidman, Morris thus focuses on 
Lubavitcher women as involved in outreach programmes and as the 
proselytising agents themselves, rather than the ‘converts’ who are the subjects 
of study in Davidman and Kaufman. The period under study however, covers 
women’s ‘activism’ from the post-war period right to the present, and although 
Morris did not conduct any ethnographic interviews, the research did include 
participant observation in contemporary events such as classes, women’s 
conventions, synagogue services, and other festivities. This makes the study 
more than a merely historical account, but a portrait of past and present 
Lubavitcher women’s lives. The focus on women’s ‘activism’ and their 
‘contributions to their own American community since 1950’ (1), as in 
Kaufman and Davidman, therefore takes these women to be active knowers, 
constructors, and subjects of religious agency.60  
By employing a feminist methodology of focussing on women’s agency, 
all three researchers state their criticisms of earlier research on Hasidim that has 
always been limited to the study of men. Whilst Morris notes that the role of 
Hasidic women has been blatantly ‘ignored’ by past historians and theologians 
(18), Davidman (1991: 204) likewise notes that the majority of sociological 
studies of U.S. Jewry have been conducted by men, and focussed on men: ‘or if 
the samples included women and men, the reports rarely distinguish between 
the women’s and men’s responses.’ And according to Kaufman (1993 [1991]: 
note 7, 170-171): 
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In most social science studies, the Orthodox Jewish community is 
generally explored and then analyzed through the perspectives and 
experiences of men, especially through the male-oriented activities 
associated with synagogue and study. Even some of the most recent 
books published on Jewish orthodoxy, despite their rich detail and keen 
insights, fail to give us any compelling sociological explanation of 
orthodoxy’s potential appeal to women. 
 
Morris (1995: 162) not only notes the absence of Hasidic women’s perspectives 
in studies of Judaism, but also their absence in women’s studies. Besides their 
critique of androcentrism in earlier studies and their application of feminist 
epistemological and methodological insights, all three researchers are 
confronted with the problem of feminist analysis and interpretation. The main 
issue for the research questions of Kaufman and Davidman both touch on the 
fundamental dilemma of women actively choosing to embrace patriarchal 
religious ideology and communities. Their studies of ba’alot teshuvah and 
women of the Lubavitcher community must therefore be considered as a 
specific kind of study of Hasidism, as the same theoretical frameworks and 
research questions cannot not be equally applied in the case of the vast majority 
of Hasidic communities and the ‘frum born’. 
Davidman places her research questions within the broad framework of 
the fallacy of the thesis of secularisation in which religion was assumed to lose 
its meaning and importance in the face of modernity. The dilemma Davidman 
confronts is the attraction of contemporary women such as the educated secular 
Jewish women in her study to the resurgence of fundamentalist and 
traditionalist religion, that ‘have resisted the liberalizing tendencies of the times 
and constructed ideologies and rules that create and maintain “traditional” 
definitions for female and male roles’ (Davidman 1991: 42). Kaufman (1993 
[1991], 1995) confronts the same paradoxes as to why the middle-class, well-
educated assimilated Jewish women in her study should have consciously 
rejected secular culture, including their perception of the deficiencies of gender 
roles and dominant liberal feminism within modern society.61 Both researchers 
who are clearly informed by a feminist paradigm of sociological or 
ethnographical research, thus face the issue of how to interpret and represent 
their research subjects, which explicitly define themselves as anti- or non-
feminist. This is minimally testified by the fact that they have chosen to live in 
a community where women appear to be defined and ‘controlled’ through 
patriarchal ideology. As explained in previous chapters (one and four), this 
fundamental dilemma often holds for many forms of contemporary feminist 
anthropology which strive to move beyond older interpretative frameworks 
caught in the dilemma of cultural relativism/universal feminist politics and the 
agency/ideology debate in general.   
Kaufman at one point expresses this uneasiness and forebodes of 
feminist critique of her analysis (1993 [1991]: 132): ‘Many readers may believe 
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that I have given too much credence to the women’s own words, that, like many 
researchers, I have “fallen in love” with my subjects, and that I am unable to 
see them objectively or analytically.’ This more subjective pondering on the 
part of the author touches the feminist anthropological dilemma at its core. 
Applying the feminist methodological premise of giving the research subjects 
their own voice and agency simultaneously harbours the dangers of 
delegitimising the feminist political agenda, which must inform any kind of 
analysis and interpretation. Kaufman all the more moves on tricky grounds, as 
her interpretative framework indeed may seem far-fetched to some. The women 
Kaufman interviewed openly rejected - what they perceived as – as feminism 
and its consequences for men and women in modern society. In her 
interpretation of the choices these women made in opting for the conservative 
gender ideology and gender roles of Orthodox Judaism, Kaufman infers that 
these women actually both ‘accommodate’ and ‘resist’ the patriarchal 
framework. This takes place through a valorisation of sex segregated life and 
notions of femininity, next to women-centred and pro-familial values which 
they find in Hasidic communities and religion. Disappointed with what the 
modern secular world and its dominant liberal views of equality had to offer, 
the return to Orthodoxy was often motivated by what these women found the 
practical and spiritual valorisation of women’s role as wife, and other ‘feminine 
qualities’ such as nurturing, caring and connectedness which are to be found in 
strictly Orthodox Jewish ideology. In her analysis, Kaufman takes her analysis 
a step further in linking the women-centred ideology of difference these women 
embrace, with similar forms of ‘difference’ feminisms that are women-centred 
and focus on sexual difference, such as the radical feminism of Adrienne Rich 
and Mary Daly (150).62                
Morris (1995, 1998) similarly refuses to view the ‘frum-born’ 
Lubavitcher women of her study as mere passive victims of patriarchal religion, 
despite their explicit anti-feminist rhetoric and views. That these anti-feminist, 
or what Morris prefers to call counterfeminist (1998: 1) women have been 
excluded from the canon of women’s or feminist studies, Morris seems to 
suggest, can also be attributed on account of ethnicity. Morris (1995: 162) 
claims that the voice of the Hasidic woman is ‘excluded from feminist texts 
because she is traditionally observant Jew, and from the critical texts of her own 
religious laws because she is female.’ Besides the dilemma for feminist 
historians, whether Hasidic women are ‘agents or victims of religious ideology’ 
(ibid.), Morris furthermore relates the dilemma of feminist research on non-
feminist women as it pertains to Hasidic women as an issue of cultural 
differences – or ‘ethnic’ in the case of Jewish identity - between women. This is 
not so much expressed in the relationship of the cultural differences between 
the researcher and the researched, but certainly in an implicit critique of liberal 
white feminism. Central to Morris’s argument of restoring ‘agency’ to the 
Lubavitcher women and what she sees as ‘a minor women’s movement of their 
own’ as educational leaders, writers and missionaries, is the notion of ethnicity 
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(1995: 168): ‘…Hasidic women’s antifeminism was rooted in minority survival 
rather than the political pulpit.’ In the struggle for the survival of the 
community and the securing of ‘Jewish authenticity’, vis-à-vis the outside 
gentile world, the politics of gender were of minor concern, combined with the 
perception of liberal feminist values as a threat to the Jewish family.  
The existing ethnographic research that focuses on Hasidic women 
rather than men as the paradigmatic members of Hasidic communities, to a 
certain extent moves beyond a phase of ‘adding women’ to existing 
androcentric research. It implicitly incorporates aspects of the main hypotheses 
following from a feminist critique of androcentric male focussed research on 
religion, yet obviously within the context and area of social scientific research 
on Hasidic communities rather than the discipline of religious studies. The 
studies by Davidman, Kaufman and Morris all seem to be informed by 
frameworks and discussions within feminist studies and gender studies at the 
level of epistemology, methodology, and the politics of representation and 
interpretation, yet these excursions are usually rare, brief and somewhat limited. 
Finally, as the three main studies have focused on one particular type of 
community that forms somewhat of an exception to the Hasidic ‘normative’ 
community and tradition, the research questions are similarly specific and are 
placed in a particular field of study. In particular they pertain to the topic of 
conversion and the rise of fundamentalist and traditionalist religion and its 
relationship to issues of gender.  
Tamar El-Or’s (1994) ethnographic study of the frum-born Gur Hasidic 
women in Tel Aviv is therefore different to the discussed research and unique 
in its kind. In one respect, this study resembles those above in it diverging from 
a typical monographic ethnographical approach. In the introduction El-Or 
explains her choice not to focus on topics such as the daily routines, religious 
lives, intimate family worlds and the socio-political status of Gur women, as 
‘private matters’ pertaining to the ‘relationships between wife and husband and 
between women and their bodies’, for she felt these were private matters that 
shouldn’t be ‘exposed’ (7). The study therefore primarily focuses on one 
particular aspect of the life of Gur women, which concerns their education 
during adult life and their intellectual world. El-Or’s most important conclusion 
is that these Haredi women are paradoxically ‘educated for ignorance’. The 
religious studies in women’s classes are limited to ex cathedra and ‘practical’ 
knowledge, - in contrast to the ‘substantive’ studying and the active discussing 
and lernen63 that men do – in order to ideologically reproduce their status (as 
mothers and housewives) within the community.64  
In her conclusion, El-Or therefore does seem to take a feminist critique 
of the community she describes and the position of women, ‘ignorance’ being a 
pejorative term. Yet for the greater part she does not focus on questions 
pertaining to feminism, women’s status and emancipation, or the victim/agency 
question in which her own views and the perspectives that inform her research 
can be found. In the afterword for example, we are only confronted with some 
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brief observations pertaining to women’s status in Haredi communities in Israel 
(1994: 209): 
 
When people learned I was carrying out a study of haredi women, many 
of them asked me a question: ‘Are they happier than we are?’ Since I 
could not provide an answer to this query, I decided to look into the 
frequency of the question. I learned that we sometimes consider the 
other possibility (i.e., the religious life), as a way out of distress we have 
been unable to resolve. A society that is structured according to sexist 
compartmentalization of men and women is nevertheless thought of as a 
possible source of happiness. Somehow, it seems better than the 
indeterminate here and now of a society that has, for the last hundred 
years, been conducting a probing inquiry into the relations between the 
sexes. People are weary of this. It still seems, even if only sometimes, 
and briefly, that ‘there,’ among women and men who ‘know their 
places,’ life might be easier.       
 
As for the usage of feminist (gender) theory at the level of epistemology and 
methodology, in the introduction, El-Or (1994: 8) merely claims that ‘theory 
and research in the field of gender studies have aided my work.’ However in the 
accompanying footnote, we only read (note 4: 9): ‘I will not discuss the subject 
of gender studies here’, and then a referral to three sources in feminist 
anthropology from the seventies.65 The words feminism or feminist theory or 
research are seldom used in the book, except for the final chapter of the 
ethnography, however, where a paragraph titled ‘Women and Men’ is included, 
in which El-Or appears to be drawing on some fundamental insights on the 
cultural construction of gender in more recent feminist theorising (187): 
 
…the haredim are constantly reexamining, in thought and in action, the 
set of categories they use to decode their social reality, including the 
categorization of men and women. The social category called ‘gender’ is 
here part of a cultural structure. Within the discourse of 
deconstructionism but without a theoretical discussion , the research 
(ethnography and its interpretation) aims to unveil some mechanisms of 
that gender structuring [emphasis mine]. 
 
After the statement, the accompanying footnote merely refers to Linda 
Nicholson’s Feminism/Postmodernism (1990), and the reader is therefore 
completely uninformed of what the ‘discourse of deconstructionism’ may be, or 
in which way and what other feminist theory may have informed the writer. El-
Or briefly discusses the differences between ideologies of gender and actual 
praxis, which indirectly touches upon the issue of women’s agency, central to 
the above studies of newly Orthodox women (188):  
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Part of this study focuses on the question of how, in practical terms, 
subordination and dependency between women and men are created. 
What are the local reasons for this subordination in each context; and 
how does each group of women, in every culture, live with it, interpret 
it, give it meaning and validity, and perhaps try to change it? It is 
therefore not enough to expose the gap between the sexes and its policy 
ideology, while presenting society as ‘male.’ The social sciences must 
also study the entire input of women into each society.   
    
This implicit critique of androcentrism in social scientific research is not stated 
until the end of the book, and as for the discussion of haredi gender 
construction and gender ideology, these insights are present, but for El-Or they 
do not appear to be central to the ethnography in terms of the research 
questions, methodology and analysis. 
 
 
 
                                              
1 See also Judith Okely’s Own or Other Culture (1996) in which she questions the way 
anthropology has traditionally focussed on the ‘exoticised other’ in far away regions, rather than 
focussing on ‘centres of power’ at home and in the West.  
2 Betty Friedan, the author of The Feminine Mystique can be mentioned here (see chapter two). 
3 The ‘modify’ in brackets refers to the distinction that Joseph makes within the category of 
religious Jewish feminists, see under the ‘great divide’ in the next paragraph. 
4 In this respect, the intertwining of religion and feminism in second wave Jewish feminist 
movement is more in line with first wave feminism in the broader western society, opposed to 
second wave hegemonic feminism as predominantly secular or even an anti-religious affair (see 
chapter two).  
5 Orthodox feminist Blu Greenberg (1998: 32) in her account of her first ‘acquaintance’ with 
feminist critiques of Judaism at the First National Jewish Women’s Conference held in New 
York it 1973, also observed the fact that many women of non-observant backgrounds ‘came to 
Judaism through feminism’. So in search for their emancipation and belonging as women, they 
similarly found a community or ‘roots’ in Judaism. 
6 Catherine Cornille (1994: 36) argues that Jewish women’s emancipation was more of a battle 
for religious equality rather than an economical affair, as in the Jewish tradition women did to a 
certain extent always partake in economic life, working in order for their husband to be able to 
study the Torah. See also chapter seven.   
7 The ‘different but equal’ ideology will also be discussed in the context of strictly Orthodox 
Jewish discourse on gender in chapter seven. 
8 Onah: literally ‘season’. The husband’s obligation for marital relations with his wife (Glossary 
Kaufman 1995 [1993]).   
9 Plaskow refers to the usual important works in this tradition such as those by Moraga, 
Anzaldua, Audre Lorde, bell hooks, etc. (see chapter three). 
10 See under Jewish Feminisms, chapter two. Ezrat Nashim was probably the most noticeable 
form of an organised feminist movement in Conservative Judaism.   
11 Since the late sixties, Jewish feminists outside of the academy starting formulating similar 
critiques, usually in denominational Jewish journals. Examples are: Ruth F. Brin, ‘Can a 
Woman be a Jew’, Reconstructionst, 24, 25 October 1968; Paula E. Hyman, ‘The Other Half: 
Women in Jewish Tradition’, Conservative Judaism , vol. 26, no. 3, Summer 1972 and Deborah 
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Weissman, ‘Towards a Feminist Critique of Judaism’, Congress Bi-Weekly, vol. 29, no. 13, 24 
November 1972 (see footnotes 2, 7 and 87 in: Shulman 1974). 
12 Midrash literary translates as ‘inquiry or investigation’, and refers to a genre of literature 
which interprets the Bible, usually homiletically, to extract its implicit meanings. Aggadah 
(aggadot, pl.) refers to ‘narration’, the sayings, homiletic interpretations, historical information, 
legends, anecdotes, and folklore of rabbinic literature. Aggadah is the non-legal portion of 
rabbinic literature, distinguished from halakhah, which refers to the legal material (glossary in 
Heschel 1995 [1983]).  
13 More information on the mitzvot for women and men follows in chapters seven and eight. 
14 Tefillin are the two leather boxes containing scriptural passages that are bound to the left arm 
and on the head and worn during prayer. Tallit is the rectangular garment to which the tzitzit, 
fringes are attached, numbering 613, representing the divine commandments.  
15 Whether women are even permitted to study Torah is matter of debate, see chapter seven. 
16 According to Arnold Jacob Wolf (1998), Rachel Adler has now repudiated some of her 
earlier studies and can be seen as ‘always reverencing tradition, but solidly feminist in spirit and 
ecumenical in tone’. Descending from a generation of Reform Jews, apparently Adler lived as 
an Orthodox Jew for many years, only to return to Reform Judaism later on. Critical of Liberal 
Judaism for ‘giving up standards of behaviour … for its “grab-bag” of performance with no 
practice’, in her recent work she nonetheless proposes what Wolf perceives to be the ‘major text 
of the new Jewish feminism’ (Engendering Judaism: An Inclusive Theology and Ethics, 
Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1998).   
17 ‘Jewish theology’, in as much as ‘Jewish doctrine’ are awkward concepts in Judaism because 
strictly speaking there is no theology in Judaism in the Christian sense of the term. Channa 
Safrai (1997) for example, argues that the word does not exist in Hebrew, nor is it found in 
traditional sources. Concepts such as ‘Jewish thought’, ‘Jewish ideas’, ‘Jewish community and 
its faith’ or ‘Jewish community in its relation to the Divine’ would be better equipped in the 
study of Jewish religion. Rachel Adler (1998: 245) similarly claims that ‘theology’ is 
problematic as the nature and methodology of theology are more open questions in Judaism: 
‘Biblical and rabbinic Judaisms embody a variety of theologies in narrative, prayer, law, and 
textual exegesis’. Anthropologist Susan Sered (2000) embarked on a similar problem when she 
set out to use anthropological research on the lives and rituals of Jewish women in order to lay 
the groundwork for a Jewish feminist theology. However, Sered soon found that theology ‘as an 
intellectual enterprise’ was much more of a Christian rather than a Jewish ‘thing’. Rather, 
according to Sered, contemporary Jewish feminists excel in ritual rather than ‘feminist 
theological conversation’ (see also the problem of ethnocentric definitions in feminist 
interreligious dialogue under Transgressing Sacred Boundaries, chapter four). Rachel Adler 
(1998: 245) also remarks how the opponents of Jewish feminism in the 1970s and 1980s often 
classified ‘Jewish feminist theological’ writings as socio-political polemic rather than theology: 
‘Even today, few feminist Jewish scholars identify themselves as theologians, although their 
work may be covertly or even overtly theological’. The problem therefore points to another 
important insight still, which will be addressed more fully in chapter seven. In the context of 
women in strictly Orthodox Jewish communities, it will be argued that a focus on religious 
agency must look to religious practice and ritual and its relation to rabbinic law, which is 
central to the study of modern Orthodox Jewish religiosity. However, ‘theology’ is used in the 
context of Judaism where the authors I draw on have applied the term (e.g. Judith Plaskow). 
Moreover, from the perspective of feminist critique ‘theology’, also in the Christian context is 
often problematised and matter of debate. This often concerns what the sources of ‘theology’ 
may be from the feminist insider’s point of view, which often privileges (women’s) experience 
over doctrine (see chapter three).             
18 This is deduced by the mere fact of reticence: all of the reformist-type of literature I reviewed 
did not even include the work by the otherwise authoritative religious studies scholar on 
feminism and Judaism Judith Plaskow, and others in their accounts or bibliography. 
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19 Later in the article, Umansky briefly lets on concerning her own positioning, stating it is not 
her intention to denigrate either the study of religious texts or the Talmudic tradition, but rather 
to ask if ‘the study of religious texts along with participation in regularly scheduled public 
worship have been the central expressions of Jewish piety, when by and large only men studied 
religious texts and participated in public worship, are we to conclude that traditionally women 
weren’t pious?’ (Umansky 1999: 189). 
20 The wordplay Plaskow uses is the same that Katherine K. Young (1999b) entitles her critique 
of the reconstructionist approach of Rita M. Gross in a review essay ‘Having Your Cake and 
Eating It Too: Feminism and Religion’, see chapter four under 1. Feminist Studies in/of 
Religion. 
21 The constitutional separation of church and state also allowed for this autonomy, whereas in 
Europe, the legal requirement of membership in one local community for all Jews made the 
development and recognition of Progressive movements and communities difficult (Levinson 
1990: 51).    
22 Lit. ‘going up’. Aliyah refers to the honour of being called up to the Torah to recite blessings 
before and after each section is read at public, communal services; also refers to the act of 
immigrating to Israel (glossary in Heschel 1995: 283).   
23 In Orthodox Jewish denominations, the problem of the get and the plight of the agunah (the 
‘chained’ woman who has been issued a get) continues to be a major problem and in the 
forefront of the Jewish media. Without a get, a woman cannot re-marry in an Orthodox 
synagogue and any children from new partnerships will be considered to be mamzerim 
(illegitimate) and consequently ostracised by the wider community (Fox 2000: 1): ‘The verdicts 
of a righteous beth din (ecclesiastical court), established by conservative rabbis in America to 
free “chained women”, have been condemned and rejected by Orthodox religious authorities for 
utilising a false interpretation of halakhah’. See also the contributions in Women in Chains: A 
Sourcebook on Agunah (Porter 1995). 
24 According to Umansky (1988: 355), although Kaplan did reject supernaturalism, not all 
Reconstructionists share this view, and a reinterpretation rather than a rejection of ‘spirituality’ 
stands central.  
25 Here we see an example of the blurring of boundaries between studying and doing religion in 
what Linda Woodhead (2001) observes as the combination of a thealogical agenda by feminist 
scholars of the likes of Daly, Christ and Plaskow with more ‘scientific’ methods of exegesis and 
even social sciences (see under Transgressing Sacred Boundaries, chapter four).  
26 In noting the great resistance towards the feminist introduction of female God-language in the 
case of Judaism, Plaskow points out to the – unjust – fear of the reintroduction of polytheism 
into the tradition. In order to counter this fear, Plaskow takes a historical-critical approach, by 
stressing the historical context in which Judaism as a monotheistic religion grew and was forced 
to suppress ‘the female side of divinity’ (1995 [1983]: 229-230).    
27 In her final concluding essay, Greenberg notes that there are also behavioural differences 
between men and women, as ‘informed by social scientists’ (1998: 173). 
28 The partition separating women from men used in many, primarily traditionalist synagogues, 
often through a curtain or a separate balcony for women.   
29 Shekhinah refers to the divine presence in the world. Jewish mystical literature describes the 
Shekhinah as the female principle of God immanent in the world (glossary in Heschel 1995).  
30 In the U.K. the traditional Rosh Hodesh group joined with the women’s group of the Reform 
movement in 1993, according to Shalvi (1995: 235) indicative that also here ‘women are clearly 
on the move, at last’.  
31 The books include Rachel Adler’s Engendering Judaism: An Inclusive Theology and Ethics 
(The Jewish Publication Society 1998), Judith Hauptman’s Rereading the Rabbis: A Woman’s 
Voice (Westview Press, 1998) and Miriam Peskowitz’ Spinning Fantasies: Rabbis, Gender, and 
History (University of California Press, 1997).  
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32 In a footnote, Robert J. Baird (1997: 93, n. 3) draws attention to the fact that Wissenschaft des 
Judentums played an inaugurating role in the development of the scientific study of religion 
(with figures such as F. Max Müller and E.B. Tylor) predating it by approximately fifty years, 
yet a fact that is unfortunately mostly unnoticed.  
33 Robert J. Baird (1997) hypothesises that the development of the Wissenschaft des Judentums 
was predicated on a kind of ‘veiled christian-ness’ as part of the ethos of the Enlightenment and 
modernity. In social and political terms the scientific study of Judaism was the recognition of 
the ‘deghettoization of the Jewish community’ in nineteenth century Germany, inextricably 
linked with a ‘fundamental reimagining of Judaism itself’ as a kind of historical and essentialist 
object, as fact and as a positive science rather than religious revelation. Baird suggests that the 
reconception and essentialisation of Judaism and jewishness must be seen in the context of the 
Christian response to seventeenth and eighteenth-century pluralism, whereby ‘religion’ was 
reconceptualised as a natural and transhistorical and transcultural generic category sui generis, 
or as belief, knowledge, and rational justification. This essentialised and ‘veiled christian’ 
notion of religion was then appropriated in the scientific study of Judaism, additionally 
constructing and reinforcing a notion of essential ‘jewishness’ in all times and places.           
34 Beth S. Wenger (1997) similarly claims that gender studies scholarship and analysis has not 
yet penetrated or challenged the ‘ongoing legitimacy of the traditional core of Jewish Studies’, 
with contemporary Jewish Studies still stuck in an earlier ‘add and stir’ phase of feminist 
scholarship.   
35 I here use the term ‘traditionalist’ for the Antwerp community I studied, as distinguished by 
S.C. Heilman and S.M. Cohen in Cosmopolitans and Parochials: Modern Orthodox Jews in 
America, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1989 in Belcove-Sahlin (1995: 15). Heilman and 
Cohen distinguish between three wings of Jewish Orthodoxy in the U.S.: traditionalism (ultra-
Orthodox, contra-acculturative); centrists (adaptive acculturative, modern Orthodox) and finally 
the nominally Orthodox. 
36 Heilman (1992) nonetheless uses ‘ultra-Orthodox’ in the title of his book rather than Haredi, 
which seems to point out that these transitions are recent and not universally accepted.    
37 Enlightenment; a movement to promote modern European culture among Jews during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. An adherent was called a maskil (plural maskilim) 
(Glossary in Heschel 1995). 
38 These Ukrainian Cossacks revolted against the Poles in 1648 under Boris Chmielnicki, 
whereby both Polish and Jewish communities were attacked (Jews often functioned as go-
betweens in running the land of the Polish nobility). According to Karen Armstrong (2000: 41), 
the Jewish experiences and discourses surrounding these massacres, made many Jews 
susceptible to the rites and penances of the Lurian Kabbalah, in order to hurry messianic 
salvation.          
39 Hebrew: governing body of the Jewish community in the European Diaspora. 
40 A new creation myth was ‘revealed’ to the Ashkenazi Jew Isaac Luria (1534-1572), founding 
a new form of Kabbalah (Jewish mystical tradition). According to the myth, the omnipresence 
of God is explained by the doctrine of the tsimtsum  (‘withdrawal’): the eternal and inaccessible 
God (called ein sof, ‘without end’) by the kabbalists) had to shrink, making space within 
himself in order to make space for the world. Creation thus began with a cruel act of God 
towards himself. In his righteous longing to become known to and through his creatures, ein sof  
had condemned a part of himself into exile. In contrast to the orderly, peaceful creation in the 
first chapter of Genesis, this was therefore a violent process. In an early stage, the ein sof had 
tried to fill the emptiness he had created by the tsimtsum with divine light, but the ‘vessels’ that 
served to carry it, were crushed under the pressure. Sparks from the divine light fell in the abyss 
from everything that God was not. After the breaking of the vessels, some sparks returned to 
God, but some remained captured in this godless realm, filled with the angry power that ein sof  
had sent out because of the tsimtsum . After this disaster, the creation went wrong; things were 
in the wrong place. When Adam was created, he could have put things right, and had he done 
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so, the exile of God would have ended on the first Sabbath. But Adam sinned and ever since 
then, the divine sparks have been captured in material objects, and the Shekinah, the presence in 
which we can best approach the divine on earth, floating through the world in an everlasting 
exile, longing to be reunited with the godhead (Armstrong 2000: 24-25).      
41 According to Belcove-Shalin 1704 (1995: 5), Mintz (1992: 9), versus Armstrong (2000: 120): 
1710. 
42 According to Zalman, the intellect consists of three faculties: hokhmah (wisdom), binah 
(understanding), and daat (knowledge). These are then the first, second and third of the ten 
sefirot , the divine emanations. God desires both the heart and the mind; thus hokhmah and 
binah act as father and mother, giving birth to the love of God. Everybody has the potential to 
become a zaddik, yet the zaddik functions as a teacher rather than a miracle worker, thus again 
bringing back the study of the Torah as an equally important element of spiritual life (Cohn-
Sherbock 1996: 55-56). 
43 Rabbi Dov Baer of Lubavitch was the son of Shneur Zalman, and after his death in 1812 
settled in Lubavitch which was to become the centre of Chabad Hasidism (Cohn-Sherbock 
1996: 61).  
44 Feminist research on the history of Jewish assimilation has countered this generalising view, 
in that women did not ‘assimilate’ to the extent men did in Western Europe (e.g. Hyman 1995), 
see also under The Gendering of Jewish Studies and Postmodern Interventions in the previous 
paragraph.   
45 The foundation of the ‘modernisation’ of Judaism and the Haskalah can be attributed to 
Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) who prioritised reason above belief, a separation between 
church and state and an individualisation or personalisation of belief which would enable Jews 
to remain ‘Jewish’ yet simultaneously ‘proper Europeans’ (Armstrong 2000: 122-123).     
46 The number of Hasidim in New York alone is estimated at 100.000-200.000 (Gutwirth 1999: 
605). However, due to the vast divergences in sources on population numbers of Hasidim and 
other strictly Orthodox Jews in North America, Israel and the rest of the world (a rough 
estimate is 650.000 worldwide), no numerical certainty can be given whatsoever. Robert 
Eisenberg (1996: 1) estimates that due to the high birth-rate, the Orthodox Hasidic population 
grows at an annual increase of 5 percent, which would theoretically imply a doubling of the 
population every fifteen years.       
47 Samuel C. Heilman (1995: xii) estimates the percentage of Haredi (strictly Orthodox Jewry 
among which the Hasidim) at 25 percent of the nearly 10 percent Jews who call themselves 
‘Orthodox’.  
48 Landau’s book is not an academic but a journalistic study, which was nonetheless carried 
through ethnographic methods of interviews.  
49 Harry Rabinowicz, A World Apart: The Story of the Chasidim in Britain, 1996. Laurence 
Podselver’s (2000) contribution to a recent conference on Jewish women in the U.S., consists of 
a short account of her research amongst the North African Lubavitcher Hasidim in Paris. It is 
likely that similar smaller less known studies exist, but here the focus has been on the best 
known, relatively widely distributed ethnographic monographs in the English language.    
50 The besmedresh is the house of study and prayer which is also used for other activities in 
Hasidic social life.  
51 Gutwirth (1968: 128-128; 1970: 51-52) speaks of approximately 1300 Hasidim in total, the 
Belzer being the largest community, next to the Satmar, the Vischnitz, the Chortkow, the Ger 
and a sixth shiebtl (prayer room) which has developed around Reb Ytsekl, originating from 
Galicia.  
52 Maimon, Solomon, Autobiography, translated by J.C. Murray, London: East and West 
Library, 1954 (in: Mintz 1968: 454). 
53 In Praise of the Besht  (‘Shivhei ha-Besht’), translated and edited by Dan Ben Amos and 
Jerome R. Mintz, to be published by the Indiana University Press (in Mintz 1968: 454). 
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54 Belcove-Shalin is the only researcher I have encountered employing the tem Hasidista for the 
‘Hasidic woman’, in Belcove-Shalin 1995: 19 or in an earlier essay hasdiste (‘female Hasid’) in 
Belcove-Shalin 1988: 77. 
55 Kranzler’s study focuses on the Hasidim of Williamsburg, who are mainly Hungarian-type 
Hasidim, some 40.000 inhabitants, consisting of fifteen to twenty Hasidic groups (1995: 23). 
The majority of the women who were interviewed for the separate chapter were followers of the 
Rebbe of Satmar, Pappa, Tzelem, Klausenburg, Vishnitz, Spinka, Krasna and others. Their ages 
averaged 32.6 years old, thus representing the young and middle-aged group, who together with 
their husbands consist of the most important element of the Williamsburg Hasidic population 
(168). 
56 Another more modest study of Hasidic women has been conducted by Stephanie Levine 
(1998) on Lubavitcher girls in Crown Heights. Nira Yuval-Davis’ (1992, 1999) articles on 
strictly Orthodox Jewish women can also be mentioned here, yet this article does not use an 
explicit ethnographical approach and applies a wholly different theoretical framework and 
therefore will be treated further on. Other social scientific studies of Orthodox, but not strictly 
Orthodox Jewish women have been undertaken by Susan Sered (1992) and Christel Manning 
(1999). 
57 This is a small case that contains a piece of parchment inscribed with verses 4-9 of 
Deuteronomy 6 and 13-21 of Deuteronomy 11 and then is attached to one or more doorposts of 
the home (Kaufman l993: 25). 
58 See their website: http://www.chabad.org  
59 Researchers such as Davidman (1991) have sometimes taken on this role as ‘interested 
potential returnee’ in order to gain access to the community, such as in enrolling on courses in 
residential centres.   
60 Another recent study of Lubavitcher women of Crown Heights was conducted by Stephanie 
Levine (1998), who focuses on ‘girls’ (unmarried women) between the ages of thirteen to 
twenty-three. Although in this short insightful article, some interesting points are raised, such as 
Levine’s observation that Lubavitcher girls seem to be: ‘less inhibited and more forceful than 
their secular counterparts’ with their own worlds and the boundaries of tzniut  (rules surrounding 
‘modesty’), Levine does not borrow any theoretical insights from feminist or gender studies.    
61 The main differences between the ba’alot teshuvah in Kaufman’s and Davidman’s studies, is 
that Kaufman focussed on newly Orthodox women who had completed the conversion process, 
whilst Davidman focuses on women new recruits in the midst of their 'conversion process', in 
two different settings: Bais Chana, a Lubavitcher residential institute for young returnees in St. 
Paul, Minnesota and a modern Orthodox synagogue on Lincoln Square in New York City. 
Kaufman in contrast, interviewed some 150 ba’alot teshuvah in five urban areas, approximately 
the half of which identified as Hasidic, belonging to the Lubavitcher or Bostoner Hasidim.  
62 Kaufman’s comparison between the discourse of her interviewees and the ideology of 
cultural feminism will be taken up further in chapter seven. 
63 El-Or (1994: 133) borrows Samuel C. Heilman’s distinction between two types of study, 
‘learning’ being a process of study to attain a certain piece of knowledge opposed to ‘lernen’ (a 
Yiddish word) as study for the stake of study, and a reproduction of culture.  
64 El-Or compares women’s study with men’s study as researched by Samuel S. Heilman, such 
as in Synagogue Life, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. 
65 These are the early feminist anthropology ‘classics’, such as M. Zimbalist-Rosaldo and L. 
Lamphere (eds.), Women, Culture and Society, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975 and 
Rayna Reiner (ed.), Toward an Anthropology of Woman, New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1975 and Carol MacCormack and Marilyn Strathern, Nature, Culture and Gender, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980.   
CHAPTER SIX 
THE FIELD: ANTWERP, 
LAST EUROPEAN SHTETL OR THE NEW JERUSALEM? 
 
 
 
This chapter presents a description of the ‘field’ of the case study and a 
reflection on the methodological process applied in approaching it. Then 
follows a general overview of the historical, social, and organisational 
information on the strictly Orthodox Jewish community in Antwerp. I will 
briefly elaborate the fieldwork methods and initial research questions, before 
turning to the results and analysis in chapters seven and eight. 
 
 
1. A Concise History of Antwerp Jewry 
 
Persecution and Toleration 
  
Historical documents show the presence of Jewish communities in the area of 
present-day Belgium as early as the fourth century (Abicht 1994: 20). Even this 
period shows evidence of discriminatory laws, such as the ban on becoming 
employed by Jews, or later attempts of forced conversion to Christianity, at 
least until the reign of Charles the Great in 800, which introduced a period of 
more tolerance and the growth of some Jewish communities. In the thirteenth 
century, Jewish settlements existed in many towns in the Duchy of Brabant and 
the first signs of Jews living in the town of Antwerp date from this period. Ludo 
Abicht (1988: 17) argues that the ‘pattern of conditional tolerance’, that was 
inaugurated at this time, characterised the situation for Antwerp Jews in 
subsequent eras, who were permitted to work as bankers, no doubt to the 
advantage of the pockets of kings or town councils. The ‘first wave’ of Jewish 
immigrants to Antwerp were Ashknenazi Jews from Central-Europe. However, 
many of these, including the Jews living in Brabant, were accused of various 
crimes and severely persecuted after the plague epidemic of 1348, and again in 
the 1370’s.  
What Abicht (1988: 16) calls the ‘second wave’ of immigration to 
Antwerp, concerned Jews from an entirely different background and area. 
These Sephardi Jews, often Marranos1, had been forced to convert to 
Christianity or alternatively flee from the Christian reconquistadores of the 
Iberian Peninsula - from Islamic authorities - in 1492 and from Portugal some 
five years later. The Sephardim who settled in Antwerp played an important 
role in the development of Antwerp with its harbour into an international trade 
centre, some of them managing to achieve a measure of success despite the 
continuous threat of agents of the Inquisition. Jacques Gutwirth (1968: 121) 
suggests that already during this time, many Jews were involved in the diamond 
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trade. After the Spanish conquest of Antwerp, and the separation of the Low 
Countries, like many of the Protestant traders and intellectuals, Jews fled to the 
North, many of these Sephardim settling in Amsterdam. 
Under the authority of the Austrian emperor in the eighteenth century, a 
limit was placed on the number of Jews permitted to live in a town and bound 
to paying special taxes. These and other laws kept the Jewish community in 
Antwerp small. Abicht (1988: 21) claims that although official numbers are 
untrustworthy, it can be inferred that these Jews were involved in the trade in 
tobacco, lace and diamonds. The Toleranz-Edikt issued by Emperor Joseph II in 
1782 finally permitted Jews to build their own synagogues, and take up 
professions other than banking, allowing them access to public schools and 
positions. Thus Gutwirth (1968: 121) claims that whilst both Spanish and 
Austrian conquerors had always been ‘eager to expel the Jews’, local 
magistrates were much more reluctant and this relative tolerance endured over 
the centuries and contributed to the prosperity of the city. In 1791 however, for 
the fist time the ruling French Republic declared Jews to be full citizens, 
introducing the fundamental changes in the transformation of Jewish identity to 
a private matter of religious practice and personal ‘choice’.    
This movement of emancipation continued under Dutch rule (1815-
1830?) and the first years after the foundation of the independent Belgian state 
in 1830. In 1816, a central synagogue was built in Brussels and this meant the 
small Jewish community of Antwerp, some two hundred people, were legally 
acknowledged. The National Congress decided to acknowledge and finance 
both the Protestant and Catholic religion in 1831, though they apparently 
‘forgot’ to mention Judaism (Abicht 1994: 43). This was speedily rectified 
however, and Judaism was accepted as an official religion and consequently 
received subsidies for religious services by the government. In 1832 the 
Centraal Consistorie van de Israelieten in België2 was founded. This has 
remained the official representative organ of the Jewish communities of 
Belgium.  
From 1800 until 1870 the first groups of immigrants to Belgium came 
from the Netherlands and the Rhine area. These Dutch Jews mainly settled in 
both Antwerp and Brussels. After Belgian independence, the Jewish immigrants 
mainly came from Elzas-Lotharingen in France. They settled in Brussels and 
other Southern parts, whilst German Jews also came to Brussels, that until 1900 
was the largest Jewish community of Belgium (5600 Jewish inhabitants). Many 
of these Jews had earned a living as door-to-door or travelling traders, settling 
into professions such as craftsman, merchant or manufacturer towards the 
second half of the nineteenth century (Abicht 1994: 43-44).  
The large ‘third wave’ of Jewish immigration to mainly Antwerp began 
in the 1880’s, the period of persecution and poverty in Eastern Europe as 
illustrated in the previous chapter. These predominantly Ashkenazi Jews from 
Russia worked in the diamond sector, numbering some 8000 Jewish inhabitants 
in Antwerp by 1901. Many of these remained in Antwerp, which served as a 
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transit centre for the thousands of Jews who were en route to the U.S. 
(Rabinowicz 1996: 39). Although there is no certainty as to the exact numbers 
of the Jewish population of Belgium at the turn of the century3, it can be 
assumed that the population most certainly was multiplied by ten compared to 
half a century earlier (Abicht 1994: 44). The Jewish population grew from some 
15.000 in 1913 to 35.000 in 1927 and 55.000 in 1933 (Abicht 1988: 25).4 
Rabinowicz (1986: 39) notes that on the eve of the Second World War, 
Antwerp furthermore counted some thirty-four synagogues and houses of 
prayer. Besides this religious community life, Jewish schools were established, 
next to a number of charitable and philanthropical agencies primarily in aid of 
refugees. 
The majority of the Antwerp Jews – most likely adult men - were active 
in the diamond industry – mostly as cleavers -, although in the industry itself 
both Jews and non-Jews worked, as was also the case since the foundation of 
the Diamond Exchange in 1904. Diverse factors contributed Antwerp’s growing 
into the world centre for diamonds, superseding Amsterdam by the 1920’s. 
Gutwirth (1968: 122) attributes this process both to the discovery of raw 
materials in West Africa and the Belgian Congo in 1912. These diamonds of 
inferior quality required skilled cutters and the wages in Belgium were low. The 
Antwerp dealers furthermore had preferential treatment in the buying of 
diamonds (especially Belgian Congo), the Jewish immigrants were hard 
workers and the traders had extensive networks with Jewish clients throughout 
the world.  
Abicht (1988: 25-26) also notes that at this time, Jews were represented 
on all steps of the social ladder, from unemployed, to manual labourers and 
entrepreneurs. Similarly, their political diversity mirrored the diversity in the 
gentile society, from the extreme left to reactionary rightwing. Many Jews in 
fact participated in the Flemish emancipation movement. That is until anti-
Semitic ideas crept into Flemish Nationalist circles in the thirties.      
 
 
The Destruction, Reconstitution and Chassidification 5 of a Community 
 
The invasion of Belgium by Nazi Germany into on the 10th of May 1940 also 
brought the Endlösing to the Jews of Belgium. Apparently, both the Belgian 
authorities and the non-Jewish population were initially resistant towards the 
persecution of Jews, as is illustrated by the relatively late introduction of the 
yellow David star on 15th of March in 1942. Documents show the Nazi 
occupiers had been hesitant because of the wave of compassion growing under 
the population (Abicht 1988: 66). Many gentile Belgians tried to protect their 
Jewish fellow-citizens, by hiding thousands of adults and children in their 
private homes, monasteries, orphanages, etcetera. On 5 July 1942, the official 
deportation commenced of the Belgian Jews, who by this time had already been 
efficiently segregated from the rest of society. Approximately half of the 
THE FIELD: ANTWERP, 
LAST EUROPEAN SHTETL OR THE NEW JERUSALEM? 
 
 
306
Belgian Jewish population was sent in 28 convoys from the Dossin-Kazerne in 
Mechelen towards Vittel, Buchenwald, Ravensbrück and Auschwitz. To 
Auschwitz alone some 24.811 Belgian Jewish children, women and men were 
deported, of which 1193 had survived in 1945 (Abicht 1994: 70). 
After the war, the Belgian authorities took active steps to repatriate 
many of the Jews who were working in the diamond industry and had managed 
to escape the holocaust. The port of Antwerp also functioned as a transit station 
for survivors from central and Eastern Europe, with thousand of refugees 
settling in the city (Gutwirth 1968: 123). Many among these East European 
survivors or ‘displaced persons’ (Brachfeld 2000: 188) were Hasidic Jews from 
Poland, Hungary and Romania, many of which participated in the fast recovery 
of the diamond industry. Brachfeld estimates the total post-war Jewish 
population of Belgium at 32.000. As for estimates of the post-war Jewish 
population of Antwerp, only Gutwirth’s (1968, 1970) study of the Belzer 
Hasidim carried out in the early sixties provides us with numbers. To date, the 
statistics of the Antwerp council do not register religious affiliation of its 
inhabitants, which means the only records available are the lists of members of 
religious congregations and other social and cultural services (Abicht 1988: 63, 
Abicht 1994: 134).  
Gutwirth (1968: 121) estimates the number of Jewish inhabitants of the 
city of Antwerp in 1966 at some 10.500, thus a quarter of the pre-war 
population. Abicht (1994: 134) notes a growth to 12.000 in 1969, to the number 
of 15.000 to 18.000 at the time of his writing in the early nineties. Abicht 
(1994: 134) claims that today, the population also includes Jews from the 
Netherlands, Sephardim from Southern Europe, a small group of Israelis and 
Americans and recently a growing number of Jews from Georgia.6           
None of the literature on the history of Hasidim in the city of Antwerp is 
precise as to the presence of Hasidic Jews before the onset of World War Two. 
Despite the much greater diversity in both social, political and religious 
orientation among the Jews of Antwerp compared the post-war period as noted 
by Abicht, it can be assumed that particularly due to the influx of East 
European Jews since the 1880’s, an Orthodox, religiously observant community 
was definitely formed and Hasidim were most likely amongst them. Gutwirth’s 
(1968) study of the Belzer Hasidim in Antwerp for example, notes the presence 
of Belzer in Antwerp before the war. However, according to Gutwirth these 
perished in the holocaust, and therefore attributes the contemporary Belzer 
community to immigrants after the war. Rabinowicz (1996: 39) informs us that 
Hasidic Jews such as the Belz, Grodzisk, Chortkov, Vischnitz, Ger, Alexander 
and Zanz did settle in Antwerp before the war, but this information is limited to 
the fact that they ‘settled in the poorer areas of Kievit, Leeuwerik, and 
Somerstreet’, which are in fact part of the contemporary Hasidic 
neighbourhood. However, Rabinowicz fails to mention any further references 
or the sources for these observations. 
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Also, as in the case of immigration after the war of East European 
Hasidim to the U.S., we can most likely assume, that in Antwerp a similar 
process of gradual chassidification  took place, with existing Orthodox Jewish 
communities becoming more and more Hasidic ever since the fifties. However, 
Abicht (1988: 36) argues that the process of secularisation which had probably 
been as strong in Antwerp as amongst the Jews in North America, Israel and 
Soviet Union before 1940, was halted after the war with the result that ‘here we 
have a form of Judaism that is much “purer” (or more “Jewish”) that almost 
anywhere else.’ Whilst the process of chassidification can possibly be explained 
by comparing the similar and synchronic phenomenon of other Jewish 
communities throughout the world, and even in the broader context of the rise 
of various traditionalist and religious fundamentalist movements, it remains 
notable that in contemporary Antwerp, the greater part of the Jewish 
community is in fact religiously observant, indeed Orthodox.   
Less religious or non-religious Jews do live in Antwerp, but the authors 
note that this concerns but a tiny minority. Willy Bok (1986: 371) estimates that 
at the time of his writing, some 80% of the Antwerp Jews are members of a 
religious community and 90% of the children aged 3 to 18 visit a Jewish day 
school. Of the estimated 15.000 to 20.000 Antwerp Jews today, the vast 
majority at least is affiliated with one of the two religious Orthodox 
congregations (Gutwirth 1999: 605). The Hasidic population is estimated to 
number some 5000 to 6000 inhabitants, which makes them approximately a 
third of the total (mostly Orthodox) population, indeed a unique situation 
compared to anywhere else in the world. ‘All of Jewish life in the to wn is 
hasidically coloured’ (Gutwirth 1999: 605), giving Antwerp Jewry its unique 
character and title of a contemporary ‘shtetl’. 
Among the rare attempts for the explanation for both the growth and the 
persistence of this shtetl type of community, is Gutwirth’s (1968, 1970) major 
focus on the socio-economical cohesion resulting from the specific role of 
Antwerp Jewry in the diamond industry. Although before the war, the economic 
activities of Antwerp Jewry mirrored the same religious, social and political 
diversity of the broader community, after the war, a relatively large number of 
the community is active in the diamond industry. According to Gutwirth (1968: 
132), ‘it seems, therefore, that the persistence of this community possessed of 
an intense Jewish identity (an archaic and rare survival in western countries) is 
related to the perpetuation of techno-economic activities [crafts and trades and 
businesses often linked to semi-skilled industries] rather similar to those which 
used to prevail in the shtetl.’ Other factors such as the historical tradition of 
Jews being involved in the diamond trade since the eleventh century, the 
transactions which require limited networks based on trust, etcetera., or in 
Gutwirth’s (1968: 133) words: ‘the industry, which is associated with ancient 
traditions and is in some measure a world in itself, exhibits further points of 
similarity with an intense Jewish life.’       
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The reconstitution of predominantly Orthodox Jewish Antwerp 
community thus involved an evolution towards a relatively tight, cohesive 
community, located in a particular area of the city of Antwerp, with its 
members acting upon the same structural networks of economic, religious, and 
social organisation. In comparison with contemporary Brussels for example, 
which is in fact the town with the largest Jewish population of Belgium, Jews 
live throughout the whole city and its suburbs, in contrast to the a relatively 
small and specific area where the majority of Antwerp Jewry lives. Most Jewish 
children in Brussels do not go to Jewish schools but use the regular official 
educational facilities (Bok 1986: 373). The Jews living in Brussels furthermore 
attest to a far larger diversity in terms of religious affiliation and religious or 
non-religious identity. Brussels is home to the Centraal Israëlitisch Consistorie, 
which represents Jewish religious communities from the whole of Belgium. In 
Brussels, the presence of many secular Jews is also testified by the importance 
of the secular Zionist Centre Communautaire Laïc Juif, which was founded in 
the sixties. Brussels also has a Liberale Israëlitische Gemeente, which in 
practice is closer to the American version of Conservative Judaism. This 
community is not represented or acknowledged by the Consistoire, partly 
explained by the resistance of Antwerp Orthodox Jewry who feel this 
community is not observant enough (Abicht 1994: 152).7 Brussels does have an 
Orthodox Israëlitische Gemeente, numbering some 2500-3000 members. The 
Israëlitische Gemeente van Brussel under the great rabbi Albert Guigini is more 
modern Orthodox and finally there is another Orthodox Sephardic community 
(Abicht 1994: 155-157). 
 
 
2. A Closer Look at the Contemporary Community 
 
Structure: Congregations and other Community Institutions      
 
In 1816 the first synagogue in Antwerp was opened on the Paardenmarkt, 
where at this time most of the Jews had settled. Descendants of Dutch Jews 
who had remained in Antwerp after the partition of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands in 1830 built the great synagogue of Antwerp in the 
Bouwmeestersstraat in 1893. Thirdly, an Orthodox community ‘following the 
Russian-Polish rite’ (Abicht 1988: 24) is to have existed since 1867, opening its 
first synagogue in the Oostenstraat in 1918. 
Today there are three officially acknowledged Jewish religious 
congregations in Antwerp. The smallest religious congregation in Antwerp is 
the Sephardic community, Gemeente van de Portugese Ritus. Portuguese and 
Turkish Sephardic Jews were acknowledged as a separate religious community 
in 1910 and opened their synagogue in the Hovenierstraat in 1913, the first to 
be built in the present Jewish area of Zurenborg and Borgerhout and in the 
middle of the ‘Diamantwijk’ (diamond area). Of the other two main religious 
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congregations, the oldest is the Machsike Hadass8, or the Orthodoxe 
Israëlitische Gemeente, which was founded in 1892 and acknowledged by the 
state in 1910 (Bok 1986: 372). According to Rosenberg (1999) however, De 
Israelitische Orthodoxe Gemeente van Antwerpen Machsike Hadass was in fact 
first called the Israëlietische Synagoog van de Russisch -Poolse Ritus and was 
founded in 1870 after a law was passed on religious services. In 1951, the name 
was then officially changed to the Orthodoxe Israëlietische Synagoog Machsike 
Hadass. 
According to Bok (1986: 372), the Machsike Hadass is inspired by the 
foundations of the Agudat Israel which was founded in 1910 and therefore 
explicitly traditionalist oriented. Whilst Rosenberg (1999) characterises the 
Machsike Hadass as a ‘generally non-Zionist Orthodox congregation’, Bok 
(1986: 372) claims that although initially and ideologically the organisation was 
anti-Zionist, today it does acknowledge the existence of the Jewish state at a 
political level, without incorporating Zionist ideology. Today’s Hasidic 
communities of Antwerp are all affiliated with the Machsike Hadass, which 
gives this community its more ‘rigorous’ or traditionalist character, compared 
to the other major religious community that follows the congregation of the 
Shomre Hadass9.  
Until recently, the Machsike Hadass was led by the chief rabbi Ch. 
Kreiswirth (who died on 30/12/2001), assisted by rabbi E. Sternbuch and rabbi 
T. Weiss, and the rabbinate is also located in the Jewish area, in the Jacob 
Jacobsstraat. Their main synagogue is in the Oostenstraat, as it was founded as 
the ‘synagogue of the Polish-Russian rite’ in the second decade of the twentieth 
century. The congregation supervises two major beth midrashim (study halls or 
houses). The rabbi and the dayan (religious judge) also regulate the religious 
legal jurisdiction, pertaining to internal, usually economical or financial 
disputes. Members voluntary abide by this law, as other citizens or residents of 
Belgium, there are subjected to the state’s legal system. The Machsike Hadass 
furthermore provides all religious services to its members, such as the ritual 
butchers for kosher meat, ritual supervisors for kosher restaurants and shops, 
mikvahs or ritual baths  (one for women and one for men, including one in 
Knokke-Heist), and ritual circumcisers, etcetera.10 The Machsike Hadass has 
numerous formal or informal relations with a number of institutions, such as the 
Jesoda-Hatora and Beth-Jacov schools, the Yeshiva Ets Chaim in Wilrijk, the 
upper secondary school Yeshiva Tal Toire, as well as the majority of all beth 
midrashim and the separate Hasidic communities (Rosenberg 1999). The 
‘kehille’ makes announcements with wall posters, and has a weekly paper 
Shabat Be-Shabato that informs its members of the congregation’s activities.  
The Shomre Hadass, or the Israëlitische gemeente van Antwerpen 
evolved out of a fusion between the older Israëlitische gemeente and a religious 
organisation Shomre Hadass which was founded in 1920 (Bok 1986: 371-372). 
According to Abicht (1994: 139) the ratio between the two congregations is 
usually cited as 60/40, with the Shomre Hadass being the larger community, but 
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this figure is probably no longer accurate due to the much higher birth rate 
among the more traditionalist Jews. Rosenberg’s website (1999a) on the Jewish 
community of Antwerp includes excerpts from ‘a letter of the congregation’, 
claiming some 1250 families are member. Although the leaders of the Shomre 
Hadass are very observant and traditionalist, the majority of its members are 
more lenient, and can perhaps be described as ‘modern-Orthodox’ (Bok 1986: 
372), or according to Abicht (1994: 136) ‘conservative’ Jewish. Anyhow, the 
community counts quite a number of members who are more liberal or ‘lax’ in 
religious observance.  
The Shomre Hadass (Abicht 1994: 136-138) runs two synagogues, the 
main synagogue in the Bouwmeesterstraat and the Romi Goldmuntz synagogue 
in the Van den Nestlei (built in 1927). The second is actually located in the 
current Jewish area. Besides these two synagogues, the beth midrash (prayer 
and study house) ‘Moryah’ is located in the Terliststraat in the building of the 
rabbinate and the community’s secretary. The Shomre Hadass is run by a board 
under the chief rabbi D.M. Lieberman, assisted by rabbi J. Kohen. The 
community also has six representatives at the Consistoire in Brussels. The 
Shomre Hadass is also responsible for the state acknowledged Tashkemoni 
school in the Lange Leemstraat and the Van Diepenbeekstraat, the only mixed 
Jewish school in Antwerp, which also accepts children from ‘mixed marriages’ 
in which one of the partners is a convert, rather than Jewish born. The school’s 
identity is therefore also illustrative of the more ‘open’ attitude of the 
community towards modern society and secular culture, regardless of the 
adherence to halakhah by most of its members. The community furthermore 
runs two burial grounds and a mikvah. Various butchers and restaurants are 
controlled by the rabbinate.  
Amongst the members of the Machsike Hadass are the more 
traditionalist and ‘ultra’ or ‘strictly Orthodox’ Jews, including the separate 
Hasidic communities (numbering appr. 5000 people in total). According to 
Abicht (1994: 139), the different courts are: The Belzer (which is numerically 
the largest), the Satmar, Vischnitz, Ger, Sandz, Chortkov, Lubavitch, 
Klausenburg, Barditchev and Bobov. Rabinowicz (1996: 39) also mentions the 
Alexander. Henri Rosenberg’s (1999) more recent website on the Jewish 
community of Antwerp however, provides us with much more detailed and up 
to date information on the present Jewish religious and non-religious 
organisations, including the Hasidic congregations. 
In his list of ‘Synagogal associations and Hasidic congregations’ in 
Antwerp, out of some thirty different institutions, Rosenberg (1999) includes a 
total number of nineteen ‘chassidé’s’, including details on their founders and 
other short descriptive informative items and addresses. The ‘Chassidé 
Alexander’ for example has the status of a ‘v.z.w.’ (non-profit organisation). 
The largest Hasidic group in Antwerp, the Belzer, are divided into two separate 
communities (Chassidé Belz – Mojsdis Chasside Belze v.z.w. and Chassidé 
belz (Bis) – Synagogue Klaus Belza – Haichal Aharaon v.z.w.), reflecting the 
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schism that happened at an international scale, when a separate branch – Belz 
Bis - evolved out of the refusal to acknowledge the present Rebbe Issachar Dov 
Rockach (°1948), and sees a descendant of Rebbe Joseph Meir as their spiritual 
leader.  The Mojsdis Chaside Belze is not officially affiliated with the Machsike 
Hadass, as is the Chassidé Prszeworsk – Beth Jischok v.z.w., the only actual 
Hasidic court which more or less originated in Antwerp, thus both functioning 
as ‘de facto quasi independent communities’ (Rosenberg 1999).  
According to Rosenberg, although the Przeworsker Hasidim originate 
from the Polish town of Prszework, in fact this dynasty is ‘typically Antwerp’. 
The dynasty was founded by Rebbe Isaac Gewirtsman from Prszeworsk, who 
came from Paris to Antwerp after the Second World War. Reb Itzekel built up a 
considerable reputation in Antwerp, according to Rabinowicz (1996: 40), he 
was visited by many Hasidim from other European countries and was known as 
a miracle worker. Reb Itzekel died in 1976 and was succeeded by his son in law 
R. Jakob Leiser (°1906) (descendant of the rebbes Teitelbaum), or Reb Jankel, 
who was simply called the ‘Antwerp Rebbe’. Rabinowicz (1996: 40) notes this 
Polish Rebbe is currently ‘the most charismatic rebbe in Europe.’ On his 
website Rosenberg (1999) claims that ‘he died a year ago’ and that he was 
succeeded by his own son, R. Leibish Leiser, or Reb Leibish. 
Rosenberg names further independent communities, synagogues or beth 
midrashim in Antwerp originating from one court, such as the Chasidé Sanz 
Sienowa – Beth Morchedai and the Chasidé Sanz-Zmigrod and also Chasidé 
Lubawitch – Huis voor Joodse Jeugd en Cultuur v.z.w. and Chasidé Lubawitch 
(Bis) – Beth Menachem. The development of the latter is also reflective of an 
international schism in which one branch acknowledges the late Rabbi 
Menachem Mendel Schneersohn (1902-1995) as the true Messiah. The 
Vischnitzer have also separated into the Chassidé Wiznitz and the Chassidé 
Wiznitz (Bis) – Ahawat Israel Weor Hachaim – Synagoog Chaside Wisnitz 
v.z.w. The reason for this schism is to be located in the mutual antipathy 
between the more pious bearded members and the more modern non-bearded 
men who remained in the original location in the Jacob Jacobsstraat. Besides 
this much more detailed specification of the communities than in the lists 
provided by Abicht (1988; 1994) and Rabinowicz (1996), Rosenberg (1999) 
adds a few Hasidic communities which do not feature at all in those lists, such 
as the Chassidé Shotz – Synagoog en School ‘Daas Sholem Shotz’ v.z.w., of 
which there is also a community in London, and the Chassidé Square – 
Synagoge Toldos Jacob Josef Chassidei Square v.z.w., a relatively recent 
congregation in Antwerp. These prayer houses all have their own rabbis, and 
according to Rosenberg (1991) there is even ‘a whole series of rabbis sans 
synagogue’ in Antwerp, such as a Saloshitzer Rabbi, a Baaier rabbi, a Deesher 
Rabbi, an Amshenower Rabbi, a Naseter Rabbi, a Przemyslany Rabbi and even 
an Ostender Rabbi.  
As for the other fundamental institutions of a community, the Jewish 
educational fac ilities similarly cater to different Orthodox communities 
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depending on their degree of observance or communitarian affiliation.11 
Perhaps more important than in the case of the synagogues and beth midrashim, 
is the case that here, Jewish schools also have to be acknowledged in order to 
receive state subsidies. The problem here lies in the fact that officially the state 
requires schools to provide certain subjects and an educational content which 
cannot be accommodated in their own (religious) curriculum. In practice this 
entails that the more traditionalist the school is, and opposed to the adoption of 
secular learning materials as an essential strategy in the resistance towards the 
surrounding society, the less likely it will receive financial assistance and must 
therefore revert to self-sufficiency. In 1843 five Jewish elementary schools 
were known to have existed in the cities of Brussels, Luik, Ghent, Aarlen and 
Antwerp. In 1912 the first secondary school was established with German as 
the main teaching language. The Tashkemoni school for boys was founded in 
1920 and taught entirely in Hebrew. There were also a few Orthodox religious 
schools for different subgroups, but as Abicht (1994: 61) emphasises, before the 
Second World War most Jewish children went to regular public schools, a 
situation which would completely change after 1945. 
The now mixed and state subsidised Tashkemoni school (belonging to 
the type of ‘free education’ which is subsidised by the Flemish government) 
which is supervised by the modern-Orthodox congregation of the Shomre 
Hadass, has three departments, including an elementary, a middle school and an 
‘athenaeum’. The school follows the official Flemish curriculum – which is the 
general education in the Dutch language -, next to some 10 hours per week of 
‘Jewish subjects’, including Hebrew, Jewish religion and tradition, history of 
Judaism and the Israeli state. According to Rosenberg (1999a), the school has 
some 850 pupils. The teachers’ corps consists of both Jewish and non-Jewish 
teachers.  
The other Jewish major school in Antwerp, the Jesodeh Hatorah – Beth 
Jacob, caters to the more traditionalist Orthodox Jews and is supervised by the 
Machsike Hadass. Like the Tashkemoni school, the Jesodeh Hatorah is 
recognised and subsidised by the state, offering the official Flemish curriculum 
and equivalent diplomas. The Jesodeh Hatorah on the other hand, in compliance 
with its more stringent observant character of the more traditionalist Orthodox 
Jews, has separate classes for boys and girls, the girls’ part of the school going 
under the name Beth Jakob. These schools include elementary, middle 
education and athenaeums for boys and girls separately and a teachers’ 
education program in Hebrew and Religion for girls (Gutwirth 1968; Rosenberg 
1999a). The subsidised Yavne-School caters for the religious Zionist Mizrachi 
movement, and according to Abicht (1994: 141) can be regarded as somewhat 
‘in between’ the more worldly Tashkemoni school and the ‘pure’ Orthodox 
schools. Classes are mixed and the secondary school curriculum offers twenty-
four hours of secular subjects and fifteen hours of religious subjects.      
Apart from these state subsidised schools that offer both profane and 
religious education, there are a number of smaller schools which are religious, 
CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
313
yet do offer private profane education on demand (Abicht 1988: 64), such as the 
Beth Rachel and Benos Jerusalem (for the Belzer Hasidim) for girls and the 
Talmud Torah (also Belz) and Torah Veyirah for boys.12 Abicht (1994: 127) 
claims that at the time of his writing, the ‘B’noth Jerusalem’ for girls is in fact 
subsidised by the department of education, which means their curriculum 
differs significantly from the Belzer boys at the Talmud Tora, including many 
more secular and much less religious subjec ts.  
Finally, Antwerp has a number of Orthodox and separate Hasidic 
schools which offer intensive religious education (all supervised by the 
Machsike Hadass). Hasidic elementary schools, the ‘cheder’ in Rosenberg’s 
(1999) list, include the Bobover Cheider, the Satmar Cheider, the Wiznitzer 
Cheider. There are also a number of yeshivas for boys including Yeshiva Etz 
Chaim, which is the only religious school that dates from before the war and is 
a boarding school in Wilrijk (Abicht 1988: 65). Other yeshivas are Jeshiva Daas 
Sholem (Shotz), Jeshiva Lazeïrim Belze, Jeshiva Tichonit, Jeshiva Tal Toïre, 
Jeshiva Wiznitz and Jeshiva Satmar (Rosenberg 1999).        
As for other institutions and associations founded by and catering for 
Antwerp Orthodox Jewry, Abicht (1988: 68) notes that again the pre-war and 
contemporary offer reflects the profound differences in the character of today’s 
Antwerp Jewish community. Whereas the political and social associations 
before the war were vastly diverse – from Zionistic, socialist (the Bund), and 
many workers unions, these have now disappeared, making place for wholly 
different types of organisations.  
These are numerous13 and their purposes range from scientific, 
historical, cultural, musealogical associations to medical funds, organisations 
that help war victims and refugees or that combat racism and anti-Semitism. 
The Romi Goldmuntz Centrum is quite well known; it offers all kinds of 
courses, has a small library and hosts cultural evenings, debates, lectures, 
folklore, etcetera. There are youth and student associations, sports clubs such as 
the (Royal) Sports club Maccabi, which was founded in 1920.  There are 
Antwerp branches of all kinds of international Jewish organisations, such as 
W.I.Z.O, the Women’s International Zionist Organisation. Most traditionalists 
are not involved with these non-religious or Zionist associations though. There 
are organisations that offer specific services such as the Goedkosjer – Joodse 
Verbruikersvereniging (°1989) (www.goedkosjer.org/), or the Israelitische 
Begrafenisvereniging Freiche Stichting (°1884) which together with Chewra 
Kadisha of the Machsike Hadass runs funeral arrangements and owns the 
Jewish cemetery in Putte (the Netherlands). Other centres offer community 
services such as counselling, such as Shalva – Joods counselling bureau 
(psychological and physical well-being for Jewish marriage and family life).  
As early as 1920 a superstructure ‘De Centrale’ (Centraal Beheer van 
Joodse Weldadigheid en Maatschappelijk Hulpbetoon) was erected to co-
ordinate the many social services, in that time for children’s clothing, taking 
care of orphans, and an old peoples home (Abicht 1988: 71). After the war the 
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‘Centrale’ still co-ordinated many services directed at ‘giving material and 
moral help to the least beneficent and those suffering’ (Rosenberg 1999a). 
Hasidic communities sometimes also have their own organisations such as a 
Satmar social service with its own children’s holiday camp in Namur (Abicht 
1988: 71). Gutwirth (1968: 131) noted more than thirty years ago that ‘the 
community has an international (and well deserved) reputation for generosity.’ 
To date this statement is equally accurate, as the official and unofficial 
voluntary organisations directed at charity, fundraising for the most diverse 
causes remain numerous. As we shall see in the following chapter, many of 
these activities are the province of Jewish women.    
 
 
Local and Global Contexts       
 
The existing – however limited – research (mainly by Ludo Abicht and Jacques 
Gutwirth) that has been carried out on what is sometimes called the last 
European shtetl in Europe, offers us a basic insight, or ‘glimpse’ into a 
particular segment of the population of Antwerp which we could define as 
‘Orthodox Jewry’. Recently, the website ‘JewishAntwerp.com’ by Henri 
Rosenberg (1999) gives us even more information on the institutions within the 
community. The majority of the Jews living in Antwerp are members of one of 
the two major religious ‘Orthodox’ Jewish congregations, which at least shows 
the probability that these members both identify as observant Jews (adherence 
to halakhah) and are involved in affiliated institutions and networks, such as the 
schools.14 Particularly telling is as Abicht claims (1988: 64), that some 85-90 % 
of Jewish children visit Jewish schools.15 Antwerp Jewry thus gains its unique 
character through the fact that while it relatively speaking may be small 
compared to say the number of Jews living in other cities throughout the world 
(including other European cities such as London and Paris), it is unique in its 
degree of observance and cohesion. This religious and socio -economic cohesion 
is strengthened and also explainable by factors such as the large involvement in 
the Diamond industry (Gutwirth’s thesis), although in recent years both its 
importance and the Jewish participation has slightly diminished, with many 
Antwerp Jews working in other professions and industries. 
The description of Antwerp as a shtetl can furthermore be attributed to 
the fact that the area of and around the Diamantwijk, from the central station 
southwards to the Stadspark and beyond, is populated by a large number of 
Orthodox Jews, and this is also where the main community facilities lie such as 
the synagogues, beth midrashim, schools, shops, etcetera. The title of a shtetl is 
also given because although they are but a minority amongst a minority, the 
strictly Orthodox and Hasidic population are visibly very noticeable to the 
outsider in their outward appearance, especially the typical old Eastern 
European style of clothing worn by men. The cohesion of the community is 
furthermore produced and recognisable by the network of other institutions, 
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such as the social services, charitable organisations, cultural and youth 
associations. The Jewish community has its own telephone book, and even its 
own exchange and market paper (‘koopjeskrant’).  
It is important to emphasise the fact that Antwerp Jewry is to a great 
extent not only a community defined by ethnicity, but also by religion , as the 
majority of the population both self-identifies and is a member of a religious 
congregation. Despite this cohesion and the possibility of viewing Antwerp 
Jewry as one type of minority community with its own ‘boundaries’ and 
markers of difference (ethnicity and religious observance) vis -à-vis the 
surrounding gentile society, in the last paragraph it also became clear that there 
are internal differences, regardless of dominant traditionalist religious 
orientation. Although we obviously cannot assume that the individual 
differences are reflected in membership association, a first demarcation at the 
level of structure is to be made along the members of the two major 
congregations. The Shomre Hadass, which can be roughly described as ‘modern 
Orthodox’ or ‘conservative’ and the Machsike Hadass, whose members are 
generally speaking ‘Orthodox’ or even ‘strictly Orthodox.’16 
The latter congregation also functions as a co-ordinating and supervising 
structure for a variety of ‘sub-congregations’, including the Antwerp Hasidic 
communities that belong to the different international Hasidic courts. In this 
respect, Antwerp Jewry itself is also internally differentiated, whilst the 
different Hasidic or Misnagdic communities for example, belong to even larger 
supra national communities, of which the members are dispersed over the 
world. That the internal diversity can sometimes even turn into adversity – 
sometimes even within one Hasidic court – is no less the case in this European 
shtetl than in for instance Brooklyn, yet the relative smallness of the Antwerp 
community both requires and further reproduces the structures, networks, and 
relations of mutual interdependence. 
Henri Rosenberg’s articles on his own website give some insight into the 
differences amongst Antwerp Jews. Particular Rosenberg’s article (in three 
parts) on the ‘representation of the Antwerp Jewish community’ (1995) both 
criticises and relates the problem of Jewish organisations acting as 
‘representative’ for the whole community. This involves the ‘Forum der Joodse 
Organisaties’ or ‘het Coördinatiecomité van Joodse Organisaties van België’ or 
even the Consistoire itself to the much broader questions of the possibility of 
representation of Jewry at a political, socio-cultural or religious level at any 
scale, even to the internatio nal level of the ‘Jewish World Congress’ itself. 
Rosenberg argues that often the most factual ‘representative’ organisms – with 
large numbers of active members at different levels – are often those that do not 
proclaim themselves to be representative of ‘the’ Jews. As for Antwerp Jewry, 
Rosenberg nonetheless claims that both the Shomre Hadass and the Machsike 
Hadass and thirdly the Centrale (het Centraal Beheer voor Joodse Weldadigheid 
en Maatschappelijk Hulpbetoon) would be the most likely candidates for 
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‘speaking for’ Antwerp Jewry, as they have thousands of members who actually 
participate in the yearly meetings and elections of the board of directors.17  
As for other associations and institutional networks, the differences 
among the schools themselves showed how even Orthodox Jews differ as to 
their views on the way to bring up their children as religious Jews. Particularly 
the strictly Orthodox and the Hasidim often not only have their own 
synagogues, prayer houses and schools, but also their own social and cultural 
centres. Most traditionalists would not even consider visiting the Romi 
Goldmuntz centre or joining the Maccabi sports club. According to Rosenberg, 
most Orthodox Jews do not even consider Reform Jews as their ‘co-
religionists’.  According to Rosenberg (1995), only recently at the Second 
European Congress of the Orthodox Agudat Israel, did the majority of the 
European Orthodox rabbis pass a motion, reminding the religious prohibition to 
perform any act whatsoever towards the Reform and even the Conservative 
movements, which ‘could be interpreted as the recognition that these Jews have 
any kind of binding with the Jewish people’ (from Jedion, the twice monthly 
journal of Agudat Israel, nr. 32 June-July 1996, p. 5). 
As in Heilman and Friedman’s (1991) typology of traditionalist and 
fundamentalist communities, the internal diversity in the Jewish community/ies 
of Antwerp can also be characterised using a framework in terms of the degree 
of acculturation or resistance towards modern society and the surrounding 
secular world. In general, Conservative and ‘modern Orthodox’ Jews are 
inclined to interact with broader society more than the more traditionalist, 
strictly Orthodox groups. The latter tend to be more separatist, i.e. avoiding the 
usage of facilities available in the general society as much as possible, in favour 
of the communities’ own services and institutions within not only the religious, 
but also socio -economic and educational spheres. This form of separatism or 
isolationism is obviously only relative, as the present-day context of the nation-
state does not allow for any possibility of ‘autonomous’ communities. In fact, 
most of the Antwerp Jews are Belgian citizens, many of which Belgian born, 
thus both subject and entitled to the same duties, rights of any other member of 
the state. However, the more observant and committed to halakhah, the more 
restrictions upon the possible forms of interaction with non-Jews or non-
observant Jews. The more traditionalist, the more far reaching this form of 
separatism and isolation from the surrounding society appears to be. 
The relative degree of local autonomy and internal cohesion 
accompanied by separatism and isolationism of Antwerp Orthodox Jewry is 
typically aligned with an enormous internationalism. There is the very complex 
and special relationship to the state of Israel, which varies even amongst many 
Orthodox Jews in and outside of Israel. Apart from this, the meaning of the 
Diaspora, especially amongst those Jews that do embrace a strong Jewish 
identity, whether this is religious, ethnically or historically defined, has 
coincided with the growth of the current ‘global village’ and the facilitation of 
international communications and travel. The internationalism of Hasidic 
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communities is especially apparent. Although the communities are even 
somewhat separatist amongst themselves, having their own community 
networks and institutions, at the international level, the contacts, travelling, and 
often emigration, temporary relocations – particularly through marriage bonds – 
are considerable. Among the Hasidim the rebbe and the contact with his 
administration is paramount, in whatever part of the world he may be residing.             
Besides these two main characteristics of Antwerp – but also global – 
strictly Orthodox Jewry, both the relative separatism and autonomy at the level 
of locality on the one hand and the inter- – or supra - nationalism on the other, 
an important recent historical shift has taken place in this traditionalist type of 
communities. As previously remarked, the Antwerp community has also 
undergone a process of chassidification in the post-war period, a process which 
is likely to have continued and possibly intensified – together with increasing 
isolation and separatism of the strictly Orthodox – during the last decades. That 
the post-war community of Orthodox Jews in Antwerp appears to be much 
more traditionalist and religious observant than the community before the war 
had already been noted by Abicht (1988, 1994). Gutwirth’s (1970) ethnographic 
work dating from the sixties then again, points to the intense religious character 
of the Hasidic Jewry in Antwerp at the time of his study. However, he sees this 
as the seeds for a decrease in traditionalism – much in line with most of the 
predictions in Hasidic studies at this time (see previous chapter) – rather than 
the birth of a ‘new’ phenomenon. New Hasidic immigrants coming to Antwerp 
after the war obviously directly contributed to this process of chassidification. 
However, there is also much reason to believe that a process of growing 
religious observance and social control has taken place amongst a large part of 
Antwerp Jewry ever since the post-war period. These shifts can furthermore 
possibly be understood in the context of and in comparison with the growth of 
many other traditionalist and religious fundamentalisms since the sixties in 
many parts of the world.  
An interesting personal account and viewpoint on the chassidification of 
Antwerp Jewry is that of Henri Rosenberg (1991) in an article on his website 
titled ‘Those were the days: About Past and Present. The Metamorphosis of a 
Shtetl seen though the eyes of a sociologist.’ Rosenberg claims that the past 
thirty years - considering the time of writing, that would be from the sixties 
onwards – a ‘large-scale metamorphosis of a generation which transformed 
itself from orthodox Jew (old style) into the new look orthodox Jew’ has taken 
place. Although the author confesses to the influence of some nostalgia, he 
nonetheless is very adamant in his own evaluation of this transformation. His 
personal opinion is characterised in expressions such as: ‘After all a particular 
type of orthodox Jew is disappearing, a trend which is particularly amusingly 
and profoundly illustrated by the post-war Bobover chossid who resolutely 
refused to follow the herd by growing a beard and explained his stubbornness 
by saying that he wanted to be able [to] show his children and grand-children 
what a Bobover chossid looked like.’ 
THE FIELD: ANTWERP, 
LAST EUROPEAN SHTETL OR THE NEW JERUSALEM? 
 
 
318
Rosenberg furthermore gives an account of his carefree childhood 
growing up in Antwerp, when being Orthodox did not entail a complete 
segregation and prohibition on contacts with the surrounding secular society. 
Jewish children watched television, went to department stores, and bought 
sweets in the local store. This involved a great deal of ‘tolerance’ towards the 
degree of religious stringency, which was also reflected in exterior demeanour: 
‘Few of our parents bothered to grow a beard (even those who had been forced 
to shave them off by the Nazis). Nor were head coverings for women widely 
used. After all moderately priced fashionable wigs in synthetic hair did not yet 
exist’.18 Similarly, the kosher food industry had not really gotten off the ground, 
which meant kashrut rules were rather lenient. In Rosenberg’s point of view, 
the increasing restrictions on the Orthodox life style towards an ideal form of 
piety has meant things have changed for the worst: ‘the times of liberal views, 
nonchalance and a tolerant morality have long disappeared’. Children have 
become more devout than their parents, they have adopted a stance against 
modern and profane society and aspiring to what they see as the original Jewish 
religious way of life. Rosenberg regrets this development and sees the birth of 
the ‘homo chassidicus’ as aligned with the rise of other sorts of 
fundamentalisms throughout the world. 
   
                
3. Entering the Field – Enter Women 
 
The previous two paragraphs provided both important background information 
on the history and social organisation of Antwerp Orthodox Jewry as a unique 
‘religious’ community. They also tentatively offered some  analytical 
frameworks on how to situate the community in terms of collective identity and 
the contemporary resurgence of religious traditionalism on a global, 
comparative scale. As explained before, the original focus of the case study was 
meant to be a traditionalist religious community, which would give the 
opportunity to illustrate the main hypotheses on the study of gender and religion 
most poignantly. Thus in the case of the Antwerp Jewish community, I hoped to 
gain access to some Orthodox Jewish women, and hopefully even some of the 
more traditionalist or even Hasidic women among them.  
 
 
The Research Population  
 
The available information I had on Antwerp Jewry, in terms of both general 
information and existing research, was limited to Gutwirth’s (1968, 1970, 1978) 
older ethnographic work on the Belzer Hasidim and Abicht’s (1994) more 
recent introductory books for a general readership, including his appendix with 
some addresses of the community’s institutions such as the congregations and 
their synagogues. Rosenberg’s much more elaborate and detailed information 
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on his website was unfortunately not yet online at the time of the interviews. In 
one respect, the determination of a particular research population seemed 
relatively straightforward in the case of the Antwerp Orthodox Jewry. The 
community itself is relatively small, cohesive, and as for the more traditionalist 
Jews, the literature suggested that a first parameter would be affiliation with the 
Machsike Hadass congregation. As William Shaffir (1991: 73) notes on his 
experiences in researching Hasidim, Hasidic Jews live in select areas with 
‘demarcated boundaries’ and they can be identified through their institutions, 
such as ‘their own house of worship that serves as a central meeting place’ 
(Shaffir 1998: 51). However, an attempt to make contacts by ‘hanging around’ 
in the neighbourhood of the synagogue or prayer house, or directly contacting 
any of the secretaries or directors of institutions seemed to be the best way to go 
about contacting Jewish women. The main research questions, my own 
positioning and the people I wanted to reach motivated the choice for an 
alternative route of entry into the field . Epistemologically, I a priori realised 
that as an outsider, both my gender and ‘ethnicity’ (as a ‘goy’) would place 
severe limits on the methods of entry that had been used by most of the 
researchers whose work I covered in the previous chapter.  
First of all, ‘hanging around’ synagogues or visiting prayer houses (e.g., 
Eisenberg 1996) would not at all prove effective, both because of my gender 
and in trying to reach any women rather than men, these locations being 
precisely areas of the male dominated public sphere in Orthodox Jewish and 
especially strictly Orthodox communities. Simply putting on a skullcap and 
walking into a synagogue to join in a prayer session (Shaffir 1991: 74) or 
paying a visit to the men’s ritual bath – another male communal sphere – (such 
as Heilman 1992), would have been quite inappropriate and simply impossible. 
perhaps I could have tried visiting the women’s section of the synagogue on the 
Sabbath, but somehow as a gentile, this step seemed far too big and I 
anticipated this would have been felt as an ‘intrusion’, an act totally out of 
place.  
I compared my situation to that of the other researchers who, despite 
their secular life style and unfamiliarity with strictly Orthodox Jewish 
communities and life styles, were their ‘jewishness’ has somehow played an 
important practical role in gaining entry to their field of research. Many of them 
had, after all, a familiarity with certain rituals, or the knowledge of languages 
such as Hebrew or Yiddish. Those researchers focussing on the Lubavitcher 
Hasidim have the additional ‘advantage’ of – as Jews - being conceived of as 
potential ‘converts’ or ‘returnees’. Naturally this gives their research process its 
own ethical dilemmas, such as the explication of research intentions, and so 
forth (Shaffir), but a priori their ‘jewishness’ did give these researchers an 
enormous ‘home advantage’ in gaining access and being tolerated by these 
otherwise ‘closed communities’. The ethnographic research on strictly 
Orthodox Jewish women conducted by David man, Kaufman, Morris, Levine 
and Podselver discussed in the previous chapter, similarly focussed on 
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Lubavitcher women, and research methods were usually applied by visiting and 
joining in programmes of institutions specifically directed at potential returnees. 
Both the fact that traditionalist strictly Orthodox Jewish women do not – 
or peripherally – participate in public religious ritual and their institutions, and 
the feminist epistemological premise that I wanted to start my research ‘from 
women’s lives’, further supported the feeling I would have to gain entry to a 
‘field’ that was precisely not that of the institutional, official or ‘public’ sphere. 
The fact that I wanted to meet women rather than men, also ultimately made me 
consider less evident people than the secretaries of the congregations or school 
directors. I anticipated that this would lead me to men, and precisely those men 
who hold important positions of authority and the responsibility of 
‘representation’ in the religious community. In view of one of the main 
hypotheses, that is countering the focus on texts and institutions in religious 
studies, this seemed exactly where I should not to look. Besides, my contacts 
with some men merely provided dry, official accounts of Judaism. This insight 
was in fact later confirmed by one of my female informants (see the quote by 
Leonie under The Research Questions and Methods). Questions on the subject 
of ‘women in Judaism’ had only brought me the kind of responses such as ‘yes, 
of course women are important in Judaism, look at the matriarchs in the Bible.’  
I consciously avoided making use of the evident channels for 
establishing contacts, such as university professors. Not only did I expect to 
receive both information and the type of contacts that probably many students 
before me had received (and mostly failed in pursuing).19 I also set out to cut 
out as many male contact persons and informants as possible in the complete 
research process, deciding to bypass the ‘male point of view’ as much as 
possible. As I did not have any personal contacts with any Jews in Antwerp or 
any other acquaintances that in some way themselves have Jewish friends or 
colleagues, I decided that ‘anyone would do’ to start with, as long as she was 
female, and I would see where this would lead me. In general my first contacts 
were more ‘progressive’ Jewish women, or women who at least were involved 
in activities outside of their own community, such as Jewish cooking lessons or 
guided tours of the synagogues in Antwerp. From some of these women I then 
received further contacts of more traditionalist or more ‘strictly’ Orthodox 
women, although this did not turn out to be so easy, as most of them had to 
think hard of anyone whom they thought would be willing to speak to me.  
Both the literature and general knowledge had taught me it would not be 
easy to gain entrance into the closed communities of strictly Orthodox Jews, 
especially the Hasidim (e.g., Eisenberg 1996; Shaffir 1985, 1998). Starting with 
some names and addresses I managed to get hold of through informal contacts 
and organisations, I succeeded in arranging meetings with three different 
Orthodox Jewish women in their private homes in Antwerp, after sending them 
a letter explaining my research intentions and stating I would contact them later 
by phone. My first meetings were with more ‘modern’ Orthodox women 
affiliated with the Shomre Hadass, who assured me that they were ‘very 
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emancipated’ and there was no difference between their lives and that of secular 
women of today. Through the well-known snow ball technique I managed to 
get hold of further addresses of Orthodox Jewish women, and using other 
available information and contact persons at the time, I sent copies of the same 
letter to some of the new names and addresses, explaining my project and my 
intentions. I also wrote letters to the wives of the rabbis and judges listed in 
Abicht’s appendix (1994), but only a limited number were willing to arrange a 
meeting, while others immediately rejected any idea of a ‘study’ on the phone. 
From spring 1998 autumn 1999, some twenty-five in-depth interviews were 
conducted with women affiliated with both the Machsike Hadass and the 
Shomre Hadass congregations of Antwerp.  
The reasons for the resistance and the wariness towards my requests and 
interest in speaking to strictly Orthodox Jewish women of the Machsike 
Hadass, was I believe not merely attributable to the general isolationist strategy 
of minimising contacts with the society at large. Thus the fifty-two year old 
Diana, one of the first ‘Hasidic oriented’ woman I spoke to told me: 
 
I don’t think everybody will think it necessary to wash out dirty linen in 
public or even clean linen in public. There was a TV program about two 
years ago, about Judaism… I didn’t watch the program, I wasn’t there, 
but it seems that a woman I know who’s active in the community was 
talking on the programme about the laws of family purity, and what 
happened the next few days, you had taxi drivers… I mean anybody can 
see who’s Jewish here, you cannot mistake me for not being Jew, 
nobody did it to me but I heard it was done… They said: ‘Oh are you ok 
now, are you in your clean days with your husband?’ You know that was 
a big shame that this was talked about on TV, it wasn’t necessary… […] 
To put this on TV, is appealing just to the really… you know, the 
voyeurism of the public and I think this is why many people will not talk 
to you. I would even say it is normal, because what do people watch TV 
for? To get the juicy bits and then they can laugh at the Jews the next 
day… 
 
Another Hasidic woman, forty year-old Tina, stated that my difficulties in 
speaking to anyone in general was due to the fact that ‘we are closed 
community’, and when I brought the issue of the taxi driver incident up and 
asked whether it also had to do with mistrust, she added: 
 
If you would have been from a newspaper or something, yes of course I 
would be more careful. Of course you want that when you say 
something, this is also the way it comes across, and if there then are 
things you never said or said differently, then it isn’t very nice, because 
of course the Jewish people also want people to think positively about 
them. Or not to think at all about them, but negative is of course not 
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interesting, we’ve had enough with negative… we don’t look for it. 
Then you must not know us and leave us alone…    
 
As for the subject of the family purity laws as referred to by Diana in the TV 
documentary, the reticence pertaining to this subject will be discussed further 
on. But the point on ‘washing out your lin en in public’ makes clear many 
people are not be interested at all in being represented in the outside world, in a 
way which could have negative effects on the community itself. For another 
woman, the fifty-four year old Hassidic rebbetsin Liddy, the issue of 
representation was precisely the reason she was willing to speak to me and she 
insisted that I should not be speaking to the ‘wrong people’: 
 
If it’s about something like this, I’m so sorry that people get the wrong 
picture and I’m deeply religious. My husband is a rabbi, I’m a rebbetsin, 
and I feel a tremendous responsibility that people get the wrong picture 
about the Jewish woman and what Judaism is, because I have often 
given lessons to nurses and midwives to enhance their understanding of 
the Jewish patients… 
 
Many women also simply thought that often language might be a problem. As 
previously noted, the internationalism of the Antwerp Orthodox Jewry was also 
attested in the diversity of the origins and places my informants had lived. Only 
two women I interviewed were actually born and raised in the city of Antwerp 
itself. Although many parents and grandparents or their husband’s parents had 
come from Eastern Europe, consistent with their often Hasidic or Misnagdic 
backgrounds, some of the women I interviewed were originally from the U.S., 
from England, Israel, the Netherlands, etcetera. One woman, Leonie, of sixty-
one, had been born in the Netherlands and still spoke Dutch with a distinct 
Dutch accent, but she had since lived in places as diverse as Indonesia, India, 
Switzerland before she settled in Antwerp. Another woman from the 
Netherlands, forty-nine years old, Nicolette, had moved homes twenty-seven 
times in her life, living in Antwerp for a few years, then on to Israel and then 
back to Antwerp after she married. She had been there for eleven years now. A 
Fifty-three year old Misnagdic woman, Rachel, was born in England, moved to 
Tangiers and later studied in Strasbourg, worked in London and Israel, where 
she married and bore her first child before coming to Antwerp. National 
identity was definitely diverse and not an issue for this ‘diasporic’ strictly 
Orthodox Jewish community. Many women had been raised in different places, 
then went abroad to study and then emigrated again upon marriage. Many of the 
women were married to men who were brought up and had lived elsewhere, a 
pattern, which equally applied to their children, or grandchildren, who would be 
living in different parts of the world themselves.    
Language fluency was high among the women in my case study. Most of 
the women appeared to speak Yiddish at home and with other community 
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members, whilst they were also all fluent in both biblical and modern Hebrew. 
Apart from these languages, they often spoke English and those who had lived 
in Antwerp for some time spoke Dutch. Thus, half the interviews were 
conducted in English, the other half in Dutch. It seemed that many strictly 
Orthodox Jews living in Antwerp today in fact do speak the Dutch language, in 
contrast to what Gutwirth (1970) says in his research dating from the sixties. 
Incentives and pressures to be in command of the Dutch language are both 
imposed by the Flemish government, and initiatives such as the Belgisch 
Israelitisch Weekblad and the ‘Genootschap ter bevordering van de 
Nederlandse taal’ have definitely stimulated this development. In one of his 
articles on his website, Rosenberg does mention the highly separatist strictly 
Orthodox are not attempting to follow this trend.   
One rebbetsin (wife of a rabbi) I contacted on the phone said neither her 
English or Dutch was good enough for her to feel confident enough to speak to 
me and what some also called simply being ‘articulate’ enough, or sure about 
themselves for ‘saying the right things.’ The Hasidic rebbetsin Liddy on the 
other hand, claimed to be able to speak thirteen languages, and had to assist her 
rabbi husband who could speak Hungarian, Hebrew, Yiddish, German and 
English very well, but no French or Dutch, so she had to act as a translator for 
him on certain occasions. Confidence rather than language appeared to be a 
problem in being able to reach the younger women of my age, in the 
community. It so turned out that my research population were middle-aged to 
senior women. Tina thought women between their twenties or thirties would not 
be self-assured enough to speak to me: 
 
They wouldn’t be sure of themselves, sure of their belief, but not in 
talking and explaining it. We know more by experience and we also 
know that it isn’t so bad if we don’t know something, but the youngsters 
want to know it for sure, and they will think, ‘ah, I’ll make mistakes 
and…’ 
     
And finally, another crucial factor in determining the character of the entry 
process, was gender-related in that strictly Orthodox Jewish women themselves 
were perhaps less used to interaction with outsiders, compared to their husbands 
who are more involved in the public secular world, often due to their 
profession. Secondly, the very subjects I wanted to talk about, female religiosity 
and religious practice, on many accounts is itself a highly private matter 
according to strictly Orthodox Jewish religious discourse. As will be explained 
later, a private-public dichotomy coalesces with the gender roles and ideology. 
 
After I had began to feel further contacts and meetings with more traditionalist 
Orthodox Jewish women were actually possible, I decided to concentrate on the 
strictly Orthodox rather than the more ‘modern’ Orthodox women. Although 
my criteria for deciding whom to count as strictly Orthodox and who not were 
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somewhat arbitrary and all these categories must be seen as relative, I opted for 
limiting my research population to women affiliated with the Machsike Hadass. 
However, as warned in the previous chapter, the boundaries here are also 
relative. Thus some of the modern Orthodox women (affiliated with the Shomre 
Hadass) I interviewed did not wear wigs, or just a hat, their husbands would 
shake my hands upon greeting me, etcetera. In contrast, the more traditionalist 
women seemed to confirm more to the exterior rules of modesty as 
commonplace in the more strictly Orthodox communities. 
At the outset of the process of referrals to further contact persons willing 
to give an interview, it became quite clear that I was to meet quite a diversity of 
Jewish women in Antwerp. It is my assumption that due to the relative small 
size of the Jewish community of Antwerp, the familiarity between Antwerp 
Jews is quite large, everybody ‘knowing everybody else’. I furthermore suggest 
that even amongst the different ‘sub-communities’ such as the different Hasidic 
courts, the networks, contacts and interaction between these groups is probably 
much higher than say, in the larger more separate communities of New York 
and Jerusalem. Perhaps this is even more so the case between Jewish women.  
Although most of my informants affiliated with the Machsike Hadass 
shared certain characteristics such as their age range, their position as 
‘community spoke persons’, such as the wives of rabbis, or otherwise rather 
important women involved in community affairs and jobs, they differed in that 
they all came from different sub-communities, such as different Hasidic courts. 
My case study also included one Misnagdic woman, and a few women who 
refused to identify with any one court, stating they were merely affiliated with a 
particular synagogue or were ‘Hasidic oriented’. These self-identifications 
furthermore underscore the insight that the sub-communities and the identities 
of ‘strictly Orthodox Jews’ may not always be so clear cut in actual reality. 
Perhaps there was indeed more networking and contact between these women 
through their specific activities as teachers, counsellors, voluntary workers and 
other structures which often crossed the boundaries of the sub-communities, 
rather than there would be between their husbands, who spent a great deal of 
their time in their ‘own’ synagogue and beth midrash. Anyhow, I decided to let 
my informants continue to control the research process in this respect, and thus 
let them determine which women I ultimately spoke to.   
At one point, one informant, a rebbetsin who was often referred to and 
obviously very much respected by many of the other women I spoke to, tried to 
exercise her control over the research process by questioning me about who I 
had spoken to and telling me who I definitely shouldn’t be speaking to. This 
rebbetsin wanted me to collect the ‘right’ information, she was therefore very 
much concerned with the issue of representation of the community in the 
outside world.  
The research population that consequently was ‘formed’ and is the basis 
for the interview analysis in the following chapter consisted of women all 
affiliated with the Machsike Hadass. Most of them self-identified as ‘Hasidic’, 
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from the Ger, Vischnitz, Belzer, Satmar, Slonim20 Hasidic courts, one 
Misnagdic, (or rather a ‘Litvish’ woman as she called herself) and a number of 
‘Hasidic oriented’ women, claiming they were more ‘mixed’ between being 
Hasidic and non-Hasidic or ‘Orthodox with Hasidic tendencies.’ The fluidity of 
the category also proved interfamilial. Some women had became more Hasidic 
because they had married a Hasidic partner or vice versa. Some children were 
more Hasidic than others, etcetera. Very basic introductory questions on the 
religious identification and affiliation beyond membership of the Machsike 
Hadass were therefore far from evident. As I tried to ‘categorise’ sixty-five year 
old Tirza for example: 
 
C: I understood the different communities are not so clearly separated or 
do they have clear boundaries? 
T: Yes, that’s correct, I’m Orthodox with Hasidic tendencies 
C: So do you belong to a particular congregation? 
T: There is a synagogue here which my husband and I are very much 
attached to 
C: Were you raised Hasidic? 
T: No, my husband is Orthodox and learned in the Talmud, but within 
time we have become drawn to the atmosphere of Hasidism.  
C: What appealed to you? 
T: The warmth, it’s not dry or cold, it’s a different atmosphere… in the 
religion itself, people sing more… 
 
Nicolette (49), also could not straightforwardly answer my question as to 
whether she was Hasidic: 
 
N: I find it very difficult to describe myself, I am much more Hasidic 
than my sister and my children are a little more Hasidic than I am. They 
go to the Satmar school, and that can be called ultra, ultra-Orthodox… 
C: Is true that the different communities are not so strictly delineated? 
N: Yes, that’s special for Antwerp, it’s not like the US, where there are 
almost wars between the different communities, by us there is no uh… 
racism or classes. My parents were, how do you say, ‘Hasidic minded.’ 
 
A few women who were affiliated with a particular synagogue and others 
simply refused to state exactly to which type of community they did or did not 
belong. The research population of women consisted all of married mothers and 
grandmothers, aged between 38 and 65. Many of these women’s husbands were 
prominent rabbis in the Machsike Hadass and other associations. All of these 
women lived in the Jewish area in terraced houses or apartments, in the 
proximity of the Stadspark and the Belgiëlei. Although no questions were asked 
on financial situation or income, I inferred from the houses these women lived 
in, their interior, and other cues throughout the interviews that the vast majority 
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were comfortable to quite well off as to their standard of living.21 Only one 
family seemed to be not so well off, although they owned a house, the furniture 
and decoration was quite decrepit, and the rebbetsin herself alluded to their 
meagre income.22 
The appointments were often difficult to make, taking into account not 
only the many Jewish holidays which many Orthodox women have a 
fundamental role in preparing, but also the full agendas many of these women 
seemed to have. Many worked as teachers and on top of that they had their 
responsibilities within the home, especially if they still had small children. 
Others were occupied with all sorts of activities in receiving travelling guests at 
home and many voluntary activities involving schools, charity, etcetera. One 
rebbetsin was so busy, that it took a few weeks just to reach her home on the 
otherwise permanently occupied phone, and another approximately six months 
of waiting before a meeting could take place due to her schedule an 
responsibilities inside and outside of the home.  
 
 
The Research Questions and Methods 
 
My main and general objective in view of the main arguments set out in the 
previous chapters, was to find out how ‘religious agency’ and, more broadly, 
how ‘religious identity’ could be characterised from the standpoint of the 
strictly Orthodox Jewish women I interviewed. As has been emphasised earlier, 
the literature and current research had taught me that strictly Orthodox Jewish 
women do not partake or only ‘peripherally’ partake in what is generally 
counted as religious practice, that is the public institutions and domains, and 
particularly the religious duties or paradigmatic ‘mitzvot’ of study and prayer 
controlled and performed by only men.  
After preparatory reading up (such as much of the literature discussed in 
the previous chapter five and paragraphs of this chapter), a rudimentary 
research guide with basic open-ended questions was designed and used during 
the interviews. The interviews themselves were all conducted in private homes, 
and usually took place in the living room or occasionally in the garden if the 
weather allowed for it. At the time of the majority of the interviews, usually no 
one else seemed to be at home; sometimes children or a nanny would appear. 
As for the husbands of the women I interviewed, apart from maybe three 
occasions, they were not at home, nor in the same room in which the interview 
took. The rare times I did see any men, they remained very briefly, did not greet 
me or take much notice of my presence. Only once did one of my informants 
ask her husband to answer a question, which he answered to her in Yiddish and 
she then translated for me.23     
The original interview guide consisted of a cluster of main questions, all 
directed at gaining insight into the religious life and identity of the woman in 
question, in an attempt to elicit her own standpoint, or personal experience and 
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point of view. As the conversations took place in an informal setting, obviously 
not all the questions on my list were asked or answered, but rather I attempted 
to let the respondent determine the nature of the conversation, although 
sometimes I had to return to the subject of the women’s perspective or role. My 
respondents also revealed much personal information, referring to their family 
and their own relationships, which I assumed to perhaps be very characteristic 
in interviewing women in this case study. I am convinced an interview with for 
instance their husbands would have elicited a wholly different type of answers, 
referring to the ‘formal and official laws’ or the ‘theoretical’ matter these men 
study every day, whilst the women not only conveyed more practical 
knowledge, but also how this related to their own daily lives and relationships. 
As Leonie (61) – an anti-Zionist - told me herself, men talk about other things: 
 
Men will probably talk more about Torah, because they have to talk 
about this all the time, it’s their obligation to learn Torah all the time, so 
they will probably talk more about such subjects. So if they talk about 
Judaism, they talk about Torah, they talk about the Second World War 
or they talk about Israel. That’s their escape you know, that’s not real, 
that isn’t it, but then they think they are talking about something 
Jewish…        
 
That the conversations took on this very informal and often personal character, 
can also be attributed to the fact that women’s religiosity itself is connected to 
daily life, her family and the private sphere, as will be discussed in the analysis 
further on.  
The research questions thus centred on the main goal of defining strictly 
Orthodox Jewish women’s experience of religiosity, in terms of their own 
identity and religious agency, in the first place in order to find out whether in 
general terms, an alternative view on ‘religion’ could be given from a gendered 
perspective within this religious community. The main hypotheses as stated in 
chapters three and four, in countering androcentrism in its focus on both 
‘scriptures and elites’, and ‘religion as sui generis’ will be illustrated with a 
‘reflexive’ analysis of a selection of these interview results. I shall return to the 
notion of reflexivity and some of the related insights on politico-
epistemological issues in chapter four towards the end of the chapter and in the 
conclusion.   
In each interview I would first pose some introductory questions such as 
‘tell me about yourself and your background’ in order to elicit some basic 
objective data such as geographical and cultural background, age, profession, 
number of children, etcetera. As noted above, I also tried to elicit which 
religious community or congregation my informants were affiliated with, what 
they considered their role in the community to be, if they were religious, 
etcetera. The main interview guide thereafter focussed on the general question 
of how they saw the differences between women and men (chapter seven, 
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paragraph one). My following questions were both based on what I had already 
read and knew about the (prescribed or researched) role of Orthodox Jewish 
women, whereby I often asked my respondents to comment on what I had read, 
such as: 
 
q Although women and men have different roles and religious obligations 
in Orthodox Judaism, women are by no means inferior, how would you explain 
this? 
q What are the most important mitzvot for women and why are they exempt 
from many of those incumbent upon men? 
q Are women any more ‘naturally’ equipped to perform certain mitzvot, 
such as hesed? 
q Tell me about the differences in school and study for boys and girls? 
q What is the role of women in the home, is her duty as a mother and 
housewife equally religious and/or equally important to that of men? 
q Describe an ideal religious man and an ideal religious woman for me 
q What are important religious values for you?    
q How important is the family in Jewish life? 
q Could you tell me more ab out the family purity laws and tzniut? 
q Who raises the children to become religious? 
q Do you think Judaism is a religion dominated by men? 
q Do you think that women are any more spiritual or religious than men?  
q Do women and men live in ‘separate spheres’?   
q What is your opinion on the roles of women and men today in the outside 
world? 
q What do you think about feminism, the emancipation of women and the 
idea of equality? Has this had an impact on the role of women in Orthodox 
Jewish communities? 
q In what way do you think you live differently or the same to your mother 
and grandmother? 
q Has life in Orthodox Jewish communities changed in any way compared 
to when you were younger? Has religious life become any more stringent?   
     
Obviously, the more interviews I did, the more I learned and the more I could 
adapt these questions or for instance, start applying the concepts and themes 
informants kept bringing up themselves. Besides the interviews, the data which 
served for the analysis in the following chapter also consisted of other primary 
sources which could teach me more on certain aspects of women’s religiosity 
such as novels which are widely read by women in the strictly Orthodox Jewish 
communities, and practical guides, such as books or booklets on the family 
purity laws. In the analysis itself, I confront my findings with those in other 
research, both social scientific and the more feminist Jewish studies as 
discussed in chapter five.  
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The basic research methods of qualitative research and ethnography24 
themselves were naturally guided by a constructionist type of methodology 
informed by postmodern feminist critique set forth in the previous chapters. In 
the context of qualitative interviewing and a reflexive approach towards this 
process of research, knowledge(s) or meanings are not so much acquired, but 
seen as produced or ‘constructed’ in a two-way process, as the product of the 
interaction between the inquirer and the respondents (e.g. Guba and Lincoln 
1998; Pinxten 1997). This constructionist view on research methods as such I 
believe is fully in line with the feminist ‘postmodern’ epistemology of situated 
knowledges appropriated in chapter four.25  
In view of the typical dilemmas in feminist anthropological research 
which were also discussed in chapter four, and the fact that my respondents can 
be characterised as ‘non-feminist women’, I did not set out to apply any of 
some ‘older’ one-dimensional feminist research methodologies and their 
accompanying research methods. As has meanwhile become clear, it was 
certainly not my intention to conduct any action or participatory research, or act 
upon the assumption of an ‘equal relationship’, full collaboration, reciprocity, 
nor did I embrace the goal of directly ‘empowering’ those researched (see also 
Armstead 1996; Kelly, Burton and Regan 1994; Millen 1997). Furthermore, 
even though tensions and ethical dilemmas may not be ‘solved’ through 
reflexivity, attention is given to the way both positionings on the axes of 
gender, class, ethnicity, religion ‘etcetera.’ affect research and interpretation, 
including the power relations involved at the sites of ‘gathering data’. For 
example, as referred to above, at one point one of my respondents expressed the 
desire to make sure I did not talk to the ‘wrong’ people, in order to be able to 
portray the ‘correct’ picture of the strictly Orthodox Jewish women of her 
community. However, I soon felt she would want to control too much of the 
research process, and the more control I would allow, the more problematic this 
‘collaboration’ would turn out to be in view of my own ‘feminist’ interpretation 
and analysis. However, my interpretation is that the standpoint of this woman – 
within the context of the interaction - was one which was clearly politically 
charged in that she was concerned with the way women in her community were 
often (mis)represented in the ‘outside world’.26 Beyond a portrayal in terms of 
‘victims or agency’, I hope to allow from more nuanced view of what I was 
told, including the representation of what I understood as both moments of 
‘compliance’ or ‘resistance’ from the interviewee’s point of view.  
Two important factors concerning the research itself and the analysis 
must be reminded or noted. First, my empirical research consisted of a small 
‘population sample’ only; serving illustrative ends in function of the main 
theoretical arguments, rather than a ‘proper’ or classical ethnographic or 
holistic representation of a particular group or community. Secondly, I did not 
partake in any participant observation, which next to  qualitative interviews is 
generally considered an essential part of ethnographical research in the tradition 
of cultural or social anthropology. As my research was limited to one-off, in-
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depth, open-ended interviews, the following analysis can therefore primarily be 
seen as a kind of discourse analysis, in that I compare and confront both the 
interview transcriptions with primary and secondary literature and research 
(partly discussed in this and the previous chapter). So although women’s 
‘religious agency’ portrayed in the following chapter will conceptually centre 
on gender and religion ‘as practice’, often of the non-theoretical or discursive 
kind – including ‘practical knowledge’ and ‘bodily praxis’ -, the analysis is 
based on the discourse on these practices.           
Within the context of what I have termed a ‘feminist postcolonial 
anthropological approach’ towards gender and religion, feminist anthropologist 
Henrietta Moore (1994) offers some interesting suggestions on the 
appropriation of feminist poststructuralist theory for anthropological research. 
Firstly, Moore argues that mainstream anthropology is in need of a ‘theory of 
the subject’. Despite anthropology’s emphasis on the cultural variability of 
constructions of gender (chapter one), Moore (1994: 54-55) argues, gender 
identity is merely seen as the outcome or the product of the exposure and 
socialisation into cultural categories. In this view of ‘culture’, the theorisation 
of the process of the acquisition and reproduction of gendered identity as such 
is neglected. Opposed to the modern idea of the unitary subject, the rational – 
supposedly ungendered – individual as the locus for action and thought, 
feminist poststructuralist theory proposes the idea of the internally 
differentiated subject, made up of multiple and contradictory positionings and 
subjectivities. Individuals can be seen as ‘multiple constituted subjects’, who 
take up multiple ‘subject positions’ within a range of hegemonic and less 
dominant discourses and social practices on femininity and masculinity, whilst 
‘reproducing’ or ‘resisting’ these. As Moore remarks however, this theory of 
the subject is not without its own problems in terms of analysis, especially in 
understanding how and why certain acts of reproduction and resistance, 
compliance, etcetera. take place. 
However, Moore does offer some theoretical ideas and methodological 
tools on how to study identity in a non-essentialist way I think, taking into 
account all levels from the symbolic, to the institutional, practical and the 
‘internally contradictory’ subjective level of the individual. A focus on 
positionings or ‘locations’ furthermore allows for a more intersectional 
perspective of identity as proposed in chapter one, one in which the markers of 
identity and difference such as gender, ethnicity, etcetera. exist in complex 
relationships and hierarchies with each other without being reified into ‘abstract 
universals’ (Alcoff and Potter 1993: 3). In terms of methods of analysis, I apply 
Moore’s conceptions of ‘discourse’ and ‘discursive practices’, in viewing these 
as kinds of situated knowledges that are produced or inter-subjectively 
produced within the context of a particular interview setting or ‘location’. This 
discourse as the product of a particular subject positionings is then confronted 
with other types of discourse (primary and secondary literature), equally 
considered as forms of situated knowledges as determined by particular 
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locations or as the product of certain subject positionings. The main objective is 
to find out how or to what extent my interviewees’ views subscribed, 
reproduced, questioned, modified or rejected these types of both ‘hegemonic’ 
and counter-hegemonic discourses on a number of topics, most often those 
concerning ‘religious ideology’.  
It is important to note that I do not set out to discuss or interpret 
religious scripture or law on its own plane of reference. This would take me in 
to a ‘theological’, religious or ‘insiders’ debate. Rather, I attempt to show if, 
when, how and in the context of which discourse, and to what purpose religious 
texts are appropriated - or not - by the subjects under study themselves 
(interviewees, community brochures, apologetic literature) and contrasted with 
other anthropological research and feminist literature. In this way the methods 
of research and analysis in the case study can be seen as the practical 
application of an approach towards the study of gender and religion suggested 
in chapter one. As I argued in this chapter this involves linking the social 
scientific perspectives on real – engendered – people engaging in religion (the 
levels of structure, agency, roles, (discursive) practice) and  the humanities 
approach (focussing on ‘discourse’ as text, ideology, symbols, metaphors, etc.) 
on – gendered – religious ‘constructions’, and their distinctive methodologies.  
  
 
 
                                              
1 Jews who had converted to Christianity (under force) yet secretly continued to practise their 
traditions in private.  
2 The Central Consistory of Israelites in Belgium 
3 The official numbers of the Consistoire for 1892 is 13.200, whilst the historian Ephraïm 
Schmidt estimates some 20.000 for 1903 (Abicht 1994: 44).   
4 Again, estimates considerably differ. Sylvain Brachfeld (2000: 187) claims that in 1940 some 
50.000 Jews lived in Antwerp on a total of 80.000 in the whole of Belgium. 
5 Janet S. Belcove-Shalin (1955b: 212) borrows this term from Marvin Schick in: ‘Borough 
park: A Jewish Settlement’, Jewish Life Magazine, Winter, New York: Union of Orthodox 
Jewish Congregation of America, 1979), denoting a cultural dynamic of the way in which 
‘American Orthodox Jews from relatively “modern homes” (which means, among other things, 
a positive attitude toward college and secular education) have adopted Chassidic dress and life 
styles, reflecting the strong Hasidic presence in the neighbourhood’. The process refers to a 
‘reversed form of assimilation’ whereby Hasidim have contributed to the traditionalisation of 
the ethos and world view of much of the surrounding Orthodox population that lived in the 
community before their arrival. Here I appropriate the term in a similar yet more general way in 
referring to the dynamic whereby in time and over different generations Orthodox Jews adapt 
an increasing traditionalist, Hasidic, or strictly Orthodox lifestyle.    
6 In 1996 the Georgian Jews in fact founded their own organisation ‘La Georgian Jewish 
Community v.z.w.’ (Rosenburg 1999).  
7 Willy Bok (1986: 376) comments on evolution of the Consistoire towards a more and more 
traditionalist attitude throughout the years: ‘In the US the conservative and liberal 
denominations are in the majority. The Orthodox leaders from Israel and the US have 
succeeded in convincing their European colleagues to form a front, to prevent the formation of a 
THE FIELD: ANTWERP, 
LAST EUROPEAN SHTETL OR THE NEW JERUSALEM? 
 
 
332
                                                                                                                                    
conservative or liberal movement in West-Europe. Their purpose is to recover the unity of the 
Jewish people on religious grounds, according to the Orthodox opinions.’     
8 According to Bok (1986: 371) this translates as ‘keepers of the faith’, according to Abicht 
(1994: 136) as ‘defenders of the faith’, and according to Julien Klener the literal translation 
from Hebrew is: ‘strengthners of the faith’ (personal communication). 
9 According to Bok (1986: 371) this translates as ‘guardians of the faith’, according to Abicht 
(1994: ‘protectors or carers of the faith’, and according to Julien Klener ‘defenders of the faith’ 
(personal communication).  
10 For the internal structure of the Machsike Hadass and all committee members, see the home 
page of the Machsike Hadass at www.jewishantwerp.com. This includes lists of names and 
addresses of all the supervised schools, mikvahs, restaurants, butchers, bakeries and other 
‘announcements’ pertaining to, marriages, publications and other services.    
11 Rosenberg’s (1999) website lists some 33 Jewish educational institutions in Antwerp in total, 
including elementary and secondary schools, but also yeshivas (seven in total), kollels 
(advanced institutes of Talmudic learning for married men (thirteen), a centre for mentally and 
physically handicapped Jewish children and adult education. 
12 On Rosenberg’s website (1999a) these two schools are called Bais Rachel and B’noth 
Jerusalem. The Talmud Torah and Torah Veyirah do not seem to be included in this list, unless 
under different names. 
13 For an extensive list of Jewish organisations located or active in Antwerp, see Rosenberg’s 
website (1999, 1999a). 
14 The only reference in which the large membership of Antwerp Jewry to these two 
congregations is disputed, is to be found in an article in the Belgisch Israëlitisch Weekblad (ed. 
Louis Davids) form 15/01/88. Rosenberg (1995) refers to this article citing the claim that not 
even half of the estimated 25.000 Jews living in Antwerp is in fact affiliated with the Machsike 
Hadass or the Shomre Hadass. 
15 In contrast, Rosenberg (1995) refers to an article ‘Hoeveel joden wonen in België’ in the 
Belgisch Israëlitisch Weekblad of 15/01/1988 that claims that only 4000 children followed 
Jewish education in 1988, and less than half of the Antwerp Jews send their children to Jewish 
schools. 
16 It is very dangerous to generalise here. It has been noted for example, that whilst the 
leadership of the Shomre Hadass is very observant, the members may be much less so. When I 
attempted to arrange an interview with a wife of a leading rabbi in the Shomre Hadass for 
example, she claimed there were no differences between the two communities at all as regards 
to religious observance. Other women from the Shomre Hadass seemed to replicate this view, 
seeing these differences as merely trivial matters. My informants from the Machsike Hadass 
however, mostly disagreed.    
17 In another article, Rosenberg’s (2000) personal viewpoint becomes even more explicit, such 
as in his critique of the Shomre Hadass, which he claims to be ‘hardly doing anything for the 
Jishoev’ as opposed to the Machsike Hadass, which is a ‘very active and dynamic institution 
which supports its members and takes numerous initiatives for its own members, which all 
Jewish “Sinjoren” [the slang term for all inhabitants of Antwerp] can benefit from.’  
18 Rosenberg’s characterisation of and opinions on the changing gender roles and ideology will 
be compared with those of the strictly Orthodox Jewish women I interviewed in more detail in 
the following chapter.  
19 Before starting work on my own case study I sent out a group of students to conduct a ‘pilot 
study’ on women in Orthodox Judaism as part of a course on fieldwork methodology. Although 
they managed to speak to some men, they completely failed to access any female informants. 
Another graduate student had met complete resilience in trying to speak to Orthodox Jewish 
women and gave up the empirical part of her project entirely. Some of the women I was to 
interview later, in fact mentioned that they had received requests from other students before, but 
usually had not conceded.   
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20 Slonim is an Israeli Hasidic court, of which only a handful of members are living in Antwerp.  
21 One woman I interviewed was said to belong to the richest family of Antwerp by another 
informant 
22 Gutwirth (1970) has noted that the Belzer are quite typically ‘shabby’, this was indeed a 
Belzer family.  
23 This then concerned some information on the history of Hasidism, the kind of knowledge the 
woman thought her husband would be more cognisant of. 
24 The literature on ethnographic research and qualitative interviewing applied was e.g., 
Creswell 1998; Denzin and Lincoln 1998; Fetterman 1989; Michrina and Richards 1996; Rubin 
and Rubin 1995; Wester 1987. 
25 As Kelly, Burton and Regan (1994: 46) argue, there are no distinct methods of feminist 
research as such, although in social sciences the tendency has been towards qualitative and 
constructionist methods. Even ‘reflexivity’ is not specific to feminist research. Rather, the 
authors argue, ‘what makes research “feminist” is not the methods as such, but the framework 
in which they are located, and the particular ways in which they are deployed’. This has also 
been my main perspective on the questions of theory, epistemology and methodology set out in 
chapters two to four.    
26 The ‘outside world’ was used by many of my interviewees in describing the broader non-
Jewish or gentile society in which they lived.  
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1. Gender Ideology: Equality as Difference through Practice 
 
The Premise of Sexual Difference 
 
When I only just began my interview with sixty-five year old Tirza, - who 
described herself as ‘Orthodox with Hasidic tendencies’ - to simply first tell a 
little about herself, she immediately refuted the assumption that Jewish 
Orthodox women are ‘oppressed’: 
 
I have eight children, but now I am very involved outside the home, I 
am in the managing board of a youth movement, that is girls and ladies, 
so I am very active socially… I never used to be to busy with the outside 
world, but I never felt enclosed as in a prison with my children, and 
together with my husband, we have built a life together. You can 
compare it to apples and pears, they are both very tasty and form a fruit 
together, they are not identical, but still they form a whole. I never felt 
as if my husband had any power over me or anything like that… 
 
Whether Tirza was directly picking up on what I had wrote in my introductory 
letter on the possible misperception of the outside world on women’s status in 
Orthodox Jewish communities – my wordings were certainly never this strong -
, or she was referring to what she perceived or had experienced to be a serious 
distorted viewpoint on behalf of surrounding society, I cannot be sure. In any 
case, Tirza’s fruit metaphor of the complementary roles of women and men in 
the mutual partnership of marriage founded on a gender ideology of ‘different 
but of equal value’ appeared to be the hegemonic religious gender ontology in 
my own interviews, and other research and literature on both real and ideal lives 
of Orthodox Jewish women.         
All my interviewees unanimously agreed that men and women were 
different, created differently by God, having different obligations and 
responsibilities according to halakhah (religious law), yet by no means could 
one be conceived of as inferior or superior to the other. The difference between 
women and men was taken to be ‘obvious’ – and my questions therefore often 
interpreted as somewhat non-sensical – and in the first place founded on a 
taken-for-granted ideology of natural, essential sexual difference. When I tried 
to probe further, the differences between women and men were differentially 
legitimated and explained through applying a multiplicity of discourses, besides 
that of merely ‘religion.’ Like Tirza’s statement though, this understanding of 
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gender difference as sexual difference, was nearly always referred to in the 
context of marriage as the expression of ‘complementarity’ or ‘harmony’, 
ultimately founded on the divine commandment of marriage as God’s purpose 
for the creation of ‘two halves’ becoming ‘one whole’. Marriage itself is 
therefore conceived of as imbued with religious meanings. According to Susan, 
a fifty-two year old Hasidic-oriented mother of five: 
 
Marriage definitely has a religious meaning, because we are taught that 
God actually created the whole world and especially men and women as 
opposites, but the whole world in order to bring harmony. To achieve 
harmony man and woman were created differently and in opposite ways, 
and have to learn to live together and become a whole and marriage is 
sacred… 
 
According to halakhah, marriage is in fact a mitzvah (divine commandment or 
precept) in itself, yet together with the mitzvah of procreation – to be fruitful 
and multiply – these mitzvot legally only apply to men. Most of my 
interviewees were in fact keen to emphasise the fact that women are legally 
exempt from these mitzvot, sometimes suggesting this could be understood as a 
token of more ‘freedom’ and choice for women than for men. However, both 
historically and in social reality in contemporary traditionalist Orthodox 
communities, both men and women marry sooner rather than later, and the 
same goes for the bearing of their first child (Heilman 1992: 278-9). As 
Orthodox Jewish scholar Michael Kaufman (1995 [1993]: vxiii) states:  
 
Those who marry demonstrate that they do not live for themselves alone 
but that they choose to live lives of continuous giving. This finds 
fruition in procreation, bringing children into the world and establishing 
a family…  
 
Later on in his book, Kaufman (1995 [1993]: 14) also emphasises women’s 
exemption from the duty of marriage and procreation. He attributes the 
exemption to a variety of reasons, such as that the man actively must seek a 
wife and not vice versa, or the man being more incomplete than the woman and 
therefore actively in need of searching a woman ‘who will make him whole.’ 
Kaufman then mentions certain Sages from the Mishnah and Talmud who did 
include women in this duty, but concludes that the final halakhic ruling is 
women’s exemption from the command to procreate, based on Maimonides 
(1135-1204) and other codifiers of Jewish law:   
 
Yet Maimonides and R. Joseph Caro advise women to disregard this 
exemption and marry to avoid facing male impudence and immortality. 
They therefore make it incumbent upon Jewish parents to arrange 
marriages for daughters as well as for sons. Marriage, then, is the 
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preferred state for women, but Jewish law does not mandate it. Halachah 
encourages the woman to marry, but does not condemn her if she 
chooses to remain single.   
 
Whilst God created men and women in order to complete each other by 
marriage, the purpose of marrying is procreation and ‘building a family’, thus 
inextricably placing childbirth in the context of the heterosexual institution of 
marriage. Although – in theory – the woman may choose to remain single, this 
is not seen as an ideal but more of a pitiable state, and in practice is almost 
nonexistent in traditionalist Jewish communities. Thus the fifty-four year old 
Belzer rebbetsin Liddy, who herself had eight children, told me about a woman 
she knew: 
 
It says in the Bible that a woman may remain alone, but it is never good 
to be alone… Loneliness… I know an old lady, she passed away 
recently and she said this proverb to me with tears in her eyes… and she 
said, I have learned a lot from her… An old lady, she lost her husband in 
Auschwitz after two years of marriage en unfortunately never had 
children. She is the kind of woman who socially was totally… She 
started up the Jewish Women’s Commission, she paid visits to the sick 
in the hospital through the rain and snow… She died in a Jewish old 
peoples’ home, but she was lucid till the very end… And she wrote to 
me: ‘La solitude est un beau lieu pour visiter, mais pas pour l’habiter’, 
being alone is nice to visit, but not to live in…’ 
 
So despite the halakhic exemption for women to both marry and procreate, in 
practice the creation of the two different sexes, the purpose of which is to form 
one unit, a ‘whole’ in the institution of marriage meant for procreation, forms 
the basic gender ideology to which both the literature and my traditionalist 
Jewish interviewees subscribed. Secondly, a conviction that informed 
everything I read and researched on the position of women in Orthodox 
Judaism, was the tenet of women and men as ‘different but of equal value’. 
According to all the literature and my research subjects, this premise could not 
be emphasised enough in any discussion of religion – what Kaufman (1993 
[1991]: 58) calls ‘theological equality’ - and daily life. All my research subjects 
agreed that although women and men were viewed as ‘different’ in their 
community and religious tradition, they are equal in worth; no one is 
intrinsically superior or inferior to the other. 
I shall return to some of these important topics of marriage, the family 
and halakhic rulings for women later on. But first I shall concentrate on the 
specifics of the gender ideologies as presented by the women I interviewed, 
beyond this hegemonic religious discourse of sexual difference in the context of 
marriage and procreation. This paragraph shall therefore concentrate on the 
plurality of gender discourses within traditionalist Orthodox Jewish 
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communities, as applied by Orthodox Jewish writers, Orthodox Jewish women 
themselves and my own research on strictly Orthodox Jewish women in 
Antwerp affiliated with the Machsike Hadass. The primary focus here will be 
on the types of discourses that are appropriated to ‘construct’ sex or gender, and 
their immediate connection and function in legitimising the gender ideology in 
traditionalist definitions of Jewish religion. In what way are men and women 
seen as different? How different are they, and how are these differences 
understood? As innate, natural characteristics, or merely consequential of their 
divergent social roles? The answers to these questions will provide some first 
cues to both the ‘official’ prescribed roles of women in Orthodox Jewish 
communities, religious gender ideology from their own real life point of view in 
the contemporary world, and whether and how the understanding of Jewish 
religion itself may be gendered. 
 
 
Multiple Gender Discourses  
 
In his introduction to The Woman in Jewish Law and Tradition, Orthodox 
Jewish scholar Michael Kaufman (1995 [1993]) applies both religious and 
scientific discourse in order to provide legitimation for the distinctive ‘gender 
spheres’ in Judaism. Kaufman (1995: xxix) sees the differences between men 
and women as ‘innate’ and ‘noninterchangeble’ within an essentialist 
framework that does not delineate and thus conflates the categories of sex and 
gender: 
 
Traditional Jewish society is based on the essential dissimilarity of the 
sexes. Where there is insistence on gender equality and unawareness of, 
or lack of sensitivity to, the natural inequality of the sexes, men and 
women suffer, as both are forced to compete with members of the other 
sex on unequal terms.    
 
Kaufman’s (1995) ideology of sexual difference as gender difference serves to 
support his rejection of feminism (or what he calls ‘masculofeminists’) that in 
his view wrongly glorifies men’s public role in Judaism, opposed to women’s 
devalued role within the private sphere of the home. Kaufman critiques these 
‘masculofeminists’ for their view of gender differences as culturally 
determined, for seeing the new-born infant as a ‘tabula rasa’ upon which 
society and rearing practices can inscribe anything, including masculinity and 
femininity.1 The author then reverts to other scientific ‘evidence’ that would 
support his idea of sexual difference. First he claims recent studies in the 
‘physical and behavioral sciences have substantiated the thesis of a 
predominantly biological basis for sexually differentiated behavior in humans’ 
(xxx), and that evidence from ‘genetics, brain research, sociology and 
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psychology confirm that the primary determinant of sexually differentiated 
behaviour is biology and not culture’ (xxxi).   
Interesting in Kaufman’s appropriation of scientific ‘evidence’ in order 
to defend sexual difference and gender, or particularly women’s role with 
Jewish law and tradition – including his vision of the proper contemporary 
Jewish religious way of life – are his brief references to Carol Gilligan’s (1982, 
1997 [1977]) famous research on women and moral development. Gilligan’s 
theory of ‘an ethics of care’ has in time become one of the classics of feminist 
research. In In a Different Voice, Gilligan sets out to expose the androcentrism 
in mainstream developmental theory and hegemonic theories of identity by 
Piaget, Erikson and Kohlberg, which view the woman as deviant or deficient 
against a norm for moral development which is solely determined by men’s 
experience, thereby excluding ‘women’s voice’. Kohlberg’s ‘six stages of 
moral judgement’ for example, views ideal moral development in a sequence 
starting with ‘an egocentric through a societal to a universal ethical conception’ 
(Gilligan 1997 [1977]: 551). Whilst men seem to represent the higher ideal 
stages when moral judgement becomes capable in terms of universal principles 
of justice and rights, free from individual needs and social conventions, 
women’s conception of the self and morality ‘sticks’ at a stage three, 
characterised by a strong interpersonal bias in judgement, relationality, 
responsibility and care. Gilligan’s research concentrates on women’s 
construction of the moral domain, in order to show that their ‘voice’ or 
language challenges the definition of what counts as ‘development’ according 
to developmental theories such as that of Kohlberg. Gilligan’s study is therefore 
a ‘classical’ example of feminist research that deeply  challenges androcentric 
forms of research that take the male to be the universal and the normative at the 
level of research question, data, interpretation and theory.2    
On the other hand, and more recently, Gilligan’s research has been 
criticised by feminist scholars on several accounts, but foremost by those 
suspicious of the premise of sexual difference that informs the research 
questions and methodology.3 Although Gilligan does not per se take any 
biological deterministic stance, an essentialist perspective on the – moral – 
differences between women and men looms in this kind of feminist research, 
and especially the way such conclusions as to psychological and sociological 
differences between the sexes are sometimes used requires attention. It 
therefore comes as no surprise that a religious and gender conservative scholar 
like Kaufman, includes Gilligan’s findings as ‘scientific evidence’ in his plea 
for gender differentiation in the religious sphere, and in this case every sphere 
in daily life (Kaufman 1995 (1993): xxxi): 
 
As sociologist Dr. Carol Gilligan points out, psychologists from Freud 
to Piaget have formed misperceptions of the female personality by 
treating women as if they were men. When women failed to develop in 
certain areas as men do, they concluded that something might be wrong 
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with them, when what they failed to perceive is that they are merely 
different. Gilligan determines that men and women have different 
behavior orientations and perspectives in regard to nurturance, caring, 
morality, and justice.  
 
Kaufman similarly uses research by social anthropologist Melford Spiro on sex 
role differentiation in an Israeli kibbutz dating from 1975. Here Kaufman 
replicates Spiro’s argument that despite egalitarian surroundings in a ‘sexually 
neutral environment’, men and women ‘gravitated to occupations coinciding 
with their natural propensities’ (xxxii). Kaufman’s amalgam of borrowings of 
arguments from biological, psychological and social scientific research thus 
serves to prove that Orthodox Jewish religious prescriptions on men’s and 
women’s roles and behaviour coincide with their ‘nature’ (xxxii): 
 
For more than three thousand years Judaism has postulated 
psychological gender differentiation, from the Sages of the Talmud and 
down through the ages. Judaism provides a way of life that is sensitive 
to, and halachic parameters that are uniquely responsive to, the 
divergent attributes of the sexes.       
 
Kaufman’s discourse in attributing essential characteristics in terms of 
sexual/gender difference to women and men, thus functions as a justification for 
a commitment to halakhah and its traditional gender prescriptions, in spite of 
changes in women’s role in modern society. Opposed to the ‘masculofeminist’ 
version of feminism that aspires for the equality of men and women based on 
patriarchal values, Kaufman claims the essential differences between women 
and men do not necessarily coincide with women’s subordination, but can be 
exalted within the framework of Jewish tradition. Distinct gender roles and the 
valorisation of essential feminine values, attributes and institutions thereby 
appear to be in accordance with the high legal status of women in halakhah and 
the importance of the family. Women’s proper role is located within the family 
and the private sphere, in contrast to men’s proclivity to the public domain 
(Kaufman 1995 [1993]: 25): 
 
Intrafamilial responsibilities require personalities with sensitivity, 
perception, gentleness, and flexibility. Women manifest these qualities 
par excellence. The male personality, having an abstract and analytical 
mentality weaker in these spheres, possesses the rigor and forcefulness 
necessary to represent the family in extra-familial confrontations.  
 
Note how the writer discursively constructs femininity and women’s role as 
revalorised, highly valuable or even of higher value than those of men, i.e. 
women’s ‘qualities’ versus men’s ‘weaker’ capacity. Contemporary Orthodox 
Jewish scholars like Kaufman ‘require’ both an ideology of sexual difference 
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and revalorisation of Jewish women’s role in the context of the dominant liberal 
ideology of gender based on sameness that reigns in much of modern Western 
society, versus distinct gender roles as central to traditional and present day 
traditionalist interpretations of Jewish religion.  
According to halakhah, which contains the totality of rules for living and 
acting to which the observant Jew must abide in his/her relationship to God, and 
to fellow human beings and nature, amongst the total of the 613 mitzvot, or 
precepts, distinctions are made dependent upon gender. Whereas the majority of 
the mitzvot are equally incumbent on both women and men – the 365 negative 
precepts apply to both sexes – like keeping the Sabbath and holidays, blessings, 
etc., women are exempt and effectively become barred from performing certain 
mitzvot, some of which are often conceived of as paradigmatic religious 
commandments for men. These include the study of the Talmud, the wearing of 
tefillin and tzitzit, the daily recitation of the Shema prayer4, the hearing of the 
shofar5, and others, which all can be seen as paradigmatic – male – religious 
public rituals. The rationale usually put forward for this exemption, is that ritual 
obligations such as these are bound to fixed times, the performance of which 
could interfere with women’s familial and domestic responsibilities in the 
home. The question which specific commandments are included and excluded, 
and the consistency of this main argument have been a matter of debate from 
time to time. Then again, in practice, women have generally assumed rituals 
from which they were officially exempt, and neglected others that originally 
were required, such as certain prayers (Greenberg 1998: 79).         
The ideal Orthodox Jewish woman’s role in contrast, is in the home as 
homemaker and mother, where she can nonetheless lead a ‘full’ religious life. 
Whereas religious roles available to women in strictly Orthodox Jewish 
communities will be discussed in more detail later on, here the focus will be on 
what (strictly) Orthodox women themselves have to say on the differences 
between women and men. I examine whether they apply ideologies of gender 
such as that of Kaufman that in any way serve in grounding the divergent 
gender roles as paramount within the realm of halakhah and observant religious 
life.  
 
Other research and some more personal accounts indeed show how strictly 
Orthodox Jewish women themselves often emphasise elements within Orthodox 
Jewish religious discourse that valorise women’s ‘unique’ spiritual, biolo gical, 
and psychological qualities, rituals and imagery, often to the extent of a 
‘celebration’ of an ideology of sexual difference. Tamar Frankiel (1990) for 
example, a lecturer in comparative religion and convert to Judaism, in her well-
known book on the position of women in traditional Judaism, attempts to 
reconcile feminism with a traditional (Orthodox) Jewish way of life. Much in 
line with traditional feminist theological methods of ‘rereading the scriptures’6, 
Frankiel looks to the ‘Mothers’ (or matriarchs) of the Torah as inspirational role 
models for the contemporary Jewish woman. The prophetic abilities of Sarah, 
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Rachel, Rikva and Leah are seen as the counterpart to ‘male logic’, akin to 
‘woman’s intuition’, ‘inner knowledge, or ability to read a situation and 
produce an insight into character’ (Frankiel 1990: 6). According to Frankiel, the 
Mothers furthermore symbolise dimensions of generativity, creativity and care. 
These maternal archetypes similarly exercised their great power within the 
family rather than in the political sphere. Hence the title of Frankiel’s book The 
Voice of Sarah, referring to the moment when God spoke to Abraham (7): 
 
‘All that Sarah says to you, listen to her voice’ (Gen. 21:12). This is 
indeed a piece of advice often given by rabbis to husbands down 
through the ages; for women are regarded as having a greater degree of 
insight in many circumstances. 
 
Frankiel continues on the theme of Jewish women in the Bible and tradition, as 
related to the power of prophecy until this bec ame overshadowed by men ruling 
the public realm and offices, first as priests and later to the exclusion of women 
from the public sphere in rabbinic Judaism. Frankiel argues that despite their 
exclusion from institutional offices, religious law and prophecy, women in fact 
enjoyed a different kind of spirituality (43). At this point Frankiel seems to 
suggest that this may be a universal phenomenon and women’s exclusion from 
the institutional and ‘analytical’ dimensions of Jewish religion may not be 
entirely accountable in political terms. Here Frankiel is of the opinion that the 
qualities attached to prophecy may be related to women’s ‘psychological make-
up’, women having strong tendencies to be ‘receptive’, capable of ‘letting go of 
our ego boundaries’: ‘Thus the egolessness of the ecstatic or prophetic kind of 
religion comes easily to many women’ (Frankiel 1990: 46). 
Frankiel mentions two other essential characteristics women possess 
which legitimise their particular role within Judaism. Referring to the halakhic 
exemption for women of studying Talmud, Frankiel suggests women are less 
apt to the ‘conscious and disciplined intellectual activity’ or ‘critical thinking’ 
or ‘abstract learning’ typical of men. Frankiel’s essentialism does not seem to 
be entirely biologically deterministic though. For example, after making the 
point about women’s receptiveness and specific ‘feminine abilities’, Frankiel 
includes between brackets ‘whether these are natural or cultural I will not 
debate’ (46). Her more careful approac h to the question of the cause or 
‘naturalness’ of women’s qualities is furthermore expressed in phrases such as 
the following (46-47):  
 
Not all women are comfortable with this [critical thinking] as their 
predominant style; those who excel in it tend to rebel against 
conventional female roles. Thus, a woman might be exposed to abstract 
learning, say in Talmud studies, but ultimately not find it satisfying 
because it does not call forth her capacities for relationship and 
involvement.  
CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
 
343
 
Like Michael Kaufman, Frankiel refers to feminist scholar Carol Gilligan – and 
other colleagues in the areas of morality and knowledge – to defend women’s 
unique form of spirituality, claiming ‘a strongly relational orientation prevails, 
giving feminine spirituality a definite communal and moral ethical bent from 
the beginning’ (109). As an academic and observant Orthodox Jewish woman, 
Frankiel nonetheless also seeks to legitimise gender roles according to halakhah 
through a discourse of sexual difference in terms of psychology and morality. 
Both Kaufman and Frankiel make their arguments in the context of Western 
modern liberal and predominantly secular society, where gender equality has 
become the ideological norm.      
When asking Rachel who is Litvish or Misnagdic (aged fifty-three) 
about the reasons why girls did not study Talmud, Rachel first explained this to 
me because they simply ‘had other interests’ such as general knowledge and 
philosophy: 
 
…the way thought is being developed in the Talmud is something less 
attractive to women I would say than to men. The logic, just to sit and 
study the whole day, plain logical discussions, the ‘how much is the 
retribution, how much must the return’ and just to go on calculations on 
end…  
C: Would you say men are more naturally inclined?  
Yes, we believe that man is by his nature is much more attracted by this 
you know, this logical side of learning, and lets say women who are 
more intuitive, you know, who have more feeling, they’re more 
interested in general knowledge and philosophy and other parts of the 
Torah… 
 
Esther, a forty-six year-old mother of eleven who was born in Israel and 
brought up in the States, belongs to the Satmar community of Antwerp and 
describes herself as ‘very very extreme Orthodox’. When I asked her how she 
would describe the ideal religious man and woman, she started with gender 
neutral characteristics, yet using the pronoun ‘he’, but then also reverted to 
some stereotypical understandings of men and women in terms of the same 
logic/feeling dualism: 
 
Someone who does what he is supposed to be doing, his duties, being 
correct and honest in business, truth is very important, trust, not to steal 
from others, not to slander, not to be jealous, this goes for men and 
women, but I think women are by nature more jealous, they babble 
more… 
C: Do you think women have any other traits by nature? 
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A man uses his head, whilst a woman uses her heart. She has more, how 
do you say, instincts, softer feelings. A man says ‘do it or don’t’ but a 
woman finds loopholes…   
 
Miriam, a thirty-nine year-old Belz mother of ten, directly related to what she 
perceived as the intellect/feelings dualism to religious discourse instead of 
general psychology: 
 
C: Do you think that women have any unique qualities? 
Yes certainly, the way a woman speaks, thinks and feels, this she brings 
into her family and work. The woman makes the home, if she is patient 
and radiates warmth, then this gives atmosphere to the home.  
C: And in a more spiritual sense? 
This is difficult to say, it is true that a woman acts more upon her 
feelings than a man, a man more upon his intellect. This difference is 
good, because the feeling alone does not always work. There are things 
in the Bible that might go against the feelings, sometimes you feel 
something is not right, but it is so because it says so in the Bible. On the 
other hand the feelings are very important as with prayer, the holidays… 
With everything you need feelings too. The intellect and the feelings of 
a man and a woman complement each other, you need both. It may 
happen that a woman doubts whether a chicken is kosher, and if she 
goes to the rabbi to ask this and he says it is kosher then it is so, even if 
this goes against her feelings. So she must not act upon her feelings 
alone.  
 
When I asked about the spiritual differences between women and men to the 
Vischnitz rebbetsin Norma (a great grandmother in her early sixties with eleven 
children), she claimed something similar, but could not elaborate on it 
extensively: 
 
It is written that a woman has more binah, more natural wisdom than a 
man. For example the Sages say that a woman can find out about for 
example with her feelings, she sees if a guest comes, if he is an honest 
person, she can feel it and tell. A man is maybe cleverer, but the feeling 
of a woman is finer without using her brain…7 
 
The Belz rebbetsin Liddy similarly used religious discourse in her explanation 
of the brain/feelings dualism: 
 
A woman sometimes has… There were things in our history that women 
felt they could do and they could not do, and that’s how we could also 
save the men… And that’s something, the feelings is something that 
God has given us, but of course as with every gift, you must know how 
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to handle it… If you have feelings there is only one danger, do not let 
your feelings overpower you. And that’s why you need a man, who not 
with his less, uh feelings, but with his brain can tame us in our 
feelings… 
 
Leonie, a Hasidic -oriented ‘very Orthodox’ sixty-one year old, gave me a 
complex religious philosophical explanation for the differences between women 
and men, presumably derived from her own knowledge of Kabbalah8: 
 
This is the world of two-ness, and how do you know this? By us, one 
thing is for sure, that’s Torah, the word of God, so that is it, absolutely. 
Now the Torah begins with the letter two, and then you can think letter 
two and letter B, but in Hebrew the letters are numbers, so then the 
world begins… in the two-ness it says, in the beginning you had heaven 
and earth, darkness and light, man and woman, that is also the two-ness 
in our heads, because we also think in categories, you have man and 
woman. The word male in Hebrew also means memory, inside, core and 
the word female means covering, the outside… , so a woman gives a 
being to everything, but in the form in thought, in the design, you and 
me, give form to the outside and men to the inside. Now the meaning of 
religion is sanctification, … so what must men develop to become 
whole? He gives form to the outside, he must develop the outside, and 
woman the inside, so that’s why men in religion step outside, the outside 
activities are for men to do, he must be a verger and a chorister and a 
rabbi and what have you, but the woman, she cannot even do it… So if 
by you for example the Pope says women cannot become priests, then 
we find that very normal, why should she become a priest? Because she 
is it already, she is it already… So religion isn’t a hobby or a chosen or 
a… something in terms of better or worse, no its just finishing 
something what you have not yet become…    
 
On the international website of Chabad, the Lubavitcher branch of the Hasidic 
groups, a series of articles devoted to the topic of Hasidic women also offers 
some insight into the construction of gender in the framework of religious 
discourse.9 In ‘Jews are from Sinai, not Mars or Venus’ Dr. Yisroel Susskind 
(2001) for example, takes his dualistic metaphors describing the ‘inherent 
differences’ between women and men even further:    
 
…the feminine forces have more of a connection to G-d through 
profound faith that is beyond rationality, that is trans-rational. In 
comparison, the masculine forces achieve more of their connection to G-
d through rationality and flashes of insight; the experience of ecstatic 
insight in Torah ultimately leads men to mystical faith. Endurance and 
breadth are characteristic of the feminine forces, while intensity and 
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focus are masculine. In football, the wide receiver is the feminine, while 
the quarterback is masculine. The transcendental number pi is feminine, 
while logarithms are masculine. Analog is feminine, while digital is 
masculine. My favorite metaphor for the difference is that gravity is a 
feminine force, while lightening is a masculine force.  
 
Susskind consciously uses the word masculine and feminine ‘forces’ rather than 
women and men, because he does not find that all women and all men equally 
and mutual exclusively possess these attributes: 
 
For while it is true that a majority of women (but not all women) will 
tend to have more of the feminine forces, and a majority of men will 
show more of the masculine, all of these characteristics are found in 
both men and women. 
 
Liddy, who was quite adamant about the essential differences between women 
and men, similarly made some nuances: 
 
Women are more sensitive, that’s why God has given us the assignment 
of education. Because by us, as the Sages describe it, the creation, the 
man has half feelings and half objective judgement, and we have a 
portion of that feeling, that, fine, Fingerspitzengefühl, that is typical 
feminine. Of course towards every rule there is an exception, you can 
have men with a feminine nature and you can have women who are 
more male by nature, but that is also not at all attractive and really not 
what you need… 
 
Debra Renee Kaufman (1993 [1991]) and Lynn Davidman (1991) in their 
research on ba’alot teshuvah, (American women who have chosen for or are in 
the process of a ‘conversion’ to a traditionalist Orthodox life style), also pay 
attention to how in both official religious discourse in the communities, and the 
ba’alot teshuvah themselves discursively construct the differences between 
women and men. In Davidman’s study (1991: 156), both the modern Orthodox 
and the Hasidic Lubavitcher women she interviewed reverted to ‘essentialist’ 
understandings of women’s nature. Whereas the rabbis in the modern Orthodox 
community seemed to mix traditionalist views on women’s roles in the home 
with more modern views on egalitarian gender roles, in the teachings in the 
Hasidic classes Davidman participated in, women’s role in childbearing and 
nurture was seen as ‘a metaphor for her essential nature’ (166). The process of 
resocialising these modern women towards Orthodoxy according to Davidman 
required a ‘radical reconceptualisation of femininity’, including the idea that 
‘women’s nature is  rooted in their biology and expressed in all aspects of their 
beings’ (166). 
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In primarily focussing on the women’s own motivations for their 
attraction to Orthodoxy and its gender role differentiation, Davidman does not 
specifically probe her respondent’s own understandings of how women and 
men are sexually differentiated or whether women possess any innate qualities 
that are reflected in halakhic religious observance or religious discourse. 
However, in some of the interview fragments it did become clear that these 
women on the verge of becoming traditionalist Jews were attracted to the very 
movement on grounds of its clear cut gender roles, including ‘conventional 
definitions of masculinity and femininity’ (Davidman 1991: 109). These 
women derided what they perceived as the pitfall of the feminist movement in 
the denial of differences and especially what ‘it meant to be a woman’, the 
search for both a feminine role and a subjective identity being the prime 
motivators for turning their back to modern secular society.     
Neither does Kaufman (1993) interview her informants as to their 
precise views on the way the fundamental differences between women and men 
can be explained. The ba’alot teshuvah do however employ a discourse that 
constantly valorises ‘femininity’ or feminine values in their justification for 
choosing and remaining in an Orthodox religious community. As in all of the 
accounts above and in Davidman’s study, one of the most central features is the 
association of women with and their fundamental role in the familial sphere, 
which is similarly valorised in traditionalist Jewish religious ideology. The 
‘profamilial’ stance of Kaufman’s subjects of study, again accompanies the 
view of women as essentially inclined to harbour values associated with care, 
nurturance and relationships. As in the tendencies in Frankiel’s (1990) account 
to delineate specific feminine forms of spirituality, Kaufman’s research also 
points out to a strong celebration of sexual difference amongst ba’alot teshuvah, 
often to the extent of imbuing the sacred itself with feminine attributes, or even 
asserting women may innately possess certain spiritual abilities which are 
superior to those of men. Thus many of the women in Kaufman’s study 
elaborated on their important role as women in Jewish symbolism, mythology 
and ritual, for instance by referring to the Sabbath as feminine or the Shekhinah, 
the indwelling of God, as feminine. In Kaufman’s (1993: 53) words: 
 
The selected bits and pieces of tradition and theology they chose to 
relate strongly suggest that they consciously reformulate that orthodoxy 
in their own image. They associate the sacred and themselves with 
positive purpose and positive self-definition. This ideology is held in 
place through the structure of their everyday lives.  
 
Many of Kaufman’s Hasidic interviewees went so far as to claim that women 
may be more spiritually inclines, closer to God and in some ways ‘superior’ to 
men, which would be proven by the assertion that God told Moses to teach the 
Torah first to the women and afterwards to the men. Or they claimed that the 
reason why women were exempt from time-bound commandments (see next 
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paragraph) was that they were by nature more spiritually inclined. According to 
Kaufman, the contrast with the non-Hasidic women she interviewed, can be 
explained by the fact that Hasidism incorporates mystical and kabbalistic 
thought, and her interviewees had capitalised on feminine principles that exist 
within Jewish mysticism, such as the importance of binah or wisdom which is 
referred to as feminine or the Shekhinah.      
By contrast, even the most Hasidic among the frum-born women in 
Antwerp I interviewed did not revert to this extent in their usage of feminine 
principles and symbolism, in order to explain anything like women’s 
superiority in spiritual terms. As frum-born women I suspect, this type of 
discourse was not ‘consciously’ required as in the construction of religious 
gender identity among the ba’alot teshuvah.10 Moreover, the women I 
interviewed in Antwerp in general did not all revert to religious discourse to 
explain the essential, innate differences between women and men. Accounts 
such as that of Leonie, who had clearly studied some mystical writings – in fact 
Leonie completed a psychology degree at a later age and even published her 
thesis which dealt with Jungian theories – were more of an exception to the 
norm. My general impression was the more Hasidic the woman I interviewed, 
the more essentialist their discourses on gender were and the more eager they 
were to explain these in religious terms, such as the dualistic attributes of 
logic/feelings, women having more ‘relational’ capacities or as more ‘intuitive’, 
etc. These differences were then explained in religious terms, as in ‘God created 
women and men that way’, and these abilities concurred with both their proper 
roles and sometimes their spiritual make-up. It became clear that it was crucial 
to underline the location or position from which each voice was speaking, next 
to the context of the expression of opinions, in comparing my interviewees, 
other research and primary literature.                        
The Orthodox Jewish writer Blu Greenberg (1998 [1996]) for example, 
similar to Tamar Frankiel – and to a less extent Michael Kaufman – attempts to 
‘reconcile’ or even appropriate feminist discourse with complete observance to 
halakhah and its distinct gender roles. Greenberg is what can be called more 
‘modern’ Orthodox though, arguing for halakhic reformation in realms such as 
Torah study for women and issues such as religious divorce. Despite her 
refutation of what she considers oppressive practices to women that may attest 
to their subordinated position in the past, Greenberg nonetheless defends the 
gender roles in traditional Judaism, in view of preserving the ‘categories of 
male and female’ and ‘a healthy sense of sexual identity’. As with the other 
Orthodox writers, women’s role in the family stands utmost central, as one of 
the most important units in Jewish religious life. To different degrees, these 
authors see the family as being ‘threatened’ by feminism and the eradication of 
distinct gender roles.11  
Greenberg, who believes gender equality can be taken further within the 
realm of religious observance and commitment to halakhah, is more nuanced on 
the question of essential differences between women and men. In contrast to 
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both Michael Kaufman and Tamar Frankiel, she does not attribute any qualities 
such as relationality or care to women, opposed to ‘analytical thinking’ to men. 
Nor does she explicitly attempt to seek legitimisation through scientific or 
religious discourse. For example, Greenberg’s opinion on the rule of exemption 
for women from time-bound mitzvot is to shrink the period of exemption to 
women’s child rearing years, or even to extend this halakhic ruling to fathers 
when they are the primary nurturers of young children. However, conservative 
views resurface relating to the issue of sexual difference, although Greenberg 
does take on the challenges the blurring of gender boundaries pose to halakhah. 
In other passages, she seems to straddle between the dualistic categories of 
‘nature’ and ‘culture’, e.g.: ‘… weight must be given to social reality and 
biology. Most women, I believe, will continue to want the edge on nurturing the 
young’ (91). Elsewhere, more essentialist notions of femininity are assumed 
without further justification (168): 
 
As Jews, we must articulate a wider definition, one that includes the 
following: the experience of extending the biologically natural role to 
one in which the soul,  the character, the sensations are all stretched to 
their outer limits; a role in which the intense encounter, the ability to 
give and receive love, and the act of giving one’s self must be perceived 
as a significant expression of the feminine self.             
 
The women affiliated with the Machsike Hadass congregation I interviewed, 
similarly did not exclusively rely on religious notions of gender difference as in 
behaviour and personality traits between women and men. As became clear 
above, while some women attributed certain absolute differences to sexual 
difference, the ‘nature’ God had created, others maintained differences were 
more psychological and social, following from women’s and men’s proper roles 
rather than their biological make-up. Others even denied any absolute 
differences that could be ascribed to religious philosophy. Here the gender 
ideologies women applied, were clearly borrowed from a multiplicity of ‘Mars 
and Venus’ types of discourse, beyond religion, such as popular psychology 
and medicine, magazines, ‘common sense knowledge’, or personal viewpoints 
inferred from experience. Here I doubt that these women’s viewpoints would 
differ dramatically from those of many secular ‘modern’ women in their same 
age category. Whereas men in general were described as for instance ‘tougher’ 
or ‘go-getters’, opposed to women who were more ‘empathetic’, ‘tender 
hearted’ ‘spontaneous’ or ‘emotional’, many doubted this was universally so, as 
there were always exceptions. Hasidic -oriented Susan (aged fifty-two), who 
started studies in psychology when she was younger, but stopped when she 
finally got pregnant after several miscarriages, and now works as a counsellor 
in a counselling office for Orthodox Jews with psychological and marital 
problems, did not believe there were any essential differences between women 
and men: 
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C: Do you think men and women have any different qualities, for 
example psychologically or religiously?            
Biologically it’s obvious, and psychologically, I’m a little bit trained, so 
I can talk from my training that in general women are more emotional 
and men are more practical and sometimes don’t get along because they 
don’t know how to talk to each other, this is something you can read in a 
hundred books. As far as religion is concerned we have a hierarchy 
which does not only consist of men and women but also within men, 
something called cohen levi Israel, depending on which tribe they 
descend from… And each member of our society has different 
obligations as the women also have different obligations, according to 
the law, and women are not obliged to do the mitzvot, the laws which 
depend on time. For instance, we don’t have to do some prayer, to pray 
every day, but not a specific prayer, we can say a specific prayer but if 
we’re not really obligated, and men are obligated to pray three times a 
day, because women are occupied with the home and taking care of the 
children and are therefore exempt from these obligations, so there is a 
sense in which women are supposed to be taking care of the children… 
 
Sixty year-old ‘broadminded’ Hasidic Chana, similarly had to think hard on any 
essential differences between women and men: 
 
Perhaps to certain degree you could say women, perhaps they are 
more… mostly being tender-hearted… I’m not saying they always are, 
but there is something in them, they are softer on the whole… I’m not 
saying all women are softer than men, cause that’s all rubbish ‘all men 
are tougher than women’, no, but on the general I think you can look 
at… men are go-getters on the whole, women are trying to become go-
getters, which is also fine, if they need it, fine…    
 
According to Susan: 
 
Theoretically you might say that women are better at listening and being 
empathetic, but I don’t know, you can’t generalise at all, just like saying 
woman are more emotional than men, men are more practical, it’s a 
generality which isn’t always… There are women who are very good 
mathematicians and engineers even though you would say men have a 
more mathematical mind… 
 
Taking all forms of internal and individual variability into account, it can be 
carefully suggested that certain patterns are to be discerned in elements of the 
gender discourse applied by the various traditionalist Jewish women hereto 
discussed. First of all, they may be some differences between the very ‘ultra’-
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Orthodox women belonging to clearly defined Hasidic courts, opposed to 
slightly more ‘modern’ or ‘Hasidic oriented’ women, in that the latter seem 
slightly less essentialist and less apt to use religious discourse in their 
explanations of gender difference.  
Another crucial remark on comparing the answers of the women of the 
Machsike Hadass and the women in the research by Davidman and Kaufman 
(including Morris and Levine), is that this entirely focuses on ba’alot teshuvah 
of the Lubavitcher Hasidim, women who previously led secular lives. In 
contrast, my research subjects were all ‘frum born’, although some of them may 
have gradually become increasingly Hasidic (‘chassidified’) during their lives. 
Ba’alot teshuvah had not only been re-educated into religious philosophy and 
observance, but their reasons for consciously returning to a religious life and 
community had often precisely been motivated by the attraction of traditionalist 
gender ideology. The difference I suspect to some extent explains the fact that 
many of my informants were less cognisant, or better put, less interested in 
religious discourse on gender. For them, difference was more self-evident, 
something they did not have to question or legitimise. Often when I tried to 
probe further about women’s spirituality or feminine symbolism, many women 
answered they were not exactly sure, and this would be a subject their husband 
would know more about.          
Finally, when looking at the literature on women’s role in contemporary 
Orthodox Judaism by Tamar Frankiel and Blu Greenberg, these authors share 
the same overt interest in religious discourse on gender and gender ideology 
such as the ba’alot teshuvah. The reason may be that from a personal quest 
these women have similarly been confronted with the issue of feminism and 
gender roles in modern secular society. Even more so, these authors have 
studied Jewish gender ideology and often even scientific research in order to – 
albeit to different degrees – defend and justify traditionalist Jewish views on 
women and men. 
Although the gender discourse pertaining to the essential differences 
between women and men varied amongst my interviewees, both the fact of 
sexual difference itself and the tenet of ‘different yet of equal value’ were 
understood as ultimately always connected to women’s childbearing capacity 
and role. That the woman is the one who raises the children and is therefore 
more bound to the home was seen as obvious and evident in universal terms. 
This emphasis on women and men’s proper roles, rather than their essences was 
in fact a shared characteristic of both my own research, other research and the 
literature discussed up to now. Both those women I interviewed who did and 
those who did not use essentialist discourses on gender, were adamant on 
centrality of the different religious obligations for women and men in any 
discussion of gender. Many women even answered my questions on whether 
women had any innate abilities or characteristics which explained their 
differences in Orthodox Jewish religious tradition and communities, in terms of 
women’s different religious obligations, thus what women and men did 
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differently rather than how they essentially were different. Even those who 
emphasised the fact that women and men were created differently, immediately 
related this to the fact that they had different religious obligations (mitzvot), 
that they were meant to act differently: men’s intellect and brain as more 
attuned to his fundamental religious obligation, which is to study Torah, and 
‘logical objective thinking’ as needed to practise Talmud study. Women, on the 
other hand, as mothers and keepers of the home, need such qualities such as 
‘feeling and softness’ for their proper role of instilling and continuing religious 
tradition.  
So in a way, my interviewees replicated a two-sexes/two-genders model, 
for besides the ‘fact’ of sexual difference, gender itself was not essentialised 
into any one kind of discursive formation (religious, psychological, subjective), 
at least not to the extent one might expect to be the case in such a traditionalist 
community. In the next paragraph, I will return to this argument and in turn link 
it to my main argument on going ‘beyond scriptures and elites’ in a gendered 
approach to the study of religion. I thereby argue that gender difference – 
according to the women I interviewed – is seen as fixed in the realm of 
practice, which in itself forms the core of traditional Judaism as a religion. For 
instance, women and men are viewed as different for what they are commanded 
to do, rather than exclusively at the level of gender ontology.  
 
 
2. Beyond Religious ‘Scriptures and Elites’ 
 
In the next two paragraphs, rather than looking at the variable types of 
discourse my interviewees used in their own ‘construction’ of gender, here the 
main research question will be whether an alternative perspective on ‘religion’ 
is possible from a gendered perspective within  a particular religious tradition 
(see also chapter one). So here I will be discussing the way the strictly 
Orthodox Jewish women of the Machsike Hadass constructed ‘religion’, rather 
then gender. In this paragraph, I shall be testing the first main hypothesis in 
accounting for the androcentrism of mainstream religious studies in its 
emphasis on merely the doctrinal and institutional dimensions of religious 
traditions, that is its limited focus on religious ‘scriptures and elites.’  
 
 
Believing and Doing Religion 
 
You can never say ‘what does Judaism say?’ we do not say that, we 
know that every Jew will say something else, but if it boils down to 
what you must do, because Judaism is a religion of doing, then that’s the 
Bible… You can say I believe this or I believe that, or I don’t believe 
that, but that’s personal, that everyone decides for himself, in that you 
are free… In Judaism it’s all about the Torah, what makes a Jew a Jew? 
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Two things: on the one hand you are born from a Jewish mother, that’s 
the biological side and on the other hand it’s all the prescriptions you 
have taken upon yourself given at Sinai, and which you keep to… … So 
belief in Judaism isn’t even essential, we have been chosen to do, 
orthodoxy is a wrong word, orthodoxy means right in the teachings, 
with us it’s orthopraxis, what you must do… … You might have more 
belief, that’s the emphasis in your religion and we have more doing… 
… We have truly been chosen for the concrete deeds, that’s our task… 
 
Leonie was very explicit in expressing here what has often been emphasised in 
more scholarly descriptions of Judaism as a religion determined by a ‘modus 
vivendi’, a way of life, focussed on wordly experience and practice rather than 
theological ‘content’ or dogmas (Zuidema 1988: 148-9; Goldberg 1994: 98). Or 
according to Julien Klener (1992: 12), an occupation with ‘things of the world, 
the afterlife, social justice and ethics, rather than with metaphysics and abstract 
speculations’. Contemporary Orthodox Jewish communities furthermore refuse 
to compromise this understanding of Judaism as traditionally a religion of deeds 
or practice rather than for example a belief system, which could be said for 
Christianity. According to Fackenheim (1999: 130): 
 
Christian theology has often taught that a Christian is saved by faith and 
faith alone. Among the teachings that the Jew Jesus himself derived 
from Judaism, however, is that by his or her fruits shall a person be 
known. 
 
Contrary to Christianity, Judaism lacks an official creed, which makes it 
difficult to point to official beliefs, although generally Maimonides’ (1135-
1204) Thirteen Principles or Articles are often referred to (Klener 1992: 12). De 
Lange (2000: 196) notes that whilst faith can be viewed as the primary goal of 
any Jew (the patriarch Abraham serving as the main model), during the Middle 
Ages, Jewish philosophers like Maimonides came to redefine faith as belief.12 
Attempts to formulate a creed predominantly then refer to the Ten 
Commandments (Ex. 20:1-17), among which only the first however, is directly 
concerned with belief13 (Gordis 1990: 60). Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles of 
belief for example, fall into three groups, the first concerning the existence, 
unity, incorporeality and eternity of God. The second group is about Torah: 
prophecy’s validity, the uniqueness of Moses’ message, the divine origin of the 
Written and Oral Torah, and the eternity and changelessness of the law. The 
third group is on reward and punishment, the omniscience of God, divine 
compensation for good and evil, the coming of the Messiah, and the 
resurrection of the dead (Smart 1997: 263). Although the existence of God is a 
fundamental assumption within the canon of accepted Jewish writing, even 
Orthodox rabbis still consider the Jew who rejects belief in God a Jew, which 
technically allows for downright atheism (De Lange 2000: 157).  
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Both Leonie’s statement and the ‘technical’ possibility of atheist 
Judaism according to the Orthodox rabbinical view, point to the centrality of 
orthopraxis above orthodoxy and belief in traditionalist Jewish religion. The 
Hasidic and Hasidic-oriented women I interviewed, next to all traditionalist 
Jews obviously do consider belief or faith in God as of utmost importance and 
connected to or enhancing their experience of religious practice. Chana, for 
example, gave the following personal viewpoint on the meanings of belief, 
spirituality and religion: 
 
There are people that carry out the letter of the Lord in a very sort of 
particular way and they are not spiritual at all: I think spiritual is 
something much deeper than carrying out the letter of the Lord. I’ve met 
people who are completely irreligious, atheists, and they are very 
spiritual. I don’t think it’s got anything to do with religion, this is the 
way I look at it, I don’t know if I’m right or wrong, but this is the way I 
see it… […] For me religion means the law, but whether I want to be… 
I wouldn’t be satisfied with just being a religious person, I would need 
to be a spiritual person, because for me… I’ve got friends who are 
Jewish, are non-Jewish, this goes beyond that, right? There are among 
us special people, there are average people, there are less than average 
people like anywhere else, I’m not one of those whose thinks that all 
Jewish people are wonderful… 
 
Whereas Chana interpreted ‘religion’ as the ‘Law’ and belief as essential, she 
did see deeds and belief as not necessarily mutually interdependent: 
 
I wouldn’t do the laws if I didn’t believe… Why should I do the laws? It 
would be ridiculous without belief… Let’s put it this way, if I didn’t 
have belief, it could happen, it could happen to anyone… You could 
lose your belief, how do you get your belief back? It’s by doing things 
that perhaps you have a possibility to get your belief back, but to wait 
till it happens, perhaps it will, perhaps it won’t… 
 
As in other contemporary traditionalist Jewish perspectives however, the Torah 
as the ‘teaching’ of God and the ‘Law’ is taken to be ultimately true. According 
to Susan: 
 
For me belief is something which transcends any scientific proof. Now 
two days ago I put on the BBC and they said, ‘Well in five minutes after 
the news we’re gonna have “Discovery: was the universe planned?”’ 
Unfortunately I had to get out of the car and go somewhere, so I 
couldn’t listen to it, but this is something which is very much in the 
news today, that it could be planned… Even scientists are beginning, 
and there is also Bible study and computer research that seeks to show 
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that the bible could not have been written by so many different people 
and that everything is true in the bible by showing the sequences of 
words which couldn’t be coincidental. Now all this is used by some of 
our people when we want to show the bible is true, let’s say scientific 
proof can be used to show that the universe was created by someone and 
didn’t exist forever. But we believe that even if there were no scientific 
proof, we accept it anyway, because that is what belief is, if it’s proven 
then you don’t have to believe it anymore. This is pink [points to 
sweater] I don’t have to believe it, right? And we have this as a tradition 
from father to son, and from father to daughter or whatever, this belief 
in God and the Bible… 
 
Central to Jewish religious life and practice is of course the Torah, the 
‘teaching’ or ‘law’ as God’s revelation to the prophet Moses on the Mount 
Sinai. According to rabbinical tradition, Moses received both the written law 
(the Torah of the Hebrew Bible) and the oral law, which was codified in the 
Mishnah during the second century and later the Gemara, the written 
commentaries to the Mishnah, known together as the Talmud.14 Torah in its 
most limited usage refers to the five books of Moses or the Pentateuch, but 
broader also the Scriptures and in its broadest meaning the complete context of 
the Scriptures including the Oral Law in its totality (Goldberg 1994: 107). From 
the Torah one knows what to do and how to live; it is not only to be understood 
as ‘law’ in a strict sense, but containing revealed history, wisdom and liturgy. 
In the Mishnaic period of rabbinic Judaism (first to third century C.E.) 
rabbis maintained that besides the Ten Commandments, Moses rec eived all the 
rest of the exact 613 mitzvot at Sinai. The rules of halakhah, whether they are 
specifically mentioned in the Torah or were deduced by rabbis themselves in 
the Talmud, all originated with God at Sinai and are therefore to be observed 
(Fackenheim 1999: 128; De Lange 2000: 192). Halakhah (the ‘Way’) itself, 
thus refers to the whole ‘body’ of mitzvot (civil, criminal, family and ritual law) 
from the Torah or in its deduced form in the Oral Law of the Talmud, opposed 
to Aggadah , which refers to the more narrative or speculative elements (ethics, 
religious thought, folklore and legend). 
A primary characteristic of Orthodox Judaism is its attempt to preserve 
the classical definition of Jewish religious tradition and the acceptance of the 
Torah as divinely revealed and therefore authoritative next to the centrality of 
halakhah and its rulings in everyday practice. Contemporary Orthodox Jews are 
what can be called ‘mitzvah centric’ (Beaver et al 1983: 292), as the acceptance 
of the covenant, the Torah and the divine commandments, means to practise 
them. As the Torah has often been mistakenly understood as the ‘Law’15, 
halakhah is similarly much more than a legal system in a modern Western 
secular sense, but it contains the totality of life and behavioural rules to which 
the observant Jew must abide in her/his relationship to God, to fellow human 
beings and to nature.  
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Orthopraxis as Moral Practice 
 
Interesting from the perspective of gender, was that many of my interviewees 
did not see belief itself as in anyway related to gender, nor did they conceive 
men anymore or any less ‘religious’ than women or vice versa. Rather, gender 
differences in religion were only relevant in the realm of religious deeds, the 
performance of the mitzvot, which are halakhically prescribed along gender 
lines. According to Tirza: 
 
Spiritually there are no differences between men and women, the belief 
is the same but the obligations are different, in the first place a woman 
does not have to do all of the obligations… Above all is belief which is 
the same for men and women, and besides that, men have to fulfil 
religious duties. But Orthodox life is not just prayer, it is also being 
honest, for example in doing business, it comes down to bringing your 
belief into your daily life, like benevolence… This is the same for men 
and women, but then she has obligations in the home, but she must also 
pray, but not so often and at set times, she looks after raising the 
children … 
 
And Tina: 
 
There are men who are more religious than women and there are women 
who are more religious than men, the difference is that they have much 
more to do, those men, they have more obligations, so it is more visible, 
they go to the synagogue three times a day or twice a day… 
 
Returning to the Decalogue, only the first of which is directly concerned with 
belief, the next two commandments revolve around ritual practice. According to 
Gordis (1990: 60) the second ‘You shall have no other gods besides Me’ 
addresses the exclusive worship of the God of Israel. The third, ‘You shall not 
take the name of the Lord your God in vain,’ apparently forbids associating 
God with any object, act, or word unworthy of Him. The fourth commandment 
would be both ritual and ethical in character, ‘Remember the Sabbath day to 
keep it holy ,’ serving as a bridge to the six remaining commandments, which 
according to Gordis (1990: 60-61) are exclusively ethical in character.16 Not 
only do the Ten Commandments, - as they were revealed by God to Moses - as 
the content of the covenant between God and Israel illustrate how Judaism is at 
its root an ethical religious tradition. The commandments are predominantly 
practice-oriented and inherently ethical in character, a characteristic of the 
whole Torah in both its written and oral form. Jewish morality can 
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simultaneously be viewed as an ethic of practice: ‘Moses did not preach 
morality; he created practices for embodying it in life’ (Gordis 1990: 60).  
The mitzvot and the Halakhah in its totality as an ethical system and 
central to normative, rabbinical Judaism, functions and is interpreted in the 
same way in contemporary traditionalist Orthodox religious communities. 
According to Zuidema (1988: 167): 
 
Contrary to our western judicial system, the Halakhah involves the 
totality of life of man and the community, in both his relationship with 
God, as to fellow human beings and to nature. This means that the 
Halakhah regulates both liturgy and ethics, that both belong to one 
organic whole: life itself.    
 
The Halakhah as the embodiment of God’s will is therefore the foundation of 
all morality. According to the Orthodox Jewish scholar Michael Kaufman 
(1995: 4), through performing the divinely ordained precepts, men and women 
partake in the ‘moral completion of the universe.’ As an absolute moral 
authority and ‘role model’; Jews must aspire to emulate God through ethical 
virtues such as love, justice, mercy and compassion. God must therefore not 
only be obeyed by believing but by behaving ethically. There is no distinction 
between moral, religious or ritual commandments, which makes faith and moral 
action inseparable from each other.  
When I asked different women of the Machsike Hadass what they would 
characterise as the ‘ideal religious person’, many effectively claimed that this in 
the fist place involved following the laws. According to Tina: 
 
That is a person who keeps to all of the laws, the laws between God and 
man and between fellow human beings. If you can keep to them, both, 
not just the one or the other… Someone who really combines the two… 
 
Many of my interviewees also emphasised the different types of laws, those 
more ‘purely’ ethical in content, generally referred to as those ‘commandments 
between man and man’ and the more ritual or ceremonial focussed laws, the 
‘commandments between man and God’. Both types were viewed as equally 
important, as illustrated by Susan:  
   
We have two kinds of religious laws actually, laws between man and 
God and laws between man and man. The ideal religious person, is one 
who is perfect… Well no one can be perfect… Who is as good as 
possible in both domains. Because you see very often people who are 
praying all the time and who look very religious or whatever, and they 
keep the Sabbath and the holidays and they are not always so nice to 
their wives, or to other people in their business dealings or whatever… 
And you see on the contrary people who don’t look religious to you at 
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all and they drive on Shabbes or whatever, but they give a lot of charity, 
and in fact one of the Rabbi’s was talking about one of these people and 
he said: ‘I don’t know what God’s gonna do when he dies, because this 
man gives so much and he is so good, but between man and God he 
doesn’t… fulfil the requirements, so this is… and I think this would 
probably include someone who is tolerant of other people, as part of the 
relations between man and man, someone who can understand… 
C: Do you see a difference between women and men in that aspect? 
I don’t think so, except that there are different laws…     
 
Susan’s last answer indicates that at the level of both belief and ethics as 
expressed in the mitzvot between ‘man and man’ there is no gender 
differentiation. By contrast, gender differentiation concerns those obligations in 
the domain of the ritual mitzvot.  
Many scholars writing on Judaism have often attempted to rectify the 
accusation that because of the centrality of the ‘Law’, Jewish religion has often 
been viewed as primarily legalistic and ritualistic, obsessed with correct 
conduct and therefore less occupied with ethics and faith (Gordis 1990: 64).17 
Although both the commandments between man and man en those between 
man and God are equally binding, Gordis argues ethics remains ‘paramount.’ A 
number of other women I asked the question how they would hypothetically 
describe the ideal religious person and subsequently the ideal religious man or 
woman, first answered in terms of the fundamental ethical relationships 
between human beings. Nicolette for example, immediately responded in terms 
of both ‘goodness’ and the laws: 
 
For me that’s just being a good person, being good for others, someone 
who keeps the laws but is also open to other people. It is important to 
raise your daughters so that they become good housewives, that they 
learn that study is important, that they are helpful, but that goes for both 
boys and girls… 
 
Others responded spontaneously in referring to the so-called ‘Golden Rule’, 
‘You shall love your neighbour as yourself’, which goes back to Hillel’s 
summation of the essence on Judaism in a Talmudic tractate (B. Shabbat 31a) 
(Gordis 1990: 65). Rabbi Akibi, a first/second century Sage taught that this was 
the most important verse in the Torah and according to Kaufman (1995 [1993]: 
9) therefore the ‘foundation of Jewish morality.’ Such as Chana’s answer to the 
question of the ideal religious person:  
 
First be a Mentsh… As a truly honest person, a person who knew 
himself or herself, and loved himself and it spilled over to the rest of 
humanity and understood himself as much as you possibly can and as a 
result spilled over to humanity. You see the love of God cannot go 
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without the love of man, it does not exist… If you don’t love people I 
don’t think you really love God… A convert came to a rabbi and asked 
the rabbi ‘I’ll become a convert if you will tell me while I’m standing on 
one foot, what’s the whole Jewish religion about?’ So he said: ‘Do not 
do to someone else what you will not have done to yourself.’ This is the 
whole Jewish religion, from beginning to end, and I would say this is 
Jewish religion and any other holiness and goodness or what 
preaching… If that’s not present, then it means nothing… 
 
Kaufman (1995 [1993]: 11) applies the idea of imitatio Dei in the practice of 
the mitzvot in terms of belief, practice and morality. God as the ultimate moral 
role model must be followed in behaving as God behaves, with ‘love, justice, 
mercy, and compassion’. Accompanying the Golden Rule is the obligation to 
perform hesed , acts of loving-kindness towards others. Again, the idea of love 
for both God and for other human beings itself must be translated into practice 
and specific actions. Whereas God constantly performs hesed for humans, 
humans must emulate God by doing hesed for one another.18 Susan gave me a 
similar explanation of why hesed was so important: 
 
This is really getting into religious philosophy… First of all, we believe 
that God built the world on hesed, God didn’t have to build the world, 
he made the world in order to be able to give, that’s number one… And 
the second thing is that we are supposed to emulate God, we are 
supposed to be merciful, have patience, I mean we are supposed not to 
get angry at people… Just as God built the world with hesed so we do 
hesed and one of our biggest ways of doing hesed is to create another 
individual, to have children, by creating our own new worlds…  
C: What about charity? 
Charity is because we are responsible for each other and the Bible is full 
of exaltations to help your fellow man, if you see someone who is 
loading or unloading we have to help him, don’t leave him to his own 
devices. We must help each other, this is really very, very principal, just 
as important for men as women… 
 
In her ethnographic research among elderly illiterate Jewish women in a 
Kurdish neighbourhood of Jerusalem, anthropologist Susan Sered (1992) found 
that these women defined their own religiosity as correct moral behaviour. 
Despite their exclusion from formal religious practices, such as the mitzvah for 
men to study the Talmud, the wearing of tefillin and tzitzit and other 
paradigmatic religious commandments reserved for men, the women in Sered’s 
research had reinterpreted and ‘domesticated’ certain rituals and symbols from 
the male-defined official institutional religious sphere of religious study and 
practice. Sered furthermore discovered that the women interpreted the essence 
of the mitzvot in the context of their domestic concerns. From their viewpoint, 
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while a man could be religious yet behave immorally, for women religiosity 
itself was defined as correct moral behaviour. For men, religion meant the 
correct observance of certain rituals (learning, prayer), whereas for women the 
most important mitzvot were moral practices such as not to slander, gossip, 
steal or cheat and to help and feed others, all of them injunctions and practices 
that focus on religious behaviour as interpersonal and contextually determined. 
For the women, the greatest mitzvah of all was to give charity, to give small 
sums of money, to cook for the sick, help the poor and the orphans, and so on. 
Sered furthermore relates her findings to the earlier mentioned Carol Gilligan’s 
(1982) research on women and moral development, equating women’s moral 
judgements with helping and pleasing others, opposed to men’s moral 
judgements, more often resting on universal principles of justice, equality and 
reciprocity (Sered 1992: 47-48). Although the men in Sered’s study were 
halakhically also commanded to give charity, the latter took to contributing or 
raising (much larger sums of) money, usually for ritual purposes. 
According to the women of the Machsike Hadass I interviewed, charity 
(tzedakah) and much broader, the performance of hesed towards others was 
indeed often seen as the way in which to act upon the Golden Rule as a great 
religious and moral principle of Judaism. In spite of the differences between 
Sered’s and my research communities and research settings, giving charity also 
showed the same gendered pattern according to the women in my case study, a 
similarity due to the same religious ideology of gender roles. Men occasionally 
collected larger sums of money, by going round houses for example. Women 
perform voluntary work, drive people to hospitals, and similarly visit the sick 
and bring them food, but they also organise charitable events for fundraising, 
for schools, Israel, etc. If they are not working full-time (as teachers), many are 
extremely occupied with all kinds of voluntary activities, involved with school 
activities, girl scouts, holiday camps, or even editing children’s magazines.  
In contrast to the elderly illiterate women of Jerusalem however, the 
women I interviewed, who were mostly well-educated and cognisant of both 
secular and ‘official’ religious knowledge, did not see any of the gender neutral 
mitzvot as more important for men or for women. Nor did they see the 
capability to perform these mitzvot as gender dependent. Men have to be 
equally honest, i.e. in their business affairs, while women have to be altruistic 
with others in interpersonal contexts and in the domestic domain, like when 
they receive guests. The fact that women and men perform these deeds in a 
different way, was ascribed to the fact that they have different roles, and 
therefore as merely consequential to these roles. I asked Rachel whether 
performing hesed was more important for women or men and if they express it 
differently: 
 
C: And what are differences between men and women in the way they  
work? 
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That’s because men are more tied down to business and they have less 
time, I mean materially they often have less time than women. Women 
who do not have to work, I’m not speaking of the working woman who 
is very tied down to her job and to her family life, but let’s say you have 
women who are quite independent, and who are materially well off, they 
have much more free time to do these things, but it doesn’t have to do 
with being materially well off, a lot of women here do voluntary work. 
C: Would you say women are any more naturally inclined, maybe they 
are more naturally altruistic or not really? 
Uh, it could be, but I believe its because they have sometimes less 
responsibilities, the men are taken up more by the work, by financial 
responsibilities, and such other things, so, that’s why the women have 
perhaps more time for these things than men. 
 
Susan similarly explained gender differences pertaining to hesed solely in terms 
of gender roles: 
  
Men and women do hesed, the men are more into giving money, and the 
women are more into doing practical things… And we learn that 
cooking a meal for a person is on a higher level than just giving money 
to go out and buy himself something, because here you’re giving him 
something which is ready, he doesn’t have to do anything, that is a very 
high form of hesed… The women who are not working full time… I’m 
also part of an organisation that drives, when people are sick here they 
don’t always go here, they go to Leuven or Aalst or Brussels to hospitals 
and I drive them and bring food because they don’t get food, they only 
eat kosher food. So we drive them and this is a very important part of 
hesed, this is something that we can do, if you have money, you can 
give money as well… 
C: So do women and men do hesed in different ways? 
Because of the circumstances, because men are the ones making the 
money, they can give the money, if there’s a woman who makes money 
then she’s obligated, we’re obligated to give ten percent of our earnings, 
to charity. There are men here who are extremely involved with sick 
people, we have people coming from all over the world to hospitals 
here, for various treatments which are better here than other places, the 
men don’t really cook, so they can’t really give the cooked meals… 
 
 
Leonie gave me some more examples of how men and women differently 
perform hesed and charitable activities. I asked her if women were more 
involved in activities such as fundraising, and she replicated the official law on 
collecting from door to door: 
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Yes, perhaps more women than men, no, in fact men as well, but in their 
own way I think. Women organise more shows, tea evenings, lectures, 
plays and men… My husband goes with someone, because you always 
have to make money with two by us, because otherwise you can put it in 
your own pocket… He goes along and then you go from door to door 
and ask… They will give more to a man, because then they think that 
maybe it’s more serious, which it often is, so for a school…  
C: Could you say that women are more involved in social activities? 
More social activities, and they raise hundreds of thousands of franks, 
and men… I don’t think men raise so much, but maybe they raise more 
in one go, but then they do not do it so often. But my husband isn’t that 
kind of type, I’m more that type… 
 
Regardless of this emphasis on individual variation, in contrast to the previous 
respondents, Leonie did give a more essentialist account for these differences 
based on religious gender ideo logy:  
 
Women have rechem, a womb, so per definition they are already 
charitable. And men have to practise: that’s why it’s the man who must 
give, because a woman would give anyway, by men it’s more of a duty 
to give, because the duties are that which you are not yet, to awaken 
them, a woman does it already… The woman does not have this duty, 
because she does it by nature, but that’s why so many women are 
involved. O.k. there are men who do it a lot, you always see the same 
types who are at it, as with women as well. But in Antwerp here it is 
very special, people who really need it, people who are sick or poor… 
As it is in Antwerp it is no where else, that’s the Flemish influence 
probably, Flemish people have that as well, such cordiality, and 
kindliness… 
 
Perhaps Leonie was more cognisant of and interested in religious philosophy on 
women and hesed.19 Orthodox Jewish scholar Michael Kaufman also notes 
women have innate qualities which lend them to be naturally inclined to 
practise hesed (1995: 31): 
 
The Sages teach that women extend more hesed, acts of selflessness and 
loving-kindness, to others. Women are more hospitable, more 
considerate of the stranger, and more empathetic to the needs of others. 
Women initiate and participate in communal charitable endeavors more 
than men. The Talmud tells of women conducting campaigns for the 
support of people confined to the Cities of Refuge and of noble 
Jerusalem women personally proffering medicines to the dying in order 
to ease their misery. 
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Religious Roles for Strictly Orthodox Jewish Women: Of Exemption and 
Exclusion 
 
 
With the Feast of the Tabernacles, then we sit in a booth… Men have to do 
this, because it is a mitzvah, a positive prescription bound to time… So the 
weather is cold and my husband says: ‘Do you want to come and sit with 
me in the sukkah?’ And I think to myself ‘no way, it’s pouring’, so I’ll just 
go and sit indoors, nice and warm and cosy reading the ‘Libelle’ [a Dutch 
women’s magazine, equivalent to ‘Women’s Own’], and I just bring him 
his soup! [la ughs]. 
    From an interview with Hasidic -oriented Leonie. 
 
 
In chapter five, under 2. Studying Strictly Orthodox Jewry, it was shown that 
even in more anthropological studies of traditionalist religious Jewish 
communities that focus on people and practices rather than texts, the focus 
often remains on those handling and interpreting the texts, the so-called 
‘scholars’ society’ in these communities. From the age of three, Hasidic boys 
start to learn Hebrew and visit the (c)heder, where they will first be taught of 
the stories from the tradition and scripture. They later take to Talmudic ‘lernen’ 
at yeshiva and even as married men, the ritual of studying next to prayer, forms 
the greatest mitzvah, or religious commandment, the observant male Jew must 
perform. The world of the yeshiva, or the ‘scholars’ society’ in general and the 
type of religious practice it represents, are therefore usually assumed to be 
paradigmatic for the traditionalist Jewish religious way of life in most 
contemporary ethnographical research on strictly Orthodox Jewish 
communities. Thus even a shift from ‘scripture as representation’ towards the 
much broader realm of ‘religious practice’ – including, rather than limited to 
the particular function the scriptures serve within these practices – that would 
appear more accurate in the description of Orthodox Judaism as a religious 
tradition, does not necessarily entail a more women-centred or gender inclusive 
focus.     
In the previous paragraphs on the other hand, it has gradually become 
clear that women are officially barred or exempt from those paradigmatic 
mitzvot such the rituals of wearing tefillin and tzitzit, the Shema prayer, 
Talmud study, and official religious functions such as rabbi, judge or cantor, 
etc. which are reserved for stric tly Orthodox Jewish men. Nevertheless, the 
women of the Machsike Hadass I interviewed did not conceive themselves as in 
any way inferior, nor did they see themselves as less ‘religious’ than men. In 
the previous paragraphs, it already became clear that despite their exclusion 
from those all-important religious roles in the construction and reproduction of 
official religious knowledge, rituals and the religious institutional frameworks 
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such as the study house and the synagogue, these women clearly do ‘practise’ 
religion as it is defined in the normative Orthodox Jewish interpretation. 
Whether the women in my case study in any way negotiated or even resisted 
their prescribed religious roles, or perhaps practised a female-defined form of 
religion which took place outside of the official framework – such as in Sered’s 
study – will be the main focus of the following chapter. 
Here, it suffices to put forward the first argument that the strictly 
Orthodox Jewish women in my case study do count as ‘religious agents’, in 
spite of their predominant invisibility in both the religious scriptures, the 
scholars’ society and religious institutional domain, and in the representations 
thereof in mainstream scholarship on such religious traditions and communities. 
That the women I interviewed do have religious roles coincides with the 
dominant religious gender ideology in these communities, and which my 
interviewees largely reproduced. The definition of Orthodox Jewish religion as 
both practice-oriented and its claim to all aspects of daily life and contexts – for 
example as in ethical practice – thus allows for a sacralisation or sanctification 
of many spheres of life, including those which are the proper domain of 
women, such as in their role as mother and housekeeper in the domestic sphere. 
Other facets of what it means to lead a religious life appear to be considered as 
gender neutral or universal, such as belief or more abstract ethical principals, 
yet in their outward manifestation these appear to be practised differently, due 
to the different religious roles for women and men as divinely ordained and 
codified in rabbinic law. The specific character of Orthodox Jewish religion 
with its emphasis on law and religious practice thus fosters gender 
differentiation in religious practice, yet it is also true that women in this 
religious tradition women do possess religious agency, an insight which will be 
further discussed later on.  
First, the remainder of this section will focus on the direct implications 
for women’s religious practice due to the so-called rule of exemption. Women 
are exempted from precisely the central religious rituals that are both normative 
in traditionalist Jewish religion and communities, where practice in the form of 
the mitzvot or commandments as revealed in scripture and interpreted through 
elites, are defined and controlled exclusively by men. Those forms of liturgy 
which are often taken as paradigmatic forms of religious celebration, take place 
within the visible public domain of institutionalised religious practice and are 
precisely those where women are absent or at the most peripherally present or 
involved.  
 
According to the Orthodox interpretation and application of halakhah, women 
are exempt from those positive commandments which are bound to fixed times, 
as they may interfere with their own gender specific and all-important own 
religious obligation of raising children and keeping a household. These include 
the most prominent of what can be considered paradigmatic liturgical practices 
within traditionalist Judaism, such as the wearing of tefillin and tzitzit during
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prayer, and the daily recitation of the Shema prayer, but also the dwelling in a 
sukkah (booth) on Sukkot (Feast of the Tabernacles), the hearing of the Shofar 
on Rosh Hashanah (at the beginning of Yom Kippur), counting the Omer20, and 
waving the lulav21 (palm) on Sukkot. Cornille (1994: 32) includes the reading 
of the book of Esther at Purim in this minimal list.  
Although all 352 negative precepts equally apply to women and men, 
according to Maimonides, of the 248 positive commandments, sixty in total are 
incumbent on every Jew at all times and in all places, among which forty-six 
upon women and men. Fourteen mitzvot are not binding upon women 
(Kaufman 1995 [1993]: 207-8). Besides the above seven most cited time-bound 
mitzvot which women are exempted from, in Maimonides’ interpretation these 
also include the study of the Torah, the writing (or acquiring) of a Torah scroll, 
being ‘fruitful and multiplying’, marriage, and devoting oneself to ‘one’s wife’ 
during the first year of marriage and circumcision. Both the secondary religious 
and scholarly literature vary on the inclusion and exclusion of certain mitzvot 
from which women are exempt other than those in the minimal list, which is 
especially apparent in the case of Torah study, perhaps the most paradigmatic 
of all positive religious commandments and ritual practice. This variation 
probably testifies to the variation in both rabbinical and Talmudic interpretation 
and discussion, and depending on the Jewish community and their authority’s 
acceptance for one or the other final regulation.  
Finally, and most importantly, there is an enormous discrepancy 
between both official law and the actual religious practice which Orthodox 
Jewish women historically and to date do and do not perform or participate in, 
as will be illustrated below. The official minimal precepts under the rule of 
exemption or even broader Maimonides’ list of fourteen, have in practice 
fostered a development in which women’s participation in many other liturgical 
responsibilities has become minimal. Whereas according to rabbinical 
interpretation women perform the commandments from which they are exempt 
through their husband, in practice the rule of exemption has led to an exclusion 
from all public religious functions, among which the possibility of rabbinic 
ordination (Cornille 1994: 32). In commenting upon the complexity of halakhic 
development on this issue, Orthodox Jewish feminist Greenberg (1998: 82) for 
example, states that next to the mitzvot of counting the Omer, hearing the 
shofar and reciting the Shema being derived from the initial exemption from 
tefillin, other derived rulings such as women not being counted in the minyan 
have followed.22 The rule of exemption in rabbinical tradition itself however, is 
far from unambiguous, which shall become clear in the following discussion of 
the mitzvah of prayer. 
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Liturgy: Prayer as an Illustration 
 
Both Blu Greenberg (1998) and Irwin H. Haut (1992) point out how the 
minimal or non-existence of Jewish women’s historical and contemporary 
practice of prayer is by no means a reflection of halakhic regulations, but more 
of a lamentable consequence of the ‘domino effect’ of the rule of exemption 
(Greenberg 1998: 79), and historical development in general. Haut makes a first 
distinction between spontaneous and formal prayer, the first of which is not 
related to gender and serves to express the emotions and needs of the individual 
in his or her relationship with God. Thus, private, individual spontaneous prayer 
was open to both women and men. Formal prayer by contrast, is both 
liturgically and halakhically determined, and as an essential mitzvah, the rule of 
exemption as it applies to the particular mitzvot of tefillin and the recitation of 
the Shema prayer also has repercussions for women’s participation in the 
broader realm of tefillah or prayer in general.23   
These exemptions however, do not release women from the positive 
commandment of prayer altogether. Rabbis nonetheless disagree as to which 
prayers are exactly obligatory for women. Both Greenberg (1998: 79) and Haut 
(1992: 92) refer to the early masters of Talmudic law who claim that women are 
exempt from reciting the Shema and wearing tefillin, but commanded to 
perform the commandments of mezuzah24 and grace after meals, as these are 
not bound to time. In the Mishnah, it is stated that women are obligated to 
formally pray. Later, Talmudic rabbis interpreting these texts somehow had to 
resolve the contradiction that in the case of this obligation, exemption due to the 
time factor does not hold. Later halakhists such as Nahmanides ruled that 
despite prayer being time-bound, from which ordinarily women would be 
exempt, they were nonetheless obligated as prayer was a special category with 
the unique function of the universal plea for mercy, for women and men alike. 
Nahmanides followed the view that the obligation of prayer was rabbinic in 
origin, concluding both women and men were to recite the Shemoneh Esreh at 
least twice a day (Haut 1992: 95).   
Maimonides on the other hand, locates the obligation of prayer in the 
Torah itself, interpreting general informal prayer in which no set times are 
given as obligatory for everybody. He remains ambiguous on rabbinic formal 
tefillah at fixed times, neither exempting nor obligating women. To date the 
opinions by various Orthodox rabbinical authorities differ as to the specific 
details. In general the ruling has been followed that women must indeed recite 
the Shemoneh Esreh twice a day (in the morning and afternoon). This concerns 
those portions of the prayers that form an intrinsic part of the basic prayers, 
often leading up to other prayers such as the Shaharit in the morning or 
accompanied by the Shema in the morning and evening, otherwise incumbent 
upon men (Haut 1992: 97-98). In general and regardless of historical and 
contemporary discussion, it seems that halakhically in the case of formal 
prayer, the rule of exemption as bound to fixed times did and does not hold for 
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women, but rather the element of the ‘invokement of compassion’ hold for 
prayer to be incumbent upon all. All other prayers are obligatory for men and 
mandatory for women.  
Despite the official obligation of daily time-fixed prayer for women, in 
actual practice, according to Greenberg (1998: 78-79) ‘most Jewish women, all 
across the religious spectrum, hardly open a prayer book from one Shabbat to 
the next, if that often.’ Haut (1992: 99) similarly comments upon the 
contradiction between official law and contemporary practice as regards to this 
liturgical practice: ‘…it is quite clear that women’s involvement with formal 
prayer under Jewish law has largely been underestimated, misunderstood, or 
ignored.’ Shortly I shall turn to some of the statements by my respondents as to 
their own participation in prayer, and whether the discrepancy between practice 
and halakhic prescription is reflected in this case as well. First it is striking to 
note that the example of prayer in itself shows how the rule of exemption as 
bound to fixed times is not internally consistent. Besides prayer for example, 
women are commanded a number of other time-dependent mitzvot. These 
include the kindling of the Sabbath lights, Kiddush 25 on Sabbath, hearing the 
reading of the Megillah, the Book of Esther on Purim, drinking four cups of 
wine on Seder (the first evening of Pesach), eating matzah (unleavened bread) 
during Seder, rejoicing during the festivals, and finally Hakhel, the public 
‘coming together’ gathering ceremony to hear the Torah read at the conclusion 
of the sabbatical year on Sukkot (Kaufman 1995 (1993): 208-209). 
The rule itself therefore appears inconsistent and not universally 
binding. Gordis (1990: 180) notes that the rule pertaining to prayer for example 
was ‘a rationalization after the fact’. In the Gemara, rabbis developed what they 
saw as an underlying principle, a generalisation of a series of concrete 
statements on different subjects in the Mishnah. Besides this inconsistency, the 
actual reason for the exemption according to Greenberg (1998: 82-82) is not 
even stated in the Talmud. Subsequent scholars (thirteenth to the twentieth 
century) offered various explanations, which are reflective of social attitudes 
towards women. Some of these are explicitly misogynous, such as the 
attribution of the exemption to women in order to be free to serve their 
husband’s needs, or even stronger because of their ‘lack of mental control.’ 
Other explanations put forward are characterised by the ‘equal yet different’ 
perspective, sometimes even referring to women’s innate moral and spiritual 
superiority, in celebrating women’s special role within the home and family. A 
number of contemporary scholars also apply the ‘time-control theory in 
reverse’, which excuses women of the time-bound mitzvot. Because of their 
menses and their biological clocks, women would not need certain mitzvot that 
mark time as opposed to men. This version was expressed by one of my 
interviewees, Leonie: 
 
There are prescriptions that are bound to time, negative ones, such as not 
working on the Sabbath, for men and women, and praying at set times 
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which has to do with sunrise and sunset, men must do this and women 
may… Because us women we have time in our bodies, we are cyclically 
ruled, we have time in us, built in, and a man hasn’t, so the man must 
build in time, because in Orthodox… the men are running around and 
looking at their watches… In the synagogue you hardly see women, 
because they don’t have to go… So, I just pray at home if I like, if I 
can’t pray or if it isn’t convenient for me I don’t even have to pray, not 
because I’m less…         
 
Rachel then again explained the different mitzvot for women and men in terms 
of the ‘equal but different’ position and women’s exemption due to her role in 
the home: 
 
They have different obligations but I can’t say the woman is in a 
position of inferiority, there is an obligation to study, there is an 
obligation to pray, the Jewish woman is limited… I mean we believe 
family duties come first, so she’s very happy that she doesn’t have to go 
to a synagogue three times a day, she doesn’t feel that she’s in a position 
of inferiority… Let’s say that she won’t go to, that she’s not tied down 
to certain hours, on the contrary, then she feels she’s freer for… We 
share responsibilities, put it that way, so if my responsibilities are 
different from those of my husband, I wouldn’t say that I’m in a position 
of inferiority, we’re sharing, sharing our life together… He’s taken on 
certain privileges, certain responsibilities, he has his and I have mine. 
I’ll give you an example, he goes to pray, he doesn’t have the obligation 
to go to the ritual bath, which you know also Orthodox women have, so 
I can’t say… There’s no superiority or inferiority, there are differences, 
that’s how we Orthodox women, I suppose you have heard it from 
others, that’s how we look at this part of life… 
 
Interesting in Rachel’s statement is also the comparison she makes of men’s 
mitzvah of prayer with women’s mitzvah of visiting the ritual bath (laws of 
niddah). In this way she seems to immediately refute the idea that women’s 
exemption in one area would be indicative of a more limited role in religious 
practice by juxtaposing this with one of the few positive mitzvot, which is 
exclusively incumbent upon women.26 The majority of the women I 
interviewed however, all replicated the viewpoint that women’s exemption 
from certain religious obligations had to do with their primary duties in their 
role as wife and mother, which they interpreted in the most positive way.     
As for prayer, my informants seemed to confirm Greenberg’s 
observation that for contemporary Orthodox Jewish women, prayer is more of a 
personal choice, and no one replicated the halakhic regulation that women are 
indeed to practise formal prayers at set times twice a day. The extremely ultra-
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Orthodox Esther for example, practises prayer in an informal context and often 
directly related to her role as a housewife and mother: 
 
Men do prayer and studies but God understands every language. If I  
pray that my child will come home safely, so I do pray and this makes 
you feel good afterwards. Especially the older you get, the more you feel 
the intensity of life, you just feel that there’s someone out there who 
keeps you safe. I pray that when my husband flies abroad, the flight will 
be safe, so a woman does pray.  
 
Although many women interpreted the rule of exemption as a matter of freedom 
and choice compared with the religious duties of men, diversity of opinion 
among rabbinic authorities exist as to the options and effects of women 
performing those time-bound mitzvot from which they are ‘free’. In most cases, 
if a woman performs such an optional precept, according to Kaufman (1995: 
211), halakhically this is perceived as a ‘meritorious deed’ but according to a 
certain rabbinic principle this is then considered: ‘a meritorious personal 
minhag (custom) or neder (religious vow) rather than a precept directly 
commanded by God’. Therefore, the woman’s reward for performing the 
mitzvah is reduced because the significance of the performance of the precept is 
reduced (ibid.). 
Orthodox Jewish feminist Blu Greenberg (1998: 85) claims that in the 
case of prayer, the principle and practice of exemption has yielded ‘negative 
self-images of women regarding a discipline of steady prayer’. The exemptions 
would not only have ‘weakened women’s commitment to prayer but also 
repressed any desire to be formally considered equal members of the holy 
community.’ Although the domino effect may have taken place in the area of 
formal prayer, it is nevertheless striking how in practice women have accepted 
certain time-dependent mitzvot, which were not officially obligatory. In the 
case of prayer, whereas most women do not perform the daily Shaharit and 
minhah27 prayers contradictory to the fact that these are halakhically required, 
they do perform the additional Sabbath and holiday prayers from which they are 
officially exempt (Greenberg 1998: 79). According to Kaufman (1995: 211), in 
practice women have also accepted the reading of the Shema, the counting of 
the Omer, the hearing of the sounds of shofar on Rosh Hashanah, taking the 
four spices on Sukkot, and eating in the sukkah as if they were obligatory. I 
confronted one of my informants with such an example, and although she did 
not know of the exact halakhic ruling, she did not seem surprised and attributed 
this to the primacy of custom (minhag): 
        
C: I read somewhere that hearing the shofar wasn’t even obligated for 
women originally? 
It’s possible that they do not have to because this is bound to time, but 
there are things that were established by the Torah and the Sages after 
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the destruction of the Temple… Also the prayer books, that then 
becomes accepted as law, like common law, law grows and that’s one of 
the things I think, the shofar that has to do with time, but then over time 
becomes established like that, then it counts as a law… 
 
Kaufman states that although the custom of women performing these optional 
mitzvot has been sanctioned, this does not hold for the two important time-
bound mitzvot for men, tallit and tefillin. These are not optional but actually 
forbidden to women. Although in my own case study on a strictly Orthodox 
Jewish community, the issue of women wanting or performing tallit and tefillin 
would not even be considered, it comes to no surprise that these forms of 
paradigmatic ritual practice are precisely hotly debated in any feminist critique 
of halakhah. Kaufman (211-212) does not discuss such a thing as concrete 
sanctions that may be brought upon women who transgress these prohibitions, 
yet uses rabbinical rhetoric in order to severely condemn such an act as a revolt 
against the will of God. Performing a mitzvah one is not commanded to 
perform and has not been sanctioned as an elective mitzvah might possibly fall 
into the category of ‘sinful arrogance’:  
 
Women who follow their own impulses in this regard rather than the 
directives of Halakhah might consider whether, fundamentally, their 
primary motivation is to fulfill God’s will or to pride themselves for 
performing a task given to men.    
 
Whereas in practice Orthodox Jewish women have abandoned required formal 
individual prayer, they seem to have taken on communal prayers during the 
Sabbath and holidays which halakhically were not required from them. This has 
been accompanied by a number of other time-bound liturgical mitzvot that also 
seem to be communal, and carried out both in the private familial or public 
sphere of the synagogue. In discussing the androcentrism in ethnographical 
studies of Hasidim, it was noted that often the synagogue is given a central 
place in the representation of the life in the community.28 From the perspective 
of mainstream religious studies the synagogue, the study houses and the schools 
are similarly considered central religious institutions, where in the case of 
traditionalist Judaism, paradigmatic public religious activity takes place, both 
liturgy and Torah study. Although neither men nor women are halakhically 
obligated to pray in the synagogue, as noted, traditionalist Jewish men do go to 
the synagogue to pray at least twice a day. The reason for this is that communal 
prayer is preferable to praying privately, although as with all other halakhic 
regulations, in this formulation, again the man is taken as the normative subject. 
Men must aspire to pray in a ‘congregation’, with at least ten individual men 
that then make up the required minyan. Praying in a minyan is more ‘desirable’, 
‘preferable’, or according to one informant ‘of higher value’ than private 
individual prayer. In a minyan, there is a situation of communal 
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interdependence as each person enables every other person to fulfil the 
requirements of the minyan (Greenberg 1998: 85). Leonie illustrated the 
practice of this requirement:    
 
C: As for prayer, women are not obliged to participate in communal 
prayer or go to the synagogue… 
No, men don’t have to either really, men have to pray with ten because 
as Jews we want to do as much as possible, you can pray more if there 
are ten of you, so if there aren’t ten of you… We used to live in Jakarta 
for three and a half years, and there weren’t any other Jews there, so we 
always prayed at home, my father as well, there wasn’t anything else, so 
then you can pray less. So if you want to pray more you go to the 
synagogue, women do not have to, so some go and some don’t, it 
depends on what you fancy. With men it’s not a question of if they feel 
like because they really have to go. Imagine you go to the Ardennes for 
a holiday, in a small village, you don’t want to meet any Jews, no Jews 
for two weeks… You will still ask a few families and if they have a few 
sons above thirteen, then that’s a plus, because then you have ten men, 
men must and women may… So a lot go, I don’t go because I don’t like 
it, but that’s personal, it’s not about more or less pious because you’re 
just not obliged… 
 
Even though halakhically women are obligated to pray, they are not to be 
counted in a minyan, a law that was rabbinically derived from women’s 
prohibition on performing tefillin (Greenberg 1998: 82). Thus the logic 
according to Kaufman (236) goes, that as a woman is exempt from time-fixed 
precepts such as congregational prayer, which may interfere with her domestic 
responsibilities, her ‘obligation may be fulfilled privately, independent of a 
minyan.’ In Progressive strands of Judaism, these halakhic rulings on women’s 
exemption or exclusion in liturgy and all other forms of institutionalised 
religious practice and frameworks have gradually been abolished or are 
critiqued under pressure of feminist voices within these communities. The 
exclusion of women from a minyan and the possibilities of more active 
communal forms of prayer is currently even a highly debated area within many 
(modern) Orthodox and traditional Conservative congregations in the U.S. 
(Haut 1992a; Umansky 1999).  
Rather than arguing for the full equal access of women to those rights 
and privileges in the religious sphere which traditionally have only been 
reserved for men, feminist critiques in these communities are directed at 
expanding the traditional women’s role and retaining a notion of gender 
difference rather than abolishing it completely (Umansky 1999: 180-183). The 
most notable demands for increased religious participation have concentrated 
on the expansion of religious education and Torah study, including Talmud in 
some Orthodox communities. However, the formation of women-only prayer-
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groups (also known as the women’s tefillah movement), particularly in the 
U.S., but more recently also in the U.K.29 has grown among women who wish 
to remain observant to halakhah, but feel that individual and private prayer 
alone does not offer them complete religious satisfaction. These more 
traditionalist Jewish women do not claim that the prayer groups are replicas of 
the men’s minyan, and hereby opt to continue abiding to what they perceive as 
the halakhic prohibition of this practice. The groups conduct a full service, yet 
refrain from certain prayers which are absolutely necessary in the men’s 
minyan, including Kaddish , Kedushah and Barekhu, or the so-called ‘sacred 
sayings’ devarim she-be-Kedushah (Haut 1992a: 140; Shalvi 1995). Only the 
prayers that otherwise may be said by women or men privately and individually 
are allowed in order to remain within the parameters of halakhah. This includes 
complete Torah readings and haftarah readings30, which are normally 
technically allowed for educational purposes.  
In some of the least traditionalist tefillah groups for women, bat mitzvot 
are even celebrated where young girls may read from the Torah and receive the 
aliyah in the private context of a small ‘congregation’ of women. Some groups 
are developing new prayers for brides, or for women going on aliyah to Israel 
or even special prayers for Agunot (‘chained women’) (Haut 1992a: 142). 
Despite the overall evidence for both historical precedents of women prayer 
groups and the halakhic possibilities, women’s tefillah groups have been 
severely condemned in many Orthodox communities. Obviously, as with many 
other matters pertaining to women’s status and halakhah, past and present 
scholars are by no means unambiguous or clear on the matter. According to 
Haut (1992a: 141), some of the contemporary rabbis are even in favour of 
women’s prayer groups, claiming they can halakhically count as minyanim. The 
resistance by the majority of Orthodox rabbis however, seems to be directed at 
what is perceived as a ‘feminist’ innovation, and therefore ‘other’ to Jewish 
tradition. The ‘public’ aspects of women coming together are similarly 
denounced as improper and untraditional, despite the fact that this takes place in 
private women-only context and by no means entails a threat to the rules of 
modesty31.  
Among the traditionalist Hasidic and Hasidic oriented women I 
interviewed, only Susan claimed to be involved in a women-only prayer group, 
occupied with the singing of psalms:   
 
We’re not obligated to pray as the men are… We are obligated to pray, 
and there are various opinions among our rabbis, some say that whatever 
prayer you say, whatever language, it’s not the prayer that’s written 
down in the prayer book, is sufficient, and others say that there are set 
prayers and there is a set order of preferability of prayers. That’s if you 
only have five minutes or ten minutes a day to pray then you say so 
much and so much, and if you have more time then, you say this, and 
that or whatever. And then we also say psalms, we believe that this is 
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very…, this is a way of our reaching God, men and women sing, but we 
have different groups of women that come together and we say all the 
books, of the psalms in order to, for sick people to recover, or there’s 
other occasions…It depends how many women come, because for one 
person to say the whole thing would take three hours, so if you’ve got 
ten people, then it’s half an hour or whatever, everybody in sections and 
they say, that means all the women together are saying the whole thing.  
 
Orthodox Jewish writer Tamar Frankiel (1990: 98-99) claims the ‘books of 
Tehillim or Psalms’ are especially favoured by women and the formation of so-
called ‘Tehillim clubs’ where the saying of the whole book of Tehillim is 
shared, is a typical custom of many pious Jews: 
 
This special feeling that women have for the psalms comes, I think, 
from the fact that their themes are often more congenial to women than 
are the formal prayers. They speak of concrete situations in which King 
David found himself rescued from distress, or they praise God’s 
handiwork in nature. Personal, poetic, and oriented toward real life, a 
psalm can combine praise, inspiration, and petition into one meditation.    
 
Susan was also quite adamant when she insisted these were not the same as in 
the minyan, and expressed the same opinion as that of many Orthodox rabbis:  
 
C: And prayer in a minyan has higher value than private prayer? 
Yes, that’s right, so men as much as possible, depending on how they 
feel also, because my husband only goes in the morning, he doesn’t go 
in the afternoon, he prays at home, but many men try to go three times a 
day, ten is definitely more valuable than one alone. And we don’t have a 
minyan of women, in America this has also started, this is the same 
thing I said about the learning, the Torah, the oral law, it’s a 
manifestation of feminism…  
 
Interviewees like Susan thus seem to replicate the dominant normative view on 
this matter, such as the opinion of Orthodox scholar Michael Kaufman. 
Kaufman (1995) is tolerant of the idea of women’s prayer groups as an 
expression of the desire of many contemporary Orthodox Jewish women to 
increase their active religious participation, yet adamant on the halakhic 
prohibition on women’s minyanim: ‘A women’s prayer group may not perform 
Hazarat HaShatz, the public reading of the Amidah, or the public reading of the 
Torah. If they recite the blessings, their utterance of God’s name is considered 
in vain and thus a transgression’ (237). The crux of the issue seems to be the 
difference between congregational prayer as a public and communal mode of 
religious practice, reserved for men only, opposed to private prayer as ‘proper’ 
for women. Communal prayer for women in the contemporary hegemonic view 
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in Orthodox Jewish communities is ‘tolerated’ to the extent that it takes place in 
the private, all-female sphere, yet is sanctioned halakhically only in so far it 
does not replicate and therefore threaten the exclusivity of the male, which is 
the paradigmatic institutional form of prayer. Kaufman (236) again relates these 
differences to men and women’s innate characteristics: 
 
In keeping with the private nature of women, women’s prayer is 
expressed in a private manner. Communal prayer is more in keeping 
with the essentially public personality of the male and consequently, his 
more public role. Public prayer is an expression of the public 
functioning of the community, and hence the responsibility for public 
prayer is limited to males.            
 
When Orthodox Jewish women do participate in congregational prayer, 
feminist critiques are often directed at what first sight seems to be their role as 
mere passive ‘spectator’ or consumer of religious celebration, as is evident even 
in the division of space within the synagogue. Separated from the main field 
where the men are standing and praying by a mehitzah, the women’s section is 
mostly on the periphery, being smaller and further removed from the bimah 
(raised platform in the synagogue from which prayers are led and the Torah is 
read). Haut (1992: 136) therefore claims that ‘their presence is not recognized 
in any meaningful way.’ Women cannot receive any synagogue honours, nor 
will they become rabbi, cantor or a choir member. The presence of a bat 
mitzvah girl will not be reflected or acknowledged in the religious ritual as a 
bar mitzvah is: ‘It makes no practical difference if hundreds of women are 
present, or if none are there, for they have no active role in any part of the 
service.’ When and if Orthodox Jewish women do go to the synagogue in order 
to participate in or at least be present at congregational religious practice, they 
will do so on the Sabbath. Apart from one or two women who did not visit the 
synagogue very often because it just was not their ‘kind of thing’, most of the 
other women I interviewed did go every Saturday, like Hasidic Tina:    
 
Yes, I do go every Saturday. 
C: The men are obliged to pray and with women it seems to be more of 
an option? 
It’s just a bit to get of the house really, Saturday morning, then I leave 
the children here, I am away for a little while, I see my girlfriend and 
then we pray a little, it’s more social for the woman, going to the 
synagogue. And of course you have those who go really out of 
religious… but most do not, it’s fun, it’s not like in the church where 
you must be very quiet or something, not like that… 
 
When I confronted Rachel with the suggestion that women going to synagogue 
on Saturday might be more of a social event, she rectified this, presumably not 
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to give me the impression that women’s participation in communal prayer is 
less serious or indicative of their possible ‘subordinate’ role:  
 
C: So do you go to the synagogue yourself? 
Yes, yes, let’s say I try to go, I mean during the week naturally not, but 
on a Saturday, let’s say I try to…  
C: And do you join in with the prayer or would you say it’s more of a 
social… 
No, no, no, I sit and pray, definitely, I mean I’m sitting and praying. 
Perhaps people go to the synagogue for the social life, but when you’re 
in the synagogue you don’t talk, you pray, you follow the prayers, I 
mean after the prayers when you leave the synagogue you talk for five 
minutes to those who are coming up, but when I’m in the synagogue I 
come to pray, not to talk… 
 
Miriam emphasised the fact that although women may have been severely 
limited in participating in religious practice in the past, this was no longer so 
today: 
 
In the synagogue it is very pleasant for the woman, there is a nice 
entrance and the women are taken care of, so they are also satisfied. 
C: Do you go to the synagogue? 
Yes, but only on Saturday 
C: Do you pray along? 
Yes, in the olden days many women didn’t even know the prayer, but a 
lot has changed, women know much more… 
 
In finally hearing Tirza’s experience, we can perhaps conclude that women’s 
exemption in liturgy such as prayer, and to an extent their exclusion from the 
most institutional public forms thereof that count as ‘paradigmatic’ for the 
normative male traditionalist Jew, have led to a situation where women’s role in 
public liturgical practice is peripheral compared to that of men’s religious 
practice as institutionalised in the ‘public sphere’. However, the extent to which 
women do participate in that which is optional for the large part depends on 
personal, individual choice:32    
 
Yes, the Saturday, not many women go in the week, but when I go 
myself I do have the feeling that spiritually I have something for myself, 
but it’s not like I have to… Of course I can just lie in bed on Saturday, 
but many women do get something out of it… 
C: And what is that like, I mean you are seated separately, and you see 
the men… 
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We pray along, we have books, we hear the singing… You do feel 
something, it gives me a warm feeling and I want to improve myself in 
this and that…  
 
Traditionalist Jewish women’s practice in the realm of liturgy is limited 
compared to that of men in that women are exempt for some, and prohibited 
from other religious obligations which are legitimated by appealing to religious 
law. According to the women interviewed affiliated with the Machsike Hadass 
and in what seems to be the dominant view in most traditionalist Jewish 
communities, this exemption can then be interpreted as an instance of more 
‘justice’, freedom and flexibility for women, as their proper role is defined as 
that of mother and housewife. Religious gender roles are furthermore defined 
according to notions of the private and the public domain, like in the case of 
prayer, the former being linked to a more individual mode, the second to a 
communal context. The male communal public sphere then represents the 
institutionalised ‘face’ of religious community, tradition and practice. Whereas 
women officially and halakhically nonetheless appear to be equally obligated to 
pray, the fact that this is somewhat less formal, binding and ritualised has in 
practice led to a situation in which women’s experience of liturgy is much more 
limited to that of men. Women’s religious ‘participation’ and experience is 
therefore largely individually determined. In some cases, the peripheral place of 
women in the communal space of the synagogue is even experienced as a 
‘social’ rather than a ‘religious’ event. 
     
Using prayer as an illustration, both the religion ‘as text’ and the religion sui 
generis conception have been challenged by carrying out an empirical study of 
both ethnographic practice (interviews) and discourse in scholarship on Jewish 
women and religious practice that primarily depart from the ‘insider’s point of 
view. In ‘Between Law and Custom: Women's Experience of Judaism’, 
anthropologist Jonathan Webber (1983) underlines the important 
methodological distinction between taking a legal, jurisprudential or normative 
approach versus an ethnographical, sociological or behavioural perspective on 
the question of women’s status in Judaism. Judaism is not a ‘religion’ is the 
same sense as Christianity, - as I have already emphasised - as Webber (144) 
suggests it can be viewed as more of a system of law, philosophy and ethics, 
next to the fact that ‘Jews’ can be seen as a people and a nation, ‘not a simply 
voluntary group of believers in a religious creed’. As I have similarly tried to 
show, Orthodox Judaism can primarily be viewed as a religious tradition with 
an emphasis on practice, the foundations of which lie in halakhah or Jewish 
law. As Webber argues, theoretically, the legal system ‘remains aloof’ for real 
life social and cultural environments (144-145): 
 
Thus the rules are supposed to generate behaviour; it is quite contrary to 
the theory of this system (blasphemous even, for some) to suppose that 
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it is behaviour that is responsible for the rules. To say that the halacha 
effectively codifies – or should – codify Jewish social realities existing 
at a particular moment in historical time is open to any sociologically-
minded cultural historian, but it is not a traditional mode of explanation 
which sees biblical commandments as timeless and externally valid.  
 
Depending on one’s viewpoint therefore, as Webber notes, and as has been 
illustrated above, feminist scholars taking ‘evidence’ from both halakhic 
sources and custom and practice can arrive at a multiplicity of interpretations 
including ‘both a feminist justification for the desirability and appropriateness 
of fundamental change and also apologetic arguments for maintenance of the 
status quo’. Even more so than in the case of doctrinal or ‘theologically’ 
defined religion therefore, any feminist perspective on Orthodox or halakhic 
Judaism is complicated by the fact in that historically it has responded to its 
social environment and change, and in both explaining and prescribing 
behaviour and daily practice it is in some sense ‘sociological’. However, 
halakhah being ‘patriarchal’ in the sense that women have been excluded in the 
study or making of halakhah, feminist scholars are confronted with a paradox: 
‘In any case women are in no position to rely on halakhic categories alone to 
describe their experience of Judaism. Yet they have no alternative except to use 
them if their experience is to appear as authentically Jewish, and legitimate 
moreover to their menfolk.’ (Webber 1983: 146-7).  
Any gendered perspective moreover, is complicated by what Webber 
argues, that from the halakhic viewpoint – in its own frame of reference - the 
‘experience of being a man, or the experience of being a woman’ are not 
halakhic preoccupations, that acts exclusively on the basis of a set of principles 
originally laid down in the Hebrew bible: “‘Women’ do not form a self-evident, 
self-contained halakhic category in opposition to ‘men’; it is even doubtful 
whether they form a halakhic category at all’ (148). In my analysis and 
consistent with my arguments on the insider/outsider problem in its relationship 
with a feminist approach, my intention so far has been not to get involved in a 
religious, or in this case a ‘halakhic’ debate. From a feminist social science 
perspective, I have aimed to show how halakhah in practice may or may not be 
appropriated in addition to other forms of discourse in the construction of 
gender and religion. In the following paragraph, I turn to the exclusion of 
traditionalist Jewish women from the contemporary sphere of halakhic study 
and practice. 
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Women, Knowledge and Texts 
  
 
Study of Torah is not confined to an elite among the people of the covenant. In 
however varying degrees, it belongs to them all.  
     Emile L. Fackenheim (1999: 160). 
 
 
Historical and contemporary traditionalist Jewish women’s participation in 
religion has not only been excluded or reduced to the level of spectator or 
consumer within the public religious institutions and their rituals, such as 
liturgy and the space of the synagogue. It has already been noted that among the 
greatest mitzvot for men such as tefillin and tzitzit, is the mitzvah of Torah 
study, in its broadest sense including the study of the Talmud. ‘Torah’ in this 
context not only refers to the five books of Moses, but all literature including 
commentaries, law and interpretation (including the Talmud). The all-important 
public domain of Jewish religious life has been men’s ‘natural’ domain, 
exemplified in both public worship and the making and study of religious texts. 
The status of women when it comes to Torah study in historical and 
contemporary times appears even more complex and strife with more 
contradictions than women’s place in the synagogue and their participation in 
liturgy. Before focussing on some of these discussions, it can be emphasised 
that the importance of Torah study in Jewish religious life is again represented 
as paradigmatic and normative in much of the academic literature. Umansky 
(1999: 189) for instance critiques - among others - the famous Jewish Studies’ 
scholar Jacob Neusner, for precisely this sort of mainstream representation. 
Umansky cites Neusner in those statements where the man’s experience is 
clearly taken as the normative and representative of religious tradition, such as 
‘The important Jew is the learned man’, or that according to rabbinic Judaism 
the study of the Torah is ‘the [Umansky’s emphasis] central expression of 
[Jewish] piety.’33 
As many religious studies’ scholars have emphasised for Judaism, and is 
evident in most ethnographical accounts of contemporary traditionalist Jewish 
communities as discussed in chapter five, in Judaism, traditionally and as is the 
case in contemporary communities such as the Hasidim, the study of sacred 
texts itself was, and is not confined to a remote religious elite. Fackenheim 
(1999: 149-150) contrasts the situation with medieval European Christianity, 
where generally only priests and monks could even read or write. Not only was 
the relationship between celibacy and religious specialisation unknown in 
Judaism, Torah scholars were of ‘this world’, married with children and living 
in the midst of the community rather than in a secluded monastery. According 
to an important rule, a Torah scholar is to spend eight hours of the day earning a 
living (and providing for his family), eight hours a day sleeping, and eight 
hours a day studying Torah. Umansky (1999: 189) cites Neusner in his 
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androcentric perspective that Judaism was exceptional in holding that 
everybody could become a ‘religious virtuoso.’ Fackenheim is more nuanced, 
in noting that although in theory everyone could potentially become a Torah 
scholar, women were the first exception to the rule. The poor could not permit 
themselves to spend eight hours a day studying and the very rich were 
unwilling, yet supported scholars, in turn being revered by the poor. In any 
case, Fackenheim (1999: 152) argues that despite the deep respect these men 
enjoyed, Torah scholars were certainly not an isolated group cut off from the 
rest of the community.  
The study of the Torah is so central to Judaism, that it is often referred 
to as the most important mitzvah, ‘surpassing all other mitzvot’ (Greenberg 
1998: 47), or according to the Sages, the equivalent itself of all other mitzvot 
(Frankiel 1990: 90).34 As a mitzvah, Torah study itself can also be conceived of 
as a form of religious ritual, in the same sense that it is seen as kind of ethical 
practice characteristic of Judaism as a religious tradition. Ever since the 
destruction of the Temple, Torah study came to replace the older rituals, 
becoming a form of ritual practice in itself. Torah became central to Judaism as 
a religious tradition, and crucial was the transfer of the knowledge of the holy 
texts from one generation to the next. This involves much more than the 
accumulation of knowledge as such, as the study and understanding of the texts 
is conceived of as a spiritual kind of practice. More than simply adding 
dimensions to ritual, ethical and spiritual practice, studying Torah – as the 
thoughts of God - can ‘become a mystical experience’, an ‘opening to many 
dimensions of our own soul in connection with God.’ (Frankiel 1990: 91).  
Torah study is often described with the Yiddish word ‘lernen’, the name 
of an activity that is difficult to translate. According to Willem Zuidema (1988 
[1977]: 69-70) lernen refers to ‘studying in the plural’, in the form of a dialogue 
or discussion, yet also a prayer, a religious act, ‘standing in a thousand year old 
tradition’ (transl. from Dutch): 
 
A Christian can study the Talmud and the Torah, besides all the other 
Jewish scriptures, even for a whole lifetime – but it is still not ‘lernen.’ 
The religious Jew begins with ‘lernen’ at a very young age. He keeps on 
doing it until his death, even though he may not become a great 
Talmudist. Because the Rabbi, the teacher, at the core does also not 
teach the Torah, but he ‘lerns’ together with his students because he is 
someone who knows how to ‘lern’.35 
 
Although Torah study may be conceived of as even a spiritual kind of 
experience, Fackenheim (1999: 154) argues the traditional lernen of the Talmud 
is also ‘as disciplined, methodical, and intellectual as the way it is now often 
studied in modern western academic institutions.’ On the other hand, it is also 
different to academic study in that it more closely resembles prayer: ‘The 
shechina dwells between those studying Torah’ (163). Lernen is therefore not 
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an act that must take place in an ivory tower, but concerns a deep kind of 
knowing that what one lerns, has implications in daily life. According to 
Zuidema (1988 [1977]: 70): it is also ‘a knowing that word and deed are so very 
much two sides of one and the same reality and that man cannot profess that 
God is the Lord of heaven and earth, without also expressing this in an intense 
reverence for all creations from the animal to humankind and the surrounding 
nature’.  
The study of Torah as described above in the contemporary world is 
mostly only practised in traditionalist Jewish communities such as the Hasidim 
and the Misnagdim. In academic settings the study of Judaism often includes 
the study of Talmudic texts, but from a much more ‘objective’ and intellectual 
approach, and not in the traditional meaning of lernen (Fackenheim 1999: 153). 
As has become evident throughout the preceding chapters on contemporary 
traditionalist communities and their educational system, Torah study still counts 
as the most important mitzvah for those who abide to halakhah. In the short 
historical overview of the development of Hasidism in chapter six, it was also 
pointed out that the present centrality of Torah study may seem somewhat of a 
contradiction considering the original context in  which Hasidism evolved, as it 
initially opposed scholarly elitism, emphasising more charismatic, mystical and 
alternative forms of expression in the realm of religious ritual. On the other 
hand, when reading what scholars like Zuidema and Fackenheim have to say on 
the interrelatedness of spirituality, prayer, ritual practice and intellectualism in 
the practice of lernen, it may be that contemporary Hasidic men are practising 
Torah study in a similar mode. As in the early days, these men today also have 
families and – mostly – jobs, and indeed not all of them become great scholars 
or rabbis.         
Halakhically, women’s position vis -à-vis men’s mitzvah of study is 
similar to that of their relationship to the practice of prayer. Although Torah 
study is not included in the seven positive precepts which are clearly bound to 
fixed times, it is included in the total list of fourteen from which women are 
officially exempt. There does not seem to be any absolute prohibition on 
women studying Torah, yet again, contradictory and especially negative 
interpretations during the rabbinic era, and finally the general implications of 
the rule of exemption like in the case of prayer seemed to have created a 
precedent whereby women hardly studied at all. According to Berger and 
Lipstadt (1996: 303), Torah study in fact left the realm of family life where it 
was taught ‘from parent to child’ in the rabbinic period and then ‘entered the 
academy’ where it became a communal affair rather than a family one, one in 
which women were obviously excluded. This is not to say that religious 
education did not take place at home at all. Jewish women’s education during 
the Middle Ages for example, was not formally or systematically taught, but 
primarily mothers taught basic observances by way of observation and in an 
informal way. Most Jewish women up until the nineteenth century could not 
read Hebrew, prayed in Yiddish and were completely incapable of studying any 
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Jewish texts (Joseph 1995: 61-62). In the twentieth century this situation 
changed, yet the historical and political context behind this transformation does 
not allow for an interpretation of this shift as wholly in the interests of women’s 
emancipation in the religious sphere.  
In 1918 the Hasidic seamstress Sarah Schenierer (1883-1935) who was 
born and raised in Krakow (Poland) founded a Jewish women’s library and 
study group in the space of one of the town’s orphanages. Schenierer is said to 
have envied her father and brothers as they were permitted to study Talmud, 
which had always exclusively been a male prerogative in the religious practice 
of Judaism. The success of these meetings incited her to make a formal request 
of approval for the foundation of official religious female education, which was 
subsequently granted by various rabbinical authorities throughout Eastern 
Europe. The very same year the first Beit Ya’akov school was established in 
Krakow and by 1937, 260 schools bearing the same name were teaching 
Hasidic girls the Bible, Ethics, the code of Jewish Law, prayer, commentaries 
and Hebrew grammar across Eastern Europe, and in Austria and Palestine 
(Morris 1998: 36)  
After centuries of religious illiteracy, when mothers taught their 
daughters the observance of the mitzvot in a practical way, finally during the 
second decad e of the twentieth century, religious education for girls became 
permitted and later considered indispensable by rabbinical authorities. From a 
contemporary vantage point this development could possibly be interpreted as a 
first step in Jewish women’s struggle for emancipation: the right to gain access 
to fundamental knowledge of both the richness of their cultural heritage, but 
also to the discourse that determines their proper role and fate. Sarah Schenierer 
most definitely challenged conventional gender hegemony by studying the 
Bible, the Oral Law and Jewish Ethics at night and on Sabbath, despite being 
made a laughing stock by her friends (Weissman 1976: 141). Schenierer’s 
‘feminist’ protest against the lack of religious intellectual education for women 
paradoxically seemed to be accompanied by a fear for their assimilation into 
‘modern’ society (Brayer36 in: Kaufman 1995: 107-8): 
 
She writes that she was dismayed when she witnessed the many hasidim 
who would flock to their rebbes during the fall festivals to be inspired 
by the Torah while ‘…we the wives and daughters stay home with little 
ones. Our festival is an empty one, bare of Jewish intellectual 
involvement. For our women have never learned anything about the 
spiritual content that is absorbed within  a Jewish festival. The mother 
goes to schul. The services ring faintly into the fenced and boarded 
women’s gallery. There is much crying by the elderly women. The girls 
look on them as being of a different century. Youth and desire to live a 
full life shoot up violently in the strong-willed young 
personalities…leaving behind them the wailing of the older generation, 
they follow the urge for freedom and self-expression. Further and 
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further away from schul they go, further away to the dancing, tempting 
light of a fleeting joy’.         
              
Rabbinic authorities yet again reinterpreted prior injunctions on women’s 
education and granted Schenierer’s request, which it appears, was at least 
motivated by a concern for the future of the tradition in its entirety. Societal, 
political and economic transformations in Eastern Europe since the nineteenth 
century had resulted in a need to redefine Jewish identity. Maskilim (adherents 
of the Jewish Haskalah or Enlightenment) supported the notion of adaptation 
and facilitated assimilation into the modernising of surrounding society, which 
led to a decline in the importance of tradition and rituals. Particularly young 
Orthodox Jewish women became receptive to this process of secularisation. In 
some countries, education had become compulsory for all citizens, and girls had 
no choice other than to attend non-Jewish institutions and follow their modern 
secular curriculum (El-Or 1994: 67; Hyman 1995: 50-4). Around the turn of the 
century, traditional Eastern European Jewish boys received classical Torah and 
advanced Talmud education, whereas many girls visited public schools or were 
provided private general tuition, their formal Jewish education not extending 
beyond elementary Yiddish and Hebrew (Hyman 1995: 54).37 
The paradoxical effect of this gender differentiation is that young 
women from middle and upper classes became more familiar in the languages, 
history and tastes of their host countries rather than those of their ancestors. 
This we can imagine led to intergenerational and interfamilial conflicts, and in 
the worst cases led to them ‘leaving the fold’. Historical records indicate that in 
the last decade of the nineteenth century, more than two thirds of Jewish 
converts to Christianity in the city of Krakow were female (Hyman 1995:73). 
Schenierer’s fears thus came to be shared by a number of prominent rabbis, 
who acknowledged that withholding Jewish girls from Jewish religious 
education would entail the loss of these women to the forces of secularisation. 
Although women were not seen as necessary for the survival of the ‘scholars’ 
society’ and the transmission of its culture, they were quite literally regarded as 
essential to the reproduction of Jewish religious tradition in terms of ethnicity.38 
When in an interview I asked Hasidic -oriented Tirza about arranged 
marriages in her community, she herself pointed to this episode in the history of 
the education of Jewish women, which showed she was quite aware that these 
transformations were needed for the survival of the trad ition in the face of the 
modern world: 
 
I don’t know if you have seen the film ‘Fiddler on the Roof’, then you 
must see it, that was Russia then, and it’s not like that now, but it does 
give you an idea where we’re coming from, because it was like that. 
Many Jewish people are against that film, because that man, the 
milkman, he has four daughters, whom one of which marries a non-Jew 
and one marries a revolutionary and that’s not so nice to know, but it 
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was like that… Girls did not have an education, no school education and 
at a time when the world became more open, a little after the revolution, 
after those things… Then those girls became lost, they had… We now 
have a firm education and we know who we are, where we stand, and 
then they didn’t know it and so a lot of girls… So before there was an 
education for girls in the Jewish community, a lot of girls left the 
community, so that is shown in the film…     
 
Susan also interpreted the need for religious education for girls as a means to 
counter the temptations of the surrounding modern society and prevent ‘losing’ 
them to secular society:   
 
Men are obligated [to study Torah], women are not obligated, but it is a 
very, very important mitzvah… Women are obligated in the sense that 
they have to know what to do, we have to learn very much in order to… 
It doesn’t all go with ‘don’t put on the light’, there are things that we 
really do have to learn, and then in the past seventy or eighty years 
women have become… have been learning more in school, which they 
didn’t used to do, because of the influence of the modern trends, I would 
say. Seventy or eighty years ago you had a lot of girls who were leaving 
Orthodoxy because they weren’t occupied with this and they went to 
schools and they saw other things… They didn’t see the richness of our 
Torah, so schools were open for girls and now all the girls go to school 
and they learn as well, so that they don’t have to get satisfaction from 
other… 
 
The politico-historical context behind the introduction for religious education 
for girls some eighty years ago, then appears not to be that dissimilar to the 
reasons behind religious education for girls in present-day strictly Orthodox 
Jewish communities. Thus Jewish Studies scholar and Orthodox Rabbi Walter 
Orenstein (1995: 58) cites the ‘renowned rabbinic authority for Ashkenazic 
Jewry of the last generation’ Rabbi Israel Meir HaKohen39, also known as the 
Hafetz Hayim (1838-1933):  
 
But today, due to our many sins, parental influence has become very 
weak; most people no longer live where their ancestors lived, and many 
women are exposed to a secular education. It is unquestionably of great 
merit, therefore, to teach women Bible, Prophets, the Writings, and the 
ethical treatises of our sages [which is Oral Law]… to authenticate our 
holy faith within their minds. For if not, they are prone to stray 
completely from the way of God. Heaven forbid, and become totally 
uprooted from our religion.   
 
OF EXEMPTION AND EXCLUSION: 
STRICTLY ORTHODOX JEWISH WOMEN’S RELIGIOUS AGENCY 
 
 
384
Orenstein’s (1995: 60) similar views are even more explicit that in the case of 
this particular mitzvah and women’s relation to it, ‘societal reasons’ prevail 
above - which we will see below are rather ambiguous - halakhic rulings:  
 
What is clearly evident from these words [those of Rabbi Israel Meir 
KaHohen] is that society changes – for better or for worse – and we 
must determine in each generation how best to preserve and foster 
adherence to Judaism. In a society such as ours, it is important to teach 
Torah to women; indeed in some circles, it is a necessity.  
 
Here, this contemporary Orthodox rabbi and scholar clearly shows that the 
survival of Judaism is the primary motivator for whether or not to allow women 
access to religious education, which is not seen as an objective in its own terms. 
Jewish women themselves furthermore, do not seem to have much to say on the 
matter according to Orenstein’s view, which is clearly expressed in this phrase, 
the ‘we’ in ‘we must determine on the issue of women’, clearly referring to 
those having the ability to determine, that is male rabbinic authorities, over the 
subjects who are women.      
Whereas the rationale behind the religious education in schools for 
Jewish women as given by both scholarly and halakhic authorities, including its 
replication by my own informants, does not seem to have fundamentally 
changed since the beginning of the last century, the same can be said for the 
curriculum contemporary Jewish girls at traditionalist schools follow, including 
the Antwerp community. These girls do receive education in the written Torah, 
they learn Hebrew, history, Jewish philosophy and then only certain parts of the 
Oral Law (presumably from the Mishnah), what many of my informants 
referred to as ‘these little green books’, ‘the Ethic of the Fathers’ and law 
insofar these relate to their own mitzvot and practical matters. Before hearing 
what some of my informants had to say on the fact that women do not study 
Talmud, go to the yeshiva or ever do any real ‘lernen’, I shall return to the 
question if there is any correspondence between halakhic rulings on Torah 
study for women, and the actual practice that has been followed and 
rationalised for almost a century in many Orthodox Jewish communities.       
As with many other issues pertaining to women’s status and their 
religious practice in Judaism in general, the secondary literature shows that the 
actual Torah for example, does not harbour any proscription against women 
studying. The Talmud, the later interpretations and commentaries on the Torah 
however, do testify to many a discussion on the matter. The biblical command 
on Torah education states ‘And teach them livneikhem’ (Dueteronomy 11:19), 
which according to the more liberal perspectives in the secondary literature is 
generally translated into ‘children’, but as livneikhem is masculine, it was 
referred to as ‘your sons’ in the rabbinic interpretation. (Joseph 1995: 61; 
Greenberg 1988: 75). The Talmud furthermore states that only those who are 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
 
385
commanded to teach Torah - men - may study Torah, which seems to rule out 
any possibility for such education or even self-education for daughters.    
On the other hand, there are some examples of famous learned women 
in Jewish history, such as the great female scholar named Beruriah, who is 
supposed to have lived in the second century C.E. Beruriah was educated by her 
father, a learned rabbi himself in the Oral and Written Torah. Her views on 
religious, scholarly, and secular matters were highly respected and decisions in 
law were made in accordance with her opinion, including her own husband, the 
famous Rabbi Meir (Gordis 1990: 165; Kaufman 1995: 69). Depending on the 
opinion on women’s education of the rabbi in question however, this story has 
been reinterpreted as both a positive precedent, yet also in terms of misogynist 
warnings. Rather than acclaiming her faith, wisdom and success within men’s 
domain, following an incident of Beruriah mocking the general rabbinical 
attitude towards women, her husband is said to have put her to test, by 
instructing one of his students to tempt her into adultery. According to this story 
from the eleventh century, Beruriah finally consented and committed suicide 
upon discovering the plot (Goodblatt40 in: Young 1993: 26; Gordis 1990: 165).  
The Sages in the Mishnah offer more contradictory interpretations. Two 
Tannatic Sages are cited on the subject of Torah education for women, both 
expressing a different viewpoint. The first is the well-known statement from 
Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus from the second century, who is said to have 
claimed that teaching the Torah to women is tantamount to teaching them 
‘obscenity’ (Jerusalem Talmud, Sotah 20A) and therefore it must be forbidden 
(Cornille 1994: 31; Gordis 1990: 90; Jackson 1997: 130; Morris 1992: 33). In 
the Mishnah, Rabbi Eliezer’s statement is contradicted by citing Ben Azzai, 
who claims teaching Torah to women is obligatory. According to Kaufman 
(1995: 250) the passage is as follows:     
 
…Ben Azai says: A man is obligated to teach his daughter Torah… R. 
Eliezer says: Whoever teaches his daughter Torah is considered as if he 
teaches her frivolity [tiflut]. (Mishnah, Sotah 3:4) 
 
Simon Greenberg (1988: 74-75) furthermore refers to the rabbinic opinion that 
women’s intellect is viewed as kallah, to be roughly translated with ‘lightly 
esteemed, ‘held of little account’ or ‘treated with contempt’, the rationale for 
not teaching them Torah, as they will ‘misuse what they learn.’ Orenstein 
(1995: 56) explains Rabbi Eliezer’s words – translating ‘tiflut’ with possibilities 
diverse as ‘subtlety’, ‘triviality’ or ‘immorality’ – in terms of the requirements 
of dedication, time and effort being so great for the ‘mastery of Torah’, that 
women, whose primary responsibilities are to the home and family, are not 
‘predisposed’ to such demands. Gordis (1990: 90) finally, makes the important 
point that despite law rarely being decided in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer’s 
viewpoints on many other matters, his particular view on forbidding Torah 
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education for women rather than that of Ben Azai prevailed throughout the 
greater part of diasporic Jewish history. 
In the twelfth century, the authoritative commentaries by Maimonides 
were less severe, not completely prohibiting women from studying, but by 
nonetheless claiming their reward to be smaller, for contrary to men, women 
were not commanded to perform this important mitzvah. Commenting on the 
Sages, Maimonides did make a distinction between the Written and the Oral 
Torah. Contrary to the study of the latter (the Talmud), he who taught his 
daughters the Written Torah did not necessarily encourage her to turn these 
words into mere ‘frivolity’ (Kaufman 1995: 253).  
Maimonides codified what thereafter seems to have become the 
dominant ruling, as was also expressed by a number of his contemporaries. The 
rather awkward issue of keeping women entirely ignorant on what was 
otherwise deemed to be the ‘key to living the rich Jewish way of life’, was 
solved by giving women access to what Kaufman (1995: 250) calls the ‘first 
level for Torah learning’, namely the practical one. The Torah as an 
embodiment of the Divine plan for the actions of mankind, thus had to be 
taught to women insofar as it was related to the performance of mitzvot, and in 
particular those that were specific for the woman as a mother and housewife, 
such as the laws surrounding Sabbath or the Kashrut. The second levels of a 
more ‘theoretical’ or ‘esoteric’ kind, were therefore not deemed necessary for 
the observant Jewish woman who was merely required to perform her own 
‘practical’ duties in a nonetheless halakhically correct way.  
With the introduction of official formal religious education for girls, 
both the method in which the curriculum was transferred became more 
sophisticated and the scope and depth of the knowledge itself obviously 
widened. This sophistication presumably continues to grow, as traditionalist 
Jewish communities have to provide for the intellectual ‘satisfaction’ of ‘their’ 
girls in modern society and must prevent them from ‘leaving the fold’. Whereas 
the position of women in society has changed and girls receive advanced 
secular education, traditionalist communities can only respond by upgrading 
their religious curriculum. The dominant viewpoint by leading Orthodox rabbis 
nowadays has taken a dramatic turn, in that Torah education for girls is held as 
an absolute necessity, far removed from the earlier discourse on the dangers of 
obscenity or mere frivolity. The boundaries between the Written and the Oral 
Law, the latter confined to mere ‘practical matters’, thus excluding the practice 
of ‘lernen’ and the institution of the yeshiva, are nonetheless abided by gender 
lines, also among the women and girls in the traditionalist community I 
interviewed. According to Miriam: 
 
We study the written Bible, we study the Prophets, and some Jewish 
philosophy and from the Oral Law, basically the Ethics of the Fathers, 
and the rest we really don’t study except if in explaining the Torah. The 
commentators bring some of the laws and we do that as well, and then 
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we study practical law. We don’t eat meat and milk together so we have 
to know a lot about that, ‘what happens if some milk spills into the pot’, 
or details of the mitzvot that women have to know, because otherwise 
we don’t know how to do what’s right, just as much as the men… The 
men are learning more about ‘how this decision was arrived at by the 
rabbis’, like you said the logic of the law… 
C: And women more the practical side? 
Right…                      
 
Rachel assured me that the fact that girls did not study Talmud or go to the 
yeshiva did not mean their opportunities for religious study were limited 
nowadays and that this was not really an issue for the women and girls in her 
community:   
 
Oh, but even in the Torah, the Torah you know it’s the five books of 
Bible, the Torah is not just the Bible, you have the Torah, you have the 
Prophets, you have the Proverbs, you have many, many, many, books 
and loads of literature which is attached to the Torah, it’s the halakhic 
laws… And what shall I tell you, it’s Jewish philosophy… If a girl just 
starts studying, if she wants to study all the various trends of Jewish 
thought, which have developed since the last thousand years I mean, she 
can go on for years on end… But besides the Talmud there are many, 
many things to study, we don’t believe that women have to study the 
Talmud, there are many, many other things that she can study besides 
that, so it has nothing to do… And if you would ask me, ‘does a 
woman…?’ Well, in our circles, women they aren’t even… I wouldn’t 
say they are even interested in studying the Talmud, because there is a 
lot of theoretical discussions, which a woman wouldn’t even be 
interested in developing… 
 
According to Tina, study itself was one of the most noticeable markers in the 
differential upbringing of girls and boys and the learning of their later gender 
roles: 
 
A boy who studies at school, religious lessons, and there is a party or an 
excursion, then they will be prone to say no quicker, ‘you stay at 
school’, for them that’s really important. And a girl who doesn’t go for 
once, that’s not the end of the world… So a man must have a very good 
reason not to go and study, or not to go and pray, or… He must be ill or 
something. With a woman… For example we just had a celebration in 
Switzerland, a family celebration, and I let my daughter come over from 
England, where she also studies, and that was allowed , that’s no 
problem. But my son in Israel couldn’t come, not from my husband and 
nor from… Anyway, that wouldn’t be accepted: ‘Oh, you have let him 
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come over from Israel for that party…’ He would have liked to be there, 
but he’s studying and he’s doing something more important and he 
knows it himself, and there is no family celebration for him… Ok, if he 
had been at home, it would be… But because he’s in Israel for that 
period, he stays there, he wouldn’t come over…  
 
The difference starts when boys are sent off to the heder, and young girls have 
more time to play, consistent with the general attitude towards ‘exemption as 
more freedom’ for girls, as explained by Chana: 
 
Heder is school that is especially for boys, that applies to uh, two hours 
of secular studying in the whole and the rest is… but the other schools 
have got... The boys are working under great stress, from early in the 
morning till late at night, because they’ve got to have the usual, required 
curriculum of secular studies plus the religious studies which is a lot, its 
very strenuous… 
  
When I asked Chana why boys studied Talmud and girls did not, she answered 
as if my question was rhetorical, thus expressing the self-evidence in this 
gender-differentiated upbringing focussed on roles: 
 
But there’s… Look boys, as you said at the beginning have got this uh… 
They end up, they have a certain obligation to learn Talmud so they 
have to learn it when they are younger, because if they are not going to 
learn it when they are younger then they’ll never know it. The girls do 
not have that, the girls are geared up, even if they do get married, let’s 
say most of them get married, and even if they do continue with a 
career, but they focus on the home, you understand, so they do not 
focus… And they don’t have to learn any Talmud, so why should they 
learn the Talmud? 
 
Although the women I interviewed from the Machsike Hadass and their 
daughters and granddaughters received even more of an advanced religious 
education, the halakhic ruling that they are exempt remains in place. None of 
them even consider studying Talmud, although the dominant Orthodox view is 
that this in itself is not prohibited. In the ‘modern’ Orthodox view, Talmud 
study is then optional. Kaufman (1995: 253) for example takes the ‘brilliant 
female scholar Beruriah’ as an example that ‘if a woman is capable and 
motivated, the prohibition against Torah study might not apply.’ The ‘might’ 
naturally gives away his and the dominant viewpoint on the matter, and a 
certain insolubility is also expressed by Orenstein (1995: 61). Orenstein first 
states that in the contemporary world, it is ‘permissible – and perhaps even 
obligatory – to teach women Torah, the Written as well as the Oral Law, in 
those areas of Halakhah that are relevant to them’. However, he continues and 
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concludes his chapter on the subject by mentioning what the ‘revered rabbinic 
decisor of our time, the late Rabbi Dr. Joseph B. Soloveitchik’ once remarked, 
that the above would ‘include most of the Talmud’.           
Feminist critiques of Judaism as a patriarchal religion often focus on the 
issue of women and Torah study, their exclusion being a barrier to the most 
fundamental method for the transmission of religious insights (Adler 1995 
[1983/1973]: 15). The historical exclusion of women from the process of 
halakhic interpretation and rulings that have determined their religious roles and 
their rights, parallels the contemporary vicious circle in which their exemption 
from Torah study as a religious form of practice, is directly linked to the 
religious institutional sphere and ultimate authority over the religious 
community. Modern Orthodox Blu Greenberg (1998 (1996): 47-48) confronts 
this fundamental dilemma head on: 
 
If the study of Torah and Mishnah is not forbidden to women, why does 
Talmud remain off limits? And if certain study is permitted to women, 
why is it not encouraged? The answer is clear: because direct access to 
learning is the key to religious leadership in the traditional Jewish 
community. Without it, there is no way a woman can qualify as a 
scholar, a halakhic decision maker, or a rabbi. With equal access, 
women will begin to raise disturbing questions. A woman with a sense 
of her innate potential will begin to ask, ‘Why shouldn’t I, too, strive to 
be learned?’ A woman the match in learning of any rabbinical student 
will sooner or later ask, ‘Why can’t I, too, be ordained?’ Ultimately, a 
new generation of parents who place high value on Torah study will ask, 
‘Why not expect the same from our daughters as from our sons?’  
 
The number of Modern Orthodox Jewish women becoming Talmudic scholars 
is in fact slowly progressing, and a number of communities have established 
facilities for advanced Jewish studies for women, such as the Stern College of 
Yeshiva University and the Drisha Institute in New York (Gordis 1990: 166). 
As with the recent tefillah groups and initiatives such as the celebration of bat 
mitzvah, however, these changes are highly contested and as Greenberg states, 
it is not yet sure what the outcome of these initiatives will be and where they 
may ultimately lead. Susan stated what is the dominant viewpoint on women’s 
education in traditionalist communities such as the Machsike Hadass, what the 
writer Gordis (1990: 166) refers to as the commitment to ‘a perception of 
Jewish law and practice as immutable’: 
 
Women don’t learn the Oral Torah, in our Orthodox community, except 
for certain parts, like ethics, we have these little green books, Ethics of 
the Fathers and then all these things are things which I can look into as 
well as my husband, because I read Hebrew very well and I do study 
them, but I don’t study the Oral Law, the Gemara, that’s something 
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else… No other parts in our community do. In America there are more 
feminist Orthodox movements, which consider themselves Orthodox, I 
wouldn’t say that they are Orthodox, where the women say, ‘Well now 
since we are already learning, we want to learn as much as the men’, and 
they do, but we don’t accept that, in our particular community. 
 
The fact that women’s religious curriculum would be more limited in scope to 
that of boys, was countered by some of my informants emphasising girls 
learned different things, for example their knowledge and philosophy was 
‘different’ or even went ‘deeper’ than that of the boys. According to Leonie, 
who applied her ‘inside–outside gender ideology’ to the object of study – men 
study the tradition, the outside, opposed to women who study the Bible, the 
‘core’: 
 
Women go more into the depth, that’s what women do, so much deeper, 
deeper, deeper, deeper, and deeper, that’s what women do and men 
don’t. We might say that’s more favourable, but it’s not favourable at 
all, it sounds nice, but it isn’t. It’s deeper in everything, many more 
meanings at many levels, that’s really feminine. For example, speeches. 
Men who speak in front of women must really have it together, they 
must have a well developed feminine side. As a psychologist I talk 
about this, and that’s really what the men learn, what men have to do, 
Torah study, the woman must give the man the opportunity for that, she 
doesn’t have to, because she is it already, she is the outside already, so 
men have to develop the outside, those oral traditions… 
 
Rachel also claimed women’s interest in the Torah was different to that of men:  
 
Yes, we believe that man by his nature is much more attracted by this 
you know, this logical side of learning, and lets say women who are 
more intuitive, you know, who have more feeling, they are more 
interested in general knowledge and philosophy, and other parts of the 
Torah... 
 
In her ethnographical study of Haredi women from the Gur community in Bene 
Barak in Jerusalem, Tamar El-Or (1994) argues the educational system for 
women is wholly geared towards keeping these traditionalist Jewish women 
‘ignorant’, in order to maintain the status quo and keep men in charge of the 
reproduction of religious tradition. Consistent with the rabbinic opinions and 
some of my informants’ views, and El-Or’s observations in some study groups 
for women on subjects such as law, the Book of Psalms, etc., the women at 
Bene Barak are educated into attaining ‘practical’ knowledge, directed towards 
action rather than thought on how to behave and perform as the ideal wife and 
mother. Men who belong to the ‘learning society’ on the other hand, and study 
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the Gemara, represent ‘the source of literate and social power in the haredi 
world’ (201). El-Or uses Samuel Heilman’s sociological description of a 
Gemara class for men, in order illustrate the fundamental differences between 
men’s lernen and women’s formal religious education41. A group discussion 
follows interpretation, which in it self is described as the sociological event of 
interest (108): 
 
During the discussion, the knowledge of the participants comes into 
play, as does their familiarity with the material being studied, their 
worldview, and their understanding of their Jewishness. The social 
reality is clarified during their discussion; doubts are expressed, and 
refined. The study room invokes a far-off historical reality that is 
connected with the reality of today. There are differences among the 
participants, the same differences raised thousands of years before in 
other places. In these classes, contradictions are resolved, as they have 
been resolved millions of other times. This social repetition of 
fundamental personal differences is the heart of the study process. It is 
the lernen .   
 
El-Or furthermore cites sociologists like Heilman who have argued that lernen 
is a phenomenon that should be understood as ‘making Judaism’. Whilst 
‘learning’ can be understood as a process of study to attain a certain piece of 
knowledge, ‘lernen’ is study for the sake of study, and concerns a reproduction 
of culture (132-133). Through discussion, social reality is constructed and 
culture is reproduced. The act of study for men does not need to be justified; it 
is ‘the pinnacle of Jewish existence’ (109). 
Not so for women. In the classes El-Or was participant observer, no real 
discussions took place: ‘The high point of the lesson is not the social reality, 
reconfirmed by group discussions. Instead, it is the interpretation, preaching 
and ex cathedra reproof of the teacher that confirm the social reality’ (109). The 
curriculum for women and the way in which they are taught, does nothing more 
than ‘culturally describe and reproduce’ their gender status and the social 
reality in which they perform their accompanying role. The paradox according 
to El-Or is that contemporary Haredi women are thus educated, through 
literacy, in such a way as to culturally resemble a non-literate group, the 
‘duplication of the Jewish mother’s home in Poland’ (89). What was once 
learned at home and passed on informally by their mothers, became 
institutionalised education some eighty years ago due to the socio - and political 
transformations in surrounding modernising society, and remains all the more 
necessary in facing the challenges of the contemporary world. 
Alyse Fisher Roller (1999)42, critiques El-Or’s interpretation of these 
Haredi women being ‘educated in ignorance’. Roller claims that one of the 
reasons El-Or, - despite her careful observations - has drawn the wrong 
conclusions, has to do with her failure to understand Torah study from the 
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‘native point of view’. Firstly, according to Roller’s interpretation of El-Or’s 
observations, contemporary strictly Orthodox Jewish women are faced with the 
dilemma of excusing themselves from their primary mitzvah, which is their 
mothering and housekeeping activity, in order to perform the act of Torah study 
that for them is merely secondary. The women feel relieved that they then study 
Torah that is concrete and applicable to their daily lives, which partly justifies 
their momentary absence from the home. Roller (1999: 47) notes that the 
difference between ‘Torah study [as] a means for understanding how to act 
according to the Torah’s commandments, and a goal in itself because it is a 
Torah commandment’ is crucial here. El-Or would then be misinterpreting that 
strictly Orthodox women study in order to understand that they should not study 
– that they are educated to become ignorant -, but rather ‘that they should study 
in order to understand that the deed, the action, in Judaism is always primary’. 
At this point it seems that Roller’s critique is merely focussed on El-Or’s 
framing of the mothering role as one of plain ignorance. Roller appears to be 
underlining the meaning of all mitzvot for both  men and women as forms of 
religious practice, a point that El-Or perhaps fails to emphasise. 
Roller continues with what she sees as a profound misinterpretation in 
El-Or’s observation that the women in a particular study session (reviewing the 
laws of the Sabbath) seemed to approach a theoretical argument from a 
practical standpoint, an indication that they may lack the ability to think in 
abstract terms. Roller claims that here El-Or from her academic background, 
does not see that in fact ‘Judaism deconstructs the dichotomous tension 
between the abstract and the concrete, between the theoretical and the 
practical’, which are both ‘different shades of the same unified reality, which is 
informed by Torah/truth, a reality than then informs human constructions of 
knowledge and action’ (49). Roller then refers to a later article by El-Or (1997), 
in which El-Or reports on the reactions of an audience of other strictly 
Orthodox Jewish women to her description of a debate that took place in one of 
the women’s study sections, as described in her former ethnography. Here 
Roller sees El-Or’s interpretation as closer to what would be the correct 
understanding of Torah study from strictly Orthodox Jewish women’s 
standpoint or the native point of view, when El-Or admits for instance that the 
women’s ‘discussion that ensued in that example presents the halakhic way of 
thinking as a manipulation, as a juggling of “truth”’. However, according to 
Roller, El-Or then makes the mistake of applying a Foucauldian-informed 
gender studies perspective, by asserting that the women in the study group were 
critically reading, and resisting ‘male defined constructs’, as part of the 
movement to ‘negotiate men’s literacy.’  
Roller on the other hand, claims that the critical or resistant tone that 
was displayed could not be explained by an analogy to feminist literary 
resistance, but rather by an analogy to the male Jewish learning that surrounds 
the women through the men and boys in their lives (50): ‘The whole thrust of 
Jewish knowledge constructions is based on resistance. This is what fills the 
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Talmud.’ In Roller’s viewpoint these women were merely reproducing the type 
of resistant reading they experienced in their environment through their fathers, 
husbands, sons and teachers, they were simply ‘learning like Jewish men.’           
In my own interviews, obviously I could not go so far as to compare El-
Or’s observations and findings with the educational system for girls and women 
or informal women’s study groups among members of the Machsike Hadass. 
Nor could I really find out more about the way in which girls and women of the 
Machsike Hadass actually learned, whether the educational system was entirely 
focussed towards the reproduction of their (future) role as mother and wife (El-
Or), or whether the styles of learning themselves differed or were similar to 
those of men. Whatever the answer to that question might be, I believe that 
Roller’s critique of El-Or’s interpretation is to a great extent directed at the way 
the latter’s feminist perspective and theoretical framework ‘prevents’ her from 
acknowledging the native viewpoint. Roller is critical of the way that El-Or 
cannot grasp the standpoint of the ‘other’ woman in terms of cultural 
difference’, a problematic issue in feminist anthropology as discussed in 
chapters three and four.   
 What I could learn from my interviews was that the religious education 
that is given to girls in the Machsike Hadass community, does appear to be 
sophisticated, even though it may not cover the content or the learning styles 
open to boys and men. Firstly, the women I interviewed gave the impression 
that the education that they received when they were younger could not even 
compare with the sophistication of that for their daughters and granddaughters 
nowadays. Leonie for example, went to school in the period just after the war:  
 
I was born in thirty-seven, and when I went to school there were very 
few Jewish children. You didn’t have Jewish schools like now, which is 
very handy, those Jewish schools, I mean for integration it isn’t so 
appropriate… But integrating into the world perhaps isn’t so right, 
maybe it was appropriate in those days… So I always went to non-
Jewish schools and after that I had Jewish classes, which wasn’t so nice, 
because everyone went to ballet, tennis… I did as well, but less, because 
I had to go to Jewish classes. But in my youth… My daughters went to 
England, to the seminary, to Jewish teachers training college. I went 
there for a few days, to see what is was like there, and that is definitely a 
level higher you must know… 
 
A few of my informants alluded to the fact that due to the high level of religious 
education, girls nowadays even knew more than boys, certainly in secular 
subjects, but sometimes even in the domain of religious law. In my interviews, 
possibly a different kind of paradox in the contemporary community surfaced, 
one in which girls knew more than boys, although it was not possible to find out 
how much of an issue this potential threat to gender ideology was. When I 
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asked Miriam what she thought about the fact that girls nowadays study all 
kinds of things, in contrast to the old days, she answered positively: 
 
Personally I find this very positive. Some parents I know are not very 
pleased because they find their daughters are perhaps too intellectually 
occupied, that they should be at home, they should be calmer… More 
important are the boundaries, that there are priorities, the home and the 
children, that is the real goal, work is only a side goal… 
 
Esther (Satmar) could be viewed as one of these parents expressing the paradox 
girl’s education offered: 
 
Girls learn too much nowadays I think. There’s a difference because 
girls don’t have to study contrary to men. This isn’t a law for girls. The 
problem is if you have to do something you don’t want to do it. So a lot 
of girls study with much zeal and some know more than the boys. The 
boys have to study Talmud and sometimes the girl knows more in detail 
on for example Sabbath transgressions. When she knows more she may 
start to feel superior and this may give conflicts. Even though the 
woman is superior, the man is king of the house, if you have a king for a 
husband and if you treat him this way, then you are a queen, if she 
knows too much however… You and I know that she sometimes knows 
more, but the thing is not to show it, if you know what I mean…This is a 
good recipe in life, because no man likes to have a wife who’s cleverer.  
 
Interesting in Esther’s claims, is that on the one hand she appeared to reproduce 
what seems to be the hegemonic viewpoint in a strictly traditionalist 
community, accompanied by personal observations on what perhaps were 
actual conflict situations growing from the paradox of girls’ religious education. 
However, this was immediately rectified with a counter-discourse shared with 
me on the basis of gender. Esther had pleasure in confiding to me the ‘truth’ 
that women did sometimes know more or were cleverer than men, yet the trick 
was to let them continue believe in their own superiority. I believe Esther’s 
statement here was one of the rare moments where some kind of ‘resistance’ 
towards male supremacy was discursively expressed and shared with me. 
Rachel (Litvish) then again, was more positive on the education girls 
nowadays receive and told me what she experienced as a paradox because girls 
‘knew more’ than boys, but then in the area of secular education. This she used 
in order to make clear what she saw as the ‘superiority’ of girls above boys, at 
least as far as their broader Jewish and secular education was concerned:       
 
But we do study, it’s not an obligation, but we study, and I would say 
today we’re growing up in a society where the girls are studying very 
much, much more I would say than thirty, forty years ago, and when 
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girls now… Let’s say girls from our community, they want to marry, 
we’re coming to a certain paradox where the girls know more than the... 
Even though boys are sitting in the yeshiva, and they are studying the 
whole day, girls are brought up with the secular education, but I would 
say with a very broad Jewish education, and I wouldn’t say the girls are 
not at all in an inferior position, on the contrary… I would say that they 
are more mature, in certain things, even much more developed than the 
boys, because the boys have been closed into their yeshiva circle. My 
daughter as an example, she studied to the age of eighteen, we sent her 
off to Israel for one year, it was a very intensive course in Jewish 
education in Jerusalem, she came back here and she’s been teaching 
here for three years, so she knows an enormous lot. She’s been working, 
she’s very mature, so I would say on the contrary, I wouldn’t see her… I 
see her as superior to the boys…  
 
Rachel considered girls more mature, more of the world than young men: 
 
Girls seem more mature because they are more… Many of them tend to 
work and to assume responsibilities whilst the boys are staying more in 
the yeshiva and studying the whole day, so auto matically a girl who is 
confronted with problems and, I’ll give you an example, my daughter 
has a class of thirty girls and they are… That’s thirty different worlds, 
and each child has his own problems and you confront the problems and 
you have to know how to overcome them, have good communication, 
you have difficult children, how do you cope with them… This 
automatically brings on maturity…  
C: would you say more social skills? 
Social skills, I would say more maturity mainly because they are more 
responsib le and she’s earning and automatically you look at things 
differently, when you are secluded, you know, from the difficulties of 
life and you know who’s just sitting studying, he doesn’t have many 
difficulties, I mean he’s studying and he concentrates on... I don’t say, 
it’s not an easy thing, but he has to concentrate mainly on his world of 
study whilst the girls are confronted more with daily problems of life.  
 
Hasidic rebbetsin Hannah then again was more critical over education for girls, 
when I asked her opinions on the changes that had taken place: 
 
There’s no question that this has changed, but are they better girls than 
their parents and grandparents? My grandmother didn’t study, but she 
was very wise. She learned herself a lot, she read a lot and she knew a 
lot like stories and common sense. She passed on her knowledge orally. 
Mind you there has never been much illiteracy amongst Jewish women. 
Women learned their prayers by heart. My mother did learn to read, but 
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not at school. But the development cannot be turned back, nowadays 
you must give girls an education. The world has become so open, she 
has to have some immunity, she has to know the right approach to a 
problem. For example she must know about going to the moon, and 
learn this from secular subjects, and about the media, although we try to 
keep this at a distance. I think slowly but surely people have started 
seeing what damage the media has done in general, especially in the 
U.S. It is a shame because TV could have been very educational. 
C: Like internet? 
Yes, it could be educational, but there is much damage.  
 
I also asked Hannah whether she thought sometimes problems did arise 
between young women and their husbands because girls had enjoyed more 
secular education and other skills. Hannah assured me this was not a dominant 
pattern:   
 
If a girl has the right approach this shouldn’t be a problem. You must 
know that girls don’t even learn a fraction of what the boys learn. A 
grandchild of mine who is thirteen-and-a-half, and goes to yeshiva, he is 
studying from six-fifteen in the morning until ten-fifteen at night, with 
three breaks in between. This is a very, very deep kind of learning, 
which the girls do not do. Maybe they are not the same subjects, but if a 
girl understands she will not feel superior, it is only a slight part of what 
the boys learn. If she is over self-confident she might feel superior, but it 
is far from it. I admit that there are sometimes are problems, but there 
shouldn’t be, it’s not justified.  
 
 
 
                                              
1 Kaufman does not include any references here. 
2 See chapter three for this type of methodological critique of androcentric scholarship.  
3 For ‘postmodern’ feminist critiques of Gilligan, see chapter four under 4. Beyond the God-Trick: 
Postmodern Feminist Anthropology and the non-Religious Viewpoint: From the ‘View from Nowhere’ 
to ‘Views from Somewhere’: Feminism Critically Appropriates Postmodernism. 
4 ‘Hear O Israel,’ a central prayer of Judaism, consisting of three biblical paragraphs. It is considered 
the basic statement of faith, accepting the sovereignty of God (Glossary in Grossman and Haut 1992).     
5 The horn of an animal, usually a ram, sounded on Rosh Hashanah (the Jewish New Year) (Glossary 
in Kaufman 1995 [1993]). 
6 See chapter three. 
7 Binah can be translated as ‘understanding, discernment, insight or perception’ according to Kaufman 
(Glossary 1995 [1993]).   
8 Literally, ‘received’, or ‘received lore’. The term is used for the esoteric teachings and mystical lore 
of Jewish tradition (Glossary in Kaufman 1995). 
9 Some of the writers who have contributed articles to the Chabad website, like Rivkah Slonim, who 
has written extensively on the mikvah (ritual bath), are read extensively by many Hasidic groups 
beyond the Lubavitcher Hasidim. 
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10 In my article using Pinxten and Verstraete’s (2002) model of identity, I argue that for the ba’alot 
teshuvah in Kaufman and Davidman’s studies, individual gender identity is paramount and imbued 
with cultural and religious meanings. For the strictly Orthodox Jewish women in my own case study 
however, I argue that ethnic/religious identification appears to be more relevant than gender (see also 
chapter eight), and is more a question of roles and practice, determined by the dimension of sociality in 
Pinxten and Verstraete’s model (Longman 2002).   
11 See chapter eight for more on my own interviewees’ perception of feminism. 
12 According to Fackenheim (1999: 130) the inclusion of belief as among the commandments by 
Maimonides can be attributed to the fact that he was ‘probably provoked by medieval controversies, 
with Christianity, Islam or both.’  
13 ‘I am the Lord your God who brought you from out of the land of Egypt, the house of bondage’, 
according to Gordis (1990: 60) deals with the fundamentals of faith: that there is only one God to be 
worshipped and obeyed, the liberator from bondage and oppression, thus to be identified with justice 
and freedom: ‘The First Commandment enjoins loyalty to one God, who is identified in the cause of 
justice and, by implication at least holds universal sway.’   
14 The Mishnah was edited by Rabbi Jehuda ha-Nassi (135-217) in Israel. Two different Gemaras 
developed following the diverse schools in and outside of Israel. The Mishnah together with the 
Jerusalem Gemara was completed in Tiberias around 380 and is called the Jerusalem Talmud (JT) 
(written in Hebrew and Eastern-Aramaic). The second Talmud, the Babylonian Talmud (BT) is more 
extensive, consisting of the Mishnah and the Babylonian Gemara and was completed around 500 
(written in West-Aramaic) (Klener 1992: 16-17). The Oral Law included the Tosefta, which is largely 
legal in nature, and the Midrash, a vast literature, primarily Aggadic in content (Gordis 1990: 62).   
15 The word ‘Torah’ is related to the verb to ‘teach’, and phonetically linked to the  
Hebrew verb to ‘see’ and to ‘show’. Torah thus refers to notions such as ‘revelation’, ‘education’ and 
‘teachings.’ ‘Torah’ was translated into Greek as ‘nomos’, which later became to be affiliated with a 
more legalistic meaning, far removed from its original meaning (Zuidema 1988: 26; Goldberg 1994: 
107).   
16 ‘Honour your father and your mother’; ‘You shall not murder’; ‘You shall not commit adultery’; 
‘You shall not steal’; ‘You shall not bear false witness’; ‘You shall not covet your neighbour’s 
house…your neighbour’s wife, his male or female slave, his ox or ass or anything that is your 
neighbours.’  
17 This interpretation obviously has its roots in Paul’s message of freedom from the Law as central to 
the development of early Christianity.  
18 According to the Sages, the Torah begins with an act of hesed, loving-kindness, by providing 
clothing for Adam and Eve in Genesis, and closes with an act of hesed with God’s burial of Moses in 
Deuteronomy (Kaufman 1995 [1993]: 10). 
19 Rachmanut (compassion) originates from the word ‘rechem’ (spelled resh chet mem ) meaning 
‘womb’ (from: http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Oracle/4581/heblang.html). 
20 The biblical wave-offering (Glossary Kaufman 1995). According to Michael Kaufman (1995: 228), 
the counting of the Omer during the seven weeks between the second evening of Passover and Shavuot 
is a duty incumbent on Jewish men, but one from which women are excused as it is a time-dependent 
positive commandment in Maimonides’ view. Nahmanides however, disagrees, maintaining it is a 
precept that is not time-dependent and is thus equally obligatory for women. For disagreements on 
other precepts, see further.  
21 Palm, one of the ‘Four Species’ held during part of the morning services during the Sukkot festival 
(Glossary Kaufman 1995). 
22 It should therefore come to no surprise that in contemporary liberal feminist critiques of Judaism, the 
rule of exemption and women’s exclusion from these paradigmatic ritual practices, is often taken to be 
one of the root causes of women’s inferiority in Judaism, see chapter five. 
23 Haut (1992: 91) distinguishes between tefillah – the Hebrew word for ‘prayer’ – in a broad sense 
connoting prayer in its general meaning, and secondly in its narrow sense as used in referral to the 
paradigmatic prayer called the Shemoneh Esreh, or eighteen benedictions.  
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24 Lit. ‘doorpost’. The small parchment scroll enclosed in a case attached to doorposts of Jewish 
homes. On the scroll are written verses from the Bible which set forth the commandment (Glossary in 
Heschel 1995).   
25 The Sabbath and festival ‘sanctification’ ritual, usually conducted over wine (Glossary in Kaufman 
1995). 
26 See chapter eight for more on the ‘woman’s mitzvah’ of ritual purification in the mikvah. 
27 Also spelled Minha, Mincha, or Minchah, Hebrew Minha  (‘offering’), in Judaism, the second of 
three periods of daily prayer. Minhah prayers are offered in the afternoon; to facilitate attendance at the 
synagogue, the afternoon service is often scheduled so that the evening prayers (maarib; Hebrew: 
ma‘ariv) can follow as soon as night has fallen. The morning period of daily prayer is known as 
shaharith (Hebrew: shaharit) (Encyclopaedia Britannica, www.britannica.com).  
28 Greenberg (1998: 93) notes the three Hebrew terms used to refer to ‘synagogue’, bet midrash (house 
of study); bet tefilah (house of prayer) and bet knesset (house of gathering), the latter showing the 
importance of the synagogue as a place of both religious practice and the central orientation point of 
the Orthodox community.   
29 See also chapter five under 1. Jewish Feminists and Feminist Jewish Studies: Sameness or 
Difference: Across Denominational Divides. In the early seventies in the U.S. Jewish women wanting 
to expand their possibilities for female religious ritual participation reclaimed the ‘lost women’s 
holiday’ of Rosh Hodesh, the new moon holiday in the liturgical cycle of religious of Jewish holidays. 
Jewish women’s groups were founded, some study groups and others prayer groups, meeting on the 
new moon, monthly on the Sabbath or on a weekday night. According to Joseph (1995: 51) some of 
these groups are explicitly feminist, focussing on new patters of ritual, others copy male forms of study 
or prayer. Initially, the first prayer groups consisted of halakhic observant Orthodox women who felt 
the most excluded and in need of separate forms of ritual practices (such as the Women’s Tefillah 
Network). Even Reform, Reconstructionist and Conservative congregations and even secular Jewish 
women in the U.S. who do have access to all formally male defined and controlled rituals are often 
involved in women-only prayer groups. Rosh Hodesh groups for women were introduced to the U.K. 
from the U.S. since the late eighties and according to Shalvi (1995: 234-235) have grown and in 1992 
many of these groups held a Shabbaton, ‘with full prayer and Torah reading, expertly conducted by the 
women, who omitted those “sacred sayings” (devarim she’be’kedusha) for which a minyan (prayer 
quorum) is required.’ In the U.K where the religious Jewish community and institutional framework is 
less pluralistic than the U.S., in 1993 a traditional Rosh Hodesh group joined with the Reform 
Movement women’s group to establish a Jewish Women’s Network.   
30 A portion from the Books of Prophets (Joshua through Malakhai, according to the canon of Hebrew 
Scripture) chanted during Sabbath and holiday services after the Torah reading (Glossary Grossman 
and Haut 1992). 
31 See chapter eight for more on the rules of modesty. 
32 Another parameter which must be taken into account is the fact that most of my respondents did not 
have children at home anymore and therefore were at a stage in life in which they had more free time 
from household duties in order to – theoretically - participate more in time-bound mitzvot. 
33 Jacob Neusner, ‘Introduction’, in: J. Neusner (ed.), Understanding Rabbinic Judaism: From 
Talmudic to Modern Times, New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1974, p. 9, 19. 
34 According to Fackenheim (1999: 158) the question of which is more important, the study of Torah 
or the ‘doing’ of Torah, deeds, is much debated in rabbinic texts and ‘answered in characteristic 
rabbinic fashion: It is the study of Torah that is greater – but only because it leads to the doing of it!’     
35 Like Jacob Neusner above, Zuidema also takes the normative Jew to be as male. 
36 Brayer, Menachem M., The Jewish Woman in Rabbinic Literature: A Psychohistorical Perspective, 
Hoboken, NJ: Ktav, 1986: 2: 172.  
37 The gendered consequences of secularisation and modernisation were therefore notably different in 
Eastern Europe compared to the West, where the influence of the ‘middle-class cult of domesticity’ 
was far-reaching in the emergence of a kind of religious domesticity in the private sphere of the home 
and ‘embodied’ by many Jewish women in the West (see chapter two and Hyman 1995).  
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38 Although women may not hold official public roles or positions within traditional Judaism, only 
they, by virtue of their sex and child bearing capacity, can ensure the continuation of physical Jewish 
identity. Despite the overtly male-dominated character of Judaism, according to halakhah, besides the 
somewhat rare practice of conversion, it is only the mother and not the father, who determines her 
child is a Jew.  
39 In: Likute Halakhot , Sotah 20a, p.11a. 
40 Goodblatt, David (1977). ‘The Beruriah Traditions’, in: William Scott Green (ed.), Persons and 
Institutions in Early Rabbinic Judaism , Missoula MT: Scholars Press, p. 221.  
41 El-Or refers to the following studies by Heilman, S.C. (1976), Synagogue Life, Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, Heilman (1983), The People of the Book , Chicago: Chicago University Press and 
Heilman (1984), The Gate Behind the Wall, New York: Summit Books. 
42 Alyse Fisher Roller’s study The Literary Imagination of Ultra-Orthodox Jewish Women: An 
Assessment of a Writing Community (1999), is not discussed in chapter five among the ethnographic 
studies of strictly Orthodox Jewish women as it concerns a literary analysis. However, Roller’s 
approach in terms of a feminist analysis is utmost interesting in that she is highly critical of studies that 
portray strictly Orthodox Jewish women as subordinated or as in this example ‘ignorant’. Through an 
analysis of different types of literature by strictly Orthodox Jewish women including personal 
narratives, anthologies, holocaust testimonials, self-help literature and fiction, Roller argues that this 
literature allows for an insight into their lives ‘from the native point of view’. Roller (1999: 4-6) 
defends the theses that opposed to portraying these women as ‘other’, their literature ‘provides a valid, 
untapped primary source for hearing them talk in their own voices’. Secondly, Fisher argues that their 
literature is ‘reactionary’ in that it offers a response to liberal feminist and Jewish feminist ideals while 
‘nominally denouncing feminism’. Thirdly, Fisher notes a difference between the literature by the 
ba’alot teshuvah and frum-born women. Where’s the former is aligned with ‘post-modern, feminist, 
self-reflecting narrative styles, the latter aligns with traditional, masculine, universalising narrative 
styles’.      
CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE DIFFERENTIATED SUBJECT IN CONTEXT: 
BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC IN THE POLITICS OF 
RELIGIOUS IDENTITY 
 
 
 
In this second chapter on the discursive construction of ‘religion’ by strictly 
Orthodox Jewish women affiliated with the Machsike Hadass congregation in 
Antwerp, I will predominantly be illustrating my second main argument in 
accounting for the androcentrism of mainstream religious studies. The 
preceding chapter mostly dealt with the consequences of limiting one’s focus to 
religious ‘scriptures and elites’, first by the characterisation of strictly Orthodox 
Jewish religious tradition as one of first and foremost religious practice. The 
gendered regulation of this practice, embodied in the mitzvot as determined by 
Jewish law (halakhah), formally bars women from the paradigmatic central 
public religious institutional sphere through the principle of exemption, which 
in practice has often led to a situation of effective exclusion. Two paradigmatic 
forms of male religious practice, liturgy – prayer – and Torah study then 
illustrated this empirically, and were both placed in their concrete historical 
socio-political contexts.  
Here, the second main hypothesis on the study of religion and gender 
will similarly be illustrated by empirical material and relevant secondary 
literature. In an attempt to disclaim sui generis religion as a decontextualised 
phenomenon, in what follows, I will be focussing on precisely the social and 
the political content, and ‘power’ in a broad meaning as integral to religion as 
studied from the perspective of gender. This implies a shift in the object of 
study from ‘scriptures and elites’, by looking at those areas which are often 
absent, peripheral or even considered irrelevant in the mainstream, ungendered 
representation of religious traditions such as strictly Orthodox Judaism. Rather 
than looking at the kinds of religious activity the women I interviewed were 
excluded from, I will be analysing some of the instances of what my 
interviewees claimed were the most important religious forms of activity for the 
(married) women in their community and tradition. This involves both their 
‘official’ religious role, as well as the realms which are more difficult to strictly 
identify as religious, thus deconstructing boundaries between ‘religion and 
politics’, the ‘public and the private’ and the religious from ‘everyday life’ all-
together. A selection is made, concentrating on three important topics, 
including the notion of woman as ‘enabler’, the family purity laws, and the 
ethic of tzniut or ‘modesty’. Towards the end of the chapter, I will be moving 
from the ethnographic level of a particular locality to an analytical and 
comparative level concerning the relationship between gender and religious 
traditionalism, or fundamentalism, in a global context. This discussion will be 
partly continued in the general conclusion.  
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1. ‘Behind Every Great Man…’ The Priestess of the Miniature Temple 
 
 
The Jewish woman is the soul and inspiration of the 
Jewish home. Through building this home she 
achieves her ultimate Jewish self-definition, and the 
stamp she leaves on the home expresses her own 
uniqueness and individuality. 
Moshe Meiselman (1978: 18)   
 
 
In feminist critiques of Judaism as a patriarchal religion, the issue of 
‘exemption as exclusion’ from religious activity has also been critiqued for one 
possible interpretation, in that women would remain observant through their 
husbands’ performance of mitzvot for them , which is most evident in the 
institution of marriage. Women are discussed most extensively in the context of 
marriage in the Torah, conceived of as a religious act and regulated according 
to halakhah. Within marriage, the wife can maintain her mitzvot through her 
husband, by complying with her primary role as a wife and mother (Cornille 
1994: 23). In some of the most androcentric interpretations of the rule of 
exemption, women are exempt in order to be available to the needs of their 
husbands, to whom they must be wholly devoted and subservient. Sue Jackson 
(1997: 131) cites an explanation by a fourteenth century commentator from 
Spain: 
 
The reason women are exempt from time-bound mitzvot is that a 
woman is bound to her husband to fulfill his needs. Were she obligated 
in time-bound positive mitzvot, it would happen that while she is 
performing a mitzvah, her husband would order her to do his 
commandment. If she would perform the commandment of the Creator 
and leave aside his commandment, woe to her from the husband! If she 
does her husband’s commandment and leave aside the Creator’s, woe to 
her from the Maker! Therefore, the Creator has exempted her from his 
commandments, so that she may have peace with her husband (David 
ben Joseph Abudurham). 
 
Again the male Jew appears as the normative religious subject, the woman as an 
‘other’, her role being limited to what Susannah Heschel (1995 [1983]: 4) calls 
a mere ‘facilitator’ for husbands and sons. Women’s physical labour in the 
domestic domain allows men to concentrate on more ‘spiritual’ activities, such 
as prayer, ritual and study. Opposed to these feminist critiques of religious 
gender ideologies that place women in a position of exclusion and 
subordination in the religious sphere, is the normative traditionalist Orthodox 
Jewish view of different gender roles. As I have shown, this sees men and 
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women in terms of their roles, considered ‘different’, yet of ‘equal religious 
worth’. This view was shared by the strictly Orthodox Jewish women I 
interviewed, in that woman’s role as a mother and housewife in the domestic 
sphere is not seen as exterior to religious activity, but as a mitzvah in itself. As 
Susan saw it for example, women were not excluded, yet exempt from certain 
of men’s mitzvot, in order to perform their own mitzvot, those connected to 
their domestic and mothering role:    
     
Take the analogy of an army, everybody in the army has his own job: 
‘For want of a nail the horse was lost’, I don’t know if you know that 
poem, ‘for want of a nail, the shoe fell of the horse…’ So everybody 
does his job, is what counts, and all of us are responsible for everybody 
else, as well as for ourselves. So to say that one is more important than 
the other, is very… is not correct. We may have a feeling which mitzvah 
is more important, which less, but it may absolutely be not true, we are 
taught that we must be just as meticulous in our observing of mitzvot 
which we feel that are more or less important… 
 
Orthodox Jewish feminist Blu Greenberg (1990: 2-3) speaks of a tension in the 
Torah between on the one hand a notion of male and female as ‘biologically 
and sexually distinctive, yet having the same godly attributes and strengths’. A 
second paradigm on the other hand, gives a derivative definition of femaleness. 
The two paradigms are expressed most poignantly in the Creation story, 
presenting two different versions of the construction of gender (Young 1993: 2-
3). The oldest, the second version Genesis 2:4b-3:24 was compiled during a 
more stable period of the kingdom of Israel, approximately around 850 B.C.E., 
and emphasises the creation of human beings. The first version, Genesis 1:1-
2:4a dates from c. 400 B.C.E., after the loss of kingdom and Babylonian exile, 
emphasising creation itself, and the creation of humans only until the sixth day. 
Thus the first (Gen. 1:27) ‘And God created man in His own image, in the 
image of God He created him; male and female He created them’ is mostly 
interpreted as referring to the equality of man and woman, created together and 
equally in the image of God. Adam and Eve are created simultaneously and 
equal, both are given dominion over all other creatures and there is no mention 
of the concepts Eden or the Fall.  
In Gen. 2, however, ‘man’ (Adam) alone was created and placed in the 
Garden of Eden upon which God decides (Gen. 2:18): ‘It is not that the man 
should be alone; I will make him a help meet for him’. God then removes of 
Adam’s ribs and with this, He forms a woman. Adam reacts (Gen. 2: 23): ‘This 
is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called Woman 
(ishah), because she was taken out of Man (ish)’. The episodes that follow have 
often been emphasised as illustrative and constitutive of women’s subordinate 
status to men in society. Eve is seduced by the serpent to eat from the tree of 
knowledge in order to become wise, in turn convincing Adam to eat from the 
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forbidden fruits. Cornille (1994: 22) attributes the idea of how woman is seen as 
the seducer and the root of all evil and sin to this passage. Greenberg (1990: 3) 
by contrast, notes that even within this version of the story itself ‘we witness a 
“dialectic”’ in the definition of women as equal or conversely inferior1:     
 
Is Eve, the mother of all human life, a temptress, progenitor of 
disobedience, and source of human downfall – as a surface reading 
would indicate? Or is she ‘more appealing than her husband… the more 
intelligent one, the more aggressive one… By contrast the man is a 
silent and bland recipient… not a decision-maker… follows his wife 
without question or comment, thereby denying his own individuality’.2    
 
Greenberg (3) similarly asks how ‘the single most romantic verse in the Bible’, 
the one that immediately follows the creation of Eve from Adam’s rib in the 
same version of the creation story (Gen. 2: 24): ‘Therefore shall a man leave his 
father and mother, and cling to his wife, and they shall be as one flesh’, should 
be read. Do questions of gender and hierarchy not merely deflect our attention 
to what could be seen as the real issues, such as ‘intimacy, romance, sexuality, 
procreation and eternal love?’  
God’s punishments for Adam and Eve nonetheless attest to the central 
ideology of both sexual difference and gender role differentiation (Gen. 3:16): 
‘Unto the woman He said: I will greatly multiply thy pain and thy travail; in 
pain thou shalt bring forth children; and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and 
he shall rule over thee’. Again, interpretation is possible in terms of women’s 
subordination to men, yet Greenberg (1990: 4) points to the ‘desire’, or what 
she translates as the ‘hunger’ of the wife towards the husband. This possibly 
alludes to ‘a magnificent contribution of Judaism - the affirmation of women’s 
sexual passions to be accounted for in a relationship’.3 Greenberg maintains that 
this kind of dialectic appears in the very first definitions of gender in Judaism, 
and continues in the sources, from Bible to Talmud, commentaries and 
philosophy, to modern-day halakhic decisions (4): ‘Always there exist two 
poles of thought vis-à-vis women – as distinctive, special, and equal on the one 
hand, as subordinate and inferior on the other. A times one definition surfaces, 
at times the other.’ 
Opposed to what Orthodox Jewish feminist like Greenberg interprets as 
both negative and positive attitudes towards women within authoritative 
religious discourse, the women I interviewed seemed to do more than merely 
reproduce the forms of hegemonic strictly Orthodox discourse on gender, which 
promotes equality through gender. Besides the more positive or even 
celebratory attitudes towards, and constructions of femininity, many of my 
informants even interpreted what is conceived of as deeply androcentric or 
almost misogynous in the most moderate to the most radical feminist point of 
view, as instances of women’s agency rather than their subordination.  
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That the creation stories are often taken as foundational in what is 
viewed as gender role ideology in strictly Orthodox Jewish society, is illustrated 
by the way in which the notion of woman as ezer kenegdo or a ‘helpmeet’ for a 
man, features in the Talmud, and in the traditionalist religious discourse that 
was applied by some of the women I interviewed. Orthodox Jewish scholar 
Michael Kaufman (1995 [1993]: 11-12) attempts a ‘dialectic’ of his own in his 
interpretation of the meaning of helpmeet. Adam is conceived of as an 
originally single androgynous being, and then separated into both female and 
male entities, as God declares the single state incomplete. A helpmeet is then 
created for ‘him’, which Kaufman understands as the existential explanation for 
the institution of marriage. Only a married couple can ‘re-create the original 
unity’. In the previous chapter, I noted how my interviewees made the same 
emphasis on the complementary roles of husband and wife within marriage. 
Sarah expresses the same opinion:           
              
So we believe that Ha-Shem4 created them to complete each other and to 
create a harmony and only by the differences of their nature and set up 
and roles, that brings the harmony. It says in our sources that an 
unmarried person is like half a person, and that makes the harmony, that 
they complete each other and live to each other, and each one does his 
own job and that’s how, we believe that they are created quite 
different…  
 
In the passage under discussion, Kaufman interprets ‘helpmeet’ as neither male, 
nor female. Pnina Navè Levinson (1990: 47) similarly points to the Hebrew 
male noun ezer, which is used in the second creation story, and to be translated 
as ‘help.’ According to Levinson, the same word is furthermore used of God 
(Psalms 121:1,2), therefore carrying an expression of strength rather than 
second-class existence. Ezer does refer to the woman in both later Talmudic 
and Orthodox interpretations though, and some of the women I interviewed also 
literally referred to the woman’s role as that of a ‘help’ to her husband. Like 
rebbetsin Hannah: 
 
The task of a woman is actually to be a help for her husband, she has to 
be ready, be free for him, ‘ezer’, a help for him. Secondly, she has to 
educate her children. She is free of certain mitzvot which are bound to 
time, a mother cannot start praying at a certain time when her children 
need her, her children then come first.  
 
Rebbetsin Liddy also drew on the idea of woman, as a helpmeet for the man, 
but interesting was the way in which she interpreted what would seem the 
inferio r position according to the Creation story: 
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Why does one say ‘l’asile le plus sûr est le coeur de la mère’, the most 
certain safety haven is the heart of the mother? And there is another 
saying which says: ‘perdre un père, c’est perdre beaucoup, mais perdre 
une mère, c’est perdre tout.’ Now, you can see, a man all alone, that’s 
very awkward, women get along much better by themselves. What is the 
reason for this? In the Creation story it is written, God first created the 
man and afterwards, he saw that isn’t any good, the man by himself, he 
needs a help at his side, and he created the woman… from the man. So 
our ‘raison d’être’ is to help the man develop himself.  
 
Later in his book, Michael Kaufman (1995: 38) does equate ezer kenegdo as the 
Jewish women’s position, which he directly links to their specific role as 
enabler. This is first expressed in the mitzvah of ‘being fruitful and 
multiplying’, which is halakhically only incumbent on men. Whereas according 
to Jewish law the woman is exempt from the commandment of marriage and 
procreation, by marrying she enables her husband to procreate. In a similar 
manner, the exemption for women studying the Torah can indirectly be 
‘compensated’ by enabling their husbands to do so.  
Rebbetsin Liddy told me how she had to end the confusion that existed 
among some women in her community as to the size of the ‘reward’ a wife 
receives by enabling her husband to study. In doing so, one can imagine, she 
elevated much of the pressure some husbands were under. According to Liddy, 
the women thought that if their husbands studied for three hours, they would 
similarly be rewarded for three hours for doing their job of seeing to domestic 
responsibilities and taking care of the children, so he need not worry about 
matters at home. During a lecture, the rebbetsin had to rectify the 
misunderstanding that wives received 180 minutes of reward against 180 
minutes of study. If the husband does not perform his best, say is distracted by a 
friend, and ends up studying only 60 minutes of a three hour period, his wife 
still receives the three hour reward. For she has given him the opportunity to 
study for three hours. According to the rebbetsin:  
 
It’s not a question of proportion, you cannot learn in his place, you can 
only do everything possible, not ask him for help, give him the chance 
and all the circumstances to do so, make sure dinner is ready on time, so 
he cannot accuse you and say ‘it’s her fault… that’s why I couldn’t 
study’. No, she gives the chance and she is rewarded, because she is the 
one who went to all the trouble.  
 
This information not only reassured the women, but also some of their 
husbands, who paid a special visit to the rabbi, thanking him for the rebbetsin’s 
lecture with the accurate information. ‘From that day on’, Liddy told me, ‘the 
men were allowed to go and study, the women didn’t object, whether the men 
studied or not, that was their problem, they were given the chance and the 
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women receive their reward’. The rebbetsin interpreted this anecdote as an 
example of the great justice of God, both in terms of individual responsibility 
towards God – everyone rewarded according to his or her effort -, and 
simultaneously within a social system of different, yet balanced gender roles. 
All my informants unanimously and repeatedly underlined this. They did not 
conceive themselves as in any way of less value or inferior to men. Everyone 
simply has his or her role to fulfil, which she/he must do to her/his best ability.  
A number of women pointed to the importance of their role as mother 
and housewife as a kind of ‘indirect’ kind of agency in enabling their husbands 
to fulfil their mitzvot. Hannah for example: 
 
It is a fifty-fifty reward. Not all men learn so well, but when she wants 
him to learn and gives him the possibility, she gets fifty percent of what 
she wants him to be, whether he fulfils this or not, she gets fifty percent 
of what she made him possible to do.  
 
Kaufman (1995: 38) even goes beyond the fifty-fifty idea, by attributing the 
enabling act as the motivating, or causal factor in the study of Torah. He refers 
the Talmudic saying ‘Greater is the one who causes a good deed to be 
performed than the one who actually does it’. In both this and in the women’s 
own interpretations, the woman can be attributed a kind of indirect power to act 
religiously, ‘empowering’ the man to study through her own enabling activities 
in the domestic sphere. A wife also has the agency to prevent her husband from 
performing his mitzvot. According to Tina: 
 
The woman is the support pillar of the home really, a woman who 
cannot keep to her mitzvot, then her husband can also not keep to the 
mitzvot, because he has to know, ‘It’s ok at home, I can eat when I come 
home’, I don’t have to ask: ‘Where did you buy this or that meat, are 
you sure…’ That causes tension, and he must know ‘I have a wife, so 
that’s all taken care of, I have nothing to do with that, she knows how to 
do it…’   
C: And this is a religious commandment for the woman in itself? 
Yes. 
 
This dependency of the husband on his wife in order to be able to perform his 
mitzvot, and the religious ‘capital’ that women perhaps have in controlling it, 
was also expressed by Miriam: 
    
A woman can put her foot between the door and prevent her husband 
from fulfilling a religious obligation. If she wants him to stay at home 
and help her with the children, then he cannot go off and study, if he has 
some heart he will stay with his wife. But if she says ‘you can go, I’ll 
manage’, then he will. You must try and do everything so he can do 
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what he must do and you can do what you must do, but not everyone is 
like that, everyone is only human. A woman is just a woman and if she 
say’s ‘no, my friend has a fur coat and I want one too’, then he will have 
to work to be able to give her a fur coat.  
 
Although the Halakhah defines women only in the way in which they relate to 
men, the women I interviewed were very much cognisant of the laws that seem 
to construct them as ‘other’, reducing them to subjects, such as expressed in the 
duties men have to perform towards their wives. Yet, they knew and interpreted 
these in terms of their ‘rights’ and how they could enforce them in actual 
practice. My respondents thus seemed to confirm their status as ‘other’, but did 
this through their own subjectivity and emphasis on agency. Many women 
referred to men’s duty to ‘love their wife as they love themselves, but honour 
her even more’. This is also understood in very material terms, such as making 
sure a wife receives a new dress for a holiday. While men and women are 
obligated to give to charity (tzedakah) for example, a woman can prevent her 
husband from donating money. For example by stating she needed the money 
for herself to buy jewellery so he couldn’t give tzedakah; she was the one at 
home, ‘waiting for his money.’ According to Miriam: 
 
Somewhere in the Bible it says: ‘A bad wife is worse than death’, but 
the Bible also emphasises the rights of the woman, the duties that the 
man has towards the wife. He must give her money, honour her… It is 
also said that for the honour of the wife a man should sell his own 
clothes to be able to honour her, he must love her as himself but honour 
her even more than himself. For example for a celebration, he must see 
to it that she has a new dress… 
 
Many women literally referred to the ‘power’ of the woman in her task of 
seeing to the home enabling men to study. They were of the opinion that 
although women did not participate in mitzvot such as Torah study and public 
prayer, their ‘mitzvot’ of housekeeping and seeing to the ‘practical’ side of life, 
was a mitzvot in itself. Although women’s religious agency is therefore less 
visible, it is seen as equal, or even more powerful than that of men. Or as Liddy 
told me: ‘Behind every great man there is a great woman...’ According to 
Sarah: 
 
Women and men are equal in their value, but not in their roles. In the 
family and in the community and that’s why our load is different… 
Obligations to men and women, keeping and looking after the respect 
for both of them… But our theory is that the family which is the part of 
the community, like in a kitchen when you have two, like in the office 
when you have two bosses, or on the boat when you have two captains, 
it does not… So the leadership, the spiritual and not the everyday 
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practical leadership but the line of the culture, of the whole, is by the 
hand of the man, but the woman is the power behind who channels and 
who builds up the home, her power is more indirect. And there are 
many, many laws who make sure that’s she’s not inferior, she will have 
a … have you heard of the Rambam? So he defines it clearly, I think. He 
brings the Talmud that says that ‘love your wife as your body and look 
after her and respect her more than you do to yourself’. So this is the 
law, but the obligation of the woman is to follow her husband of course 
which includes giving him his food and looking after the home, so that 
he should be free to do his obligation, which are to provide the financial 
side of life… Or men who devote themselves to studying, to teaching 
like my husband, so this is an agreement, like I want him to do that, so I 
take upon me the art of the providing…  
 
The act of enabling may be conceived of as a mitzvah or commandment in 
itself, and therefore as religious agency in its own terms. The fact that women 
are more occupied  with the ‘practical’ rather than the spiritual, does pose some 
questions whether domesticity in itself is to be seen as a form of religious 
activity. Tirza for example, despite her insistence on the important role of 
women in Jewish religion, made a differentiation between domestic 
responsibilities on the one hand and religious responsibilities on the other: 
 
The family forms the basis and it is the woman who fulfils her domestic 
duties and the man who has his religious duties and together this forms a 
whole, this goes together. So the role of the woman is very important, 
even if she does not step into the spotlights in the public world, but for 
us she is the guiding light, but she has another part, people only think 
that the man is the guiding light.     
 
Women’s role in providing, supporting and enabling at least does include the 
performance of activities which in themselves do not belong to the religious 
sphere, such as earning a living. Returning the Creation story once more, 
opposed to God’s punishment towards Eve with the labour of childbirth for 
eating from the tree of knowledge, Adam was punished with the labour of 
producing food (Gen. 3: 17-19): 
 
And to Adam He said: ‘Because thou hast hearkened unto the voice of 
thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee, saying: 
Thou shalt not eat of it; cursed is the ground for thy sake; in toil shalt 
thou eat of it all the days of thy life. Thorns also and thistles shall it 
bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat the herb of the field. In the sweat 
of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; for out 
of it wast thou taken; for dust thou art, and to dust shalt thou return’. 
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Michael Kaufman (1995: 35-36) refers to this ‘key passage’ in emphasising the 
differences between women and men, and in arguing for the woman’s 
dependence on the man. Women must labour to bring forth children, 
diminishing her physical abilities, and increased reliance upon the man. Men in 
turn are the breadwinners for their wives and children. This basic principle is 
also expressed in the institution of marriage in Judaism, which is regulated by 
halakhah. According to Cornille (1994: 33) the ritual of marriage was the only 
one in which women played any role at all: ‘In the Talmud, particularly in the 
beginning and the end of the marriage, there are moments at which the woman 
managed to escape from the control of the man, surrounded by numerous laws’. 
Besides being a ritual and legal institution, marriage as kiddushin, meaning 
‘sanctification’, is also conceived of as a spiritual union between woman and 
man. Legal and simultaneously ‘ethical’ principles are embodied in the ketubah, 
the Jewish marriage document. As it is the man who ‘acquires’ the wife – as he 
is one who is commanded to seek a wife -, he must write the ketubah, which 
contains the husband’s obligations to his future wife and vice versa.       
According to Maimonides’s delineation of the mutual obligations 
between spouses embodied in the ketubah, a man assumes ten obligations 
toward his wife and ‘acquires’ four obligations from her (Kaufman 1995: 113). 
These ten obligations are mostly related to providing for her maintenance and 
protection. The four obligations of the wife to her husband, according to 
Kaufman are (114) ‘designed only for the establishment of goodwill and to 
compensate her husband for some of his obligations towards her’. For example, 
the woman must ‘relinquish the earnings from her labour’. Halakhically the 
woman does have the option of unilaterally abrogating the obligation to supply 
her husband with her earnings and become financially independent, opposed to 
the husband who does not have the right to abrogate his responsibility for her 
sustenance. Even if the woman chooses to be financially independent, she still 
has the right to support from her husband for expenses such as clothing, 
cosmetics, and personal needs. 
It can be severely doubted whether many strictly Orthodox Jewish 
women do choose to become financially independent. The ideology of the man 
as the breadwinner and head of the house in financial matters was upheld by my 
all my informants, although both historically and in contemporary, strictly 
Orthodox Jewish communities, most women in fact do work outside of the 
home and contribute to the family’s income. Historically in many traditional 
Jewish communities, women were economically active outside the home. Many 
even provided for all of the family’s income, so that their husbands could 
devote themselves to Torah study (Cornille 1994; Hyman 1995).5 In many 
families nowadays, women working outside of the home has become a pure 
financial necessity. Liddy told me why in practice many strictly Orthodox 
Jewish women work: 
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It is true that to every rule there is an exception, so sometimes we do 
things that really belong to the man. We help in earning a living. 
Earning a living is really something that the man has to do, but because 
we want to let him study, not as something for myself, that wasn’t my 
task, but then God gives me the strength to do this, but this does not take 
away that I must say ‘voila, I do this…’ No, I must know that a priori I 
must be a woman, and if I take something else on, then that must not be 
at the cost of my real ‘raison d’être’ on earth. So in that sense the 
woman has the spiritual strength to support her husband and help her 
husband rise, that is true piety, God trusts the Jewish woman 
tremendously…  
 
Contrary to this practice and the long tradition of women working in enabling 
their husbands to study, the ideal wife remains at home and is in any case 
committed to her role as housewife and mother.      
Orthodox Jewish women’s peripheral, yet facilitating or enabling role 
can also be identified in the nature of their participation in the mitzvot of 
celebrating the ‘festdays’, which mark the religious rhythm of the Jewish 
calendar. According to Willem Zuidema (1988 [1977]: 112-113), the liturgical 
year is connected to nature and original agricultural celebrations – opposed to 
the Christian based calendar it is based on the moon cycle -, and the dates of the 
celebrations all have historical backgrounds or are associated with historical 
facts. Finally, the year is perceived to be religious in that it is seen as a ‘gift of 
God’, of being ‘underway with God towards the future’.  
The periodic celebrations include Pesach (Passover festival of eight 
days, including the Seder eve feast), Shavuot (Feast of Weeks), Rosh Hashanah 
(New Year, some time at the beginning of Autumn), Yom Kippur (Day of 
Atonement), Sukkot (eight-day festival of booths in September-October), 
Hanukkah (Feast of Lights, eight-day midwinter celebration), and Purim 
(Spring). Both men and women are obliged to observe these festivals, apart 
from women being exempt from the time-bound mitzvot connected to these 
liturgical celebrations as explained in chapter seven. During these celebrations, 
which often involve family get-togethers, the practice of prayer and going to the 
synagogue is performed by men. Women mostly fulfil a domestic role of 
preparing the festivals, such as cooking and cleaning. It can be argued that their 
role during the festivals is often that of facilitator or enabler, at least compared 
to that of men. Women’s domestic, enabling role is furthermore reflected in the 
weekly celebration of Sabbath. While the Sabbath starts on Friday evening 
before sunrise, housewives have already started cooking and cleaning on Friday 
or even Thursday, including the preparation of food for the following Sabbath 
meal and meals on the Saturday. When I asked Tina if men performed the 
‘religious’ part of the festdays, she illustrated how role divisions were ‘natural’, 
like on the Sabbath:  
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Going to the synagogue… it’s the same again, for example the blessing 
over the wine at the dinner table, the prayer over the challes6… is done 
by the man, the cooking and the preparing… You sit as a family 
together at the table and the man sits at the head of the table, and he 
really leads… How do you say, there will be singing and readings… It’s 
up to the father to say… It’s not like ‘sit here and now we’re going to 
tell about the weekly parashah7’, you know the Bible reading, I don’t 
think so… enfin, maybe in other families, but probably not, it is father 
who just does this and he starts to sing a song or so… 
C: He takes the initiative? 
Yes, the initiative of the whole course of the celebration, and the wife 
sees, ‘yes we have finished with the fish, let’s bring the soup…’ It’s the 
man who… You don’t really feel it, it’s so automatic, that’s just the way 
it is, it’s not like I think ‘now I would have liked to say something…’ 
That the woman doesn’t think ‘Why can he always decide what we are 
going to do’, or that he says ‘I would have liked to prepare the fish…’ 
It’s just the way the roles are divided…             
 
Even if in practice many women in strictly Orthodox Jewish communities work 
outside of the home – among my interviewees were women who assisted in 
their husband’s business, others were occupied with their role as rebbetsin, and 
many others teachers at the community schools – the ideal of the man as 
primary breadwinner is upheld. At the same time, women’s enabling domestic 
and mothering responsibilities in the private sphere are ‘sacralised’ in religious 
terms, and put on par, or even above men’s religious obligations in the public 
sphere. One of my interviewees literally appropriated the saying ‘my wife is my 
home’ to show how it was women’s responsibility to ‘build the home’, which 
she considered ‘the centre of Jewish life’. The same kind of rhetoric is used by 
Orthodox Jewish scholar Michael Kaufman (1995: 19) on the importance of the 
family as ‘the foundation for of Jewish life’. Moshe Meiselman (1978: 16) 
similarly presents an account of a kind of ‘religious domesticity’, claiming that 
it is the home rather than the synagogue, which is the centre of Jewish life: 
 
The Jewish woman is the creator, molder, and guardian of the Jewish 
home. The family has always been the unit of Jewish existence, and 
while the man has always been the family’s public representative, the 
woman has been it soul.  
 
Many of my informants applied similar discourse, literally referring to the home 
as an ‘institution’, a ‘fortress’ or even the ‘miniature temple’, where the 
fundamental religious responsibility of women lies. Liddy for example, claimed 
the woman could be seen as the ‘priestess of the home’: 
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…The two highest functionaries of the Jewish people are the king and 
the high priest. The king is the head of the people and the high priest is 
the spiritual leader of the people, the king also to some extent because 
he is the spiritual leader of the people and the high priest of the Holy 
Temple, that unfortunately was destroyed and the wailing wall 
remains… No one was allowed to do what he did, he was the only one 
allowed into the holiest place of the Holy Temple, and to the services of 
Yom Kippur, the King was never allowed there…  […] There are two, 
they are equal in greatness, but totally different… He is the head of the 
temple and he was the head of the people… The family of a Jew is the 
miniature temple and we must and this is obligatory…  […] The man 
builds the house and the women the home, so the woman is the 
manager, the minister of interior affairs and the man the minister of 
foreign affairs… […] They are both important, the man is the king of 
the home but the woman is the high priestess … […] You cannot have 
but one crown, and two kings, but if there are two crowns… Then there 
is no problem, everyone has their crown… The only thing you must 
watch out for, do not exchange the crowns… 
  
Many of my interviewees also emphasised the fact that whereas men studied 
Torah, women were the ones who were responsible for the initial and practical 
religious education of the children. They were responsible for ‘bringing up the 
next generation, and to be in the home, making a strong cosy secure place and 
the children and for the needy people…’. Women taught their children the 
fundamental basics of Jewish religion, in the sense that as a religion of practice, 
the mundane is sanctified. According to Sarah: 
 
The studying is given more by the father, but teaching practically how to 
do things, how to eat, how to wear clothes, how to refrain from doing 
forbidden things on Shabbat… So a lot of this is given to the mother, a 
lot of customs, to do Shabbat and the festdays, is mainly the part of the 
woman…. How she prepares the home and the table and how she cooks, 
how she explains to the children, the meaning of many, many things that 
happen in the house and in life… 
 
Rachel who is a teacher, emphasised the importance of this basic education: 
 
I have so many pupils in school, as much as I try to instil to my pupils… 
If they are not going to get the real backing at home, I don’t know if 
they will always have the moral strength to live up to all what they are 
being taught… … I find that if the family doesn’t live up to what the 
school is demanding, they are creating a big conflict with the child… So 
therefore religion begins at home and not in the school, the school can 
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only perfect, let’s say, elevate a bit what’s been done at home, but there 
has to be the religious background of the family life…  
 
Mothers take care of the basic but fundamental religious education, opposed to 
the father who according to halakhah is responsible for the more theoretical 
religious education, and sees to it that their boys study from the age of three. 
Mothers take care of the more practical education which is taught by way of 
‘positive example’. This concerns Sabbath observance right down to the way 
children must dress, and undress, which shoe to put on first and all aspects of 
living which take on a religious meaning. The mother is the one who provides 
the right ‘atmosphere’ and ‘feeling’ of religion. Perhaps in a less tangible, less 
explicit, and less easily ‘representational’ way, she contributes to the formation 
of religious practice and tradition.  
Orthodox Jewish scholar Moshe Meiselman (1978: 17) also points to 
women’s important role in ‘communicating the fundamentals of Jewish belief 
and practice to her children’. Contrary to some of the feminist critiques on the 
separation between the physical and the spiritual in Judaism, Meiselman argues 
that homemaking involves more than providing for the family’s physical needs: 
‘In a such a context, even the physical aspects of homemaking achieve a 
spiritual dimension’ (ibid.). Alyse Fisher Roller (1999: 83), in her analysis of 
literature written by ultra-Orthodox Jewish women8, similarly points to the way 
in which ‘giving’ and ‘caring’ is sanctified, and ‘personal domestic experience 
is seen as fertile ground for the religious woman to focus her divine service’. 
Roller (1999: 96-97) includes a poem by a widely read Hasidic ba’alat teshuvah 
(returnee), Sarah Shapiro, in her analysis. She hereby attempts to show how for 
the writer ‘godliness combines commonplace activities with an awareness of 
the sanctity inherent in them’:    
 
Washing dishes, watching the dishes, 
not really seeing 
her hands wash the dishes, because 
it’s always like this, and the sun 
lengthening along the floor. 
   One, 
two o’clock, and then she’s done 
the laundry. Get the baby crying. 
Sweet baby. 
 
Because. 
There is no because.  
 
But one day the sun hits a frying pan in soapy water 
and she’s holding a rainbow. 
The thought flashes through her like a lightening: 
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“G-d’s creating light!” and she sees all this, 
the light the water her hands herself 
are miracles.9       
 
 
2. Niddah: The Prototype of a Women’s Mitzvah? 
 
In the previous discussions of women’s religious agency, the focus has been on 
‘indirect’ forms of religious practice, including those which according to my 
strictly Orthodox Jewish interviewees are ‘sanctified’ to the extent of counting 
as mitzvot. Next to the official mitzvot from which women are exempt or 
excluded, however, and apart from the gender-neutral precepts, it must be noted 
that there in fact are three mitzvot, thus official religious obligations that are 
exclusively incumbent on married women. At least, so the impression is given 
in much of the secondary literature. These mitzvot are often referred to with 
ChaNaH,10 an acronym for challah or hallah (taking of dough), niddah (laws of 
family purity)11 and hadlik ner (lighting of Sabbath candles). A closer 
inspection of the secondary literature reveals, that even these three mitzvot do 
not appear to officially or halakhically exclusively apply to women, and 
perhaps through tradition have come to be interpreted as ‘women’s mitzvot’. 
Kaufman (1995: 212) for example, notes: ‘There are three commandments that, 
though they may be discharged by men, have primarily devolved on women, 
are mitzvot in which women take precedence over men.’  
Therefore, even though two of the mitzvot centre on the celebration of 
the weekly Sabbath in the private, familial domestic sphere, whilst niddah is 
bound to women’s sexuality, the precepts as such appear to be halakhically 
open to both women and men. This again seems to confirm the ‘androcentrism 
of halakhah’. It also appears to support Jonathan Webber’s (1982) argument 
that the question of women’s experience or agency is utterly problematic from 
the halakhic point of view, in that women as such cannot be conceived of as a 
‘halakhic category’ (see previous chapter). Niddah, according to Tamar 
Frankiel (1990: 72) and opposed to Kaufman’s statement, is in fact the only 
mitzvah which is unique to women. Although for strictly Orthodox Jewish 
women today the religious practice surrounding the laws of niddah is indeed 
perhaps the most important form of religious activity they perform and men do 
not, the laws in themselves, generally referred to as taharat hamishpachah, or 
the ‘family purity laws’, appear to be halakhically incumbent on all observant 
Jews. Almost consistent with the thesis of ‘women as enabler’, the woman must 
ensure that through her own correct ritual practice, the ‘family’ remains 
religiously observant.           
In chapter five, paragraph two (Studying Strictly Orthodox Jewry), on 
the lack of ethnographical research on and representation of strictly Orthodox 
Jewish women in mainstream accounts, I showed how the topic of sexuality and 
religion was not featured to a great extent in contemporary research. If the topic 
THE DIFFERENTIATED SUBJECT IN CONTEXT:  
BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC IN RELIGIOUS IDENTITY 
 416
is discussed, then this is usually conducted from a male-centred viewpoint, 
concerning both the ethnographic subject and writer himself. The same can be 
said for the laws and practices surrounding niddah, the menstruating woman, 
and broader, the theme of the ritual purity of the completely observant Jewish 
family. Whatever the reasons for the brief references, or altogether passing by 
of these laws in the mainstream literature, this in any case shows a remarkable 
contrast to some of the statements by the women I spoke to. They claimed that 
the laws of niddah were among, or even were the most important laws of all.  
However, perhaps the negligence or reticence on the laws of family 
purity cannot only be ascribed to the fact that most of these traditional and more 
recent ethnographies have been conducted by and predominantly on men. The 
laws of niddah and any other issues concerning women and men’s sexuality is a 
highly private subject in strictly Orthodox Jewish communities, let alone to be 
discussed with outsiders. For this reason, possibly combined with an 
commitment to principles of professional anthropological ethical – or perhaps 
especially feminist12 – scrutiny, Israeli anthropologist Tamar El-Or (1994: 7) 
chooses to refrain from bringing up the topic in her ethnography of Hasidic Gur 
women and their status in religious education13:      
 
During the course of the study I developed a strong antipathy to 
deliberately exposing private matters, such as the relations between wife 
and husband and between women and their bodies. Contrary to the 
prevalent image of anthropological work, and contrary to the 
expectations of my friends, colleagues, and family members, voyeurism 
was not my purpose. I was well aware that the material collected on my 
computer diskettes revealed a society and individuals for whom privacy 
was of utmost importance. As a result, I preferred to focus on social 
processes that are not centred on the individual. 
 
Several remarks can be made regarding this citation. On the one hand, El-Or 
appears to be concerned with her informants’ integrity, which would be 
compromised by exposing their views and practices surrounding sexuality. As 
far as we can infer, this concerns a subject her informants would not like to see 
in print. On the other hand, El-Or’s conclusions in a feminist framework, and 
especially her word choice represented in the very title of the monograph 
Educated and Ignorant do not strike as particularly flattering, and one can 
imagine would be equally offensive for the women in question. This doubt is 
expressed by El-Or in her word of thanks in the last sentence of the preface 
(1994: x): 
 
I have not expressed my thanks to the women I studied. I am aware that 
this book does not convey my gratitude in a way they would appreciate.       
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Later, El-Or (1997) in fact did confront a public of Gur women with her 
findings – although not the same women she studied -, addressing the very 
‘feminist dilemmas’ this particular type of research on ‘non-feminist women’ 
represents. On the other hand, and as touched upon in the final part of the 
previous chapter on the subject of women’s literacy, Alyse Fisher Roller (1999) 
reacts just as critical to the manner in which El-Or seems to denounce the extent 
of strictly Orthodox Jewish women’s agency and lack of representation from 
their standpoint or ‘native point of view’. However, leaving this particular kind 
of critique aside for now, I argue that the meaning of ‘privacy’ in relation to the 
laws surrounding sexuality rather - and similarly - needs to be explored rather 
than assumed. In the first place, and as argued from the reflexive point of view, 
we still need to remain aware of how our own assumptions on sexuality and 
gender influence our research. This is required inasmuch as both traditional and 
contemporary ethnographers’ preconceived cultural views on sexuality need to 
be taken into account. 
Although strictly speaking sexuality and niddah can be viewed as highly 
private matters, surprisingly only one of my informants literally left it at this, 
refusing to discuss the topic at all. Others were very insistent - despite the 
importance of ‘privacy’ - on what they perceived to be the wholly different 
meanings of sexuality in their society, compared to that of the ‘outside world’. 
Susan’s statements on ‘washing our dirty or even clean linen in public’ in 
referring to outsiders’ ‘voyeurism’ can be reminded of here.14 It was not so 
much problematic that the laws had been discussed in a documentary on 
national TV. Rather, it had been the subsequent disrespectful remarks by 
goyim15 taxi drivers concerning women’s sexuality and menses that had caused 
the trouble. This was  interpreted as damaging to the integrity of the whole 
Jewish community. I will later return to El–Or’s final remark on the subject, on 
sexuality being an individual matter rather than a social process.            
 
 
Taharat hamishpachah: Historical Development and Cultural Diversity 
 
Etymologically, the roots of the Hebrew niddah (in general meaning 
‘menstruating’, ‘menstruant’ or ‘the menstruating woman’) are ndh , meaning 
‘separation’, connected to the root ‘ndd’, or ‘to make distant’ (Meacham (leBeit 
Yoreh) 1999: 23). As with all other halakhic laws, the fundamentals 
surrounding niddah are to be found in the Torah, appearing in what is called 
both the Priestly Code and the Holiness Code in biblical literature (Wasserfall 
1999: 4; Cook 1999: 47). In the biblical period, most of the laws surrounding 
niddah and many other physical conditions applied to maintaining the purity of 
the Temple cult, at least until the second Temple was destroyed in 70 C.E. The 
relevant chapter referring to niddah is Leviticus, divided into the two sections 
of the Priestly Code (chapters 8-15), and secondly the Holiness Code (chapters 
18-27). The Priestly Code includes niddah among other ‘impure’ states such as 
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childbirth, death, seminal emissions, unexplained genital discharges and skin 
diseases such as leprosy. The Holiness code on the other hand, deals with 
forbidden sexual relationships, keeping the Sabbath, not worshipping idols, 
offering sacrifices, not damaging the body, etc.  
The main difference between the two codes is that in the Priestly Code 
‘purity’ refers to states that are natural and do not imply violation. Holiness 
refers to those practices which are perceived as capable of being abided to or 
transgressed. The two categories are also differentially related to the question of 
morality. In the Priestly code, it is not a sin to be impure as such, as long as the 
correct rituals of purification associated with the physical conditions are 
observed. In the Holiness code, sin is about making the wrong choice. Leslie A. 
Cook (1999: 48) states that Leviticus as a whole defines the relationship 
between God, human beings, and nature, as embodied through both ethical and 
ritual practice: ‘Holiness is essentially a moral category and a representation of 
similarity [to God]. Impurity, generally speaking, is not a moral category but is, 
rather, a representation of difference’. 
In Leviticus chapter 15 several forms of genital discharge and their 
accompanying laws are treated, distinguishing between men’s abnormal genital 
discharge (presumably gonorrhoea) (zav), seminal flow following or not 
following coitus (baal queri), women’s menstrual flow (niddah) and uteral 
blood flow outside of menstruation (zava). Men and women with abnormal 
forms of discharge must count seven ‘clean’ days after the discharge has 
ceased; only men must then bathe in ‘living waters’ (a spring or running water), 
yet both must bring a sacrifice. Both forms of normal seminal discharge must 
be purified by bathing and waiting until sunset. Normal menstruation only 
includes a waiting period, yet those contaminated by a menstruating woman 
must bathe in order to become pure.  
A number of scholars has suggested that the medical or ‘scientific’ 
paradigm underlying these biblical laws and subsequent Tannatic sources, is 
one in which menstrual blood is understood as the female contribution to 
conception, as female ‘seed’ analogue to male seed. In this paradigm, while on 
a time scale women’s entrance into the temple was more limited to that of men, 
an interpretation in terms of women’s subordination and exclusion from the 
cultic sphere may be inaccurate. Together with the insight that a state of ritual 
impurity in itself was not sinful, it is possible that the rules were simply 
concerned with both the male and female pollution of ‘seed’ (Meacham 1999: 
25). Blood symbolism was nonetheless particularly central in the ancient 
biblical Jewish tradition. According to Leonie J. Archer (1999) it was a means 
in which gender identity was constructed in terms of a hierarchical nature-
culture model.16 According to the Priestly code, predominantly male animals 
were selected for the more important sacrificial procedures, and female ones for 
minor sacrifices for which the sex of the offering was altogether irrelevant. In 
Archer’s analysis, the rites involving blood that then survived the destruction of 
the Temple carried the same gendered hierarchical structure. Men’s 
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circumcision represened ‘covenant’, the ‘culturally’ manipulated spilling of 
blood as an act of inclusion within the religious community, opposed to 
women’s ‘natural’ bleeding as a source of pollution and exclusion from the 
public religious sphere. Cook (1999: 50-52) by contrast – at least as far as the 
biblical period is concerned - argues against what she calls feminist 
interpretations, such as the association of male blood with purification (as in the 
ritual of circumcision), and that of women with contamination. In Cook’s point 
of view, gender as such was not relevant in the Priestly literary system, but 
rather the context in which women’s or men’s blood was discharged. Thus in a 
particular ritual such as Yom Kippur, blood could be a means of purification, 
whereas in another context it could lead to a state of impurity.    
In Leviticus 15, 18 and 20 prohibitions are formulated on sexual 
contacts between men and women, during the menstrual impurity of the latter. 
In the Holiness Code in Lev. 20:18, sexual intercourse with a niddah is even 
threatened with the punishment of karet (excision from the community). In 
contrast to the laws of the Priestly code, this prohibition does not refer to the 
Temple cult. In Lev. 20:21 the sin of adultery with the wife of one’s brother is 
described using the word niddah, whilst in other parts of the Bible niddah is 
also used to describe abominable acts, objects, or status, including sexual sins 
and idolatry (Meacham 1999: 27). So on the one hand, niddah is viewed as a 
natural or even positive process, whereas in other parts of the Bible the term is 
associated with various forbidden acts and immorality. In any case, the biblical 
laws surrounding the (normal) menstruating woman were limited to a waiting 
period of seven days, with no particular purification rituals or sacrificial acts 
attached. Menstruating women were segregated and stayed in a separate house, 
where they ate alone.           
Rabbis substantially reinterpreted the laws of niddah after the 
destruction of the Temple and its sacrificial cult, as evident in the Mishnah (192 
C.E.). During the Tannatic period (first century until middle of third century) of 
the compilation of the Mishnah, the distinction between the zava and the niddah 
was eliminated. The seven-day waiting period was upheld (the so-called ‘white’ 
days after menstruation ceases), but the practice of purification through bathing 
in a mikvah was introduced for menstruating women (rather than merely for 
those contaminated with menstrual blood). Laws for the construction of the 
mikvah were made, such as the requirement of the pool to contain natural 
waters, collected from rain, spring water, or water from a river. Other rules 
were added such as the prohibition on sexual contacts for twelve hours before 
menstruation, the usage of cloths for vaginal self-examination to check the 
beginning and end of menstruation, and numerous detailed laws surrounding 
the size and colours of blood stains, pregnancy, childbirth, etc. The association 
of niddah with immorality, sin and pollution – one pole of the original biblical 
ambivalent attitude – presumably grew during this period. Rahel R. Wasserfall 
(1999: 5) furthermore notes that as only married women were obligated to 
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immerse in the mikvah, the laws surrounding menstruation and ritual purity 
entirely shifted to conjugal relations.  
If a focus on the written normative religious (biblical and talmudic) 
scriptures on niddah shows tremendous historical shifts as to the laws and their 
interpretation, then a multitude of interpretations of niddah from the perspective 
of gender of these sources is possible. Cook (1999) for example, argues against 
a ‘feminist’ interpretation of women as having a subordinated position in 
Jewish ritual life, including the transition from biblical to rabbinical practice of 
the laws of niddah. In Cook’s view, the replacement of the Temple sacrificial 
system (the priestly worldview) with the reconstruction of Jewish ritual practice 
without the Temple and its priests, entailed ritual self- determination and 
‘empowerment’ for both women and men. In particular, Cook regards the new 
laws of self-examination and the increase of detail surrounding niddah in the 
Mishnah as a mode in which women themselves become the ‘structural 
equivalent of the priest’. Having the information necessary to examine and 
determine their own bodily status, the women in effect became their own 
‘judges’ on being, or not being niddah.   
Charlotte Elisheva Fonrobert (1999) on the other hand, focuses on the 
figure of the rabbi as the new expert and hegemonic authority, following the 
reinterpretation of biblical laws on niddah during the rabbinical period. Almost 
diametrically opposed to Cook’s point of view, Fonrobert argues that new rules 
that were introduced by rabbis in the Mishnah Niddah diminished rather than 
enhanced women’s control over their own bodies. Halakhic discussions of the 
ketem (the bloodstain) and the distinctions of various types or colours of 
women’s genital blood, would have instituted the rabbis as the sole legitimate 
experts on menstrual bleeding. According to this ‘new rabbinic science’, 
women are ‘disowned of knowledge of their own bleeding since the projected 
scientists of the science of blood, are, of course, the rabbis’ (Fonrobert 1999: 
67). Fonrobert critically searches the scriptures for instances of ‘gender trouble’ 
where women may have resisted this rabbinic control. This is perhaps 
evidenced in passages (with the story of Yalta in the Talmud and its subsequent 
Talmudic discussion as a case in point) where it is at least shown within the 
normative text that tensions must have been negotiated. This kind of reading of 
the scriptures brings us to the question of more examples of actual practice 
pertaining to the laws of niddah in history, and especially those forms of 
practice that went against official law.           
More changes took place during the Talmudic period, following the 
transfer of the laws of purity from the context of the Temple to that of the 
synagogue. When prayers came to replace the earlier sacrifices, the notion 
developed that prayer, Torah study and entrance into a synagogue required 
ritual purity (Cohen 1992: 106). Initially, and as stated in the Mishnah, all 
forms of genital discharge (including normal menstruation) did not prevent one 
from entering the synagogue and reading or studying Torah, except for the male 
ejaculant. Both the Jerusalem and the Babylonian Talmud furthermore state that 
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the purpose of this prohibition was to restrain male sexuality. This matter was 
intensely debated until the Middle Ages, until a more lenient position was 
adopted by R. Joseph Karo, permitting the ejaculant to both pray and study 
Torah. In the Post-Talmudic period however, as Cohen (1992: 107-108) argues, 
despite the non-existence of any kind of legal basis in the Talmuds, in actual 
reality, Jewish women began to be excluded – or excluded themselves – from 
the ‘sancta’ during their menstruation. Menstruants kept away from the 
synagogue whereas impure men did not, even though the authoritative view was 
that they could not pray. Thus the only form of impurity (such as the categories 
of ejaculant and leper) to actually retain its practical consequences after the 
period of formative rabbinism, was that of women’s menstruation (Steinberg 
1997: 9).    
The extra-rabbinic text Beraita de Niddah (composed in Israel in the 
sixth or seventh century) signalled another change in attitudes towards 
menstruation. This text was to have a profound influence on later Ashkenazi 
practices during the Middle Ages, next to its impact on Jewish mysticism and 
the Kabbalists (Koren 1999). In the Beraita de Niddah, the association of 
menstrual blood with pollution and danger increased, introducing prohibitions 
on the participation of menstruating women in many rituals, both in the 
synagogue, yet also even pertaining to the lighting of the Sabbath candles. 
Those who indirectly came into contact with a menstruant, for instance with her 
nail clippings or the ‘dust upon which she trod’, developed boils. Food and 
utensils touched or made by a menstruant rendered others impure. According to 
the text, a menstruant’s spit, breath and speech may even cause impurity in 
others. Sex with a menstruant would lead to leprous births. Meacham (1999: 
32) notes that all these ideas entered both the normative legal works and 
influenced daily behaviour and the negative or even superstitious beliefs were 
taken on by uneducated Jews. Therefore, even though the identity of the author 
of the Baraita di Niddah is unknown, its influence on later Jewish piety was 
great and its ideas were internalised by both women and men. Similarly, by the 
tenth century, the restrictive view on women’s entrance to the synagogue 
prevailed. The Sephardic codifiers of rabbinic law Maimonides and R. Joseph 
Karo explicitly omitted prohibitions such as these. Yet in the Middle Ages, in 
Ashkenazic communities all prohibitions on women entering the synagogue or 
praying were accepted ‘if not as law then as custom’ (Cohen 1992: 109). 
Shaye J.D. Cohen (1992, 1999) analyses the conflicts between law, 
custom and practice in a number of instances surrounding women’s 
menstruation. Menstruating women in medieval France for example were 
‘oblivious’ to the law that did not prohibit their entrance into the synagogue. 
However, this was often wrongly sanctioned by local rabbis, whereas in other 
parts of Europe the practice appeared to be completely unknown. Other 
examples of ‘incorrect’ practices surrounding menstruation revolve around the 
rite of purification after menstruation and the required waiting period. Cohen 
(1999) infers after the reading of four medieval polemics discussing incorrect 
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purification practices, that many of the women thought they were acting at least 
as legitimate as the rabbis, despite some efforts of the latter to correct their 
improper behaviour. Ashkenazi women in Northern France and the Rhineland 
at the time of the Tosafists (disciples of the rabbinic Sage Rashi (1040-1105)) 
in the eleventh century for example, simply bathed after their menstruation 
ceased. They neglected the required cleansing before their immersion in the 
mikvah after the seven required ‘days of whitening’. Reading other legal 
commentaries, including that of Maimonides, it becomes clear that the 
deviations by women of medieval Spain, Byzantium and Egypt were even more 
serious. Spanish and Byzantine women observed the seven days of whitening, 
yet simply washed in baths instead of immersing in a mikvah. Egyptian women 
apparently refrained from waiting the seven days altogether and sprinkled 
themselves with water instead of immersing. 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Hebrew Taharat 
hamishpachah became used in referring to the menstruation laws, meaning 
‘purity of the family’ or ‘family purity’. The term seems to have derived 
through German from the Yiddish ‘reinheit das familiens lebens’. Meacham 
(1999: 32) suspects the term came from traditionalist circles, responding to the 
rejection of some of the laws by the Reform movement. At this time the family 
purity laws basically implied the prohibition on sexual relations between 
husband and wife during menstruation and for the seven following ‘white’ days, 
upon which the woman must immerse herself in a mikvah. Like many other 
halakhic laws that were conceived archaic, the Reform movement abolished 
those surrounding family purity. Initially the immersion in the mikvah was 
abolished and later the prohibition on sex during menstruation was explicitly 
condemned, in line with the feminist movement’s interpretation of the laws of 
menstruation as an expression of sexist views of the woman’s body.     
The history of menstruation in Jewish religious tradition and 
communities shows that not only the laws themselves and their hegemonic 
interpretations developed, but also that the actual customs and practices 
continuously evolved, varying from one time and place to the other. 
Contemporary anthropological and sociological research on, and interpretations 
of the practices and meanings surrounding niddah and mikvah, shows a similar 
diversity throughout Jewish communities all over the world. Lisa Anteby’s 
(1999) article on Ethiopian Jewish immigrants in Israel shows the extent of 
cultural diversity inasmuch as historical continuity in menstruation rites, despite 
forced adaptation to new living circumstances. Ethiopian Jewish women had 
been continuing the practice of monthly segregation and isolation in menstrual 
huts, a custom that was discontinued in Europe ever since the end of the 
Temple period. Once immigrated and housed in Israeli hotels, mobile homes 
and finally urban apartments, Anteby’s study shows how these women 
accommodated to their new environment by introducing new forms of spatial 
and verbal metaphors in order to continue their rites of purity.  
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Historical continuity is also proven in Jacob’s (1999) discovery of the 
survival of – albeit similarly transformed – rituals of purification among so-
called crypto-Jewish women in the Southwest of the U.S., descendants of 
conversos in fifteenth century Spain during the Inquisition. The forced 
conversion to Christianity had not eradic ated but transformed the practice of 
Jewish religion. This had led to a privatisation of rituals, of which only monthly 
sexual abstinence during menstruation and immersion in the mikvah survived 
until the twentieth century. A further illustration of contemporary 
ethnographical diversity can be given by referring to Sered, Kaplan and 
Cooper’s (1999) research into the phenomenon of voluntary mikvah parties. 
Certain Jewish North African and Asian brides-to-be in Israel have parties on 
the night before a wedding. The practice is virtually unknown among other 
groups in Israel, whereas immersion itself before marriage is legally required 
for both secular and religious Jewish women in the state of Israel. The authors 
compare the conflicting interpretations of the parties from different viewpoints 
of both the brides themselves, mother-in-laws, mikvah personnel, rabbis and 
local and national religious authorities, that appear to revolve around 
hierarchical axes of gender, ethnicity and age.  
Most of the ethnographical studies referred to above, all belong to a 
unique collection on menstruation rites in Jewish life (Women and Water: 
Menstruation in Jewish Life and Law). As editor Rahel R. Wasserfall (1999) 
notes, they point to the great diversity in how rituals were used, resisted and 
manipulated in different ways, always depending on broader social, historical 
and political contexts. The collection furthermore shows how purity, pollution 
and the purification rites pertaining to women’s bodies and their reproductive 
capacity, are fundamental for any understanding of the relationships between 
gender, power, authority, identity, and the public/private divide in Jewish 
religious traditions. Both historical and contemporary ethnographic illustrations 
not only show how official religious law appeared to be multi-interpretable, 
resulting or sometimes even irrelevant of actual custom and practice. It also 
shows how the scholarship on these different forms of discourse and practice 
itself appropriates different and often conflicting paradigms and interpretative-
political frameworks. The studies in Wasserfall’s volume approach the topic of 
menstruation rites in Judaism focussing on the multiplicity of power and 
agency, as related to the status of women in Judaism. Other types of research 
referred to above can perhaps be called more explicitly ‘feminist’ in the sense 
that discourse and practices surrounding women, purity and menstruation have 
been interpreted as instances of the patriarchal control of women’s bodies and 
sexuality, exemplary of women’s absolute subordinate position in Judaism 
(e.g., Archer 1999; Steinberg 1997).  
A similar perspective is shared by feminist critiques of Judaism as a 
patriarchal religion since the second wave and discussed in previous chapters. 
The harshest critique is by revolutionaries like Susannah Heschel (1995 [1983]: 
xl): ‘Woman as Other is expressed, for instance, by Judaism’s “purity laws”, in 
THE DIFFERENTIATED SUBJECT IN CONTEXT:  
BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC IN RELIGIOUS IDENTITY 
 424
which women convey impurity not to themselves or to other women, but only 
to the men with whom they come into contact.’ For Heschel, the purity laws are 
but one fitting example of not only women’s peripheral role in Jewish religion, 
but also of the complete absence of attention to their own lives and experiences. 
The laws and rites that do exist for women are only and consistently in function 
of their relationship to men, typical of the way women are associated with the 
physical and sexual opposed to men’s capacity for spirituality. Pnina Navè 
Levinson’s (1990: 58-59) critique by contrast, can serve as an example of the 
perspective of a reformist feminist, and simultaneously that of a Reform Jew:  
 
In the Reform tradition, no differences are observed with regard to 
synagogue activities based on the bodily functions of men and women. 
Long ago the biblical rules for men were removed. Reform Halakha did 
the same for women. […] Except for Orthodoxy, the private dates of 
women are not pried into when setting the wedding date. The Mikveh, 
or ritual bath, likewise is no more practised. Instead, sexual ethics are 
taught and discussed.  
 
As noted above, feminist critiques of the purity laws appear to coincide with the 
redefinitions of Judaism and subsequent development of Jewish 
‘denominations’ from the mid-nineteenth century. This started with the Reform 
movement that designated many of the commandments connected with 
physiology as ‘primitive’ (Meachem 1999: 33). After the abolishment of 
circumcision for boys, and women’s immersion in the local mikvah, in a much 
later stage the critiques of all aspects of the menstruation laws within the 
Reform movement functioned as a dismissal of traditionalist or Orthodox 
Jewish practices as sexist, such as expressed in the quotation above. As for the 
Conservative movement, Meacham notes that as far as the menstrual laws are 
concerned, as  with many other laws, the attitudes are more ambivalent. Many 
rabbis simply avoid the subject and observance therefore varies considerably. 
Practices in contemporary modern Orthodox Jewish communities also 
vary, regardless of the legal requirement, in lin e with halakhic observance of 
laws such as kashrut and the Sabbath. The ‘family purity laws’ reinterpreted in 
normative Jewish Orthodoxy vis-à-vis the growth of liberal strands, to date 
include the basic prohibition on sexual relationships during menstruation and 
the waiting period of seven ‘white’ days, followed by immersion in the mikvah. 
Modern Orthodox Jewish mikvahs may take on the appearance of modern-day 
beauty parlours in the U.S.. Opposed to the Diaspora, the context in the State of 
Israel is different again, having a system that does not separate politics from 
religion in many aspects of family law, where marriage is controlled by 
religious authorities.17 Rabbis require official proof of ritual purity of even 
secular Jewish women who must immerse themselves in a mikvah before a 
wedding (Sered, Kaplan and Cooper 1999: 145).  
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Contemporary Strictly Orthodox Jewish Rules and Practice 
 
From a feminist perspective that does not aspire to the norm of liberal equality 
based on a notion of sameness between women and men, the abolition of the 
laws of niddah as ritual practice and central in the definition of Jewish religious 
tradition, - as in the case in contemporary Progressive Jewish denominations in 
the Diaspora - appears perfectly consistent. On the other hand, the eradication 
of the only law and form of ritual, exclusively incumbent and reserved for 
women, - despite its multi-interpretability and differential forms in all 
traditional Jewish communities - can also be interpreted as acquiescence to the 
male as the normative form of religion, eradicating the possibility of specific 
forms of female religiosity.  
The family purity laws or the laws of niddah as practised by all strictly 
Orthodox or traditionalist Jewish women today, remain the only official 
mitzvah, halakhically designed and required of them as – married – women. As 
an utmost private form of religious practice, connected to what is considered 
equally or even more private issues of both women and men’s ‘sexualised’ 
bodies and intimate lives, nid dah does not particularly lend itself as an evident 
topic to be studied. The topic is all the more awkward following the methods of 
feminist social scientific research as proposed in chapter four. Returning to the 
above discussion on Tamar El-Or’s (1994) refusal to probe into what was 
perceived as a private, perhaps even taboo subject as an act of voyeurism 
above, here I focus on what some women willingly and unproblematically 
communicated to me on the topic of niddah. This led me to cast some doubts on 
the absolute private, and especially the ‘taboo’ nature of niddah among at least 
some segments of women affiliated with the Machsike Hadass.  
It must be added that as with the majority of the other subjects discussed 
in the interviews, the ‘normative’, hegemonic view of the purity laws was 
mostly reproduced. This is consistent with dominant views expressed in other 
research (e.g., Marmon 1999), and especially the discourse in so-called 
‘manuals’ in the purity laws, which are always sanctioned by Orthodox 
religious authorities. Sexuality and the laws of family are a private affair, and 
presumably, reticence and an aura of taboo reign in many strictly Orthodox 
Jewish circles and communities. Sexual education as in the ‘outside world’ is 
viewed in disgust and a threat to the central notion of tzniut or ‘modesty’ (to be 
discussed in a later paragraph). On the other hand, one Misnagdic woman I 
interviewed, Rachel, informed me that changes definitely had taken place 
pertaining to both the laws and the ritual bath. Although she professed there still 
was much reticence and taboo, she frankly claimed that things were different 
nowadays compared to her own generation. She said that the ‘young girls of 
today could not be fooled’, and needed to be treated with more ‘openness’ than 
their mothers had been. When I asked Rachel (who is a teacher) if the laws of 
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niddah were the sort of subject I would be able to bring up in my interview with 
her and other Hasidic or Misnagdic women, she thought this was possible:   
 
You can, I tell you, when I got married thirty years ago there were 
certain things which were quite… which we call the family purity laws, 
it was something which was not spoken much about… Until I got 
engaged my mother never told me about these things and she didn’t tell 
me that much about these things, but in the last thirty years because the 
world has become more open, automatically you just can’t know, you 
just can’t hide, behind, you know, curtains and say ‘Well we don’t talk 
about these things’… I for example… These are things I will bring up in 
a class room, other teachers will not, because perhaps they don’t want to 
face it, they don’t have the courage and they are scared of parents’ 
reaction… I have never been, I mean, I’m not scared, so I’m not scared 
to approach the subject, so I believe that because our girls are hearing so 
much and there’s so much going on with publicity, and they hear what’s 
going on in the world… Let’s not kid ourselves that they don’t go… 
know what’s going between a man and a woman, let’s say by the 
Hasidim, this is a subject that will never ever be spoken about in public, 
even nowadays, in our circles, it depends, it depends who you talk to… 
Me personally I feel that girls have to be treated much more openly 
because even if the mothers don’t want to admit it, but I’m sure the girls 
talk a lot among themselves and they know what goes on in the world… 
 
As has been mentioned earlier, the laws surrounding menstruation and all the 
detailed procedures such as the internal checks and ritual immersion are only 
incumbent on married women, the only category conceived of as sexually 
active, or better formulated, as capable of reproduction. There are no special 
rites that accompany menarche. Menstruation itself amongst unmarried women 
does not involve any rites of purity, nor prohibitions on any forms of public 
religious participation like it did in biblical times. In line with the institution of 
marriage and the characteristic upbringing of boys and girls according to the 
rules of modesty, sexual contacts are only permitted once married. The laws of 
niddah as they are practised nowadays revolve entirely around women’s 
sexuality in the context of a monogamous conjugal relationship and her 
capability of producing children. There is no sexual education for girls or boys, 
as sexuality is only deemed appropriate and conceivable within the marital 
relationship. 
During the period of engagement between a young woman and man in 
strictly Orthodox Jewish communities, both bride and groom-to-be each receive 
their ‘sexual education’. This is meant to prepare them for married life and their 
duties tied to the commandment of procreation. Some more ‘conservative’ 
women in the community will teach the girls the pure theoretical laws. They 
will basically explain the way to ‘count’ the period they must refrain from 
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sexual or any physical contact whatsoever with their husbands, from the onset 
of their menstruation till seven days thereafter, until immersion in a mikvah. 
Some teachers or especially trained counsellors, however – as Rachel used to be 
–, try to turn these bridal courses into a more positive experience for young 
women. They try to offer more than the mere ‘dry’ legal aspects, or so Rachel 
told me. Listening to Rachel’s point of view, and following up on some 
arguments made in the previous chapter on education, it can be inferred – at 
least for groups or circles some of the women I talked to belong - that many 
young strictly Orthodox Jewish women nowadays, are educated and no longer 
‘ignorant’. It is impossible to completely protect them from the changes and 
‘openness’ in the outside world regarding gender and sexuality that prevail in 
modern society. According to Rachel, rather than for them to hear publicly, or 
by reading books that will:  
 
…give them a distorted view of how the Torah considers, you know the 
physical intimacy between a man and a woman, I would like to show 
them what’s beautiful and what’s positive and they shouldn’t see the 
ritual bath as something very archaic, as something which is a formal 
obligation which woman has to do, you know as a real duty a bit against 
her will… A girl who gets married, I want her to be happy, she should 
feel privileged that she can keep these laws and she should not see it as 
some remnant of the past, like all kinds of laws… You hear African 
tribes, which are primitive and are archaic and have no logical reason, 
but I want them to understand why they are doing it, they should 
understand that it’s something that they ought to feel happy about… 
 
The vast majority of both Hasidic and Hasidic -minded women I spoke to at 
least agreed to this viewpoint, in that they were convinced of the importance 
and the very positive aspects of the family purity laws. Most were also highly 
aware of the ignorance and misrepresentation of the practices in the outside 
world. Particularly the distinction between ritual purification and physical 
cleanliness was emphasised. During menstruation and seven days thereafter any 
form of direct or indirect physical contact between husband and wife is 
forbidden (e.g. passing objects to each other). The woman’s body is considered 
tumah or ritually impure, comparable to that of a dead person. This was 
explained to me by Leonie as the period when there is a breakdown of the 
possibility of a living creature to develo p: 
 
You mustn’t say clean and unclean… So during the week of your 
menstruation and a week after that… That’s your body developing, your 
body is developing for a baby, and after the ovulation it breaks it 
down… So imagine that body that was ready, that was the case already 
from that sixth day, so that’s still developing, and that’s nothing for 
‘Tom Thumb’, so no bodily contact, no passing anything to each other, 
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you put it down and he picks it up, I mean you don’t throw it to the other 
side, you put it down…   
 
Detailed laws exist as to when and how the niddah must count the five days 
from the onset of her menses. After the bleeding has completely ended, 
minimally counting a period of five days, the seven ‘white’ or ‘pure’ days 
commence, after the niddah has thoroughly inspected herself during the evening 
before sunset. According to one manual published in Dutch and distributed 
widely among brides of the Machsike Hadass (Zahler 1980: 34): 
 
First the lower part of the body must be washed. Then a clean white and 
soft cloth must be inserted with the finger as deep as possible, and 
moved back and forth in every direction. The cloth must be checked 
during daylight. Even if the smallest kind of bloodstain is discovered, 
and it is no longer possible to repeat it on the same day before sunset, 
the checking must be repeated the next day in the late afternoon, as 
described above. Not until this check does not show up any trace of 
blood, can the counting of the ‘seven pure days’ begin. The woman now 
applies clean white cloths. Moreover, she covers her bed with clean 
white sheets.    
 
In the chapter ‘The Countdown’ in another well-known manual on the family 
purity laws, also known to and used by some of the women I interviewed who 
themselves had counselled brides-to-be, Tehilla Abramov (1988) provides more 
information on the procedures to be followed after menstruation. The transition 
from niddah to taharah (ritual purity) is confirmed by what Abramov calls the 
hefsek taharah, the procedure quoted above. The cloth to be used, the bedikah, 
and the process of inspection must also fulfil all the necessary requirements. 
Details are given on the rules on all possible exceptions, such as status 
(pregnant, newly-weds, etc.), irregular periods, and irregular or questionable 
stains. When in doubt, Abramov (1988: 89-90) advises the following:  
 
If questionable stains are found on the cloth used for the last 
examination before sunset, the cloth should be put in an envelope, 
preferably after it is dry, to be taken later to a Rav.18 Nevertheless, the 
woman should continue with the taharah process until the Rav’s 
decision is made.    
 
Additional procedures such as a moch dochluk are described, when after a first 
inspection a second bedikah cloth can be inserted and left in the vagina ‘from 
before sunset until the emergence of three stars’. Numerous practical 
suggestions are made pertaining to underwear (preferably white), and keeping a 
personal calendar ‘to prevent mistakes’. Abramov (93) furthermore stresses the 
importance of counting in a continuous and complete way. The obligation of 
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the woman to count seven days is attributed to the verse ‘And she shall count 
for herself’ (VaYikra 15:29). Leonie though, informed me that she knew of men 
who assisted their wives: 
 
So you have to work out beforehand when that is, the woman does 
that…  The man can look over her shoulder... I do it myself and I don’t 
like it if my husband, for example, if he comes into the kitchen and he 
starts talking about the soup I say: ‘You know what, we’re not both 
going to stir the soup, I do it or you do it.’ I like fixed territories really, 
but anyway, that’s my problem, that’s my personality. But a lot of 
women do count together with their husbands. 
 
In the descriptions of the actual technical procedures the woman must follow, 
such as the counting, the above manuals in contrast, do not mention any 
involvement of the husband in any of the ritual procedures, except regarding the 
prohibition on intimate contacts and other forms of ‘inciting’ behaviour, 
similarly according to detailed rules. Rabbi Zwi Zahler (1980: 33) merely notes 
that during the ‘niddah separation’ (tr. from Dutch): 
 
…not only is intercourse prohibited, but also every approach and even 
every gesture, that may lead to an erotic impulse. Before everything, one 
must avoid all bodily contact, and definitely not sleep in one bed 
together.     
 
The other manuals reviewed, go into more detail on what is understood by 
erotic or inciting behaviour. The ‘hedge of roses’ as the rules are called by the 
Sages, according to Abramov (1988: 111):  
 
…will guide and instruct a couple how to behave in the wide variety of 
situations they will encounter while the woman is a niddah. Unless 
specified otherwise, these rules apply equally to both husband and wife.  
 
Both Abramov’s manual, and one by Rabbi Elyohu Blasz (5752), another 
manual distributed by the Machsike Hadass, give further details on the 
prohibitions. Firstly, husband and wife must not touch each other, directly or 
even indirectly by using an intermediate object. They must not hand objects to 
each other, sit on ‘moving’ chairs such as rocking chairs or swings, nor on a 
sofa unless another person or obvious object sits or is placed between them. 
Different rules apply to travelling, some more lenient as to the seating 
arrangements; others more specific such as eating from the same plate, or the 
wife preparing the water for her husband to wash himself with (Blasz 5752: 66). 
Abramov (114) applies this law to both husband and wife, both being 
prohibited from preparing water, or washing each other, or bathing in presence 
of one another.  
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As for the bedroom, separate beds are compulsory; a husband must not 
sit or lie on his wife’s bed, even if she is not in the room, as long as at the time 
she is in the same town. Gender differences regarding the regulations become 
apparent in both Abramov (1988) and Blasz (5752). For example, the wife is 
not allowed to lie on her husband’s bed in his presence, but is allowed to sit or 
lie on the bed in her husband’s absence. This rule thus seems to suggest that in 
this context the husband is more ‘easily incited’ than his wife. In Blasz (5752: 
65), it is furthermore stated that the wife may not make her husband’s bed in his 
presence: 
 
La femme ne doit pas faire le lit de son mari en sa présence, ni s’étendre 
sur son lit en sa présence. 
 
Abramov (1988: 114) does not make any gender differentiation here, applying 
this domestic activity to both partners: 
 
They may not prepare each other’s bed for sleeping in each other’s 
presence.  
 
Different rules applying to eating, carrying deviations form the usual norm, 
such as placing an object or unnecessary food item in between their plates. 
Abramov notes the wife may sit in a different place than usual. A couple may 
not eat or drink from the same plate, dish or cup. A husband may not eat or 
drink from his wife’s leftovers in her presence, only if someone else has first 
eaten from her leftovers, if they have been transferred to another plate, or if she 
has left the room. A woman in contrast, may eat from her husband’s leftovers. 
One can obviously pose the question to what extent the gender differentiation in 
these rules has to do with inciting behaviour, or bears connection with the more 
negative view on women’s impurity as ‘pollution’ during her status of niddah. 
Blasz (5752: 67) lists some forms of behaviour which are not permitted during 
a meal: 
 
En général, on doit éviter tout ce qui pourrait amener à des relations plus 
closes. Pour cela il est défendu d’entretenir des conversations 
affectueuses, et d’avoir un comportement léger. Il convient pour la 
femme de porter un vêtement spécial ou un coiffe spéciale pendant la 
période enitière de Nidda pour leur rappeler son statut. 
 
Although Abramov (114) does not include any rules that have to ‘mark’ the 
wife, showing her status of niddah, similar rules preventing mutual sexual 
attraction are included under the rubric ‘additional restrictions’: 
 
A husband and wife may not engage in flirtatious behaviour that may 
lead to sexual desire. (Obviously, this does not mean that during the 
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time the woman is a niddah, he and her husband must appear grumpy or 
sour faced!) During this time, a woman should take care to appear 
attractive, but not provocative, to her husband. 
 
Additional restrictions in both Abramov and Blasz include the prohibition on 
the husband seeing his wife undress or any parts of her body which are 
normally covered. He may not smell her perfume, on her, or on her clothes. He 
may not listen to her singing. If one of the spouses is ill and needs to be taken 
care of by the other, the laws still apply or a rabbi must be consulted.   
Many of the rules which apply during this period of ‘the hedge of roses’ 
between husband and wife, for the greater part seem to be directed at men’s 
possible initiatives upon being attracted to the woman, who is the one who must 
take care she does not provoke him. This is in line with the general rule of 
tzniut, or modesty to be discussed later on. My interviewees more or less 
seemed to repeat some of the same laws and details as stated in the manuals, 
which seems to suggest that they were important for what it meant to be 
religiously observant. Although they did not go into any aspects of private or 
intimate life, and they certainly did not comment on how they personally 
experienced the laws and their relationship, it did seem that there were no 
doubts as to the prohibitions on certain kinds of contact between women and 
men. Leonie for example, told me about a recent film she saw, a fictive 
portrayal of the Hasidic community of Antwerp in the seventies. Although she 
did not normally watch TV, she claimed she had had to watch the film for an 
essay by some student. She claimed the well-known director and actor of the 
film had simply gone to a rabbi in Amsterdam for advice on how to give a 
realistic portrayal, especially concerning the rules of interaction between 
women and men in Hasidic communities.19 Leonie, however, claimed: 
 
Simply every movement in the film is completely wrong. Like when she 
takes his coat… I mean, obviously they want to show how subservient 
the Hasidic wife is to her husband, of course she might well be 
subservient as far as I know, but she would never take his coat, she’ll 
never touch him, you never see that, never walking hand in hand in 
public and that… 
 
The manuals similarly provide detailed proscriptions regarding the actual 
technical procedures of the ritual of immersion in the mikvah, the ritual bath. 
After the seven white or spotless days and nights of counting, after the last 
inspection, the woman must prepare herself  for the evening visit to the mikvah 
for ritual immersion. The immersion must only take place at night, according to 
Abramov (1988: 134) ‘after at least three stars are visible’.  If the woman for 
any reason cannot visit the mikvah on the particular evening, she may immerse 
on the eighth day, but only after consulting a rabbi. Abramov adds to this, that 
if a wife’s husband is out of town, ‘it is preferable that she postpone her 
THE DIFFERENTIATED SUBJECT IN CONTEXT:  
BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC IN RELIGIOUS IDENTITY 
 432
immersion until his return. Nevertheless, the halachah allows her to immerse 
regardless’. From laws or interpretations of laws such as these, we can infer that 
not only are sexual relations permitted; they are even encouraged at the moment 
when the woman regains her status as ritually pure, a moment often coinciding 
with her period of ovulation. Husbands are encouraged to organise their 
business trips so they do not even miss the time of their wife’s immersion.  
For the preparation for immersion in the mikvah, the woman must wash 
herself from head to toe, so she is already ‘clean’ befo rehand. Many informants 
appropriated this law as ‘proof’ that physical cleanliness had nothing to do with 
ritual purity. As explained in all the manuals on taharat hamishpachah, this is in 
order to be rid of any kind of ‘intervening substance’ (chatzitzah) between the 
body and the water. The washing procedure is thorough and detailed, requiring 
the washing, untangling and combing of the hair, the combing or separating of 
all other body hair, the cutting of finger- and toenails, cleaning of ears and 
earring holes, brushing and flossing of teeth, etc. All extra-bodily attributes 
must be removed such as jewellery, glasses, plasters or bandages, make-up, and 
even contact lenses and false teeth.20 Extra regulations exist as to the body hair, 
dandruff or lice, hair dyes and conditioners, scabs, splinters, coloured or 
hardened skin, etc. The woman must inspect her body as to make sure there is 
no chatzitzah, any kind of substance, however minute, that may come between 
her body and the water and thereby render the immersion invalid. All the 
manuals advise her to ‘take it easy’, and make sure, the preparation can be 
started during the day and without a rush. 
The manuals prescribe how the immersion in the mikvah at night must 
proceed (except for Zahler 1980). They refer to the assistance of the balanit 
(mikvah attendant, officially a Jewish female person above the age of twelve), 
who must supervise the immersion itself and pronounce it kosher. The 
immersion requires the whole body to be under water at once. The woman must 
therefore stand upright, yet relaxed and spread her legs and arms, gently closing 
her eyes and lips. After immersing completely, she must stand up again and 
recite the following blessing (beracha): 
 
Blessed are You, God, our Lord, King of the world, who has sanctified 
us with His commandments and commanded us concerning immersion.      
      
Zahler (1980: 35) mentions that a second immersion is required after saying the 
beracha, whilst both Abramov (1988) and Blasz (5752) claim the procedure has 
ended, or ends upon final confirmation by the balanit. The niddah has now 
changed her status to that of taharah and may resume ‘marital life’.     
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The Personal: Re/Interpreting Niddah  
 
Although the women I interviewed would not discuss the laws of niddah at the 
level of their personal experience, or give the kind of technical details that I 
could find in the manuals, some women did tell me about their understandings 
and attitudes towards the laws at a more general level, as expressed in the quote 
from Rachel ab ove. Similar to Rachel’s perspective, there was definitely an 
emphasis on the positive aspects of the laws. They were legitimised through 
multiple forms of discourse, beyond that of religious law. This kind of positive 
reinterpretation is expressed in many types of literature on taharat 
hamishpachah. This includes some of the more autobiographical work by 
individual Orthodox Jewish women (Frankiel 1990; Greenberg 1998), the more 
proscriptive literature on women’s role in traditionalist Judaism (Kaufman 
1995; Meiselman 1978), and the educational or practical manuals used, or at 
least distributed in strictly Orthodox Jewish communities (Abramov 1988), 
including those by the authorities of the Machsike Hadass (Blasz 5752; Zahler 
1980). Finally, some of the social scientific research on Orthodox Jewish 
women has focussed on the laws of niddah, albeit similarly at the level of how 
women interpret the laws during an interview (Kaufman 1993; Marmon 1999).  
As argued above, the literature provides insight into the extent and the 
way in which more ‘feminist’ and also Progressive Jewish perspectives on, and 
condemnations of the laws of family purity are contested by counter-discourses 
in terms of legitimising the laws as central to Jewish women’s ritual practice 
and identity. Debra Kaufman (1993 [1991]) in her interviews with ba’alot 
teshuvah in the U.S., places these women’s own understandings and language 
central, rather than what may be perceived as the ‘abstractions’ in many Jewish 
feminist critiques of the laws of niddah, and women’s status in Judaism more 
generally. Kaufman (1993: 68-70) argues that the interpretations of the family 
purity laws by her interviewees, serve as an illustration par excellence of one of 
her main theses. In reality and practice, whereas the ba’alot teshuvah may 
observe patriarchal law, they do reinterpret it, thereby ‘accommodating and 
recasting’ Orthodox ritual. Naomi Marmon’s (1999) research into 
contemporary mikvah practice based on interviews with Boston Orthodox 
Jewish women (ranging from modern Orthodox to Hasidic) similarly focuses on 
the women’s own feelings and experiences in regards to the laws of niddah. The 
differentiated research population and the results of the exercise nevertheless 
proved more variable in terms of positive and more ambivalent attitudes. 
In my own interviews, the overall very positive attitude towards the laws 
of family purity was expressed through various kinds of legitimising discourses, 
including statements which often proved to be exact replicas of some of the 
ideas put forth in the manuals. Here I repeat the last sentence of the above quote 
by Rachel, when she emphasised that as for the young girls in the community of 
today, she wanted to go beyond a mere ‘dry theoretical’ explanation and 
teaching of the laws of niddah [emphasis mine]: 
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…I want them to understand why they are doing it, they should 
understand that it’s something that they ought to feel happy about… 
 
Rachel gave me an example of the meanings of ritual immersion in the mikvah, 
she taught to  her students: 
 
So I explain to them for example, the mikvah, the purity of water, water 
in all ages and in all times, it’s always been a symbol of purity for man, 
it connects between heaven and earth… I’m just giving you small 
examples, like you know, raindrops, they fall from heaven and they 
come, they fall on the earth, that’s what brings growth, that’s what 
brings blossoming to this world… When you go to the mikvah, it’s a bit 
of a new birth, and because when a woman goes under the water she’s a 
bit in a foetal position, like a baby in the mother’s womb… And I 
explain to them, when the baby’s in the mother’s womb it also bathes in 
a liquid, and when its born and they pull the head up and then life 
begins… I tell them that’s exactly what you do every month, after all the 
relationship between the husband and the wife is something which, it… 
How shall I tell you, it changes, it develops, there’s a constant evolution, 
its not… Life would be very sad, very monotonous if we weren’t 
developing and changing, constantly something new that comes up 
every month, and I try to explain them… Just as life changes, we make 
mistakes and we do sometimes things which we could have perhaps 
done differently, but every month God is giving us a new chance to start 
off anew, like a new birth… You go to the mikvah and you feel 
refreshed, you feel a bit pure and perhaps you were depressed before, 
perhaps you felt a bit low, and now there’s life… 
 
The identification of the mikvah with the womb is also made in an article 
excerpt of a book by Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan called Waters of Eden, which is 
included in a collection of articles titled La Splendeur et le bonheur Du Foier 
Juif (1980), and distributed by the Machsike Hadass. Both Orthodox Jewish 
scholars Tamar Frankiel (1990: 83) and Michael Kaufman (1995: 146-7) also 
refer to the same Rabbi as an authoritative expert on the subject. Although the 
article is not specifically directed at the laws of family purity, - in fact, a person 
immersing is consistently referred to as ‘he’ - similar parallels between 
immersion and rebirth are made.21 Immersion in water as the essence of 
‘impermanence’, symbolises a state of non-existence and non-life, whereby a 
person completely ‘subjugates his ego to God’. The mikvah also represents a 
grave, which according to the writer is not a contradiction with the 
representation of the womb: ‘Both are nodes in the cycle of birth and death, and 
when a person passes through one of these modes, he attains a totally new 
status’. Some of my informants made the similar comparison between the 
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mikvah and life, but related death to tumah, impurity during women’s status of 
niddah, such as expressed by Hannah: 
 
The principle is, that when a woman gets her menstruation, there is a 
certain breakdown of the possibility that there was for a living creature 
to develop. You can compare it to a dead person, it is tumah, impure. 
It’s the same idea when a woman gets her menstruation, there was the 
possibility, but a living creature did not develop, which makes the 
woman impure and she has to be separated from her husband, they may 
not touch and so forth… 
 
Abramov’s manual (1988: 122-3) only briefly touches upon the philosophical 
and mystical insights behind the mikvah, similarly referring to the notion of 
tumah as revolving around the absence of life. So according to this viewpoint, 
and focussed on the specific experience of women and ritual purification in the 
mikvah, the loss of a potential life is a source of tumah, to be transitioned into 
taharah through immersion in water, according to Abramov (1988: 123), the 
source of new life:         
 
The divine commandment of immersion in a mikvah can be seen as a 
transition from a connection to death to the renewal of life. Beneath the 
mikvah’s waters, a woman rejuvenates herself and once again becomes 
a potential partner with God and her husband in the act of creation. She 
emerges from the life-giving waters ‘born anew’ and ready to conceive 
anew. 
 
The two themes of both death and impurity on the one hand, and purification 
through living waters, symbolic of renewal and life as a privilege, on the other, 
according to Blu Greenberg (1998: 112) are typical of the dualistic, ambiguous 
(or what she elsewhere calls ‘dialectic’, see previous paragraph) perspective 
towards women and their sexuality in general. The two themes are then 
illustrative expressions of the two different contexts in which the laws of niddah 
are situated in the Torah alongside other laws of impurity, defilement and death, 
and secondly, those forbidding sexual relations. This dual influence is then 
reflected in contemporary literature. On the one hand impurity, defilement and 
minute details are expressed, whilst other times married love, the holiness of 
sex and mutual respect are emphasised.  
Rachel felt that explaining ritual immersion in terms of its symbolism 
and possible philosophical background – the why behind the law – would 
facilitate the education of this mitzvah for brides-to-be. It would encourage and 
facilitate the performance of ritual practice by way of offering a interpretative 
framework. However, some of my informants, and Tehilla Abramov in her 
manual, modify the importance of philosophical interpretation. Thus, Susan 
claimed when I asked her if the mikvah was also symbolic: 
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Yes, there are whole books about it because water is very important for 
us, water is life, is the Torah, water represents the knowledge of the 
Torah and as I said there are all sorts of books about the spiritual sign of 
this… But for us, besides the spiritual sign they are also commanded, so 
even if you don’t understand any spiritual side of things…  
C: To do it? 
We do it, and we do it, because God commanded it, we are performing a 
commandment of God, when we eat a piece of cake, we say thank you 
for... Uh, giving us the cake, and whatever else we do, is because we 
were commanded.  
C: Would you say me asking why-questions isn’t right, that it’s the 
performance itself… 
No, you see all those books, so a lot of the books are on the question of 
why we do the mitzvot, but on the one hand we’re not supposed to ask 
why, and the mitzvot are divided among really three kinds. There are 
mitzvot which we don’t really understand the reason, there are mitzvot 
which we understand the reason for, like not to kill, not to steal, and 
there are mitzvot which we understand the reason in a different way. For 
instance Pesach, is a mitzvah to remind us that we went out of Egypt or 
Sabbath, is a mitzvah to remind us that God created the world, this is 
one of the reasons, right, uh, however, even the mitzvot like don’t steal 
or be nice to your friends or whatever… If we do them only because 
they are socially uh, normal, not because God commanded them, then 
that’s not enough, so we can find reasons for all the mitzvot, even the 
ones that we don’t understand, it could be because of this, it could be 
because of that… But we’re not supposed to do them because of that. Of 
course knowing the reason, even if we don’t know that is the reason, 
giving spiritual significance to something enhances the performance of 
the mitzvah, it makes it more pleasant for us to do as well… 
 
Both Abramov (1988: 122) and Kaufman (1993/1995: 146) similarly claim that 
the ‘reasons’ for the laws of niddah are very much subjugated to their 
acceptance as a mitzvah commanded by God. They simply must be performed, 
regardless of any philosophical content or ultimate rationale. Again, this would 
seem consistent with the general characterisation of Judaism as a religious 
tradition, and the way it is followed in contemporary traditionalist Jewish 
communities, with an emphasis on practice and law above belief and 
philosophical speculation as described in the previous chapter. The statements 
by both my interviewees and in the Orthodox Jewish literature and manuals, 
nonetheless appear to contradict on what seems to be a discourse of 
legitimisation, or even propagation of the laws of family purity, in terms of 
their absolute centrality and numerous ‘benefits’ for all.  
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Apologetic Discourse and Additional Benefits 
 
The first part of a booklet (in Dutch) published by the Chabad community 
authorities in Antwerp (Zahler 1980), covers some thirty-one pages on what are 
conceived to be central issues concerning the laws of niddah, such as the 
‘contemporary family’, marital problems, medical benefits (eleven pages in 
total!), and the general primacy of the laws according to halakhah. The second 
part of the booklet then again, discusses the more technical details – how to 
practice the laws - only compromising some six pages (including addresses of 
mikvahs all over Europe at the back).  
The types of discourse presented in both explaining and legitimising the 
practice of taharat hamishpachah do not so much revolve around religious 
philosophy and symbolism, but concern the concrete functions and ‘additional’ 
benefits of maintaining the laws, primarily in medical, psycho-sexual terms and 
sociological terms. The medical benefits of the laws of niddah were not 
emphasised largely by my interviewees, nor are any detailed medical benefits 
mentioned in the literature by Orthodox Jewish women themselves. As far as 
some of the manuals, and the books by Orthodox Jewish scholars Michael 
Kaufman (1995) and Moshe Meiselman (1978) on the woman in Jewish law are 
concerned, however, the mode of offering various scientific ‘proof’ and citing 
medical specialists on health benefits takes on a typical form.  
Zahler (1980: 13) for example, claims that the very laws that were 
historically honed by non-Jews, are nowadays acknowledged among all 
‘civilised’ peoples. This includes the necessity of a weekly rest day, and 
circumcision in order to prevent many diseases as practised in many maternity 
clinics in the U.S. Before Zahler turns to his eleven pages of medical literature 
on the health benefits of taharat hamishpachah, the author builds in the 
reservation that ‘the scientific meaning of a Godly law can never do justice to 
the deeper content thereof’. However, this does not prevent an exposé of all 
possible diseases and infections that according to the author can be avoided by 
practising the laws of family purity. By applying medical terminology, such as 
‘the bacteria of Döderlein’ and ‘microflora’, Zahler (1980: 14-15) explains how 
during women’s menstruation, described as ‘the result of an internal wound’, 
there is higher risk of infection as there is less resistance to bacteria from the 
outside. This includes venereal diseases such as syphilis, gonorrhoea, and 
infection of the oviducts, which is why ‘according to the opinion of prominent 
gynaecologists’ sexual contacts must be avoided. 
Other more ‘indirect’ benefits of taharah hamishpachah would be the 
prevention of ‘women’s diseases’, especially through the self-inspections that 
must be performed outside of menstruation. Zahler furthermore claims that for 
any general disease the women is ‘weaker’, and therefore less resistant during 
her ‘difficult days’ when her ‘organism is weakened’. The writer claims for 
example, that in seventy-five percent of the cases when polio is transferred, this 
happens during women’s menstruation (15): 
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…not only sexual relations, but even every form of erotic excitement 
such as cuddling or physical rapprochement during the critical days can 
bring damage to the already weakened female organism, even apart 
from the question of infection. This can lead to an overstimulation of the 
nerves and a serious disturbance of mental balance. 
 
That this excerpt quotes an article on the ‘Sensitization of Guinea Pigs par 
Vaginam’, only underlines the extent to which the perceived authority of 
medical science is not only used to justify gender through sexual, physical 
difference, but also how the medical language itself is injected with gender 
meanings. In this discourse which is used as a means of justification for the 
practice of religious law and ritual, the feminine body is often constructed as 
passive, fragile and weak, susceptible to stronger dangerous forces ‘from the 
outside’, leading to all kinds of terrible infectious diseases, or as the channel for 
the development of other contagious conditions. The state of the ‘wounded’ 
womb is then extrapolated to the whole feminine organism. This is considered 
weak for a period of at least twelve days a month during women’s reproductive 
life cycle, and even affecting her psychological or mental state. All possible 
organs are perceived to be influenced by the monthly cycle, according to the 
writer this ranges from rectal temperature, pulse and blood pressure, endocrine 
system, pupils, blood vessels, lungs, metabolism, to urine, etc. (Zahler 1980: 
17): 
 
In America the non-Jewish doctor dr. M.MC. Stopes, a scientist by 
name, and whose own marriage broke up, has been trying to find a 
connection between the monthly oscillations in the functions of the 
different organs and sexual life for decades. In her important work 
‘Married Love’, she leaves us a legacy, which once again proves to 
deliver a ‘medical certificate’, for the extraordinary meaning of Taharat 
Hamischpachah.  
 
Despite the inbuilt reservations that scientific ‘proof ‘ as such does not function 
an ultimate rationale for the observance of the God-given laws of niddah, the 
author nonetheless pays a considerable amount of attention to what is 
considered the universal truth surrounding sex, health and the sexualised body. 
An altogether separate chapter discusses the ‘feared disease’ of cervical cancer, 
- also referred to in Kaufman (1995: 153-154) and Meiselman’s (1978: 128) 
books  - which is stated to be much less frequent among women Jewish 
women.22 Again, Zahler builds the argument that there would be a connection 
with those women who practise taharat hamishpachah, firstly ascribed to the 
Jewish marriage with its ‘sexual morals’ and abhorrence for promiscuity, and 
secondly the same greater risk of infection during menstruation, which is 
annulled by practising sexual abstinence, as argued above. Finally, it is argued 
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that even the whole public health is benefited, as the Jewish child is conceived 
at a time when both the wife and the husband’s health is in its most optimal 
state.  
Typical of many contemporary traditionalist religious movements in the 
modern world, the hegemony of scientific knowledge is appropriated rather 
than posed as an antithesis to religious discourse, in this case mutually 
reinforcing each other as both heavily invested with the dynamics of gender, 
power and control. 23 In a recent analysis of the ways in which the rhetoric 
surrounding the otherwise fairly consistent set of rules and practices 
surrounding niddah has changed throughout history, Jonah Steinberg (1997) 
argues that it was paradoxically the very belief in the ‘inaccessibility of divine 
intent’ regarding the laws, which allowed for its changing theorisation. The 
rhetoric has developed from the dominant theme of danger and revulsion 
associated with menstruation in the work of classical and medieval rabbinic 
commentators, to the very different form of apologetics in contemporary 
popular modern Orthodox manuals and guidebooks on taharat hamishpachah. 
Regarding justification through medical discourse, Steinberg notes this 
theme is not entirely new. Nahmanides, also known as Ramban, the twelfth-
century Catalonian rabbi and physician, in a commentary upon Leviticus 18:19 
gives a blend of medical and spiritual ideas. In the passage Steinberg (1997: 13-
14) quotes, Nahmanides explicitly refutes the earlier biblical view on the 
prohibition of sexual intercourse during menstruation, in function of the blood 
being women’s contribution to the formation of the foetus. Nahmanides does, 
however, attribute notions of pollution, danger, and literal uncleanness to 
menstrual blood. He views intercourse with a menstruant who is ‘harmful’ and 
‘contagious’ for the formation of child, as well as for the men around her. 
According to Steinberg, Nahmanides’ justification of the laws of niddah, 
drawing upon the medical knowledge of the time, is illustrative of a typical 
tendency - rather than an anomaly - in rabbinic commentary. Thus in 
Steinberg’s view, the way scientific discourse is used in order to defend the 
laws in itself is not wholly ‘modern’. It is a typical feature of the way wisdom 
external to Jewish literature is used to prove that the commandments of the 
Torah are the guidelines for an ideal life. In this respect, Nahmanides’ account 
in terms of legitimising the laws of niddah and the gender constructions and 
discourse on sexuality, are not so radically different from those proposed by 
Zahler and in other recent manuals. 
Another form of discourse in defence of the laws of family purity, and 
as presented by the majority of my interviewees and the majority of 
contemporary manuals does appear to be wholly new. This furthermore deeply 
contradicts attitudes such as prevalent in the Middle Ages that considered 
menstruation and the menstruant as polluting and dangerous. Steinberg (1997) 
goes so far as to speak of a complete reversal of the older rather misogynous 
view towards menstruation. In popular modern Orthodox rhetoric ideas of 
attention, affection and companionship between husband and wife are defended 
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as intrinsic values to the laws of niddah. The rhetoric Steinberg is referring to 
may not be limited to modern Orthodox communities alone. Similar values and 
attitudes were presented by many of my own strictly Orthodox informants, and 
are presented in the manuals they are familiar with. The ‘benefits’ of sexual 
abstinence during women’s period as a niddah, are described in terms of the 
marital relationship in its psychological function of sexual restraint and mutual 
attraction. According to Chana, who claimed there was ‘a lot of wisdom’ to the 
laws of family purity:  
 
…When your menstruation begins, you’re forbidden to your husband, 
right, and then the menstruation ends and then you count seven days, 
and then its so… To a certain degree it’s lovely, you’re never sick of 
each other, right, there’s always something fresh to look forward to, so 
when you go… and then as a result, something else say… 
 
Before she continued, Chana asked me if I was married, which I answered in 
the negative:  
 
The most marvellous thing that God ever created is that when man and 
wife can be together, there’s nothing more beautiful than that. But on the 
other hand this, when you have this sometimes, you don’t need to talk so 
much, or sometimes you do talk, but what I have found, looking back… 
How old was I when I got married, about twenty-three? So about 
twenty, twenty-five years of menstruating and counting, in the days that 
we… We were not allowed for each other, there was much more 
closeness, verbal closeness, there was much more talking, because we 
couldn’t touch, right… So it’s another area whereas now there’s a lot of 
touching, hah hah, and talking as well, but when you’re young it’s 
different, there was… I say all said and done, I think this is a wonderful 
thing, I think this is a wonderful thing, and I can’t say I think everything 
is wonderful, that would be a lie right, but I see only benefits from it… 
 
Hannah told similarly told me about the different kind of relationship that 
evolves when physical and sexual contacts are off limits:  
 
It doesn’t mean that the husband has to stop loving her… In a way a 
spiritual love is developed to the person and not to the body… 
 
This type of discourse in both explanation and defence of taharat hamishpachah 
features even more prominently than the medical rhetoric in both interviews 
with (strictly) Orthodox Jewish women, and in many of the manuals and 
literature by Orthodox Jewish women and men. For example, Frankiel (1990: 
81) notes that many women seem to experience a shift in the marital 
relationship, where love and care are not merely expressed in a physical way. 
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Abramov (1988) devotes an entire chapter of her manual titled ‘Making the 
heart grow fonder’ to the benefits of physical abstinence in order to allow for 
the development of an even ‘closer connection’ between husband and wife. 
Abramov (1988: 98-99) points to the fact that many psychologists and marriage 
counsellors adopt similar approaches in guiding couples with marital problems, 
this time turning to psychological rather than medical discourse as a means of 
further justification. Kaufman (1995: 147) similarly argues abstinence can be 
viewed as: ‘a medium through which Jewish couples can develop a strong, 
healthy relationship rooted in mutual attachment that is nonsexual’. Both 
authors claim that these benefits must not be seen as an end in and of 
themselves, and then shift to religious discourse and the laws of separation as 
first and foremost divinely commanded. They must be placed within the much 
larger goal and purpose of marriage, which is to develop a ‘spiritual union’, or a 
relationship founded on ‘spirit, emotion and mutual understanding.’ Moshe 
Meiselman (1978: 129), after stressing the tangible medical benefits, similarly 
recurs to religious discourse: ‘The medical facts may well be an indication of 
some overriding divine plan, and one who views the Torah as God’s word will 
stand awestruck at the coincidence of the laws of the Torah with the laws of 
nature. Beyond this, however, we cannot proceed’.   
Steinberg (1997) argues that the emphasis in the literature on ‘attention, 
affection and companionship’ suggests a complete shift from the earlier view 
on the complete avoidance of the contaminating menstruant, towards the 
opposite of bonding, emotional proximity and ‘intimacy without touch’ during 
the period of menstruation between husband and wife. Steinberg furthermore 
notes that this type of literature is extremely selective in its presentation of 
earlier Jewish religious discourse on the subject, as the association of 
menstruation with pollution is completely denied. Kaufman (1995: 146) for 
example, notes that despite the ‘blood taboos abound in primitive societies’, 
critics who suggest the same of the laws of niddah ‘reflect an unawareness of 
the reality of Halachah. Menstrual blood does not contaminate.’    
It is obviously difficult to attain precisely how, and when, this form of 
psychological discourse evolved. The consistency with what many of my 
interviewees claimed was striking. Marmon’s (1999) interviews with a variety 
of Orthodox Jewish women shows how the majority of the women at least 
claimed verbal communication in their relationships was heightened during 
their status of niddah. Although several women believed this contributed to the 
strength of their own marriages, others claimed physical separation caused 
emotional distance, rather than the closeness that is propagated in many of the 
manuals and contemporary literature. Debra Kaufman’s (1993: 78) research on 
ba’alot teshuvah similarly claims a good number of women interviewed, 
suggested that the period of separation forced them and their husband to 
communicate differently, which was interpreted in a very positive way.      
Another additional benefit of taharat hamishpachah for the marital 
relationship, - this time focusing on the explicit sexual component thereof - 
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does not appear to be entirely novel, as much of the contemporary literature 
quotes the same statement by Rabbi Meir from the Talmudic tractate Niddah 
(Kaufman 1995: 149):  
 
Why did the Torah require a period of seven days of separation? 
Because by becoming overly familiar with his wife [marital relations 
become routine and] repulsion sets in. The Torah therefore ordained 
seven days of separation so that she will be beloved [by her husband on 
the day of her immersion in the mikveh] as she was at the time she 
entered the bridal canopy.  
 
Moshe Meiselman (1978: 126-127) translates the second sentence somewhat 
differently: 
 
For, since the husband is accustomed to his wife, he may begin to find 
her unpleasing. 
 
Steinberg (1997: 18-19) and Rachel Biale’s (1984: 172) citations also focus on 
the husband’s sentiments, yet then again apply much stronger and more 
demeaning terminology. Steinberg claims the husband to be ‘repelled’ by the 
wife, and Biale’s translation is that the husband might ‘develop a loathing 
toward her’. Whatever the exact intention of the Sages, it is clear that in this 
excerpt on the benefits of the laws, that not only is the man taken as the subject 
or agent, but it is definitely his sexual desire and pleasure (or absence thereof) 
for the woman that is central. Kaufman (1995: 147), however, uses this excerpt 
in order to argue that the laws can serve as an antidote to the ‘monotony’ of 
sexual relations for both husband and wife: ‘Denying the married couple the 
right of constant access heightens mutual attraction and maintains a continuous 
fascination’. Steinberg remarks that for many of the manuals, a shift takes place 
from the man’s perspective to mutual sexual attraction and the indirect 
acknowledgment of women’s sexual desires towards gender neutrality, which is 
also expressed in Kaufman’s (1993) and Marmon’s (1999) interviews. Most of 
the ba’alot teshuvah claimed abstinence caused increased sexual interest and 
pleasure within the marriage. Marmon found that over a half of the women she 
interviewed experienced a ‘sense of rejuvenation’, and a temporal renewal, 
especially on the night returning from the mikvah. One-fifth of the women she 
interviewed by contrast saw abstinence and the subsequent pressure to have sex 
as a negative experience, which seemed to be determined by the general state of 
the marital relationship. In my interviews this form of benefit of increased 
sexual attraction was also mentioned, usually in the same gender neutral terms, 
as stated by Hannah: 
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These laws are an education for both men and women, for example 
when you have a very special meal every day it’s not so nice any more, 
when something is not allowed, it gets a certain freshness. 
 
Rachel also stressed the advantage of the laws for breaking monotony, when 
she told me what she told her brides-to-be during their taharat hamishpachah 
education: 
 
You’re starting off a new relationship with your husband and life is not 
monotonous, because there’s been a period of separation, and that sort 
of… It creates also a bit of a more of a physical attraction. I try to 
explain to them that physical attraction is something very positive, 
there’s nothing to be ashamed about it. There is such a thing as feeling 
pleasure and it’s very legitimate and it’s a very positive thing, but a 
couple should feel mutual attraction and the mikvah a bit helps… It 
tends to bring back the physical attraction, you haven’t touched each 
other for two weeks and then you sort of get together again, well, life’s a 
bit more pleasant after that… 
 
Esther also made some comparisons: 
 
I remember a comic where a group of men are all looking at a woman 
who is covered at the beach, instead of naked women… If you see, then 
you don’t lust for these things. It’s like hiding jewellery, if you wear a 
piece every day, then it loses its specialness, whilst if you put it away for 
a few weeks and then wear it again, this makes it nice again. It makes it 
holy, this is not easy to explain...  
 
 
The Sanctification of Sexuality 
 
The relationship between sexuality and holiness was another aspect emphasised 
by some of my interviewees. In Samuel Heilman’s (1992: 329-330) 
ethnographic monograph, in a chapter on the subject of sexuality based on an 
interview with a married couple from the Reb Arelach Hasidim in Israel, the 
author infers that in this community, or at least as taught by their rabbi to men, 
the commandment of procreation completely overrides sexual pleasure itself. 
Sexuality must be suppressed, or at least one had to be aware that in bed, there 
‘were always three marriage partners: husband, wife and their creator.’ In 
contrast to what may seem a very ascetic view on sexual pleasure - 
commanding the act, yet denouncing bodily pleasure (at least as directed 
towards the Hasidic men in this community) -, many of my informants claimed 
there was no such negative view on both sexuality or sexual pleasure itself. The 
important thing was that this remained within the strict boundaries of the law, 
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accompanied with the emphasis on monthly self-restraint. Susan claimed the 
following: 
 
There’s not a split between the holy and the profane in Judaism, 
everything is a mixture and our sexual life is also a mixture. That means 
we don’t believe as the Christians do that… I think it was Saint 
Augustine or Saint Paul who said it’s better to marry than to burn, but 
that it’s better to be celibate… That’s absolutely not right, just as God 
wants us to be together, he wants us to be together in a physical way as 
well and enjoy it, and this is part of it just as much as any other part of 
any other spiritual… We have to imbue our physical life with 
spirituality, by saying a blessing when we’re eating, we imbue our 
physical life with spirituality and by having sex with our husband, not 
just with somebody we meet on the street, we’re doing the same…  
                                           
In their books on the status of women in Judaism, both Orthodox Jewish 
scholars Michael Kaufman (1995: 123) and Moshe Meiselman (1978: 116) 
similarly claim how the Jewish view of sexuality radically differs from 
Christian doctrine, which conceives sexuality as a ‘necessary evil’ or debasing. 
In contrast, Judaism would recognise that sexuality is both natural, neither 
inherently evil or good, but to be elevated to the divine or ‘to be imbued with 
holiness, sexual activity must be performed in a licit manner that reflects 
elevated human conduct’. Solely within the context of marriage and related to 
men’s mitzvah of procreation and sexual relations, does the fulfilment thereof 
imply that sexuality is a means of sanctifying, of attaining kedushah (holiness).  
Both Debra Kaufman (1993) and Naomi Marmon (1999) in their 
research similarly point to the theme of the sanctification of sexuality. A large 
number of women interviewed by Marmon (1999: 146) claimed – and as 
similarly expressed in the statement by Susan above - that for them, observing 
the laws of niddah elevated the sexual act from ‘simple gratification of the 
basest carnal desires to a hallowed event with spiritual significance’. Sexual 
relations imbued with kedushah therefore do not necessarily imply the 
repression or denial of physical pleasure. As I did not probe into any of my 
informants’ personal sexual life, it remains open whether this form of discourse 
can be viewed as mere justificatory rhetoric; presumably, much depends on the 
person and the relationship. Although Rachel for example, was quite open and 
positive about the laws of niddah, she also warned that this must not necessarily 
be the case among all the women in her community: 
 
Let’s say not everybody believes in this open way of looking at things, I 
don’t know if in the Hasidic world they will agree with it always… I 
don’t think it will be uncomfortable to talk to you about it, I mean unless 
they’re not totally convinced themselves, it can be uncomfortable if you 
go to bring up a question which has been bothering a woman for years 
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and she is doing something, let’s say against her will, and she… And 
you bring it out in the open, it could be, then it could be at that 
moment… 
 
It is also possible that there are differences between ‘frummies’ and the ba’alot 
teshuvah, such as in Kaufman’s research, concerning both the extent they are 
prepared to discuss, and perhaps even experience taharat hamishpachah and 
sexual relationships. Kaufman suggests this in her own research, particularly as 
almost all the women she interviewed made references to the laws of onah, the 
commandment on men to sexually satisfy their wives.24 According to Michael 
Kaufman (1995: 128-9), onah is in fact one of the three fundamental obligations 
the husband takes on upon marriage. Besides providing her clothing and 
sustenance, he is commanded to give her pleasure: 
 
The Torah and the Talmud reveal a sensitivity of female sexuality. The 
Sages teach that the woman’s drive is a more powerful one and that her 
passion is greater than that of the man. The married woman is granted a 
greater right to fulfillment than is her husband; the obligation is placed 
on the man to provide his wife with fulfillment. 
 
The mitzvah of onah in fact appears to be halakhically required. The man has a 
minimal obligation to have regular relations with his wife, depending on his 
‘physical capabilities and his occupation’.A wife can prevent her husband from 
changing profession for example, if this will reduce the frequency of their 
marital relations. A husband is also required to have relations with his wife if 
she ‘indicates a desire’, or he can ‘anticipate’ her desire. Impotence, inadequacy 
or the conscious neglect of the wife’s needs and inability to fulfil conjugal 
obligations appear to constitute legal grounds for financial compensation for the 
wife, or even divorce. Besides the emphasis on quantity, according to 
Meiselman (1978: 119), the Talmud also requires that the husband ensure his 
wife’s satisfaction. Kaufman (1995: 133) quotes Maimonides on the wife’s 
entitlement to divorce: 
 
If a woman says, ‘My husband is repugnant and I cannot willingly be 
intimate with him,’ we compel him to divorce her forthwith, for she is in 
no way like a captive who is compelled to be intimate with one she 
hates. 
 
Again the question can be raised whether what may seem quite a surprising 
acknowledgement of women’s sexuality and her desires (apart from 
procreation), within such a patriarchal and male-centred framework, was 
equally important or legally compelling in actual practice in Jewish 
communities. The commandment itself remains directed towards men inasmuch 
as the mitzvah of procreation is incumbent on men and not on women. In 
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reflecting upon the paradoxical view of women‘s sexuality as both more 
passive or ‘hidden’, yet also containing a greater ‘passion’ than that of men, it 
must always be remembered that these often conflicting sources remain those of 
men’s attitudes and perceptions of women’s sexuality. They do not ‘firsthand’ 
concern their feelings and experiences (Biale 1984: 122). The fact that the 
emphasis and discourse above on the laws of onah is mostly limited to the male 
Orthodox Jewish scholars’ work and in the interviews by the ba’alot teshuvah, 
is perhaps again indicative of a selective attitude towards sources that may offer 
positive or empowering religious codes for Jewish women. Biale (1984), 
Greenberg (1990) and Plaskow (1990) claim that next to the ambivalent and 
often contradicting attitudes towards the laws of niddah, for the law of onah and 
the view on women’s sexuality there are equally diverging viewpoints, from 
affirmation and relative permissiveness to more restrictive or even ascetic 
standards. There are many discussions for example on the times for sex 
proscribed by onah, whether these are to be interpreted as a minimum or a 
maximum amount. Authorities even differ in their perspectives on coital 
positions or the approval or complete dismissal of foreplay.     
Firsthand discourse on the possible experience of Orthodox Jewish 
women is alluded to in some of Kaufman’s (1993: 82-83) interviews with 
ba’alot teshuvah. The women, who stressed the importance of their own sexual 
satisfaction whilst referring to the laws of onah, were similarly positive about 
the laws of niddah for their sex life in general. As the night of the mikvah is 
encouraged for sexual relations between spouses, Kaufman inferred that for 
many of the women she interviewed, this was experienced as an erotic moment. 
Many of the women who ‘celebrate the woman, body and soul’ in fact found 
erotic fantasies in the cleansing of the body for purity purposes, their religious 
rituals thus heightening and being intimately connected to their own sexuality.      
Taharat hamishpachah appears to have developed from an older range of 
laws surrounding impurity and purity in general as related to the public 
religious sphere of the holy Temple, then shifting to the private, yet equally 
potentially religious or ‘holy’ sphere of conjugal relationships and sexuality 
between husband and wife. As a mitzvah for married women, this elaborate 
system of rules and ritual for which the responsibility and performance involves 
the woman herself, simultaneously extensively regulates and controls sexual 
relations on both partners through the period of abstinence during women’s 
status as a niddah. On the one hand, sexual relations are commanded upon the 
man through the mitzvah of procreation and that of onah. These are to be 
carried out by the husband, but directed at the pleasure of the wife, who in 
contrast to her husband appears to be entitled to a sexual life apart from the act 
of conception and reproduction itself.  
This contradiction between restraint on the one hand, and active 
encouragement on the other - albeit ranging from permissive attitudes in the 
halakhah to more moderate or even ascetic views by later commentators and 
authorities – is related to women’s monthly biological cycle. It considers the 
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sexuality of the woman, although the sexual subject to whom the laws pertain is 
male. Although the theme of restraint and self-control as applicable to both 
partners is suggested in both the literature and by many of my interviewees, it 
becomes apparent in most of the contemporary religious discourse that 
primarily men’s sexual desires and inclinations require being controlled. 
Female sexual desire is acknowledged, at some times seen as greater than that 
of men. At other times it is conceived of as introvert, private and non-initiating, 
the medium through which man’s taken-for-granted active, extrovert sexuality 
must be circumscribed and controlled. 
In both the contemporary literature and manuals, and the other, and my 
own interviews it become clear that the period of abstinence is interpreted as a 
time of ‘tranquillity and repose’ for the wife who can have a ‘bed of her own.’ 
Many of Kaufman’s (1993) interviewees even interpreted this period as one of 
‘autonomy and control’, as a time every month they had for themselves. Both 
Michael Kaufman (1995) and Tehilla Abramov (1988: 104-105) relate the 
period of abstinence as beneficial for women, in giving them some space for 
themselves and a ‘welcome opportunity for privacy’:  
 
A man who observes the harchakot25 does not view his wife’s behaviour 
as a disinterest in himself. Obviously, such as approach avoids much 
frustration and insecurity. A man’s ego may be extremely sensitive, 
especially when the issue is his wife! The harchakot guarantee a 
woman’s rights to privacy while preserving a spirit of peace and 
harmony within the home.   
 
For Michael Kaufman (1995: 152) these ‘women’s rights’ are related to her 
biological rhythm. In contrast to men’s libido, with no distinct periods of time 
‘when he is more or less prone to sexual arousal’, Kaufman claims in response 
to the ‘monthly physical upheaval’ in the women’s bodies, she only requires 
‘nothing more then rest – physical tranquillity accompanied by mental and 
emotional repose.’ Another recurring claim is that taharat hamishpachah 
guarantees that ‘the woman is not a sex object’, which also replicated by my 
own interviewees. What many Orthodox Jewish women may interpret as their 
‘rights’ to their own bodies and sexuality, guaranteeing respect from their 
husbands as persons rather than bodies, is nonetheless severely criticised by 
Steinberg (1997) and Plaskow (1990). Both scholars refute that the intention of 
the laws and contemporary discourse as such, would truly be liberating or 
empowering for women. Steinberg (1997: 20) for example, comments that 
niddah separation for the woman ‘supposedly guarantees the Jewish wife a 
monthly period during which she will not be physically molested by her 
husband and allegedly forces the husband to contemplate his wife as something 
other than a sexual plaything, which (it is often made to seem) would not 
otherwise be possible’. Steinberg’s view that the ideology of family purity 
would ultimately still express the monthly ‘reobjectification of the woman as 
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the target of an almost demonized male sexual desire’, is similar to Plaskow’s 
(1990: 184-185) interpretation of the Jewish view of sexuality. In this 
interpretation, women’s sexuality is seen as a ‘lure’, an ‘ever present danger’ to 
male moderation, consistent with the general view of woman as ‘other’ to the 
normative male.  
Regardless of the extent to which one considers the underlying sexism 
or instances of ambivalence in these original patriarchal constructions of 
sexuality within the Jewish religious tradition, in practice, the meanings and 
experiences of taharat hamishpachah are continuously reinterpreted and 
negotiated, which can definitely be said for both contemporary Orthodox 
Jewish authorities and Orthodox Jewish women. In literature such as that of 
Kaufman and Meiselman, the laws are clearly legitimised, denouncing what are 
conceived of feminist and anti-Semitic critiques of so-called sexist traditions. 
Meanwhile, feminist discourse is simultaneously appropriated by making the 
laws and ritual accommodate contemporary gender ideology in which women 
are considered ‘equal’ yet different. Those readings and extra-religious 
discourse which attest to the practical benefits for women, or even her 
autonomous sexuality are selected. In my own interviews, for Susan for 
example, the laws of niddah served as proof of women’s equal status:  
 
You can’t say that women are inferior to men, because a woman, she 
has to know when she stops menstruating, and this doesn’t depend on 
the man… The man has to trust her, it’s a very, very contravention of 
our law to have sexual relations without going to the mikvah and 
without waiting seven days after stopping menstruating, very, very 
serious… And this is something where the man trusts the woman, and 
the woman is really the one...  You know, what she does affects the man 
and he trusts her, because he also is contravening even if he doesn’t 
know about it, so to say women are less important than men is really not 
so, it is an enormous responsibility. After menstruation has finished, she 
has to count seven days and she has to see that there is no blood and 
then she goes to the mikvah and then she can resume sexual relations…  
 
Susan clearly sees the performance of the laws of niddah as a kind of ‘power’, 
perhaps to be interpreted as a form of religious ‘capital’ in that the husband 
must totally rely on his wife to perform the ritual of self-inspection, counting 
and immersion correctly. The husband, who has sex with a niddah, is indeed 
transgressing religious law, even though he may be ignorant of the fact. 
Rebbetsin Liddy’s following claim not only shows the dichotomy between 
women’s mitzvot as related to the private sphere of female religious practice, 
versus men’s public religious role. It also stresses the women’s mitzvah of 
maintaining purity as an individual practice, which she saw as women’s special 
status in their relationship to God:  
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As far as trust is concerned, you see that God gives more trust to the 
woman than to the man, because the man must always be ‘en public’, he 
must come and pray in the synagogue, one sees whether he is with ten 
men, what time he comes and when he must study, by the woman all 
that is… No one can testify there, yes the woman can see which kosher 
products… but that which she must do with regards to purity, no one can 
testify there… 
 
In her manual on taharat hamishpachah, Abramov (1988: 45) similarly 
emphasises women’s religious agency in terms of God’s trust in her, and God’s 
attribution of tremendous responsibility on women’s behalf: 
 
The Jewish woman has been charged with the responsibility for the 
maintenance of this fundamental mitzvah. While there are laws and 
prohibitions, such as observing the harchakot, the laws of separation, for 
which the husband, too, is responsible, the practical observance of this 
mitzvah – checking her body, immersing in the mikvah, and keeping a 
calendar – is entrusted solely to the Jewish woman. No one is instructed 
to verify or check her actions. Her word is relied upon absolutely, and 
halakhic decisions are based on information which she provides.    
 
This type of discourse which seeks to prove that the observant Jewish woman is 
a religious agent in her own right, with an amount – or even more - autonomy 
and religious capital vis-à-vis men, parallels Cook’s (1999) interpretation of the 
rabbinical view of niddah in the Mishnah that the woman is in fact empowered 
through practices associated with niddah. As noted earlier, Cook claims that the 
introduction of the idea of ritual self-examination gave women the control of 
religious knowledge of their bodies, and the power of determination over their 
status as pure or impure, making the woman the ‘the structural equivalent of the 
priest.’ In manuals like Abramov’s, it  is nevertheless irrefutable that ultimate 
authority and control – including halakhic decisions of course – lie with 
rabbinic authorities. Typical in manuals such as these are the numerous 
injunctions that the woman should turn to a rabbi when in doubt. Abramov 
(1988: 56) thus claims a few pages after that of the last quote: 
 
Nevertheless, meeting this responsibility requires the assistance and 
guidance of a Rav. In addition to his halachic knowledge, a Rav will 
have developed the sensitivity required for dealing with these delicate 
and personal issues. A woman must have a Rav with whom she feels 
comfortable to consult when questions arise.   
 
In Zahler (1980: 36) the same advice is given: 
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Answers to these and many other questions are hard to find in the 
available literature. It is therefore the duty of every Jewish woman with 
a feeling of responsibility in case of the smallest doubt to explain her 
problem in detail to a rabbi.   
 
In explaining how to perform hefsek tahara bedikah (the internal check to see 
whether menstruation has ceased), Abramov (1988: 89-90) even advises women 
who should find questionable stains on the bedikah during the final examination 
the following: 
 
…the cloth should be put in an envelope, preferably after it is dry, to be 
taken later to a Rav. Nevertheless, the woman should continue with the 
taharah process until the Rav’s decision is made.  
 
Next to elaborate explanations of the all possible rules and details in 
determining the status of stains and proper way to count, the consultation of a 
Rav is continuously emphasised throughout the book. For example, as 
summarised at one stage (Abramov 1988: 64-65): 
 
1. Only a Rav can determine the status of spots and stains of a 
  questionable type, size, or coloring. 
2. A Rav can be helpful when problems arise which are related to  
difficulties in becoming pregnant. 
3. A Rav can advise a woman who has difficulty in making bedikot,  
internal checks. 
4. A Rav can provide superb Torah-oriented counseling in cases of  
marital difficulties. 
5. Refraining from consulting a Rav is not considered an act of 
modesty. Quite the contrary, one must never be too embarrassed to 
approach a Rav. 
6. When consulting a Rav, a woman should state her question clearly,  
providing all the necessary information. 
 
The role of the Rabbi is not only understood as an ultimate authority on 
religious knowledge, but a helpful guide and counsellor in the most intimate 
sphere of a woman or couple’s life. The fact that Abramov has to go to lengths 
to promote his consultation, and comfort her readers  that they should not be 
‘embarrassed’, is most likely suggestive of the actual practice in which many 
women probably do not visit their rabbi whenever they encounter a 
‘questionable’ stain. Indeed, they probably are often very much embarrassed, 
even though they ‘should’ not be. This discrepancy between prescription and 
practice surfaced when Liddy told me about her role as a rebbetsin:  
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For example, when women come with their ordinary questions, such as 
about the family laws, they come with questions to the rabbi… Then I 
am at home and sometimes they wish that the questions are passed on 
through me, it’s more… Uh, it’s not about decency, because if I’m not 
here then they will go to my husband, that’s just a kind of, uh… 
modesty, that the women will go to the women… Bon, they also have 
other problems, like marital problems, I sometimes speak to the wife, 
my husband to the husband, sometimes together… It can also occur that 
women speak to my husband directly, sometimes couples who speak to 
my husband directly, there are also couples who just come to me… But 
sometimes it’s just a question of language, I’m also an interpreter for my 
husband sometimes…  
 
That the rebbetsin often plays an important role when women approach the 
rabbi on questions on the laws of nid dah, is suggested by Zahler (1980: 36): 
 
Opposed to what one may presume, every rabbi is familiar with the 
subject and used to applying the required discretion. If the woman 
nevertheless still does not feel comfortable speaking about it herself, her 
husband can do it or she can appeal to the rabbi’s wife.  
 
Despite what may seem to be the dominant message in these manuals on the 
ultimate religious knowledge and control of women’s bodies, many Orthodox 
Jewish women to appear to interpret and experience the laws of niddah as a 
mitzvah of their own, one in which they can feel empowered and exert 
control. 26 Although religious authorities would definitely not approve, it is 
known that in practice some Jewish women do ‘use’ the laws as a means of 
birth control, for example by postponing immersion in the mikvah. Others do 
not so much manipulate the laws, but clearly experience them in a positive and 
empowering manner. 
 
 
The Political: Purity as a Symbol of Collective Identity  
 
In some of the opinions expressed by Orthodox Jewish women writers, and 
most notably by the ba’alot teshuvah, the celebration of women’s bodies and 
their sexuality is taken even further. The laws of niddah are viewed as the 
essence of women’s religiosity and their identity as Jewish women. Blu 
Greenberg (1990: 29, 1998: 119) for example, claims that ‘niddah can generate 
a different sense of self for a woman, a feeling of self-autonomy’. Greenberg 
(1998: 119) thereby challenges many a (liberal) feminist critique of the concept 
of mikvah, suggesting mikvah could very well be the ‘prototype’ of a women’s 
mitzvah: 
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As I go about my business at the mikvah, I often savour the knowledge 
that I am doing exactly as Jewish women have done for twenty or thirty 
centuries. It is a matter not only of keeping the chain going, but also one 
of self-definition: this is how my forebears defined themselves as Jewish 
women and as part of the community and this is how I define myself.  
[…] The laws of niddah continually remind me that I am a Jew and 
niddah reinforces that deep inner contentment with a Jewish way of life.  
 
Next to all the positive functions within the marital relationship and all the extra 
practical benefits taharat hamishpachah serve, as a prototype of the women’s 
mitzvah, the ritual of immersion functions within a narrative of identity at the 
level of belonging to a community, one in terms of both female and Jewish 
subjectivity. This sense of belonging was also expressed among a number of 
Marmon’s (1999: 237) Orthodox Jewish interviewees. They claimed that 
immersion in the mikvah provided a sense of ‘womanhood’, a deeply religious 
feeling of belonging to a ‘woman’s religious community’. Some women 
expressed sentiments similar to those of Greenberg, in that the observance of 
the mitzvah of ritual purification expressed a ‘connection’ to Jewish women 
across space and time.   
What may be experienced as a deeply private, intimate, individual form 
of religious practice, this woman’s mitzvah is indeed in stark contrast to the 
more public communal performance of mitzvot by men. A particular kind of 
rhetoric on taharat hamishpachah in much of the literature by Orthodox men 
and the manuals, furthermore contains an appeal to a more public level. It 
stresses the fundamental importance of the observance of the laws by women, 
not only for their direct family but even for the future of the Jewish people or 
‘the nation’. In their analysis of religious Zionist manuals on the laws of family 
purity in Israel, Niza Yanay and Tamar Rapoport (1997) show how the meaning 
of niddah has been expanded to the public national domain. According to the 
writers, this particular rhetoric on niddah is constructed in a wholly new socio-
political context, instructing women to observe the laws, thereby producing 
‘symbolic domination in order to create and preserve, through the woman and 
her body, the symbolic unity between territory, religion, and the state’ (Yanay 
and Rapoport 1997: 653). In referring to Mary Douglas’s (1976 [1966]) classic 
thesis on the way the private body and the social collective mirror one another 
in the symbolic domain, the religious Zionist discourse similarly appeals to the 
individual woman in stressing the importance of the laws of menstrual purity 
and impurity, linking these to the Jewish nation in its whole.  
Although the context of the manuals analysed by Yanay and Rapoport is 
specific in that these manuals are clearly religious Zionist in their orientation 
and directed at all members of the nation of Israel, - including secular Jewish 
women - there are certainly many parallels in the rhetoric of the manuals used, 
and distributed in the Diaspora in Orthodox Jewish communities. They 
similarly seem to produce ‘a system of control which unifies individualized 
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practice and penetrates individual lives through ritualized action, aiming to 
constitute a collective Jewish identity’ (Yanay and Rapoport 1997: 656). On the 
one hand, the practice of niddah is utmost private, such as the act of immersion, 
stated by Abramov (1988: 143) for example as ‘a private matter between 
husband and wife. No other people should know of it’. However, not merely 
gender ideology construction takes place in the contemporary discourse 
surrounding and propagating the laws; it also concerns the (re)production of a 
collective religious Jewish identity.      
From what originally was a system of laws and ritual practice related to 
the public domain of cultic religion, in which those who were impure could not 
enter the Temple, the laws have historically shifted to the private domain of the 
family and the intimate relations between husband and wife. As a reaction to 
the rejection by the Reform movement of some of the laws, particularly the 
usage of the mikvah, in the late nineteenth century the neo -Orthodox response 
was the emergence of a philosophy of the ‘elevated state of modern 
womanhood, along with her sanctity of her commandments to keep the family 
pure’ (Meacham 1999: 32-33). Family purity later became connected with the 
idea of the purity of the nation. According to Meachem this happened among 
early Israeli rabbis like Rav Kook, and especially in the traditionalist attempts 
of ‘rescuing the remnants of European Jewry after the Second World War’. A 
first level in which the ‘private’ is expanded to the public in the contemporary 
manuals discussed earlier, is through an appeal to the above noted woman’s 
individual ‘responsibility’ in observing the laws, in order to guarantee the purity 
of her entire family. Zahler (1980) for example, before turning to the 
psychological and medical rhetoric in defence of the laws of niddah, opens his 
account on the importance of the family unit in view of the contemporary 
‘crises’ in many families, and the general ‘decline of morality’ in the world of 
today. The special role of the woman as a wife and mother in the family, the 
Jewish home as a ‘bulwark’ for the survival of the Jewish people, is then 
directly connected to martial stability. This in turn would be guaranteed by 
observing the laws of niddah.  
The Jewish (married) woman is consequently ‘entrusted’ with the 
responsibility of maintaining the purity laws, which are considered the 
foundation for a stable Jewish marriage and family. The utmost importance of 
the laws of niddah are underlined for instance, by referring to halakhic 
regulations on the mikvah, and presenting narratives of survival thanks to the 
adherence to the laws by Jewish ‘foremothers’. Abramov (1988: 119), Kaufman 
(1995: 157) and Zahler (1980: 28) note that whilst the concept of community in 
Judaism is popularly associated with the synagogue, according to  Jewish law, a 
mikvah is more important. Building a mikvah – in a poor community for 
example - would be more important than building a synagogue, purchasing 
ground for a cemetery, or even acquiring a Torah scroll. These items must even 
be sold to finance the building of a mikvah if necessary. As long as a group of 
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Jews does not have a communal mikvah, according to Kaufman’s interpretation 
of Jewish law, they do not even constitute an official community.  
Abramov (1988: 39) offers historical and archaeological ‘evidence’ and 
even first hand accounts, to show how the observance of the laws of taharah 
hamishpachah ‘has been one of the major factors ensuring the survival of our 
people.’ From ‘our ancestors’ in ancient Egypt who observed the laws in the 
depths of slavery, to the women in ‘the midst of a life-and-death struggle’ at 
Masada; from the secret and dangerous travels for hundreds of kilometres 
across the Carpathian mountains, to the nearest mikvah of an observant Jewish 
woman in Russia… For Abramov these stories show women’s ‘heroic 
determination and unswerving commitment to fulfill God’s will’. Zahler (1980: 
28) shows how the observance of the laws of niddah on the face of extreme 
hardship or even death may be taken quite literally. The principle that in case of 
life or death the prohibitions of the Torah are even subordinate, does not apply 
to taharat hamishpachah, as according to another Toraitic impetus ‘it is better to 
sacrifice life than to give up honour and purity’. Zahler (1980: 27) also stresses 
the importance of the laws of niddah by pointing to the consequences of not 
practising the laws correctly. A woman who transgresses the laws remains 
niddah, even for her whole life. This is officially accompanied by sanctions 
similar to those transgressing the law of circumcision, eating animal blood or 
the violation of Yom Kippur. Zahler invokes the punishment of karet, which he 
describes as ‘the destruction of the soul and loss of children from the Bible’.27  
The observance of the laws of niddah serves to secure the ‘future’ 
directly as it is seen as beneficial for children, e.g. ‘molding the spiritual nature 
and well-being of our children’ (Abramov 1988: 50), or ‘the child who is 
received in purity will be more noble and better disposed’ (Zahler 1980: 12). 
The meanings attributed to the laws are also expressed by the fact that mikvah 
functions as a means to define identity ‘differentiating the Jew form the non-
Jew’, as the mikvah is also used and symbolic of any conversion process to 
Judaism. According to Kaufman (1995: 143-144), observance of the laws of 
family purity is regarded as among the most essential distinguishing factor 
between practising Jews and non-observant Jews. These writers thus shift 
between medical, psychological, marital, and familial ‘benefits’ of the laws of 
niddah to narratives of the survival of Jewish identity itself, for which the 
Jewish woman is held to be ‘responsible’ (Abramov 1988: 50): 
 
…not just the woman herself, but her immediate and extended family, 
the entire Jewish nation and its future generations, are directly 
influenced by the purity and wholesomeness which the Divine plan 
inspires..  
 
My own informants in Antwerp did not invoke any nationalist rhetoric on the 
laws of family purity, except for one woman who was in fact originally from 
Israel, and claimed that not observing the laws of niddah would ‘ruin the health 
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of the nation and society’. However, the idea of the transferral of personal 
‘purity’ to that of the family and beyond was definitely present in many of the 
responses. Liddy for example, claimed, whilst adamantly defending the 
important role of the Jewish woman: 
 
That is the purpose of the mother, to develop a defence mechanism to 
the epidemics from outside, and then the father comes along if there are 
problems, but the child has already received the basis... Those are the 
spiritual qualities of the woman, to support her husband, the 
upbringing… She is the foundation, she is kashrut, she is the purity… 
She has the responsibility to carry on pure generations...   
 
The meaning of taharat hamishpachah in the context of a narrative of communal 
or collective public identity is expressed in Zahler (1980: 28): 
 
That she [the Jewish woman] shall commit herself with body and soul to 
the idea of Taharat Hamishpachah and win the hearts of all our Jewish 
brothers and sisters. That is why Jewish parents, mothers and daughters 
must realise that the fate of our children, their education and even the 
future of the Jewish people is in their hands and those of us all. That is 
why Taharat Hamishpachah is never ever a private matter of the 
individual. 
 
In the forgoing analysis I have attempted to challenge notions of private versus 
public, of individual versus social or communal practice and identity in a 
number of ways, through focusing on one of Orthodox Jewish women’s most 
important form of religious activity, which has often been neglected or avoided 
in the mainstream research and literature. Halakhic, historical, geographical, 
and individual interpretations and experiences vary significantly, as multiple 
forms of discourse are currently applied, from the practical and symbolic to the 
psychological, relational and the medical, beyond merely religious rhetoric. In 
strictly Orthodox Jewish discourse, where the religious circumscribes all facets 
of ‘everyday life’, men, and more so women’s physicality and sexuality are in 
any case sanctified and not seen as anti-thetical to the spiritual or the 
‘religious’. Opposed to radical and liberal feminist critiques like Susannah 
Heschel’s (1995), who professes a fundamental dichotomy between 
nature/culture, aligned with physical/spiritual and men/women, I suggest that in 
contemporary strictly Orthodox Jewish discourse, although guided by a 
dichotomous and patriarchal gender ideology, women’s religio sity itself 
becomes defined in sexual terms. Michael Kaufman (1995: 157) for example, 
claims that the ‘the woman’s Sanctum Sanctorum is her own body, and she 
must experience intimacy in a state of holiness’. Tamar Frankiel (1990: 83) sees 
sexuality as women’s ‘hidden power’, connecting the waters of the mikvah to 
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the waters of Eden: ‘they make for us each month a rebirth of spiritual 
virginity’.  
The re/interpretation of niddah in positive terms and by using very 
‘modern’ terminology, is sometimes accompanied by what can be seen as 
almost a kind of feminist discourse in terms of sexual difference, emphasising 
the liberating aspects of the ritual practice and focusing on women’s agency and 
subjectivity. However, against the private body as a means to women’s 
experience and ritual, is the backdrop and circumscription of hegemonic 
patriarchal discourse, with ‘ultimate’ control over interpretation resting with 
halakhic and rabbinic authorities. The ‘heterosexual matrix’ and 
heteronormativity define gender ideology with an emphasis on sexual 
difference and women’s reproductive capacity, despite the acknowledgement of 
the sexuality of men in the traditionalist view. The ‘private’ is therefore not so 
private at all, as women’s bodies function as vehicles for the construction of 
communal boundaries and collective identity. In the last paragraph of this last 
chapter, I turn to broader and comparative contexts, and questions on the 
relationship between gender and religion in communities and movements such 
as those of the strictly Orthodox Jewish community under study.  
 
 
3. Gender, Power, and Piety: Global Contexts    
 
The Ethic of Modesty 
 
Connected to the laws of niddah is the principle of tzniut or modesty. My 
interviewees perceived tzniut as perhaps the most important religious principle 
for strictly Orthodox Jewish women of all. According to Michael Kaufman 
(1995: 28): 
 
Tzeniut nurtures an awareness of privacy, a knowledge that the inner 
space takes precedence over the external. Sensitivity to tzeniut affects 
both attitude and behavior: speech, dress, appearance, and comportment. 
Tzeniut is incumbent upon all Jews. However, women surpass men in 
sensitivity and privacy.      
 
Moshe Meiselman (1978: 11) similarly expresses the fact that tzniut is not 
restricted to women, but that according to the Midrash, ‘implicit in woman’s 
creation was a command that she develop a specific trait of the human 
personality to its maximum, the capacity for tzniut’.28 Tzniut can be conceived 
of as a ‘test of moral character’ as one woman told me. It is also a matter of 
performance, as it circumscribes women’s behaviour and appearance, tied to a 
dialectic of both emphasising and ‘repressing’ women’s sexuality. In order to 
be ‘good’, ‘pious’ and to act properly, the strictly Orthodox Jewish women 
must take care in being modest in everything she does. As I inferred from my 
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interviewees, the main purpose of tzniut is entirely relational to men’s sexual 
desires (or rather the repression thereof), in order not to provoke or distract him. 
Whereas the strictly Orthodox Jewish man in the first place must see to it that 
he sufficiently turns up at the synagogue and that he studies and prays, which 
are public, or ‘outside’ activities, for the women I interviewed, female piety 
involved foremost modest demeanour and behaviour.  
When they get married, strictly Orthodox Jewish women must cut their 
hair, and from that day on they must cover their hair with a kerchief or a wig, at 
least in public settings. Depending on the customs of the community they 
belong to, or the stringency some personally prefer, some shave their head 
entirely (such as the Satmar Hasidim), whilst others maintain a short hairdo 
under their wig. Some women wear their kerchief or wig at all times, while 
others may sometimes take it off at home when they are alone with their 
husbands. The practice of covering the hair or head, which is common to many 
Mediterranean religious and cultural traditions (Eilberg-Schwartz 1995: 9; 
Levine 1995), was interpreted by my interviewees as connected to women’s 
sexual attractiveness and its necessary privatisation. For most respondents it 
was an evident and unquestioned part of tzniut, the details of which were 
determined by tradition, or so Hasidic-oriented Susan attempted to explain:        
 
It’s part of tzniut, not to have… for married women, not to have uh… 
wild hair… In some Hasidic communities hair has a very mystical 
significance, but I’m not so much into that, so I don’t know… 
 
Whereas the practice of covering the hair only applies to married women, all 
young women and girls must wear modest clothes, which minimally includes 
the covering of the knees, the décolleté and the elbows. Clothes must also be 
distinctively ‘feminine’, such as skirts, dresses, and delicate feminine shoes, 
although conspicuous items such as high heels or bright colours are prohibited. 
Susan claimed that ‘We must not be auffallend, that’s the main thing’. Like 
some of the distinctive features of men’s clothing, such as the length of the side 
locks or the jacket, many Hasidic women also wear clothing specific to the style 
of the court or community. This may involve certain colours or types of 
stockings, with some being very strict, such as thick brown stockings with a 
seam in order to hide the leg as much as possible, whilst others are permitted 
permit themselves to wear lighter shades like beige or navy blue.  
Some of the women I interviewed somewhat ridiculed, or at least 
understood the extremes one could go to in the exact length of the hems, the 
colour of the tights as a relative matter. Tina who belonged to the Ger Hasidic 
community for example, claimed: ‘The Satmar, for them the wig isn’t enough, 
they wear a hat on top of it. But you don’t have to, as long as the hair is 
covered…’ As long as basic rules were abided, one can go ‘as  far as you 
wanted’. Therefore, although it is halakhically clear what was tzniut and what 
not to my informants, it was also possible to differentiate between degrees of 
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expressing tzniut, between both individuals and the customs and rules of the 
community (see also Greenberg 1998: 1). According to halakhah, girls must 
start to cover their arms and legs from the age of twelve, yet some schools and 
parents will gradually start as early as the age of six or even three, in order to 
prevent ‘rebellious’ twelve-year-olds later on. Hasidic -oriented mother, 
Nicolette, who sent her daughters to the ‘ultra-Orthodox’ Satmar School, 
claimed her daughters loved going there. Although Nicolette said that she 
herself had always dressed the same way, she would make fun of her daughters 
a little if they became ‘too’ pious, for instance when one of the girls would 
remark on someone else’s sleeve being rolled up to high. Leonie told me that 
little Hasidic girls have separate swimming classes in pools with drawn 
curtains, and that they have to wear little dresses, like a ballet suit, which at first 
Hasidic-oriented Leonie found rather funny.  
The impression I gained is that tzniut in terms of clothing, was not 
something that was limited to the public sphere or in the presence of men. 
Although the limits on interaction between the genders starts at a very young 
age in most Hasidic communities, I inferred that tzniut and the way women’s 
bodies are ‘sanctified’ is also something that is internalised at the level of 
individual subjectivity. It appears to be somatised , embodied, into what 
Bourdieu (2001) would call a typical feminine disposition in the gender habitus 
of sexual difference within a cultural system of masculine domination (chapter 
one). When telling me about the way mothers are responsible for the ‘practical’ 
religious education of their children, for instance, Esther (Satmar) gave me the 
example of how the mother dresses the child, teaching him to ‘put the left hand 
in the sleeve and then the right…. The little girl is taught to undress slowly’, 
which Esther referred to as tzniut or ‘bescheiden’. 
However, regardless of the deep connection between modesty as a 
means of sanctifying sexuality that is localised in/on the female body, all my 
informants agreed that there was much more to tzniut than looks alone. Tzniut 
also means to behave appropriately, not to shout, sing or laugh aloud. ‘Inner 
modesty’ was described as not ‘to be arrogant or proud’, ‘to be rough’, or to 
‘display your wisdom or your wealth’. Being tzniut was even determined by the 
things you would read or talk about. Many women referred to the biblical 
passage ‘the honour of the daughter of the king is inside’, which they insisted 
not to interpret in a negative way.29 Although some claimed it was not easy too 
explain, tzniut was connected to notions of privacy, interiority, of ‘keeping the 
woman bound to the home’. This could also pertain to women being permitted 
to drive, although again this was very relative, and determined by community 
custom. For instance, Susan told me about the way traditions differ with regards 
to the particulars of tzniut: 
 
I drive, but there are many women of the Hasidic community who don’t 
drive, and one of my daughters didn’t understand… One of the 
rebbetsins…. Right, she asked me to drive her somewhere, and my 
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daughter asked me, she said ‘if they think driving is not proper for 
women, how can she ask you to drive her?’ And I said, ‘you know, I’m 
going to ask her’, so she said that this is her tradition that they don’t 
driven this is also… I don’t know whether this is called a breech of 
modesty… Anyway, she said since we drive and we can do many good 
things by driving, it’s not wrong for us to drive, with our tradition that 
we may drive… It says somewhere in the Bible somewhere that the 
honour of the daughter of the King is indoors. That’s not such a nice 
translation of it, but that’s what this phrase means, right… And that 
means that a woman should not show herself too much outside, and 
driving is an act which is for the outside, you’re going places, it’s not an 
inside activity. This is by us also one of our tenets, it’s just that by some 
people more than others…  
 
Michael Kaufman (1995: 28) also refers to King David’s teachings in the Bible: 
‘All glorious is the princess within’, and to the eleventh-century commentator 
Rashi who relates the verse ‘to the reserve and modesty of women and their 
relationship to the palace of Judaism – the home’. Sarah is said to ‘personify the 
idea of privacy’: 
 
When the angles visit Abraham and ask where Sarah is, he replies, ‘In 
the tent.’ Rashi comments: ‘Tzenuah hi,’ She is a private person. 
Although he was the public person and she the private, Sarah surpassed 
Abraham in prophetic power. Can one postulate from Sarah a 
correlation between privateness and spiritual power?    
 
Moshe Meiselman (1978: 12) refers to the same commentary and stresses it 
does not imply that ‘hidden from the public view’ implies inferiority. King 
David’s verse would have been used in rabbinic literature in two ways, 
according to Meiselman (ibid.): 
 
First, it has been viewed as a statement of the private nature of the 
female role, and second, as a panegyric on the private nature of the 
religious experience in general. The Midrash unifies the two 
interpretations and sees the same underlying thread running through 
both applications of the verse – true achievement is always in the private 
sphere, hidden from the public eye.  
 
As referred to in the previous paragraph, Orthodox Jewish feminist Tamar 
Frankiel (1990: 35-36) appropriates idea of a connection between modesty, 
women’s sexuality, spirituality and power: 
 
It follows that Yehudit, Esther, Ruth, and Tamar had to be otherwise 
chaste, modest, and pious. And the reverse images, of the harlot or the 
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adulterous woman, are such powerfully negative ones in Israelite 
literature precisely because the image of sexual holiness is so strong.  
[…] The feminine models in Judaism tell us that sex used in any other 
way than for holiness is dishonest to God, dishonest to the purpose of 
our feminine being. The woman who knows her sexuality and her inner, 
spiritual self can recognize her true purpose in life, can act with power 
and confidence at any moment, and can thereby affect her own destiny, 
the destiny of her people, and that of the whole world.   
 
However, most of my interviewees claimed that the main reason for modesty 
was that the body of a woman was beautiful, to be treated with dignity and 
respect. The woman must be modest in order not to ‘provoke other men’, ‘put 
wrong thoughts into their minds’ or cause them to be ‘lead into temptation’. 
Covering the body also meant not to expose or ‘cheapen it outside’ and to ‘keep 
it beautiful and alone for the husband’. Interestingly, through behaving and 
dressing modestly, women also felt that they could control their husband’s 
faithfulness to them. According to Hannah: 
 
It’s very important that the man only interacts with his own wife, and if 
you’re in a company and there are women who are not dressed tzniut… 
We therefore do not want our men to go to other women, so that’s why 
the sleeves and the wig… Then there’s much less chance that they… 
 
Being modest rather than ‘ostentatious’ or ‘showing off’ was linked to the 
broader context of women’s place within the family or private sphere, and 
keeping her bound to the family and obligations in order not to be attracted by 
the ‘outside world’. However, important to note is that my interviewees did not 
interpret this at all as submissive confinement. Being a pious woman did not 
mean that one could take on positions or jobs of responsibility and authority 
within the community. My respondents stressed that there was no religious 
prohibition on a strictly Orthodox Jewish woman even becoming a headmistress 
or even ‘director of the Delhaize’30 if she wanted. When I asked Tina if there 
were any religious objections to women working outside of the home, she 
answered the following: 
 
Of course, you always have men who… but I think that that is the same 
everywhere, who don’t want their wives to work… Maybe less 
nowadays, but twenty years ago it was like that, that men said ‘You stay 
at home’, I think and maybe we’re a bit slower than… But religiously 
there is nothing against it. Of course if you go and work somewhere 
where they tell dirty jokes all day, than you’re stuck there and it’s not 
very nice at all. And you can think that is not encouraged for young 
girls, to go and work somewhere, where… Because who knows, maybe 
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they will see someone there or someone will fall in love with me, or 
whatever and that is not appreciated…  
 
Many of my respondents – and particularly the senior women who did not have 
to take care of small children anymore – were incredibly active, outgoing 
women, as rebbetsins and teachers or involved voluntary work, counselling and 
charitable activities. However, this activity mostly took place within the 
community. Like many of the young men who go off to yeshivas abroad, many 
of the women’s daughters visit special Jewish women’s colleges – usually for 
teachers’ training – in Israel or in other cities of the Diaspora. In practice, the 
rules of modesty and the limits placed on interaction between women and men 
make it difficult or impossible for strictly Orthodox Jewish women to pursue 
certain studies and many jobs, due to the mixed and ‘immodest’ environments 
in the broader society. Especially in smaller diasporic communities such as that 
in Antwerp, the possibilities and opportunities may be more limited.   
Whereas I read that other researchers had – or felt that they had - to 
comply to the norms of modesty in order to be able to conduct interviews, or 
enter strictly Orthodox Jewish women’s homes (e.g. El-Or 1994; Morris 1998), 
when I asked some of interviewees about what they thought about the way I 
dressed, they answered this was not relevant. I suspect that as a ‘goy’, perhaps I 
was ‘judged’ less in terms of my own perceived feminine appearance and 
behaviour. Although they may have had their personal opinions, tzniut did not 
seem to apply to me in the same way it would apply to a modern ‘emancipated’ 
non-observant or secular Jewish woman. Tirza simply said to me: ‘I know that 
you follow another path’.             
 
 
Conflicting Gender Ideologies 
 
If the laws of niddah can be conceived of as the ‘prototype’ of a strictly 
Orthodox Jewish woman’s mitzvah, then the above paragraph on what my 
interviewees stressed as fundamental in women’s religiosity, tzniut, or modesty, 
can be interpreted as the very definition of female piety. Whereas the pious 
strictly Orthodox Jewish man is ideally committed to the activities of study and 
prayer in the public space, then piety itself for women is a gendered activity, 
related to the way religious discourse ‘constructs’ women as sexualised beings. 
When I asked my respondents their views on the status of women in the outside 
world, or what they thought of the feminist movement, then it became clear to 
me the paradox which a traditionalist community faces, in striving to retain and 
reproduce its religious identity, that is patriarchally and ethnically defined.  
Davidman (1991, 1995), Kaufman (1993, 1994, 1995) and Morris’s 
(1995, 1998) research on ba’alot teshuvah in the U.S. showed how newly 
Orthodox women who had previously lead secular ‘modern’ lives, often 
capitalised on a kind of cultural feminism, stressing an ideology of sexual 
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difference which they found in traditionalist religious rhetoric. This they 
opposed to what they perceived as the ‘failure’ of liberal feminist ideologies of 
equality. In Bonnie Morris’s study of women as proselytising agents within the 
Lubavitcher community, positive models of female spirituality and family are 
similarly propagated. Strong anti-feminist rhetoric is applied, despite their 
rejection of the idea that women who lead Orthodox religious lives would in 
any way be subjugated or inferior to men. Morris (1995) argues this anti-
feminism can be explained through the priority given to ethnic survival and the 
association of both women’s subordinate status, and the consecutive feminist 
movement, within the Christian or secularised majority culture. In previous 
chapters, I similarly drew attention to the way in which the relationship 
between Jewish identity and feminism is a complex issue; due to the way, 
historically, the feminist movement has marginalized the ‘differences’ between 
women along axes of ‘race’, ethnicity and religion.  
Apart from the clear insistence on maintaining traditional gender 
ideology and roles - hegemonic in patriarchal religious discourse - as a part of 
simply ‘upholding tradition’, other factors certainly play a role in the way 
strictly Orthodox Jewish authorities and communities perceive feminism and 
the demand for gender equality as a ‘threat’. The feminist movement and its 
critiques of patriarchal religions was not only often perceived as anti-Semitic. It 
was seen as a threat to the family, and women’s role as mothers and a 
reproductive agents in both an educational and in a ‘physical’ sense. As an 
‘ethnically’ defined religious tradition, and especially one in which according to 
halakhah Jewish identity is transferred only by the mother onto the child, the 
modern demand for the autonomy and equality of women was not only seen as 
a possible threat to the survival of religious tradition, but also the actual 
existence of ethnic continuity. Particularly since the holocaust and the great rate 
of assimilation amongst Jews, survival has been proclaimed a crucial issue by 
Hasidic and other strictly Orthodox authorities. This was similarly emphasised 
by a number of the women I spoke to. The invocation of the religious 
commandment of procreation, and the prohibition of, or at least restrictions on 
birth control that are propagated by religious authorities, ensure that women in 
strictly Orthodox Jewish communities are seen as ‘the biological producers of 
children/people’, and therefore quite literally attributed the status of ‘bearers of 
the collective’ (Yuval-Davis 1997).        
As frum-born women, my respondents were less apt to emphasise ideas 
of women’s special, ‘superior’, or innate spiritual qualities. As I showed in the 
way they ‘constructed’ gender, a multiplicity of discourses was applied, 
underlining a paradigm of ‘different yet of equal value’, primarily located in the 
realm of religious practice and gender roles. The status of women in the outside 
world, and the developments ever since the second feminist wave in Western 
society, could not have gone unnoticed to my interviewees though. Especially 
since they were middle-aged to senior-aged, and lived in a broader society in 
which considerable changes had taken place concerning gender relations and 
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‘sexual mores’. Whereas some women stated that feminism was simply ‘not an 
issue’ for themselves nor for the community in which they lived, when I kept 
on questioning, many had outspoken and expressed both positive and negative 
opinions on what they perceived was the state of the ‘outside world’, which was 
notably often understood in terms of ‘gendered morality’. Susan for example: 
 
I believe people are individuals, that you can’t classify all men here and 
all women there… And I have an example, my mother in law, who is the 
boss in the business, she works all day, she doesn’t know how to cook… 
But to say she is a feminist, she’s not a feminist, this is her nature… She 
wouldn’t even believe in having women making their own minyans, 
their own ten people to pray together, saying we’re just as good as the 
men… That doesn’t come into our realm of thought, we are just as good 
as the men, but we are different, so for me feminism is really not an 
issue… And my husband believes that women can do anything that men 
can do… My daughter in law tells me, Samuel, that’s my son, 
‘Whatever I want him to do for me…’ He says my mother changes the 
light bulbs at home, ha, ha, it’s absolutely not an issue…      
 
Leonie similarly thought gender relations were more of an individual thing: 
 
I find that when I read about emancipation, I do think about it… I just 
mean, the world, especially in the time of ‘Dolle Mina’31, it’s a while 
ago now… But I thought what are they talking about? We are already 
much more emancipated by the Jews I thought, but that’s something 
depending on the individual. I mean you always have insecure men who 
say ‘This is my right’. […] I mean of course you might have Jews who 
need it [feminism] but you will not reach them anyway, just like non-
Jews, but I was brought up that way, so I thought that feminism was 
quite superfluous and insane, but I do see… The status of women in the 
world has improved the last years, but maybe not really… I don’t 
know…  
 
I asked Leonie if she could that say that for example economic equality 
between women and men was compatible with the position of women and men 
in Judaism: 
 
Yes, every Friday evening, the man says at the table, he reads from 
Proverbs, a piece: ‘Who can find a woman of valour…? So it’s about 
her, about this world, God in relation to the world, so the women gives 
form to this world, so really we don’t really need emancipation for 
Judaism, that’s not really necessary, not relevant. Ok, I mean in society 
it’s necessary, because in that way you can get jobs and so on, but no 
not really… There were always Jewish women who is told about what 
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they did, that they did step outside to let their men learn Torah, all the 
things they did and earned… I mean you will always have men, who 
oppress their wives, but they are just imbalanced types, but as a 
principle that’s not Judaism. Everyone just has his or her task in religion 
and what you make up around all that, that’s up to you…  
 
Many of my interviews replicated the general view of feminism, as in women 
‘wanting to be like men’. When I asked Chana on her views of ‘women’s lib’, 
as she called it: 
 
I feel sorry that people have to prove that they are the same, but I 
basically believe that… I wouldn’t want to be a man, I mean I never had 
any visions… I’m very content to be a woman, and in a way and to a 
certain degree I think it’s sad that you have to… who do I have to prove 
to, to myself that I’m equal? I think I’m equal in any case, I don’t think 
I’m any less, I don’t think any of us are any less, but this is the way I 
look at it… I mean it’s normal, you know I can even understand how 
women’s lib started, because women did feel suppressed to a certain 
degree and it could make sense, it could be… We, you know, I didn’t 
feel this at all… … I think because my father very much respected my 
mother, and because I married a man who respected me from day one 
onwards, right? Besides loving, respecting again is not always loving 
right, I think as a result, I think I have been exposed to men in my 
family… Later I’ve been confronted with different…, right? I never felt 
that we needed more… […] There is an innate respect for women right, 
even so let’s say he won’t give you a hand when he meets you, but he’ll 
talk to you… But there is an innate… Whether all Jewish people have it, 
I don’t know, I’ve been lucky, I think many Jewish people have do have 
it, even though the one off you meet… I think the world sees us, them, 
as you know, black-hatted, you know, looking away and everything, but 
I think deep down underneath that we would be honest enough to say 
what they really felt, he, not all of them, but you’d be surprised what 
you’d hear, you’d be very surprised…   
 
The more ‘Hasidic’ my respondents, however, the more they rejected what they 
perceived as feminism and the emancipation of women in the outside world. 
Miriam (Belz), who is a counsellor, claimed: 
 
It is said that when Alexander the Great conquered a country in which 
only women lived, they said ‘If you conquer us, what will the people 
say, that you have conquered a country with women?’ And he left them 
alone, and they were right, because the feminists want to make the 
woman equal to the man, but this didn’t work and led to bankruptcy. 
God created us this way, everyone has his or her role and everyone is 
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happy with this. There is a harmony that fits, man and woman are equal 
in value, and must be able to develop and self-respect in everything 
instead of wanting to change the roles. …  
 
However, despite her conservative view, Miriam was not entirely negative 
about women’s emancipation, a development with both positive and negative 
sides, from which traditionalist communities could not remain unaffected. 
Miriam even suggested that a kind of emancipation for men had to take place:   
 
Much has been invested in the world of the woman and developments 
have definitely taken place, but there has been less emphasis on men, 
because so much has been done to save women… This cannot be turned 
around, women have learned to have self-respect, they are full of 
everything and know where they stand. This cannot be turned around, 
this is inevitable. But maybe something must change for the men, 
sometimes this causes trouble. The woman mustn’t learn Talmud, but 
for everything there is a way... You basically do have the stronger and 
the weaker sex, the man is leader of marriage and the family and 
sometimes this is difficult for a woman if she feels stronger. But after 
the years this balances out when he’s studying and working... But I have 
read that this is also a problem in the outside world, that girls study too 
much, and because of feminism women know much more, become more 
self-aware while men are just looking for a nice and sweet girl. Women 
are looking for men who can take on a man’s role, like taking quick 
decisions and this is difficult. So I do consider the developments 
positive but it couldn’t happen any other way, this is the way it is, but 
then nothing is like it is a hundred years ago, the world has changed 
tremendously.       
 
Hannah, who is in her late sixties, and the wife of a dayan (religious judge), 
also expressed the viewpoint of changes in the outside world affecting gender 
roles in her own community as ‘inevitable’, but was more sceptic on the 
possible benefits of these changes. When I asked her what she thought of the 
fact that Orthodox Jewish girls study much more than they used to, she 
answered attesting to same kind of rhetoric referred to earlier, in that girls 
needed education in order to keep them within the boundaries of the 
community, rather than ‘lose’ them or allow them to ‘glitch’, as one respondent 
put it:        
 
There’s no question that this has changed, but are they better girls then 
their parents and grandparents? My grandmother didn’t study, but she 
was very wise. She learned a lot herself, she read a lot and she knew a 
lot like stories and common sense. She passed on her knowledge orally. 
There has never been much illiteracy among Jewish women. Women 
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learned their prayers by heart. My mother did learn to read, but not at 
school. But the development cannot be turned back, nowadays you must 
give girls an education. The world has become so open, so she has to 
have dome immunity. She has to know the right approach to a problem. 
For example, she must know about going to the moon, and learn this 
from secular subjects, and about the media, although we try to keep a 
distance. I think slowly but surely people have started seeing what 
damage the media has done in general, especially in the U.S.A. It’s a 
shame because TV could have been very educational.  
 
Hasidic Sarah, fifty-years old, a teacher and wife of the head of a kollel32 and 
mother of three, was utmost convinced of the natural and qualitative differences 
between women and men. She was much more critical of the idea of ‘women’s 
equality’, when I asked her opinion on women’s liberation and feminism: 
 
We think that it was against the woman. When I was a child, then a man 
who took a heavy case from a woman and help her, nowadays they carry 
themselves, no one would get up for her on a bus… We think that the 
women lost a lot, a lot through this equality, they lost a lot of respect, a 
lot of consideration, a lot of… No, I don’t believe… I rather prefer to be 
woman, have a family, to have less power and even less career, but to 
have the respect of my husband and my children and to keep my dignity, 
to keep my role as queen of the home, in the family… And I wouldn’t 
like to compete, I give him respect, even though many things I know 
better! Ha, ha... But I think there must be some hierarchy, some people 
understand things better than the prime minister, but he is still the prime 
minister, ok, so to give respect…  
 
Although the perspectives of my interviewees varied in what they saw as the 
gains and the setbacks of the changing status of women in society, often taking 
in ambivalent standpoints, they were consistent in their view of women and 
men as ‘of equal worth’ in their own communities and religious traditions. In 
order to be religiously observent and to retain their identity as strictly Orthodox 
Jewish, they necessarily insisted on gender role differentiation in line with what 
would be called highly ‘conservative’ from the general ‘outside’ – and 
definitely ‘feminist’ point of view. When I asked their opinion about the ‘state 
of the outside world’ in general, many of the answers pointed to the very 
conflict in diverging gender ideologies, often connected to notions of morality, 
or more precisely ‘moral decline’. The problems of the broader society were 
often linked to the loss of security and values, particularly in relation to the 
demise of gender certainties, nuclear families and above all, the way in which 
‘modesty’ and sexual morals had disappeared. According to Hannah for 
example, continuing on her opinion of feminism: 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
 467
It’s quite clear that the woman is respected and she is also secure, she 
knows that he doesn’t look… Normally, there are always exceptions, but 
ninety-nine percent, our women, even when we grow older, our middle 
age, I’m fifty… We’re secure, and loyal, we are never scared that he 
will find a younger woman, I can sleep peacefully at night. I know he’s 
loyal, it’s for life and… There are sometimes disputes, but the 
percentage of destroyed marriages is not even a fraction of what… in the 
outside world. Our family life is always our strength, right through the 
generations, and this is because of the law and the very clear roles of 
women and men.   
 
My interviewees often juxtaposed tzniut, as a fundamental religious principle, 
connected to women’s role, and keeping her ‘bound’ to her family and the 
private sphere, against the detrimental ‘openness’ of the outside world. When I 
asked Hasidic-oriented Tirza (mid-sixties) about the meaning of tzniut: 
 
It’s difficult to explain, it has to do with the home and the family. If you 
make yourself conspicuous, and go around with other men, start 
cohabiting and so forth like happens in the open world, where 
everything is allowed… Does this bring you closer or further from your 
family? I’ve heard that girls just go off to study and live in a room… 
This is unheard for the Orthodox… Just letting your daughter go and 
live alone… I mean I do want to wear something nice, something classic 
and nice, not the latest model or anything, but not clothes from a 
hundred years ago… I mean in the Jewish world the morals have also 
changed… I remember when women first started wearing trousers, when 
was that? 
C: In the sixties I suppose? 
I stood on De Keyserlei and we saw women in men’s trousers! And 
what things do you see nowadays? Girls showing off their bare navels… 
Everything is so open… I find it such a pity, the things that are allowed 
nowadays, living together, homosexuals… It used to be much more 
decent didn’t it, in the open world too?    
       
When I tried to find out whether morals, gender conservatism and stringency 
concerning rules of modesty had increased during the last decades in the strictly 
Orthodox Jewish community of Antwerp, or during my respondents own lives, 
the answers were again somewhat ambiguous. Although in principle my 
respondents claimed they were not living any differently or ‘stricter’ than they 
had done when they were younger, I inferred that an increase in stringency and 
isolationism opposed to the ‘outside world’ had taken place. Whereas many of 
my informants had been brought up in contact with secular culture, and many 
had even followed – if not finished higher secular education, their daughters 
and granddaughters (and sons and grandsons) had been more ‘closed off’ to the 
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outside world. Many drew attention to the fact that divorce and broken families 
were on the rise, and they pointed to many other disastrous consequences of the 
‘permissive society’. In general they perceived society to have changed for the 
worst, contrary to decades ago when ‘things were much less open’, and decent, 
‘even in the outside world’. Whilst many changes had inevitably influenced and 
‘modernised’ their way of life, some claimed that this did not imply that they 
lived any more or less observant than their mothers or grandmothers had done. 
Others admitted to an increase in religious stringency and separatism. The lack 
of ‘boundaries’, with everything ‘being allowed’ and ‘having its price’, did 
make it necessary to raise their children in a stricter and more isolationist 
environment, protected from the dangers of the media, sexual education, 
permissiveness, and ‘vulgarity’. Many of my respondents used to go to the 
beach, but now they could not anymore because of the nudity. They used to 
read the newspaper, but were fed up with the headlines on murders and bikinis 
on the front page. Therefore, from the native point of view, it was not so much 
their world, but the outside world that had changed. According to Sarah: 
 
The difficulty is coming from the outside, not the inside, the difficulty is 
the attitudes in the outside world. This is a big problem nowadays, to 
protect our youngsters. We know where we are, and to us, we see that 
the world is not going towards a happier society, healthier society. To us 
it looks as if they are going backwards, in morals, in justice, in 
security… But how to protect our youngsters of the influence? So we 
have to be much more strict nowadays. When I was child [after the war 
in Europe] they learned in the general schools, not Jewish schools, 
nowadays they can’t do that, because they would be exposed to a certain 
kind of behaviour, or studying, or media, or videos, or immoral things 
like that… You can’t do it anymore…  So what can you do? Can you 
keep the children away from papers, from television? It’s very, very 
difficult, so it becomes much more difficult, that’s why we have to have 
our own institutions, we can’t allow them to mix with the non-Jewish 
society, and we have to provide them with magazines, enough cultural 
material, we do that… … So we have our own colleges, we have our 
own seminars, oh yes, our religion, believes very much in… Concerning 
what’s going on in the outside world, and adapting also… We don’t 
ignore, and just sit and wait for Moshiach, and close our eyes… No, we 
are always involved in politics, economical life, cultural life, but since 
nowadays morals are so different and so low, we have to be more 
careful, to protect ourselves and our children mainly, to the influence 
which we find is a dangerous influence… And there are youngsters who 
get swept, but it’s a small minority…  
        
Television, videos, and pc’s were not so much the problem, it was their 
immoral messages, so they could be used, as long has this happened in a 
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controlled, ‘kosher’ way. So on the one hand my informants claimed to have 
necessarily ‘adapted’ to the outside world (especially in its technological 
modernisation). On the other hand, they claimed that they had remained 
essentiality ‘the same’ in terms of practising and passing on their religious 
identity and tradition. In order to remain the same and continue tradition, 
however, opposed to the downside of change in the surrounding society, this 
required partaking in a resistance toward the sexual and gender politics of 
secular modernity. For most this involved reproducing the discourse and 
practice of women’s proper religious or moral behaviour, as a defining feature 
for both women’s own religious identity, but also that of collective strictly 
Orthodox Jewish identity. In the final paragraph, I shift from my informants’ 
voices and agency to the level of this collective hegemonic discourse on gender 
in traditionalist religious traditions. Here I end with a more critical feminist 
analysis, by situating my local analysis of gendered subjects in more 
comparative contexts of the relationship between gender and religious 
traditionalism or fundamentalism on a global scale. 
 
 
Women as Agents and Symbols in The Politics of Religious Identity 
 
 
As a secular Jewish citizen of the State of Israel, I watch the 
fundamentalist arena with resentment. As a feminist 
anthropologist, I try to decode their discourse and 
experience it as a form of communication as well as critique. 
Tamar El-Or (1997: 672) 
 
 
That the notion of women as ‘bearers of the collective’ recurs in various 
contemporary religious traditionalist, fundamentalist and nationalist movements 
throughout the world has been argued by feminist scholars like Gita Sahgal and 
Nira Yuval-Davis (1992a), Yuval-Davis (1997), and is illustrated in various 
cross-cultural collections (e.g. Charles and Hintjens 1998; Howland 1999; 
Moghadam 1994a; Sahgal and Yuval-Davis 1992b). First however, the question 
whether the frum-born Jewish women from the strictly Orthodox Antwerp 
community I interviewed, and have hereto called ‘traditionalist’, may be 
straightforwardly considered ‘fundamentalist’ needs to be touched upon briefly. 
In most of the general ethnographical studies of contemporary Hasidim 
discussed in chapter five (e.g. Heilman 1992; Kranzler 1995; Mintz 1992), the 
concept of fundamentalism in order to describe these traditionalist religious 
communities is somewhat curiously seldom appropriated.33 Jonathan Webber 
(1987: 97) is highly critical of the pejorative and outsider concept of 
fundamentalism as applicable to contemporary traditionalist Jewish identities. 
Webber prefers to take a closer look at the ideological structures and 
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circumstances that have given rise to the usage of this term, ‘whether it be seen 
as a “response” to modernism or simply as a re-statement of traditional 
orthodox tenets which modernists classify as “fundamentalist” so as to make 
sense of their position appear normative by contrast’. On the other hand, the 
type of publications on fundamentalism ever since Marty and Appleby’s 
prestigious Fundamentalism Project, and as unambiguously becomes clear in 
Heilman and Friedman’s (1991) contribution to the first volume of this series, 
the contemporary haredim  of Israel are clearly identified as Jewish 
fundamentalists. Moreover, the authors consider the haredim as the successors 
to the historical Hasidic movement, an ‘early form’ of Jewish religious 
fundamentalism (chapter six). Other authors similarly consider the traditionalist 
movement of Hasidism originating in the seventeenth and eighteenth century as 
the ‘roots’ of Jewish fundamentalism of today (e.g. Armstrong 2000; Stump 
2000). So there are obvious complexities in applying ‘fundamentalism’ as an 
overarching concept for what is identified as a worldwide growing 
phenomenon. Many scholars – however critically or thoughtfully – taking a 
comparative, rather than a strictly ethnographical viewpoint, nonetheless refer 
to the contemporary haredim as one of the two main forms of Jewish 
fundamentalism, the other being religious Zionism, predominantly embodied in 
Gush Emunim (the Block of the Faithful).  
Whereas Gush Emunim oppose secular Zionism, in their vision of the 
erection – and territorial expansion or repossession - of a religious state, many 
Israeli haredim do not necessarily share what is often seen as one of religious 
fundamentalism’s defining features: the refutation of the separation between 
religion and politics, between the ‘church and the state’. Even though they do 
believe in the coming of the Messiah, the Satmar Hasidim for example, are 
adamant in their condemnation of the religious Zionist literal vision of the Land 
of Israel as the context for the Messiah’s arrival. For this reason, a writer like 
Lustick (1993) rejects the application of the term fundamentalism for the 
majority of any Haredi (Hasidic or Misnagdic) communities. For they do not 
politicise their messianism in the sense that they are seeking to transform 
society through state politics, although in practise they may be politically active 
in the securing and the preservation of their own ‘isolationist’ communities.  
Madeline Tress (1994: 315) then again, argues that even Gush Emunim 
‘in terms of religious orthodoxy’ cannot be considered ‘fundamentalist’: 
‘Moreover, since the Jewish tradition is based upon the authority of various 
commentaries on the text itself, such as Talmud and Midrash, classical Judaism 
cannot be truly fundamentalist. If anything, secular Zionism, through its 
rejection of Talmudic tradition and reliance solely on the Hebrew Bible, is more 
fundamentalist than the very forces it accuses of being so’. Nira Yuval-Davis 
(1992b) similarly argues that even the attempt by secular Zionists to separate 
the spheres of religion and the state ‘as part of their attempt to “normalise” 
Jewishness into a European-type nationalist project’ ultimately fails, as it 
needed the Jewish religious legitimation for its most basic claims (being ‘for the 
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land’ and ‘for the people’). Other authors see these differences in terms of 
degree, categorising the religious Zionists as the more active or innovative 
radical type, opposed to the more quiescent or conservative Haredi (Cromer 
1993; Friedman 1993; Hyman 1999).  
So even if many haredim do not ascribe to a conflation between the 
national and the religious in the definition of their collective identity, and Gush 
Emunim may be held to be the ‘paradigmatic’ form of Jewish religious 
fundamentalism, most authors appear to agree on the overwhelming similarities 
between haredim, and other forms of what is mostly identified as religious 
fundamentalism. The differential categorisation on grounds of Zionism, non-
Zionism or anti-Zionistic perspectives can moreover be de-emphasised by 
broadening the definition of ‘politics’ to more than just party politics and state 
control. Most haredim in Israel in fact are politically active, and often do appeal 
to the state in order to support their own political and economic projects 
(Yuval-Davis 1999). Both groups are furthermore extremely politically 
motivated in that they reject secularism tout court, in that all spheres of life, 
including the private or the personal, are seen to be regulated by halakhah, 
religious law. 
When the focus is shifted to strictly Orthodox Jewish communities in 
the Diaspora, categorisations become complicated even further, as within the 
context of secular states with freedom of religion, such as in the U.S., these 
communities do not share the same political struggles vis-à-vis their 
governments, but can take their isolationism even further. Thus, strictly 
Orthodox Jews can have a national identity that is that of a U.S. citizen, 
Belgian, British, etc. For the individual, Jewish ethnic/religious identification 
nevertheless remains paramount, as was also claimed by many of my own 
interviewees. The grounds for comparison are further supported by the 
increasing internationalisation of strictly Orthodox Jewry (see chapter six for 
Antwerp), and if not an overt orientation towards Israel, at least a positioning 
vis-à-vis Israel, lives in the consciousness of many diasporic strictly Orthodox 
Jews. In any case, in general, all strictly Orthodox Jews aim to ‘sacralise the 
profane’ in their daily lives, as for these traditionalists, religious identity 
circumscribes everyday life and experience. As one of the women I interviewed 
said to me: ‘We live and breathe religion, it is not limited to the way you 
celebrate Christmas once a year’.  
Taking into account the same reservations and stressing the necessity for 
continuous contextualisation and specification of the community or movement 
under study, I nonetheless believe that the discourse on religious identity and 
tradition reproduced by the women I interviewed, did show many of the same 
structural features that have been noted for the gender identity politics of many 
contemporary movements and collectivities that are referred to as 
‘fundamentalist’. The securing of identity vis-à-vis that of the ‘other’ – usually 
seen as ‘modern’, ‘Western’, ‘secular’ - who is perceived as a threat through 
clearly defined boundaries is one of these main characteristics. Although the 
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context for the rise of fundamentalist movements and the contemporary ‘crisis 
of identities’ in general has been referred to as that of ‘modernity and its 
discontents’, the relationship with modernity is also often described as 
ambiguous or ‘dialectic’ (Silberstein 1993: 6). As I referred to in the previous 
paragraph, the growth of these communities has clearly depended on and is 
known for appropriating precisely typical ‘modern’ elements in order to thrive, 
in particular technology, the media, etc. Whatever important differences there 
may exist between, and within different forms of religious fundamentalisms, the 
battle to preserve what is understood to be the traditional religious identity of 
the community, almost cross-culturally involves opposing a specific feature of 
Western modernity. This I argue, concerns gender equality and in particular the 
disintegration of patriarchal society as a major historical development 
throughout the West and beyond during the twentieth century. In this ‘control 
of women’ through for instance strict gender segregation, or preventing 
women’s access to the public domain and positions of (religious) authority, 
religious discourse is then often used as a means of justification, and always in 
the name of ‘timeless tradition’, defying the internal and cross-cultural 
dynamics of gender throughout time.  
As I have tried to show, however, for many of the strictly Orthodox 
Jewish women in my case study, there appeared to be a tension between 
continuity and innovation of traditional gender patterns. Gender appeared as a 
pattern of generational sociality and practice, rather than the appropriation of 
overt explicit essentialist gender ideology in accounting for clear-cut gender 
roles. Typical of traditionalist Judaism in general, the preservation of religious 
identity is expressed through halakhic observance, thus in the realm of 
behaviour rather than, or at least above religious doctrine and belief. Beyond 
individual identity, the regulation of women’s behaviour is nonetheless crucial 
in the definition and reproduction of both the identity of the group and the 
‘imagined’ community. Gender not only functions as a marker of difference 
between women and men, but as a marker for the difference between the 
group’s identity versus the ‘other’, in this case secular modern society, or as my 
informants referred to, ‘the outside world’. Beyond the construction of women 
as the ‘biological reproducers’ of the strictly Orthodox Jewish ethnicity, and as 
the primary agents of socialisation of the young (Moghadam 1994b: 18), 
women also function as the ‘symbolic border guards and as embodiments of the 
collectivity’. At the same time, they are its ‘cultural reproducers’ (Yuval-Davis 
1997: 23), or the ‘cultural carriers’ of group identity (Saghal and Yuval-Davis 
1992a: 8).      
This ‘burden of reproduction and representation’ means women and 
their ‘proper’ behaviour in many fundamentalist, nationalist and ethnic projects 
often symbolise the integrity or ‘honour’ and the boundaries of the collective 
identity. The control of women’s sexuality and her bodily praxis, as in 
restrictions on ways to comport oneself, dress and behave appear to be 
characteristic of many patriarchal societies, cultures and religious traditions. 
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However, in those contemporary communities which are seeking to preserve 
and reproduce ‘tradition’, this control is often not only intensified, but takes 
centre stage in maintaining the difference between the own and the other’s 
identity. In the case of strictly Orthodox Jewry, and as testified in many of my 
interviews, gender functions as a marker for further difference and isolationism, 
although from the ‘native viewpoint’, change is attributed to the other and 
therefore an external cause is identified for any increase of gender 
conservatism.  
According to many of my interviewees tzniut or modesty is one of, if not 
the most important principles circumscribing women’s religiosity. Besides the 
mitzvot, that are seen as gender neutral and thus equally incumbent on both 
women and men, in concordance with men’s specific public ritual role, women 
as keepers of the home and the private world are to follow an ethic of modesty. 
The regulation of women’s sexuality as an essential tool for the construction of 
collective identity is also expressed in the laws and rituals surrounding niddah, 
or the family purity laws. The individual responsibility of each woman to abide 
to these laws was interpreted by my informants as of enormous important, not 
only for the husband and family, but for the community, or as one Hasidic 
woman said to me, ‘for the sake of the nation.’  
I also referred to the research on contemporary religious Zio nist 
discourse on the laws of niddah in Israel, which shows how the meaning of 
niddah has expanded to the public domain, rhetorically linking the importance 
of the practice of the laws by women to collective Jewish identity (Yanay and 
Rapoport 1997). In an analysis of literature by Orthodox Jewish women from 
various backgrounds, Jody Myers and Jane Litman (1995) suggest the discourse 
on the traditional role of observant women, including the practice of the family 
purity laws, is more apologetic when written by the women who were formerly 
secular. In trying to reach a secular audience, they require a ‘counter-ideology’, 
incorporating concepts and symbols from the secular world in order to justify 
Orthodox practice. The literature by frum-born women, the authors argue, is not 
in need of the same level of sophistication in explaining the laws women must 
follow, as obedience to God and the fact that the laws have been practised for 
generations in itself suffice. My interviewees also appeared to have less 
essentialist understandings of gender and the idea of an ideology of female 
superiority was absent. There was also was less emphasis on cultural or 
symbolic meanings in explaining and accounting for the laws of family purity 
among my frum-born respondents. Still, in my interviews, similar rhetoric was 
used in attributing collective responsibilities to women, as expressed in their 
correct individual behaviour, which will guarantee the ‘purity’ and the 
‘modesty’ of the whole community. It therefore seems to be the case that 
women and their behaviour functions as an important symbol in diverse strictly 
Orthodox Jewish communities, and in similar ways in various identity politics 
in many religious traditionalist, fundamentalist or nationalist movements 
throughout the contemporary world.             
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As frum-born traditionalists however, from their own perspective and in 
their own voice, many of my interviewees denied that they were not doing 
anything fundamentally different to what their mothers or grandmothers had 
done, although some did admit to a possible increase in gender conservatism in 
recent times. Interesting was that they attributed this to the ‘outside world’, 
which for them used to be ‘decent’, yet had evolved into a society of ‘unisex’, 
with too much ‘freedom’ and with ‘everything is possible and everything is 
allowed’, and in general serious moral decline. From the native viewpoint, I 
argued, paradoxically, change was necessary in order to remain the same. 
Although many of my middle- and senior-aged informants had been brought up 
in a society in which everyone was ‘decent’ - women still wore skirts and 
sexuality wasn’t made public and for sale - their sons and daughters needed 
much more protection, so that they wouldn’t be exposed to the dangers of 
modern society and possibly ‘glitch’. In practice, this has meant an increase in 
isolationism and gender conservatism, the latter especially consequential for 
girls and women who must keep bound to the home and private world. The 
gender ideologies put forward by my interviewees were by no means always or 
completely essentialist. However, an increase in gender conservatism, as in 
more gender segregation at younger ages, a more stringent application of 
modesty laws, - such as applying the rules of dress at a younger age than is 
even halakhically prescribed - is deemed necessary. Stringency is required to 
oppose, and what my interviewees strongly disapproved of, as the decline in 
sexual morals and the dominant dangerous gender ideology in the surrounding 
society.     
The principle of tzniut or modesty in itself was linked to the broader 
context of a woman’s place within the family or private sphere, and keeping her 
bound to her family and obligations in order not to be attracted by the ‘outside 
world.’ However, this was definitely not interpreted as submissive confinement. 
As all my informants made clear, women’s religious duties did certainly not 
mean that she could not study, work, fulfil herself, or even take positions of 
authority or responsibility. In practice however, and which is especially the case 
in diasporic and smaller communities outside of Israel within secular societies 
such as Antwerp, the rules of modesty simply make it impossible for strictly 
Orthodox Jewish girls and women to pursue studies or apply for many jobs, as 
mixed environments are out of the question. Many of my informants in fact had 
studied later on in life. One woman even solved the problem of a course in 
alternative medicine she could not follow because of the presence of male 
students, by invit ing the teacher to her own home, with a number of other 
secular women eventually joining in the lessons that were given in the private 
sphere of the home. Another woman told me that perhaps new possibilities 
would open up with ICT, where the difficulties of the physical mixed gender, 
public secular world would become unnecessary. Above the possibilities for the 
strictly Orthodox Jewish women I interviewed to educate themselves, their 
interest even for secular culture and literature – within the boundaries of what 
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they considered to be decent and non-vulgar – to travel, work, etc. individual 
self-fulfilment did remain subservient to their most important duty of 
maintaining the home. Through their religious obligations as mothers and in a 
domestic role – religious domesticity -, next to their practice of ‘piety’ through 
proper modest and sexual behaviour, they saw their role as of utmost 
importance in the maintenance of stability, tradition and religion.  
In the course of the final chapter I have shifted between both levels of 
women’s religious practice, agency, and resistance or reproduction of dominant 
religious discourse, ultimately ending with the theme of women as ‘symbols’ of 
religious discourse (See Sered 1999 and chapter one). This has allowed for a 
feminist gender analysis, of the place of gender within diverse religious 
traditionalist, fundamentalist, or nationalist identity politics at the level of 
communities and movements within in a global context, thus from the level of 
intra- to intercultural comparison. However problematic the application of often 
used pejorative terms such as fundamentalism, it cannot be denied that a 
particular kind of patriarchal religious discourse is on the rise in culturally 
diverse forms, yet on a global scale. Typical for many of these movements is 
the appropriation of certain aspects of ‘modernity’ and the rejection of others, 
most notably gender equality, which is perceived as a threat to the ‘authentic’ 
identity, religion or tradition. Whether ‘tradition’ is simply being continued – 
religious traditions such as Judaism being inherently and historically patriarchal 
from a feminist perspective -, reproduced or innovated, an increase in gender 
conservatism is no doubt taking place: ‘Women, their roles, and above all their 
control, are at the heart of the fundamentalist agenda’ (Sahgal and Yuval-Davis 
1992a: 1), becoming both part and the parcel of the community’s identity.   
Throughout my account however, I have at least tried to give attention 
to nuances, be wary of simple objectification and over-generalisation, such as 
the ‘false consciousness model’ or ‘women as victims’ approach that 
characterised an earlier stage of feminist research - and to some extent still does 
- on cross-cultural communities. Lynn Davidman (1991, 1995) and Debra 
Kaufman’s (1993, 1994, 1995) studies of newly Orthodox women are precisely 
illustrative of a reactive trend in feminist research, which moves beyond the 
victim-approach. The objective of these analyses is to present more reflexive, 
fine-tuned, empathetic, and in general more feminist methodologically sound 
analyses of women’s lives, that are different to or probably almost the counter 
pole of that of their interpreters. Feminist writers like Sahgal and Yuval-Davis 
(1992a), Sered (1992, 1999) and (Yuval-Davis 1992a, 1999) are nonetheless 
critical of the apparent paradox that women who participate in fundamentalist 
movements - such as the Lubavitcher Hasidim – should actually ‘gain a sense 
of empowerment within the spaces allocated to them by fundamentalist 
movements’ (Sahgal and Yuval-Davis 1992a: 9). 
Susan Sered (1992), in a book review of Davidman (1991) and Kaufman 
(1993) for example, takes Kaufman to task for accepting her informants point 
of view too easily, and neglecting to compare their perceptions with actual 
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practice, or including interviews with women who had more negative 
experiences under patriarchal law, or left the Orthodox Jewish community. 
Yuval-Davis’ (1992a, 1999) own research on what she calls people who 
become Khozrim Bitshuva  (returnees) among the Lubavitcher Hasidim, is less 
extensive than that of Davidman and Kaufman, but nonetheless does portray the 
downside of the phenomenon, in line with her more general viewpoint on 
fundamentalism and its detrimental consequences for women’s status. Despite 
all possible differences due to class position or other sociological determinants, 
the idea of empowerment for these women - e.g. emotional bonding between 
women in a separate, women’s community – remains problematic for the 
author. Besides the basic halakhic inequalities that remain in place, some of the 
women and social workers Yuval-Davis interviewed, reported cases of physical 
and mental exhaustion, post-natal depression among the poorer large families 
and other familial problems.  
The general paradox of empowerment and the necessity for a critical 
perspective revolves around the dilemma of identity politics of minorities or 
any kind of collectivities in general: ‘Minority women often face the dilemma 
that the same particularistic collective identity that they seek to defend against 
racism and subordination, and from which they gain their empowerment to 
resist dominant oppressive systems and cultures, also oppresses them as women 
and can include many reactionary and exclusionary elements’ (Yuval-Davis 
1999: 40). In my own interviews, even if the legitimising ‘rhetoric of choice’ 
was absent, the frum-born women I interviewed nevertheless perhaps did paint 
a rosy picture of their position as women within their traditionalist community. 
Although I did not make any enquiries about their financial status or ‘class’, the 
vast majority of the women living in Antwerp did appear to enjoy comfortable, 
some even affluent life styles, with home helps for domestic chores or help with 
the children when they were young. Speaking towards myself as an outsider, 
from their subject positions as ‘spokespersons’ for their relatively tiny minority 
community within a dominant secular and potentially racist modern society, 
however, I had not expected them to do any different than make this type of 
‘political’ move. 
 
 
 
                                              
1 In a comparative volume on the variety of interpretations of gender in Genesis 1-3 throughout 
history, (Kvam, Schearing and Ziegler 1999), the editors argue that in all three Mediterranean 
religious traditions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam), the Creation story has been interpreted in 
differential ways. Yet all three religious traditions have used the story of the first man in woman 
in order to understand and ‘construct’ gender relations, and in all three traditions, both 
worldviews, the ‘egalitarian’ versus the ‘hierarchical’ are present.    
2 Greenberg borrows this alternative interpretation from Phyllis Tribble, ‘Depatriarchalizing in 
Biblical Interpretation’, Journal of American Academy of Religion, vol. 41, no. 1, March 1973, 
p. 40. 
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3 In paragraph 2. Niddah: The Prototype of a Woman’s Mitzvah the topic of women’s sexuality 
in Judaism will be discussed more extensively. 
4 Ha-Shem is a euphemism for God, to avoid ‘the careless use of God’s name’ (Glossary in 
Grossman and Haut 1992). 
5 In her study of gender and assimilation in modern Jewish history, Paula Hyman (1995: 66-67) 
notes that particularly in Eastern Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth century women 
actively participated in secular public economic life. An elite of learned families, which realised 
the Ashkenazi cultural ideal of full-time Torah study for men even imposed upon the wives ‘the 
primary obligation for sustaining the family economically’. This was a stark contrast to Western 
Europe where many Jewish women ‘assimilated’ the ‘bourgeois cult of domesticity’.   
6 Sabbath breads, from challah or hallah, special braided Sabbath loaf. Hallah also refers to the 
mitzvah of taking of the dough portion during baking, or the part of the dough that must be 
given to the priest (cohen) according to halakhah (Glossaries in Kaufman 1995 and Zuidema 
1988).  
7 Torah portion. The Torah is divided into weekly readings, to be read on each Sabbath 
(Glossary in Grossman and Haut 1992). 
8 Unfortunately, Alyse Fisher Roller’s (1999) book was only published after I conducted my 
interviews. I did manage to find out more on what sort of fictional literature my interviewees 
read and even borrowed some books from one Hasidic woman. Whereas some of the more 
‘open-minded’ women I interviewed also read ‘decent’ secular literature, or certainly had done 
so when they were young, the more ‘ultra’ Hasidic women limited their reading to strictly 
Orthodox Jewish publications. The ‘writing community’ of ultra-Orthodox Jewish women 
writers that Roller studies is definitely growing, although these books are not easy to find 
outside the community and its networks. Afterwards, I did find out that some of the few books I 
borrowed are included in Roller’s bibliography and therefore presumably widely read, like 
Libby Lazewnik’s Between the Thorns (1994) and the holocaust testimonial The Scent of 
Snowflowers by R.L. Klein (1989). Fiction by women in the Lubavitcher community is more 
easily accessible and known to a broader public, such as the recently published Around Sarah’s 
Table: Ten Hasidic Women Share their Stories of Life, Faith, and Tradition, by Rivka 
Zakutinsky and Yaffa Leba Gottlieb (2001).    
9 From Susan Shapiro, Don’t You Know It’s a Perfect World?, Southfield, Michigan: Targum, 
1998, p. 97, in: Roller 1999: p. 97. 
10 According to Tamar Frankiel (1990: 72), Channah is the mother of Shmuel the prophet, one 
of the great female leaders of the Bible.  
11 Niddah is translated as ‘menstruant’ but also refers to the ‘laws of family purity’, the body of 
regulations restricting contact between husband and wife during the menstrual period (Glossary 
Grossman and Haut 1992). 
12 See chapter four for the dilemmas and ethical conflicts in feminist anthropology. 
13 Tamar El-Or’s research is also discussed in chapter five and in the final part of the previous 
chapter. 
14 See chapter six, 2. Entering the Field – Enter Women. 
15 Goy (pl. goyim) is Hebrew and Yiddish for someone who is not-Jew.  
16 Archer derives this model of analysis from anthropologist Sherry Ortner’s (1974) famous 
thesis of the universal subordination of women through their association with ‘nature’, versus 
men and ‘culture’. See also e.g. Bauman 1995 [1983].  
17 Whereas in Israel there is a strong democracy that ensures a high level of constitutional and 
legal protection for women’s right to equality, affirmative action, etc., concerning issues such as 
equal pay, parental rights in the workplace, etc., and even familial matters concerning domestic 
violence, division of matrimonial property, abortion, etc., marriage and divorce are nevertheless 
regulated by religious authorities of the various communities. According to Frances Raday 
(1999: 157), the result is that in practice: ‘women are excluded from participation in 
policymaking or public offices in those spheres of public life delegated to autonomous 
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regulation by the institutions of the religious communities. Secondly, it subjects women to 
patriarchal norms in the spheres of social activity regulated by these institutions, particularly the 
family’. E.g., women are barred under the law from appointment to the judiciary on matters of 
marriage and divorce. Furthermore, not only are actively religious women subjected to 
inegalitarian norms. Even secular women’s right to marry, divorce or remarry is officially 
governed by religious precepts. Regardless of their civil rights, Raday argues, their subjection in 
religious courts consequently ‘undermines their assertion of these other rights in civil courts’.      
18 Rav is short for Rabbi or Rebbe. 
19 The film Leonie was referring to is Left Luggage, directed by Jeroen Krabbé (Netherlands, 
1998). 
20 For many of thee modern day attributes, obviously halakhic resolutions have continuously 
been sought. 
21 Strictly Orthodox Jewish men apparently also use a mikvah for ritual immersion, following 
the same ritual procedure of going under three times and pronouncing a blessing. 
Anthropologist Samuel Heilman (1992) describes – and even participates in – the event in his 
monograph. However, it seems to be more of a communal and social event, a ‘social gathering-
place of the first order. A place to while away time. A place to exchange opinions and 
information’ (321), such as in the preparations for the weekly Sabbath. Women’s immersion by 
contrast, is a totally private event, except for the presence of the mikvah attendant.  
22 In fact, Kaufman cites an article on research evidence by the same ‘Dr. Serr’ published in 
1972 as Meiselman, including some additional, - but no more recent - medical literature dating 
from the seventies. 
23 See chapter one for more examples on the way in which ‘scientific truth’ is both used for, and 
invested with ideologies of gender.   
24 Onah literally means ‘season’, and according to Kaufman (1995) in his glossary, refers to the 
husband’s obligation for marital obligations with his wife. 
25 Abramov (1988: 98) uses the ‘rules of harchakot’ in referring to ‘maintaining a distance 
between husband and wife’ during the latter’s status as niddah.    
26 Apparently, recently some new women Jewish law experts on the purity laws in Jerusalem 
have set up some kind of hotline in which other women can call them up for expert advice 
instead of talking to a man (personal communication with Oonagh Reitman).  
27 According to Biale (1984: 155) karet translates as ‘being cut off from his people.’ In the 
Bible it appears as a capital punishment inflicted by God and in post biblical sources as 
punishment at the hand of heaven, presumably premature death. In any case, though in itself 
considered utmost serious, it does not seem to be punishable by society. 
28 According to Meiselman (1978: 11), the root of tzniut (zena), occurs twice in the Bible, once 
in a verse which translates ‘Those who are private [in their Torah learning] will achieve 
wisdom’ (Prov. 11:2), and once in the verse: ‘He has told you, man, what is good and what the 
Lord demands from you, but to do justice, love kindness, and to walk privately with your God’ 
(Mic. 6:8).  
29 Meiselman (1978: 14) refers to the verse as ‘The entire glory of the daughter of the king lies 
on the inside’ (Ps. 45:14), and claims it is entirely non-pejorative, and furthermore underlies 
much of the Jewish attitude toward the female role.   
30 Well-known supermarket chain in Belgium. 
31 Left-wing feminist activist group from the late sixties, early seventies in the Netherlands and 
Belgium.  
32 An institution for advanced Torah study, usually for married students (glossary in Kaufman 
1995).  
33 A monograph-type of study by political correspondent David Landau (1993) of the haredim 
in New York, London and Jerusalem, by contrast, does explicitly feature the term 
fundamentalism. 
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I have taken on the challenge of ‘centring’ women’s religious agency and 
standpoint as a kind of situated knowledge from the perspective of feminist 
gender theory and analysis. Towards the end of my account I hope to  have 
shown how a gendered perspective can reveal the methodological deficiencies 
of a non-reflexive and de-contextualised approach to the study of religion, that 
employs a notion of reified ‘religion’ and the ‘religious subject’ as an 
undifferentiated homo religiosus. Rather, power, politics, and control appear to 
lie at the heart of ‘religion’, especially in the context of contemporary religious 
traditionalist communities, where religion is appropriated as a vehicle for the 
construction and reproduction of collective identity. Without getting drawn into 
a ‘religious’ debate, e.g. on the feasibility of ridding historical patriarchal 
religious traditions of androcentrism, and adapting or transforming them 
according to feminist norms, I have nevertheless attempted to move beyond a 
‘God’s eye view’. Next to the religious point of view, I have similarly proposed 
avoiding the ‘god-trick’ in the sense of detached ‘objective’ scholarship in 
which the researcher is viewed as detached from her/his own position, instead 
of being necessarily positioned according to axes of difference, and implicated 
in struggles and choices on how to live, act and reflect on the world.  
Whereas my choice for a case study of women’s religious agency in a 
traditionalist religious community defined according to explicit patriarchal or 
non-feminist norms has served my methodological theses most poignantly, in 
terms of a feminist assessment the challenge has been even more profound. 
Especially towards the end of my account, where I have taken my analysis to 
the level of comparison and current transnational contexts, new questions have 
been raised and alternative future directions of analysis have been tentatively 
proposed. In the very first chapter I referred to the UN Fourth World 
Conference on Women held in Beijing (September 1995) in order to illustrate 
the problematic status of gender as an analytical concept within the context of 
both contemporary transnational feminist policy and activism, and feminist 
research and theory in the academy. As an international and intercultural forum, 
the ‘gender confusion’ at this conference was multifaceted. Numerous feminist 
activists and researchers from different corners of the globe showed their 
concern for the way the mainstreaming of gender had led to  a neutralisation of 
the concept, and its original intent towards a theorisation and eradication of 
women’s subordinate status in many various communities and locations.  
However, I also drew attention to another kind of attack on the concept 
of ‘gender’, from an entirely different corner and expressing components of a 
‘backlash’ to contemporary feminist concerns. Conservative Catholic activists 
from countries in both the North and the South were highly represented at the 
conference and expressed their anxieties over what they perceived as the 
eradication of gender certainties, family values and particularly homosexuality 
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and abortion. Nira Yuval-Davis (1997b: 122) signals how one of the most 
pronounced differences between the 1995 Beijing Conference on women and 
the 1985 one in Nairobi, was the prevalence of well-organised fundamentalist, 
religious and other ‘traditionalist’ groups at the first. Next to the above noted 
presence of Catholic conservatives, apparently at least seven Islamist 
workshops a day took place. Only a year earlier at the 1994 UN Cairo 
Conference on population and development, an ‘(un)holy alliance’ was 
contrived between the Catholic Pope and Islamist Iran in their common fight 
against reproductive rights for women.  
Women themselves are participating in what can be viewed as what 
Amrita Basu (2001) calls the phenomenal growth of transnational networks of 
the religious right. Both official state organisations and members of non-state 
organisations are furthermore ‘able to achieve a striking degree of consensus’ 
on issues relating to motherhood, sexuality and family values. According to 
Basu, the growth of these networks has contradictory implications for women’s 
movements. Presenting themselves as local community-based, yet very much 
the product of transnational forces, these religious movements and alliances 
appear to lessen earlier polarisations between North and South, and particularly 
the kind of Western imperialist universalistic feminism that dominated during 
earlier decades. On the other hand, Basu warns, ‘the religious right has really 
complicated the ability of women’s movements to appeal to the language of 
human rights’. The Vatican for example, is becoming ‘particularly adept’ in 
appropriating the language of human rights, arguing e.g., against abortion in it 
violating the ‘right’ of the unborn child, while at the same time defending 
people’s ‘right’ to a large family.      
According to Basu, women’s movements which are similarly the 
product of both local and global forces, cannot turn a blind eye, nor ‘think about 
strategies for empowerment without appreciating the importance of the 
religious right, and the extent to which the agendas of the religious right 
intersect with those of feminists in peculiar and often unpredictable ways’. In 
view of these global and transnational contexts I conclude that feminism needs 
to take religion seriously, related to a similar plea I hold for contemporary 
feminist scholarship. Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan (1997: 17) for 
example, draw on the notion of postmodernism in their proposal for 
transnational feminist practice, and tools of analysis in a comparative mode, 
rather than ‘the relativistic linking of “differences” undertaken by proponents of 
global feminism’. Instead of dismissing the notion of ‘postmodernism’ as the 
‘apolitical celebration of Western popular culture’ or an aesthetic rather than a 
political debate, the authors argue that postmodernism can be read as ‘the 
operations of transnational culture’, the ‘scattered hegemonies’ which are the 
‘effects of mobile capital as well as the multiple subjectivities that replace the 
European unitary subject’ (7). This would involve a non cultural relativistic 
approach in the analysis of the place of women in the nation-state in revivals of 
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‘tradition’ and fundamentalisms, but also the relationship between gender, the 
nation-state and mobile, transnational capital.   
Arguing against essentialism in the study of religion and gender, my 
analysis also draws attention to the way in which, in practice, the contemporary 
resurgence of traditionalist religion accompanies, and is simultaneously being 
fed by the representation of ‘cultures’ in relativist and essentialist ways. For 
feminist activists and scholars the phenomenon of contemporary identity 
politics – whether these be ‘religious’, ‘nationalist’, ethnic’, etc. - that appeals 
to essentialist differences is problematic, especially when women ‘voluntarily’ 
seem to be active participants or capitalise on what appear to be ideologies and 
practices detrimental to women’s status, reproducing or even intensifying 
patterns of subordination. As Nira Yuval-Davis (1997b: 63) and others suggest 
– the ba’alot teshuvah being an example –, one of the paradoxes of many 
fundamentalist and nationalist movements is that women seek comfort from the 
‘crises of modernity’ - and even ‘gain at times a sense of empowerment within 
the spaces allocated to them’, in that they offer clear and coherent forms of 
gender and collective identity and roles. Yuval-Davis (1997b: 37) furthermore 
notes that it is often the older women who are given the roles of cultural 
reproducers of the collectivity, ‘empowered to rule on what is appropriate 
behaviour and appearance and what is not and to exert control over other 
women who might be constructed  as ‘deviants’”.     
Movements applying ideological constructs in order to divide people 
into different collectivities and ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1991 
[1983]), whether these are ‘ethnic’ projects, or defined in terms of religious, 
national, racial, or cultural grounds, draw on various resources in order to 
establish inclusive – and exclusionary - boundaries of difference and belonging. 
In these political struggles, gender is often deployed as an important marker of 
difference, and often in very similar ways to which I have referred. The ‘proper’ 
behaviour of women is often used to signify the boundaries of the collectivity. 
Women are viewed as the ‘cultural carriers’ of the collectivity, whilst their 
sexuality is controlled through rules and regulations on marriage, divorce and 
reproduction, in order to ensure the future generation remains within the 
boundaries of the collectivity in both biological and symbolic terms (Yuval-
Davis 1994: 413). The promotion of the patriarchal family implies an 
identification with women in their role as mothers and homemakers, often 
accompanying a restriction on their movement in the public domain.  
In gender studies of nationalist movements, similarly, women’s 
symbolic status is often connected to their reproductive roles, with ‘only pure 
and modest women’ being able to re-produce the ‘pure nation’ (Mayer 2000b: 
7). Charles and Hintjens (1998b: 2) note how the nationalist ideologies that 
emerged in late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century Europe were 
grounded in a specific gender division of labour, sexual orientation and 
ethnicity. These ‘involved notions of respectability and appropriate sexual 
behaviour, “manliness” and a complementary role for women, and ideas of 
 TAKING RELIGION SERIOUSLY  
 
 
482
racial superiority’. Women became the guardians of morality and tradition in 
the private sphere. In the last years of the twentieth century by contrast, 
nationalism takes many different forms, among which its alliance with religious 
fundamentalism. In various contexts from postcolonial states to within Western 
liberal democracies, conservative gender ideology is therefore used and ‘rooted 
in an idealised past’, reasserting a collective identity in the face of secular 
modernity and/or westernisation.           
In the so-called ‘Third World’, the rise of fundamentalism, and/or 
nationalism appropriating religious ideology can be situated in a postcolonial 
and particular socio-economic context, rallying against racism, 
(neo)imperialism and Western supremacy. Many women participate in these 
movements, and recent feminist research is increasingly paying attention to 
women’s contribution and engagement in fundamentalist discourse, and the 
way strategies of resistance or complicity are employed that may offer means of 
agency and empowerment in their daily lives (e.g. Ask and Tjomsland 1998; 
Brink and Mencher 1997; Howland 1999; Gerami 1996; Jansen 1994; 
Moghadam 1994a). This shift has been greatly influenced by anti-orientalism 
and postcolonial critique, and signals an attempt on behalf of feminist 
scholarship in making amends for its earlier limited or even exclusive 
‘Western’ universalistic focus, towards an acknowledgement for the differences 
between women in both local and global contexts. However, according to 
Haideh Moghissi (1999) for example, in regards to Islamic fundamentalism, in 
what she identifies as a kind of ‘postmodern’ or anti-orientalist analysis, this 
paradoxically balances towards a convergence with fundamentalist 
conservatism. In order to counter anti-Muslim prejudices and neo -orientalist 
representations of Muslim women, women’s agency and empowerment is 
attributed to particular groups of women who have for instance, ‘taken on the 
veil’. The consequence is not only that internal diversity is overlooked, but that 
critical analysis stops short at the representation of ‘authentic’, ‘empowered 
Muslim women’. The call for tolerance unfortunately ends up in an 
endorsement of ‘the fundamentalists’ solutions to crisis of modernity and 
modernization’ (46).            
Moghissi (1999: 47) represents the style of thought and cultural climate 
that converges with Islamic fundamentalist conservatism as ‘postmodern 
relativism’, as ‘a style benchmarked, by an uncritical pursuit of the culturally 
exotic and untouched’ (47). However, I argue that the term ‘cultural relativism’ 
may be more appropriate for the climate leading to the link Nira Yuval-Davis 
(1998a) and Charles and Hintjens (1998) make between policies of 
multiculturalism and the rise of many ethnic or religious fundamentalist 
movements among minorities in the west. According to Yuval-Davis (1998a: 
172), multiculturalist policies and ‘anti-racism’ which developed in response to 
the failure of liberal approaches that assumed racism would disappear once 
immigrants acculturated and assimilated, have contributed to the process of 
identity politics and proliferation of imagined communities. Multiculturalist 
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policies would construct ‘cultures as static, ahistoric and in their “essence” 
mutually exclusive from other cultures, especially that of the host society’. 
Moreover, Yuval-Davis argues, ‘culture’ in the multiculturalist discourse is 
often collapsed into ‘religion,’ which becomes the signifier of cultural 
difference. 
Debate expressing feminist concerns over the way multicultural 
tolerance appears to reinfo rce gender inequality in many minority groups has 
recently been provoked following the publication of Susan Moller Okin’s 
controversial essay ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?’ (1999). Okin points 
to the growing tension between feminism and the multiculturalist concern for 
protecting cultural diversity in terms of group rights for minority cultures. In 
Okin’s view, this often runs counter to liberal norms of individual freedom and 
gender equality. Okin’s view of ‘culture’, ‘religion’ and ‘tradition’ is highly 
essentialist and de-contextualised though, reifying clear-cut identities and 
differences with simplistic statements such as ‘most cultures having as one of 
their principal aims of the control of women by men’ (13). However, Okin does 
draw attention to the fact that all collectivities are gendered, and particularly to 
the fact that advocates of group rights pay little or no attention to the private 
sphere. From critiques of theories of citizenship through to human rights, 
feminist scholars have repeated ly emphasised that the distinction between 
public and the private is itself an ideological construction, and that from the 
perspective of gender, it is precisely in the latter, concerning the regulation of 
reproduction and women’s behaviour, where gender equalities persevere. As I 
have repeatedly argued, in identity politics that draw on ethnic, religious or 
cultural resources, women often come to symbolise the boundaries of the 
collectivity, whilst they are expected to reproduce it through patriarchal 
behavioural norms.  
The secular democratic model as a product of the Enlightenment project 
with its separation between the state and religion; the secular public versus a 
private sphere, where individuals, families and communities are ‘free’ to 
practise religion, according to Yuval-Davis (1994: 7-8) has therefore created a 
paradox in which ‘in the name of pluralism’ intolerant ideologies have been 
endorsed. The consequence of multiculturalist policies guided by ideologies of 
cultural relativism is that ‘members of different groupings [are seen] as 
essentially different from the “norm”, as well as internally homogeneous’. (8) 
Whilst the naturalisation of a Western hegemonic culture continues, minority 
cultures are reified, remaining oblivious to internal differences and conflicts 
along lines of gender and class. Certain segments can then claim to be 
representatives of ‘authentic’ cultures or communities, whereby for instance, 
the demands made by minority women are not regarded ‘legitimate’. The most 
conservative constructions of gender are then considered ‘authentic’, and at 
worst enforceable in the name of cultural relativism, pluralism and the freedom 
attributed to the ‘private sphere’.  
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The fact that in so much of the identity politics of traditionalist, 
fundamentalist, nationalist movements or ‘ethnic projects’ gender conservatism 
is so pronounced, is generally attributed to the ‘crisis of modernity’, with which 
feminism is identified as a symbol of wholly Western, secular and liberal 
culture and society. In many postcolonial states the – selective - rejection of 
‘westernisation’ has led to nationalist and fundamentalist movements beckoning 
women to return to their ‘traditional roles’, in order to preserve the ‘spiritual 
essence’ of national identity. As I have extensively elaborated, feminist 
scholarship has had to – and continue – to deal with the way it has projected 
Western norms on other cultures and groups, beyond ideas of victimhood and 
false-consciousness. On the other hand, anti-orientalism and postcolonial 
critique that has enabled a focus on alternative perspectives of gender relations 
and models of agency, needs to be wary of perpetuating similar essentialisms 
when it comes to theorising the differences between women.  
Uma Narayan (1997c: 397) for example, warns to be attentive to the 
common rhetoric that Third-World feminist voices would ‘be rooted in elitist 
and ‘”Westernized” views of their cultures’. She argues that ‘for many Third 
World feminists, their feminist consciousness is not a hot-house bloom grown 
in the arid atmosphere of “foreign” ideas, but has its roots much closer to 
home’. Elsewhere, Narayan (1998: 93) argues how feminist critiques of gender 
essentialism through paying attention to the differences among women, must be 
careful no to revert to cultural essentialism that represent them as if they were 
‘natural’, or distinct entities: ‘Instead of seeing the centrality of particular 
values, traditions, or practices as given, we need to trace the historical and 
political processes by which these values, traditions or practices have come to 
be deemed  central constitutive components of a particular culture’ (93).          
In my analysis of the discourse of strictly Orthodox Jewish women in a 
diasporic minority community, I have attempted to apply the same kind of 
approach, and have attested to similar dynamics concerning the way 
traditionalism is characterised by particular appropriations of religious and 
gender ideology. I have similarly shown how in the identity politics of this 
transnational community, feminism is seen as symbolic of secular modernity 
and liberalism. Again historical contexts are important in accounting for these 
processes. As Christel Manning (1999: 32) notes - and I have likewise referred 
to as problematic in the formulation of a Jewish feminism as ethnically defined 
-, in the North American context, maintaining traditional gender norms has 
been a way of safeguarding Jewish identity, whilst embracing feminist norms 
was seen as Americanisation, thus perceived as a threat to the survival of both 
tradition of/and the collectivity.   
At the same time, my research showed that many of my interviewees 
were somewhat ambivalent on the issue of women’s emancipation. The process 
of the changing status of women cannot not have affected traditionalist 
communities. Feminist language is selectively but definitely being appropriated 
in normative discourse, for instance, by claiming that women within the 
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tradition of the collectivity were already always equal or even superior, 
allowing to reject feminism as not only alien, but simply irrelevant to native 
concerns. As Yuval-Davis (1997a: 195) notes, collectivities as a general rule 
are composed of family units, and this is where the conflict with ideologies and 
practices of individualism such as in secular and liberal democracies lies. 
Traditionalist versions of religion furthermore collide with Western and modern 
notions of religion as a matter for the individual, rather than communal and 
belonging to the public sphere (Hawley 1999: 6). Therefore they challenge the 
private/public distinction that is the very foundation of the secular, pluralist and 
‘non-racist’ society. As I have illustrated, the relationship between gender and 
religious identity in the contemporary practice of merely one religious tradition, 
is played out in complex ways. This behoves careful and contextualised 
analysis with attention to the way multiple factors and axes of power and 
differences intersect in complex ways. 
In the case of Judaism for example, as traditionally a communal 
religion, Yuval-Davis (1992b) draws attention to the fact that in classical 
Judaism as such, there was no separation between the ‘private’ and ‘public’ 
spheres within the community. Although strictly speaking women were 
excluded from public forums of religious practice, communal laws embodied in 
halakhah equally applied in the ‘private’ spheres of life. The most significant 
division was that between the communal sphere of the ‘other’, of which the 
gentile state was part. Although historically the general rule was to accept the 
state’s authority and laws, in practice there has been strong resistance to the 
state’s involvement in anything pertaining to the relationship between Jews and 
within the boundaries of the community. After the Enlightenment and the 
founding of modern states and notions of citizenship, as I have shown, Jewish 
identity was reconstructed in terms of a voluntary ‘religious identity’ modelled 
following Christian norms. Jewish identity has consequently been reformulated 
in complex ways in various political, national and ethnic projects. For 
traditionalist Orthodox Jews who continue to abide by the rules of halakhah in 
the communal sense and circumscribing all aspects of everyday life, the 
question how to remain ‘religious’ thus concerns the perpetuation of religious 
practice, cross-cutting the boundaries between public and private which are 
defined in accordance with deeply gendered norms.             
The fact that general feminist scholarship has so far greatly marginalized 
feminist studies in religion, as I observed in chapter one, is therefore not that 
surprising considering its predominantly secular and liberal tenets, and 
considering the context in which feminism has grown in a climate of declining 
religion, the latter considered a bulwark of a patriarchal legacy, circumscribing 
centuries of gender ideology. Whereas a number of Western feminists during 
the first wave of feminist movement were more positive about religion, this 
involved appealing to it in order to ground claims of for instance ontological 
equality between women and men. Radical and cultural feminist versions of 
alternative religion then again, mostly appear to be founded on ideas of 
 TAKING RELIGION SERIOUSLY  
 
 
486
essential differences between the sexes, although hierarchies may be inverted 
and separatism propagated. These kinds of feminist ‘scholarship’ have similarly 
been held as suspect, or doubtful as to their validity for claiming a place within 
the academy. Conversely, postmodern constructionist feminist theories of 
gender have not taken really influenced the feminist study of religion, where as 
I have argued, the notion of essentialism prevails in the conflation of 
confessional and ‘outsider’ boundaries.    
If fundamentalist movements can be characterised by their appeal to 
religious immutable and foundational essences (fundaments), - however these 
may be defined concerning the tradition in question - from a comparative 
perspective, they appear to share remarkable similarities in their conservative 
gender ideologies. For these similarly appeal to dualistic gender essentialisms 
which are in any case diametrically opposed to contemporary feminist liberal 
and ‘third wave’ constructionist perspectives. Although these ‘fundaments’ may 
be mere ‘myths’ (Jansen 1994) from the outsider’s point of view, the problem is 
that myths are the very stuff of which religion is often made of. Attributing a 
foundational status to these (Pinxten 2000) is nothing new in the case of at least 
the Mediterranean religious traditions, whether the emphasis lies on doctrine, 
belief, morality or practice. So the problem that feminist activism and 
scholarship has with ‘religion’ I think, is that simply in many cases – especially 
in the monotheistic Abrahamic traditions – these similarly contain and provide 
deep-rooted essentialist ideas on the essential differences between women and 
men. If religious studies has to start taking gender seriously in order to move 
beyond a ‘God’s eye view’, then feminist scholarship and activism equally must 
start taking religion seriously, both in view of the apparent dangers, and the 
‘empowering’ effects it appears to be having in the identity dynamics for 
increasing numbers of both women and men.                
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